


Fall 2016

Populist radical right parties and the securitization of migration in France

Ashley Middleton

SIT Study Abroad, ashley.middleton@duke.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection

 Part of the [Comparative Politics Commons](#), [European Languages and Societies Commons](#), [Organization Development Commons](#), [Political Theory Commons](#), [Politics and Social Change Commons](#), and the [Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Middleton, Ashley, "Populist radical right parties and the securitization of migration in France" (2016). *Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection*. 2430.

http://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection/2430

This Unpublished Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the SIT Study Abroad at SIT Digital Collections. It has been accepted for inclusion in Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection by an authorized administrator of SIT Digital Collections. For more information, please contact digitalcollections@sit.edu.

Migrants as threats?
Populist radical right parties and the securitization of migration in France

By Ashley Middleton

Fall 2016

SIT Switzerland: International Studies and Multilateral Diplomacy
Gyula Csurgai

Duke University
Public Policy Studies and Political Science

Abstract

This research paper addresses the interrelationship between the securitization of migration and the influence of the French populist radical right party, *Front National* (FN), in promoting anti-migrant claims. By analysing how political actors have played a role in applying security terms to migration in Europe, the paper addresses the different types of socio-political factors that have influenced the anti-migrant sentiment in France. The paper also aims to summarize the role of the media in securitizing migration. Furthermore, the analysis continues with an exploration of French security policy with regard to migration to better understand how FN has benefitted from a public conceptual understanding of migration as a security threat. To develop a comprehensive analysis, this paper incorporates both traditional primary and secondary academic sources as well as field-based interactive research including four face-to-face, formal interviews with academic experts.

Acknowledgements

This project could not have been completed without the encouragement of my parents who have inspired me to maintain a strong work ethic and to complete every task with integrity and humility. I would also like to thank my host family and the SIT office for providing support throughout the process of writing this academic project. Finally, thanks to Dr. Khalid Koser, Dr. Marco Giugni, Dr. Christin Achermann, and Cenni Najy who all helped provide useful insight into the current migration situation and rise of right wing populism in Europe and France.

Table of Contents

Introduction	4
Literature Review.....	5
Research Methodology.....	8
Definitions and the analytical/theoretical framework.....	8
Analysis	10
Defining the securitization of migration: Lessons from the Copenhagen School and 9/11	10
Populism and the extreme-right party.....	14
How media affects securitization of migration and extreme-right parties	18
Securitizing migration in France and Front National’s security policy proposals	21
Conclusion	24
Bibliography.....	25

Introduction

With over a million people irregularly entering Europe in 2015 (well over the 280,000 the year before),¹ the situation has been described as nothing less than a migration ‘crisis.’ The large number of migrants and asylum seekers entering Europe today pose various political questions that are now testing the current interconnected political entity of Europe. Heightened fears and public perceptions of potential terrorist attacks, rising unemployment issues, resource pressures and cultural clashes represent just a few of the concerns that European politicians need to address. Arguably, such a rise in irregular immigration in Europe has influenced the saliency, visibility, and popularity of extreme-right populist parties across Europe. As national elections provide a window of opportunity for political restructuring throughout Europe in which some groups advocate for extreme policy responses to migration, current political actors are delegated with the task of identifying the best way to protect migrants’ and asylum seekers’ inalienable human rights but also address the concerns of part of the national electorate that fears much of what current migration entails. To better understand solutions to this issue, it would be helpful to analyse the theoretical concepts and real-life trends about migration, security and extreme-right populism that might provide insight into how these complex concepts interact.

The main objective of this research paper is to identify the socio-political forces that create an environment in France that allows for anti-migrant claims and sentiments to be made and sustained. Through analysing the key themes of security, migration, extreme right parties, populism, and the media, this paper intends to better understand the interrelationship between the securitization of migration and the influence of the French populist party, *Front National* (FN), in promoting anti-migrant claims.

¹ BBC News. “Why Is EU Struggling with Migrants and Asylum?” *BBC News*. BBC, 3 Mar. 2016. Web. 3 Oct. 2016.

First, the paper details the broadening of the security studies field and defines the securitization of migration based on the seminal work of the Copenhagen School for Security Studies. This paper focuses on the societal aspect of security studies, while the national security threats of potential terrorist attacks largely remains outside the scope of this paper. The central aspects of securitizing migration highlight the framework it provides for politicians and other actors to make anti-migrant claims. Then, the paper addresses the ‘rise’ of populism and the extreme right and how these parties interact with the topic of migration. The concept of issue ownership of migration demonstrates how populist right-wing parties might be legitimized or seen as a valid source of migration policy proposals. The paper then addresses the role of the media as an outlet and an actor in making or supporting anti-migrant claims. Finally, this paper provides an analysis on the way migration has been securitized in France since the 1980s and how the FN specifically has relied on the foundation of migration as a security issue to make anti-migrant claims. This section includes information about how migration in France has been incorporated into French and European security policy and rhetoric by more than just right wing populist parties; it includes a historical description about French security policy that identifies migration as a security threat.

Literature Review

The Copenhagen School for Security Studies, lead by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, has provided the theoretical framework that describes how security studies and policies post-cold war have been reshaped and broadened. Particularly in the work “Security: a new framework for analysis,”² the Copenhagen School describes how migration has been introduced into security

² Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap De. Wilde. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Pub., 1998.

policy and rhetoric. Furthermore, much of the recent literature in security studies points to the affect of the political actions taken after September 11th on how states, citizens and the media all conceptualize migration as a security issue.^{3 4 5 6} Many scholars and experts describe the processes in which politicians through ‘speech acts’ incorporate migration into security terms,^{7 8} while other scholars have focused more on how national or EU policies encompass migration into security policy.^{11 12 13 14}

In terms of populism and the rise of extreme-right political parties in France, the literature addresses the commonalities between different populist parties^{15 16 17 18} and the ways

³ Cesari, Jocelyne. "Securitization of Islam in Europe." *Die Welt Des Islams* 52, no. 3-4 (2012): 430-49. Accessed October 26, 2016. doi:10.1057/9781137121202.0011.

⁴ Karyotis, Georgios. "European Migration Policy In The Aftermath Of September 11." *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research* 20, no. 1 (March 01, 2007): 1-17. Accessed October 26, 2016. doi:10.1080/13511610701197783.

⁵ Taras, Raymond. "Approaching the End Times? The Securitization of Paris-and Beyond." *Harvard International Review*. February 27, 2015. Accessed October 26, 2016.

⁶ Baker-Beall, C. (2009). ‘The Discursive Construction of EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: Writing the ‘Migrant Other’, Securitisation and Control’, *Journal of Contemporary European Research*. 5 (2), pp. 188-206.

⁷ Buzan et. al, *Security*.

⁸ Karyotis, Georgios. "The Fallace of Securitizing Migration: Elite Rationality and Unintended Consequences." In *Security, Insecurity and Migration in Europe*, edited by Gabriella Lazaridis, 13-29. Farnham, UK: Routledge, 2016. Accessed October 27, 2016.

⁹ Togral, Burcu. "Convergence of Securitization of Migration and ‘New Racism’ in Europe: Rise of Culturalism and Disappearance of Politics." In *Security, Insecurity and Migration in Europe*, edited by Gabriella Lazaridis, 219-37. Farnham, UK: Routledge, 2016. Accessed October 27, 2016. ProQuest ebrary.

¹⁰ Giugni, Marco, Ruud Koopmans, Florence Passy, and Paul Statham. "Institutional and Discursive Opportunities for Extreme-Right Mobilization in Five Countries." *Mobilization* 10, no. 1 (2005): 145-62. Accessed October 27, 2016. <http://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:84641>.

¹¹ O’Neill, P.E. "The European Union and Migration: Security versus Identity?" *Defence Studies* 6, no. 3 (September 01, 2006): 322-50. Accessed October 26, 2016. doi:10.1080/14702430601060149.

¹² Marin, Luisa, and Alessandro Spena. "Introduction: The Criminalization of Migration and European (Dis)Integration." *European Journal of Migration and Law* 18, no. 2 (2016): 147-56. Accessed October 26, 2016. doi:10.1163/15718166-12342096.

¹³ Taras, "Approaching the End Times?"

¹⁴ Baker-Beall, "The Discursive Construction of EU"

¹⁵ Wirth, Werner, Frank Esser, Martin Wettstein, Sven Engesser, Dominique Wirz, Anne Schulz, Nicole Ernst, Florin Buchel, Daniele Caramani, Luca Manucci, Marco Steenbergen, Laurent Bernhard, Edward Weber, Regula Hanggli, Caroline Dalmus, and Christian Schemer. *The Appeal of Populist Ideas, Strategies and Styles: A Theoretical Model and Research Design for Analyzing Populist Political Communication*. Swiss National Science Foundation. National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century. May 2016. Accessed November 8, 2016.

¹⁶ Krastev, Ivan. "The Populist Moment." *Eurozine*. September 18, 2007. Accessed November 08, 2016. <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2007-09-18-krastev-en.html>.

¹⁷ Giugni et. al, "Institutional and Discursive Opportunities"

¹⁸ Arzheimer, Kai, and Elisabeth Carter. "Political Opportunity Structures and Right-wing Extremist Party Success." *European Journal of Political Research* 45, no. 3 (2006): 419-43. Accessed November 1, 2016. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00304.x.

that these parties interact with the rest of the political environment.^{19 20 21 22} Much of the discussion about the current situation of populism in France comes from news articles and other news media outlets that highlight the success of Front National and Marine Le Pen in gaining electorate and public support.^{23 24 25 26} *Counterpoint's* quantitative analysis on the extent to which French press framing of issues corresponds to those of Front National also provides a comprehensive study that highlights the role of the media in the rise of Front National.

Many scholars describe the concepts and modern realizations of populism, right-wing extremism, migration, and security, but there seems to be a few published academic research that analyses how exactly the securitization of migration has played a role in the rise of right-wing extremist parties. Much research draws upon how extreme right-wing parties' rhetoric utilizes terms that conceptualize migration within the security realm. However, identifying causal relationships between these phenomena is difficult, if not unreasonable. Most literature seeks to unpack the relationship and interaction between these political forces within the grand scheme of domestic or international politics. Future research could examine the extent to which various

¹⁹ Buzan et. al, *Security*.

²⁰ Wirth et. al, *The Appeal of Populist Ideas*.

²¹ Mudde, C. (2013). Three decades of populist radical right parties in Western Europe: So what? *European Journal of Political Research*, 52(1), 1–19. doi:10.1111/j.1475- 6765.2012.02065.x

²² Minkenberg, Michael. "The Radical Right in Public Office: Agenda-setting and Policy Effects." *West European Politics* 24, no. 4 (October 2001): 1-21. Accessed November 1, 2016. doi:10.1080/01402380108425462.

²³ Banulescu-Bogdan, Natalia, and Elizabeth Collett. "Top 10 of 2015 – Issue #6: Refugee Crisis Deepens Political Polarization in the West." *Migrationpolicy.org*. December 11, 2015. Accessed November 10, 2016. <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/top-10-2015-issue-6-refugee-crisis-deepens-political-polarization-west>.

²⁴ Mount, Ian. "Why Populist Parties Are Booming Across Europe." *Fortune*. April 04, 2016. Accessed November 10, 2016. <http://fortune.com/2016/04/04/populist-parties-europe/>.

²⁵ Vinocur, Nicholas. "Le Pen's Revolt against France's Political Class." *POLITICO*. November 12, 2015. Accessed November 10, 2016. <http://www.politico.eu/article/le-pen-rise-revolt-against-france-political-class-elites-far-right-populism/>.

²⁶ Özerim, Mehmet Gökay. "European Radical Right Parties as Actors in Securitization of Migration." *International Journal of Social, Behavioral, Educational, Economic, Business and Industrial Engineering* 7, no. 8 (2013): 2196-200. Accessed November 14, 2016.

right wing groups in Europe, in the advent of the current migration challenge since 2015, have gained ground and popularity because of the securitization of migration.

Research Methodology

This research project incorporated a variety of sources to develop a comprehensive analysis on all of the political and social factors that influence the rise of populist parties in France. Specifically, this paper relies on primary sources including interviews with experts in the field of security, migration, and populist parties in Europe, and government documents that outline migration and security policy in France. The secondary sources include qualitative analyses on the theories of securitization of migration and the rise of populist and extreme right parties. Other secondary sources include newspaper articles and commentaries regarding the current migration crisis in Europe and the 2017 French presidential race. The main methods of collecting data included online searches through various research journals as well as searches for experts in the fields of study.

In terms of ethical considerations, this paper recognizes that the interviews need to be respectful and professional. Each interviewee was informed of the purpose of the interview, his/her right to remain anonymous, and was ensured that any interview quote to be included in the paper would be sent via email to the interviewee to guarantee the correctness of the quote.

Definitions and the analytical/theoretical framework

This paper relies on the Copenhagen School's characterization of the 'securitization' of migration. The Copenhagen School takes a constructivist approach to the security agenda that analyses how political actors transform 'normal' phenomenon into the security realm, which justifies an emergency response from a government.²⁷ Through this theoretical framework, this

²⁷ Buzan et. al, *Security*.

paper identifies how political actors in France have placed migration onto the national security agenda.

Furthermore, despite the academic difficulties defining populism, this paper establishes a definition of the extreme-right populist party (the term ‘populist radical right party’ is also used) based on other scholars’ identifications of the common theories, ideologies, and claims of these parties. Populist parties are defined as political groups that argue that the people have an unalienable right to sovereignty and that the elite political cohort continually threatens to deny people this right.^{28 29 30 31} Populist radical right parties’ ideology includes elements of nativism,³² ultra nationalism,^{33 34} and ethnocultural pluralism with restrictive definitions of their own society.³⁵ Because of their xenophobic and nationalist ideologies, these populist radical right parties also contribute to much of the anti-migrant rhetoric in various nations.^{36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43}

44

²⁸ Wirth et. al, *The Appeal of Populist Ideas*.

²⁹ Krastev, "The Populist Moment."

³⁰ European Humanist Foundation. *The European Union and the Challenge of Extremism and Populism: How to Protect Democracy and the Rule of Law in Europe?* Report. October 2013. Accessed November 10, 2016.

³¹ Vinocur, "Le Pen's Revolt against France's Political Class."

³² Mudde, C. (2013). "Three decades of populist radical right parties in Western Europe: So what?" *European Journal of Political Research*, 52(1), 1–19. doi:10.1111/j.1475- 6765.2012.02065.x

³³ Minkenberg, "The Radical Right in Public Office."

³⁴ European Humanist Foundation. "*The European Union*"

³⁵ Liang, Christina Schori, ed. *Europe for the Europeans : The Foreign and Security Policy of the Populist Radical Right*. Abingdon, GB: Routledge, 2007. Accessed November 3, 2016. ProQuest ebrary.

³⁶ Banulescu-Bogdan and Collett. " Refugee Crisis Deepens Political Polarization in the West."

³⁷ Özerim, "European Radical Right Parties as Actors in Securitization of Migration."

³⁸ Nilsson, Per-Erik. "'Secular Retaliation': A Case Study of Integralist Populism, Anti-Muslim Discourse, and (II)liberal Discourse on Secularism in Contemporary France." *Politics, Religion & Ideology* 16, no. 1 (February 17, 2015): 87-106. Accessed November 10, 2016. doi:10.1080/21567689.2015.1012160.

³⁹ Taras, "Approaching the End Times?"

⁴⁰ Giugni et. al, "Institutional and Discursive Opportunities."

⁴¹ European Humanist Foundation. "*The European Union*."

⁴² Minkenberg, "The Radical Right in Public Office."

⁴³ Liang, *Europe for the Europeans*.

⁴⁴ Evans, Jocelyn A.J. "'La politique du dehors avec les raisons du dedans': foreign and defence policy of the French Front National." Edited by Christina Schori Liang. *Europe for the Europeans : The Foreign and Security*

Analysis

Defining the securitization of migration: Lessons from the Copenhagen School and 9/11

In a post-Cold War security studies debate, scholars faced a conceptual decision to widen or narrow the definition of security in which the boundaries of security studies would expand beyond topics related to the threat or use of force.⁴⁵ While some scholars argued that a progressive widening would jeopardize the “entire fabric of social and international relations,”⁴⁶ Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde from the Copenhagen School for Security Studies conceptualized security studies in a broader sense. They challenged the traditional method of confining security to military discourse and a rigid understanding of relevant sectors and instead investigated the process and logic of security as it relates to various aspects of daily socio-political life.⁴⁷ According to their framework, instead of relating to traditional concepts of the stability and persistence of a state and its sovereignty, security can relate to any issue that is “presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object” that “justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them.”⁴⁸ Any referent object that is deemed threatened by an existential force legitimizes “actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure” and thus becomes securitized.⁴⁹ It is the ‘speech act,’ or the actual expression of a topic referring to security, that securitizes the referent object.⁵⁰

The Copenhagen Schools’ understanding of security studies includes different sectors that incorporate various part of daily human life: military, political, economic, societal, and

Policy of the Populist Radical Right. 125-138. Abingdon, GB: Routledge, 2007. Accessed November 3, 2016. ProQuest ebrary.

⁴⁵ Buzan et. al, *Security*, 2.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid, 5.

⁴⁸ Ibid, 21.

⁴⁹ Ibid, 24.

⁵⁰ Ibid, 26.

environmental.⁵¹ These sectors serve as a conceptual expansion of security and work to differentiate how all components of a state or region are securitized or merely politicized.⁵² P.E. O'Neill mentions that traditionally the nation-state is the center of security debate, but the Copenhagen School created a new framework that identifies the complex security environment and analyses how different sectors affect each other.⁵³

In this paper, the relevant sector of security as it relates to migration is societal security. According to Buzan et. al, societal security's referent object refers to large-scale collective identities of a society.⁵⁴ These identities naturally evolve and change according to internal and external pressures, but "whether migrants or rival identities are securitized depends upon whether the holders of the collective identity take a relatively closed-minded or relatively open-minded view of how their identity is constituted and maintained."⁵⁵ O'Neill emphasizes that societal security does not depend on whether or not the cause of security threat is real or not, but rather how states and polities react to this debate based on the perceptions of their societies.⁵⁶ Georgios Karyotis similarly posits that any force that threatens the identity of a society "challenges the very existence of a traditional pattern of living" and thus can be conceived as a security threat.⁵⁷ Specifically, the process of securitizing migration includes an understanding that migrants and 'outsiders' pose a threat to the collective cultural identity as they challenge the homogeneity and collectivity of a society. O'Neill describes how states are expected to uphold borders, sovereignty, and a relatively stable national identity, and migration threatens these

⁵¹ Ibid, 7.

⁵² Buzan et. al, *Security*.

⁵³ O'Neill, "The European Union and Migration" 323.

⁵⁴ Buzan et. al, *Security*, 22.

⁵⁵ Ibid, 23.

⁵⁶ O'Neill, "The European Union and Migration," 330.

⁵⁷ Karyotis, "The Fallace of Securitizing Migration," 13.

objectives; migration is viewed through a security lens insofar as it threatens the cultural cohesion and exclusive national identity of a society.⁵⁸

Within a given political space, the role of elite political actors in securitizing migration serves as an essential aspect of analysis for modern security studies.⁵⁹ Karyotis mentions that it is the political elites of Europe “who often see themselves as defenders of national purity and societal security” that aim to place migration within security terms and treat migrants and asylum seekers as a threat to a society’s cultural identity.⁶⁰ This process of defining migrants as threats to collective identity is what securitizes migration. As Raymond Taras describes, it is the “entrenched elites which have been imposing counterproductive and unpopular policies” about restricting migration that solidify the securitization of migration.⁶¹ Anastassia Tsoukala posits that European political elites, who fear a loss of sovereignty due to globalization and Europeanization, place blame on foreigners for social problems, justifying strict immigration policies as a way to protect borders, and uphold a sense of control over collective national identity.⁶² The mainstream political elites, she argues, transmit discourse that describes a reality of national culture that is threatened by outsiders.⁶³ Karyotis describes that elites support the security-migration nexus because they believe they are serving their country’s interests and therefore are justified in their positions towards migrants.⁶⁴ This assumption of serving the country’s interests, however, is unfounded and untrue, according to Karyotis.⁶⁵ When elites place

⁵⁸ O’Neill, “The European Union and Migration,” 325.

⁵⁹ Buzan et. al, *Security*, 36.

⁶⁰ Karyotis, “The Fallace of Securitizing Migration,” 20.

⁶¹ Taras, Raymond. “Approaching the End Times? The Securitization of Paris-and Beyond.” *Harvard International Review*. February 27, 2015. Accessed October 26, 2016.

⁶² Tsoukala, Anastassia. “Turning Immigrants into Security Threats: A Multi-faceted Process.” In *Research in Migration and Ethnic Relations Series: Security, Insecurity and Migration in Europe*, edited by Gabriella Lazaridis, 180. Farnham, UK: Routledge, 2016. Accessed October 27, 2016.

⁶³ *Ibid*, 192.

⁶⁴ Karyotis, “The Fallace of Securitizing Migration,” 19.

⁶⁵ *Ibid*, 23.

migration within the security framework of the nation, they create a society that “lives in permanent fear from the real or perceived threats” and “exacerbates negative effects on societal homogeneity and harmony through its distractive unintended consequences.”⁶⁶ Securitizing migration, he argues, is not a conducive way to manage migration; it prevents elites from working effectively and promoting the nuances of labor needs for migration because “the distinctions between ‘desirable’ economic migrants, asylum seekers and irregular migrations become muddled in the public mind.”⁶⁷ What follows is a construction of national security from the bottom-up instead of top-down, which can constrain political action and choices for policy nuances.⁶⁸

Furthermore, within the literature about security studies, many scholars point to the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 as a pivotal moment that reinforced the way nations address migration within a modern security framework. Jocelyne Cesari describes how the ‘War on Terror’ regards Islam as an existential threat that necessitates an emergency political response outside the bounds of regular action.⁶⁹ The legal responses to terrorism after September 11th, have led to serious limitations on Islamic religious practices.⁷⁰ As Christopher Baker Beall describes, post-9/11 policy responses of strengthening borders and increasing surveillance personified a meta-narrative of ‘control’ in which a “discursive link between the danger/risk/threat of terrorism and migration, asylum and border control” was emphasized.⁷¹ Karyotis characterizes the period as inextricably linking migration to security as “it became almost unthinkable to refer to the fight against terrorism without special reference to the threats

⁶⁶ Karyotis, "The Fallace of Securitizing Migration," 23.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Cesari, "Securitization of Islam in Europe," 430.

⁷⁰ Ibid, 432.

⁷¹ Baker-Beall, C. (2009). ‘The Discursive Construction of EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: Writing the ‘Migrant Other’, Securitisation and Control’, *Journal of Contemporary European Research*. 5 (2), pp. 196.

posed by migration.”⁷² He argues that the attacks of September 11 did not necessarily catalyze the uncertainties and issues of security with regard to migration policy, “rather they accelerated dynamics that were already deeply rooted in the emerging European internal security regime.”⁷³

Whether or not the basis for securitizing migration is valid or justified, politicians and citizens must be aware of how securitizing the natural phenomenon affects the lives of migrants and is problematic for general politics. As Karyotis describes, the securitization of migration highlights how citizens and politicians of a nation claim that “*our* security justifies limitations to *their* rights” which legitimizes restrictive policies against migrants of specific religious or ethnic backgrounds.⁷⁴ The securitization of migration not only interferes with European values of equality, human rights, and legal obligations to asylum seekers, but also distracts policy makers from real issues of migration management policies.⁷⁵ Dr. Khalid Koser, of the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund, describes that while politicians are faced with challenges of migration and public concerns that come along with failure to integrate, labor competition, and environmental damage, there exist risks to securitizing migration (i.e. the government legitimizing extraordinary responses).⁷⁶ “Politicians should be able to say that national security is paramount,” he argues, but still the main goal is to “manage migration to maximize it.”⁷⁷

Populism and the extreme-right party

Populist radical right parties for many years have relied upon xenophobic, nationalist, and popular sovereignty ideologies to gain support and make claims that reject the social inclusion of

⁷² Karyotis. "European Migration Policy, 6.

⁷³ Karyotis. "European Migration Policy, 13.

⁷⁴ Karyotis, "The Fallace of Securitizing Migration," 16.

⁷⁵ Karyotis, "European Migration Policy," 12.

⁷⁶ Koser, Khalid. Interview by Ashley Middleton. Personal Interview. Geneva, 27 October 2016.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

migrants or regard migrants as security threats. These parties utilize “enforcement-laden language” to demonstrate control over the national migration situation that many see as ungoverned.⁷⁸ While there exist many different political actors that contribute to the securitization of migration, populist radical right parties especially play a key role in promoting rhetoric that capitalizes on the public anxieties towards migrants and places migration within a national security context to protect original national values.⁷⁹ These groups present “immediate and demagogical solutions to people’s day to day problems”⁸⁰ that rely upon a belief that international migration has posed a significant threat to the society’s traditional culture and safety.⁸¹ Specifically with the case of the France, the primacy of French culture and sense of ethno-cultural superiority has meant that many French people aim to protect their culture from internal and external foreign threats, especially that of migrants.⁸² Cenni Najy characterizes that “the extreme right is focused on the preservation of a set of identities... which they think are threatened by globalization.”⁸³ As Christin Achermann posits, one of the major issues in the case of France is the religious aspect that plays a role in barriers to inclusion.⁸⁴ Achermann describes how Muslims in France are often portrayed as being menaces to society and how certain political parties work towards stigmatizing immigrants of Muslim origins.⁸⁵ When populist radical right parties draw upon realities and legitimate issues to advance solutions that counteract ideals of inclusion and universalism, there remains an overwhelming sense of social exclusion and ‘otherness.’

⁷⁸ Banulescu-Bogdan and Collett. " Refugee Crisis Deepens Political Polarization in the West."

⁷⁹ Özerim, "European Radical Right Parties as Actors in Securitization of Migration," 2198.

⁸⁰ European Humanist Foundation. "*The European Union*," 2.

⁸¹ Liang, *Europe for the Europeans*, 18.

⁸² Evans, "La politique du dehors," 129.

⁸³ Najy, Cenni. Interview by Ashley Middleton. Personal Interview. Geneva, 16 November 16.

⁸⁴ Achermann, Christin. Interview by Ashley Middleton. Personal Interview. Neuchatel, 15 November 2016.

⁸⁵ Achermann, Christin. Interview by Ashley Middleton.

While states continue to experience populist movements that aim to re-imagine the current political system, the current phase of populism in Europe has been characterized as a rise of democratic illiberalism. Populist democratic movements are illiberal insofar as they advocate for a government run by the people, reject representative democracy claiming that elite politicians are unreliable and corrupt, and oppose a heterogeneous acknowledgement of the populace.⁸⁶ As defined by Ivan Krastev, the populist movement is in fact the rise of democratic illiberalism not so much because these movements aim to abolish democracy, but rather because they oppose the “representative nature of modern democracies, the protection of the rights of minorities and the constraints to the sovereignty of the people.”⁸⁷ The discourse that political elites are corrupt combined with the situation in which “European elites secretly dream of a system that will deprive irresponsible voters of the power to undermine rational politics” exacerbates the deep-seeded mistrust and failure of communication between the two groups.⁸⁸

What provides populist radical right parties much of their rationalization for anti-migrant claims depends on the citizenship regimes of the relevant country.⁸⁹ According to Giugni et. al, the citizenship regime of a nation refers to “prevailing conceptions and shared understandings of the criteria of membership in a nation, [which] provide[s] a framework for explaining the varying impact of challenging groups that mobilize in the field of immigration.”⁹⁰ France’s civic assimilationist approach suggests that the nation has a tendency to impose republican values on migrants⁹¹ and expect migrants to conform to French culture, rejecting some of their unique

⁸⁶ Wirth et. al, *The Appeal of Populist Ideas*, 16.

⁸⁷ Krastev, "The Populist Moment."

⁸⁸ Krastev, "The Populist Moment."

⁸⁹ Özerim, "European Radical Right Parties as Actors in Securitization of Migration."

⁹⁰ Giugni, Marco, and Florence Passy. "Influencing Migration Policy from the Outside: The Impact of Migrant, Extreme-Right, and Solidarity Movements." *Dialogues on Migration Policy*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006: 194. Accessed November 10, 2016.

⁹¹ *Ibid*, 196.

traditions. The French citizenship regime provides a ‘discursive opportunity’ for populist radical right parties to make anti-migrant claims as these remarks “resonate with the legitimate ethnocultural conception of citizenship and national identity.”⁹² Based on the ideology of the extreme right populist parties, if a migrant does not conform to an imposed set of norms, (s)he is rejected from being a ‘true’ French citizen and the way to reject her/him from society is to prevent her/him from coming to France in the first place. It is a restricted model of citizenship in France that helps establish a favorable environment for populist radical right parties to make anti-migrant claims.

Populist radical right parties cannot be examined without taking into consideration the political institutional opportunities, interactions with other established political actors, and a sense of issue ownership with regards to migration that allow a populist radical right party to be successful. Giugni et. al define the political institutional opportunity for radical right claims-making partly as a function of the political space of the right⁹³; if there exists no other party on the right, then there is ample space for a new populist party or old party with renewed populist discourse to fill the void.⁹⁴ Arzheimer and Carter similarly attribute the success of a party not from the actual political actor, but because of the general political structures (including: the electoral system, ideological position of competitors in the party system, and levels of immigration and unemployment)⁹⁵ that produce opportunities for groups to accumulate electoral or ideological support.⁹⁶ Furthermore, according to Minkenberg, policy outcomes result from pathway dependencies of other political parties’ actions in the policy making process.⁹⁷

⁹² Giugni et. al, "Institutional and Discursive Opportunities," 190.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Giugni, Marco. Interview by Ashley Middleton. Personal Interview. Geneva, 02 November 2016.

⁹⁵ Arzheimer, and Carter, "Political Opportunity Structures," 423-5.

⁹⁶ Ibid, 422.

⁹⁷ Minkenberg, "The Radical Right in Public Office," 6.

Specifically in France, “a longtime consensus on immigration was undermined by the very different manner in which the established parties handled the FN at the electoral level.”⁹⁸

Populist radical right parties influenced mainstream parties by presenting electoral competition and thus necessitating mainstream groups to shift towards more populist and nativist tendencies with regard to migration policy.⁹⁹¹⁰⁰ Mudde contends that the actions of mainstream groups in the past laid the foundation for much of the migration-security policy nexus as they implemented migration management policies that conceptualized (either overtly or subtly) as related to national security issues.¹⁰¹ Taras uniquely problematizes the situation and identifies European political elites who “impose counterproductive and unpopular policies adversely affecting Muslims and nativists alike that contribute to interethnic tensions” rather than the populist radical right anti-migration rhetoric.¹⁰² Finally, it is the sense of issue ownership that can oftentimes legitimizes radical right anti-migration policies in the eyes of the electorate. As Giugni mentions, the parties that are known for dealing with certain issues oftentimes are seen as legitimate sources of policy recommendations for the electorate,¹⁰³ and in the case of migration, the populist radical right parties are often known for maintaining this issue as one of their hallmark identifiers.

How media affects securitization of migration and extreme-right parties

Media outlets serve as essential sources for political news and commentary, liaisons between politicians and citizens, and framers of different political situations. Media serves not

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Mudde, “Three decades of populist radical right parties,” 8.

¹⁰⁰ Banulescu-Bogdan and Collett. " Refugee Crisis Deepens Political Polarization in the West."

¹⁰¹ Mudde, “Three decades of populist radical right parties,” 11.

¹⁰² Taras, "Approaching the End Times?"

¹⁰³ Giugni, Marco. Interview by Ashley Middleton.

only as a “self-interested actor,” but also as a “facilitating infrastructure”¹⁰⁴ that can serve as a “vehicle for certain discourse.”¹⁰⁵ An outlet’s political orientation can shape how populist right wing parties, populist rhetoric, and migrants are represented and constructed in the public conscious.¹⁰⁶ Whether or not the source presents information in an intentionally biased way, the outlet still transports images and framings that in turn have an effect on the way migrants are represented.¹⁰⁷ As Anastassia Tsoukala explains, the ways that migrants are represented in the media can contribute to the validation of some of the populist radical right’s anti-migrant policy proposals and rhetoric.¹⁰⁸ Koser mentions that the effectiveness of the right wing parties to utilize the media has influenced how citizens conceptualize migration in security terms.¹⁰⁹ During the 1980s and 1990s in French media outlets, Muslim migrants were represented as dangerous threats to French secular democracy and harmful to domestic economies.¹¹⁰ In the late 2000s, immigrants were seen as vital components to national economy, but it was “assumed that their presence on the territory [was] tolerated as long as, and to the extent that, they [were] deemed necessary to cover domestic need.”¹¹¹ News stories that present an account of overwhelming numbers of migrants, migrants committing crimes, and stories that lack nuance create situations in which stereotypes and general fears are bred in the public mind.

With regard to the Front National specifically, there exists an interesting and “paradoxical”¹¹² relationship between the party and the media outlets that cover their issues. The

¹⁰⁴ Wirth et. al, *The Appeal of Populist Ideas*, 26.

¹⁰⁵ Giugni, Marco. Interview by Ashley Middleton.

¹⁰⁶ Tsoukala, "Turning Immigrants into Security Threats," 187.

¹⁰⁷ Achermann, Christin. Interview by Ashley Middleton.

¹⁰⁸ Tsoukala, "Turning Immigrants into Security Threats," 180.

¹⁰⁹ Koser, Khalid. Interview by Ashley Middleton.

¹¹⁰ Tsoukala, "Turning Immigrants into Security Threats," 181, 183.

¹¹¹ Ibid, 185.

¹¹² Hobeika, Alexandre and Gael Villeneuve. “National Front themes and the agenda of the French press (2006 – 2013). Compiled by Counterpoint. *Shaping the Vote? Populism and Politics in the Media*. Counterpoint. 57. Accessed October 31, 2016.

press aims to cover stories that the general public takes interest in, oftentimes the same topics proclaimed by the FN, which inadvertently legitimizes some of the party's rhetoric.¹¹³ Although journalists and reporters oftentimes intend to oppose the rhetoric presented by the FN, the press still covers much of the same topics that the FN has issue ownership over: "insecurity, Islam, immigration and political weakness."^{114 115} As the press continues to highlight FN policies and the party in general, the more important these issues seem in the readership populations,¹¹⁶ the more the FN becomes accessible in voters' minds, and the more likely they are to be considered as an option when voting.¹¹⁷ As Bos et. al outline in their research analysis on media coverage of right wing populist parties, media coverage has a small yet noticeable effect on party support in terms of discourse on migration regardless of if the party was mentioned.¹¹⁸ Hobeika and Villeneuve characterize the situation in a more dramatic stance: "far right rhetoric on security has invaded discussion on immigration and security, and drives the actions of policy-makers and leaders."¹¹⁹ To them, the media justifies the presence of migration and security on the national agenda as "minor incidences are dramatized" and commentaries and criticisms overwhelm a "context of relative safety and stable immigration."¹²⁰

¹¹³ Cassely, Jean-Laurent. "Can Social Experience Play into the Hands of the Front National?" Compiled by Counterpoint. *Shaping the Vote? Populism and Politics in the Media*, September 2014, 53. Accessed October 31, 2016.

¹¹⁴ Hobeika and Villeneuve, "National Front themes," 57.

¹¹⁵ Cassely, "Can Social Experience," 53.

¹¹⁶ Hobeika and Villeneuve, "National Front themes," 57.

¹¹⁷ Bos, Linda, Jonas Lefevere, Roos Thijssen, and Penelope H. Sheets. "The Impact of Media Coverage on Right-wing Populist Parties: The Role of Issue Ownership." *Amsterdam School of Communication Research*, 6. 2014.

¹¹⁸ Bos et. al, "The Impact of Media Coverage," 21.

¹¹⁹ Hobeika and Villeneuve, "National Front themes," 86.

¹²⁰ Hobeika and Villeneuve, "National Front themes," 86.

Securitizing migration in France and Front National's security policy proposals

Since the 1980s, migration in Europe has been regarded as a national and international security issue, formalized in national and European Union level security policies and agreements. Although post World War II migration was regarded as essential for economic reconstruction of collapsed European economies, the oil crisis in the mid 1970s increased unemployment rates and led to restrictive migration policies as migrants were seen as foreign competitors in the national labor markets.¹²¹ The 1980s and beyond were dominated by a 'Europeanization' of internal security policies as European agreements like the Maastricht Treaty, Amsterdam Treaty, Single European Act, the Ad Hoc Group on Asylum and Immigration, the Schengen Treaty, and Europol became formalized.¹²² Burcu Togral defines what was once "seen as an innocent economic activity, blessed with a vital role in the construction of European economies after World War Two, welcomed and encouraged by European states," migration now came to be a security matter that threatened European states and was frequently associated with "criminality, socio-economic problems, cultural deprivation, and lately to terrorism."¹²³ At the same time, there was an 'externalization of security threats,'¹²⁴ as a meta-narrative of the immigrant 'other' and potential threat to European identity was formalized in European internal security policy.¹²⁵ Strengthening the visa and asylum policies demonstrated the EU's hard legal power in essentially emphasizing security concerns over the rights of migrants.¹²⁶ European emphasis on border control and maintenance of 'acceptable' flows of people to the region demonstrate how

¹²¹ Karyotis. "European Migration Policy, 4.

¹²² Ibid, 5.

¹²³ Togral, "Convergence of Securitization of Migration," 219.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Baker-Beall, 'The Discursive Construction,' 194.

¹²⁶ O'Neill, "The European Union and Migration," 337.

the European polity stressed the permanent cultural integrity of the region and in turn regarded migrants as threats.

When looking specifically at the policy standpoints of the FN, it becomes evident that the group maintains overtly critical ideologies about migrants and the threats to French cultural Exceptionalism. Jocelyn Evans provides a helpful description of FN foreign and domestic policies from the mid-2000s under the leadership of Jean Marie Le Pen that highlight the party's concern over economic and strategic strength but more importantly "the primacy of identity."¹²⁷ FN's policy platform proposes a movement towards the predominance of France and French decisions in Western development, protectionism of French cultural identity which is under threat from internal and external forces, national isolationism as globalization has jeopardized French identity, post-colonial imperialism to continue to exploit geopolitical opportunities to benefit France, and finally policy pragmatism that opposes the proposals of mainstream political parties.¹²⁸ More recently, Marine Le Pen has led the FN movement as the party aims to secure the 2017 French Presidential election. Vinocur describes Le Pen's leadership as "riding a revolt against a political class that voters view as ever more detached, arrogant and powerless."¹²⁹ Based on the FN's 2012 policy manifesto, the policy priorities of the FN include a reduction in legal immigration to France (from 200,000 a year to 10,000), a ban on immigration rights to join a relative legally residing in France, the end of Schengen Area Agreement and a reinstatement of border checks, more stringent requirements to obtain French citizenship forcing applicants to exhibit a commitment to France, a priority to French citizens over foreigners for jobs, and a banning of dual nationality for non-Europeans which effectively targets citizens of former

¹²⁷ Evans, "La politique du dehors," 128.

¹²⁸ Evans, "La politique du dehors," 129-30.

¹²⁹ Vinocur, "Le Pen's Revolt against France's Political Class."

French colonies in Africa.^{130 131} Such an emphasis on restricting migration points toward an importance of the preservation of national identity which justifies, in the eyes of the FN and its supporters, all necessary measures required to uphold said identity. These include banning migrants and implementing structural barriers and difficulties for them to reside in France and become French citizens. The FN's anti-migration claims also seem to be based on a rejection of the traditions, cultures, values, and languages that vary from what some consider a 'true' French identity. These external threats to the homogenous and exceptional French society place the migrant within a framework that labels him/her a security threat.

Making these anti-migration claims, the FN relies upon the history of securitization of migration in France and Europe and at the same time perpetuates the securitization of migration. Because political actors of the past began to identify and apply security terms to migrants, it provided a constructed discourse and rhetorical framework for the FN to later build upon and exploit the justifications for identifying migrants as security threats. The FN's current policy proposals and strong anti-migrant rhetoric is somewhat an unintended consequence of the initial characterization of migrants as national security threats. Whether or not the inclusion of migrants actually jeopardizes French society, the public belief that it does gives the FN a receptive audience to the anti-migrant claims that are made. Furthermore, one can characterize the FN's rhetoric in the French policy arena as promoting the securitization of migration as the party continually and unabashedly identifies migrants for what it sees as negative transformations of French cultural cohesion today.

¹³⁰ France 24. "What Does France's National Front Stand For?" France 24. May 28, 2014. Accessed November 16, 2016. <http://www.france24.com/en/20140528-france-national-front-policy-eu/>.

¹³¹ Le Front National. *Notre Projet: Programme Politique Du Front National*. 2012. Autorité de l'Etat Avenir de la Nation Politique étrangère Redressement économique et social Refondation républicaine.

Conclusion

This paper has outlined the interrelationship between the securitization of migration and the rise of populist right wing parties, namely the Front National in France. The paper outlined the process of applying security terms to migration including the leading political actors and the ways that these parties conceptualize migrants as societal security threats. Through defining the ideologies of populist extreme-right parties, this paper also addressed the primacy of identity as a key reason why migrants are perceived as threats and why these political parties advocates for more restrictive migration policies. The paper's main outcome aimed to delineate the process in which the FN relies on a history and rhetorical framework of securitization of migration to successfully make the anti-migrant claims that epitomize the party's main policy platform.

Within the larger European context, the rising populist political movement reveals the frustrations and skepticism of the political strength and control that the European Union has over continental issues like migration.¹³² The current success of populist parties across Europe could have tremendous consequences for the future of the EU as many of these Eurosceptic parties call for a major reformation of the organization to better manage migration for the region. Finally, for an extension of research, it would be interesting to create an analytical comparison between the migration situation and the rise of right wing populism in France to that of the situation in the United States under the presidency of Donald Trump.

¹³² Mount, Ian. "Why Populist Parties Are Booming Across Europe."

Bibliography

- Achermann, Christin. Interview by Ashley Middleton. Personal Interview. Neuchatel, 15 November 2016.
- Arzheimer, Kai, and Elisabeth Carter. "Political Opportunity Structures and Right-wing Extremist Party Success." *European Journal of Political Research* 45, no. 3 (2006): 419-43. Accessed November 1, 2016. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00304.x.
- Baker-Beall, C. (2009). 'The Discursive Construction of EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: Writing the 'Migrant Other', Securitisation and Control', *Journal of Contemporary European Research*. 5 (2), pp. 188-206.
- Banulescu-Bogdan, Natalia, and Elizabeth Collett. "Top 10 of 2015 – Issue #6: Refugee Crisis Deepens Political Polarization in the West." *Migrationpolicy.org*. December 11, 2015. Accessed November 10, 2016. <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/top-10-2015-issue-6-refugee-crisis-deepens-political-polarization-west>.
- BBC News. "Why Is EU Struggling with Migrants and Asylum?" *BBC News*. BBC, 3 Mar. 2016. Web. 3 Oct. 2016.
- Bos, Linda, Jonas Lefevere, Roos Thijssen, and Penelope H. Sheets. "The Impact of Media Coverage on Right-wing Populist Parties: The Role of Issue Ownership." *Amsterdam School of Communication Research*, 2014.
- Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap De. Wilde. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Pub., 1998.

Cassely, Jean-Laurent. "Can Social Experience Play into the Hands of the Front National?"

Compiled by Counterpoint. *Shaping the Vote? Populism and Politics in the Media*, September 2014, 51-54. Accessed October 31, 2016.

Cesari, Jocelyne. "Securitization of Islam in Europe." *Die Welt Des Islams* 52, no. 3-4 (2012): 430-49. Accessed October 26, 2016. doi:10.1057/9781137121202.0011.

European Humanist Foundation. *The European Union and the Challenge of Extremism and Populism: How to Protect Democracy and the Rule of Law in Europe?* Report. October 2013. Accessed November 10, 2016.

Evans, Jocelyn A.J. "‘La politique du dehors avec les raisons du dedans’: foreign and defence policy of the French Front National." Edited by Christina Schori Liang. *Europe for the Europeans : The Foreign and Security Policy of the Populist Radical Right*. Abingdon, GB: Routledge, 2007: 125-138. Accessed November 3, 2016. ProQuest ebrary.

France 24. "What Does France’s National Front Stand For?" France 24. May 28, 2014. Accessed November 16, 2016. <http://www.france24.com/en/20140528-france-national-front-policy-eu/>.

France. Présidence De La République. Ministry of Defence. April 29, 2013. Accessed November 08, 2016.

Giugni, Marco, and Florence Passy. "Influencing Migration Policy from the Outside: The Impact of Migrant, Extreme-Right, and Solidarity Movements." *Dialogues on Migration Policy*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006. Accessed November 1, 2016. ProQuest ebrary.

Giugni, Marco. Interview by Ashley Middleton. Personal Interview. Geneva, 02 November 2016.

- Giugni, Marco, Ruud Koopmans, Florence Passy, and Paul Statham. "Institutional and Discursive Opportunities for Extreme-Right Mobilization in Five Countries." *Mobilization* 10, no. 1 (2005): 145-62. Accessed October 27, 2016. <http://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:84641>.
- Hobeika, Alexandre and Gael Villeneuve. "National Front themes and the agenda of the French press (2006 – 2013). Compiled by Counterpoint. *Shaping the Vote? Populism and Politics in the Media*. Counterpoint. 55-88. Accessed October 31, 2016.
- Karyotis, Georgios. "European Migration Policy In The Aftermath Of September 11." *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research* 20, no. 1 (March 01, 2007): 1-17. Accessed October 26, 2016. doi:10.1080/13511610701197783.
- Karyotis, Georgios. "The Fallace of Securitizing Migration: Elite Rationality and Unintended Consequences." In *Security, Insecurity and Migration in Europe*, edited by Gabriella Lazaridis, 13-29. Farnham, UK: Routledge, 2016. Accessed October 27, 2016.
- Koser, Khalid. Interview by Ashley Middleton. Personal Interview. Geneva, 27 October 2016.
- Krastev, Ivan. "The Populist Moment." *Eurozine*. September 18, 2007. Accessed November 08, 2016. <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2007-09-18-krastev-en.html>.
- Le Front National. *Notre Project: Programme Politique Du Front National*. 2012. Autorité de l'Etat Avenir de la Nation Politique étrangère Redressement économique et social Refondation républicaine.
- Liang, Christina Schori, ed. *Europe for the Europeans : The Foreign and Security Policy of the Populist Radical Right*. Abingdon, GB: Routledge, 2007. Accessed November 3, 2016. ProQuest ebrary.

- Marin, Luisa, and Alessandro Spena. "Introduction: The Criminalization of Migration and European (Dis)Integration." *European Journal of Migration and Law* 18, no. 2 (2016): 147-56. Accessed October 26, 2016. doi:10.1163/15718166-12342096.
- Minkenberg, Michael. "The Radical Right in Public Office: Agenda-setting and Policy Effects." *West European Politics* 24, no. 4 (October 2001): 1-21. Accessed November 1, 2016. doi:10.1080/01402380108425462.
- Mount, Ian. "Why Populist Parties Are Booming Across Europe." *Fortune*. April 04, 2016. Accessed November 10, 2016. <http://fortune.com/2016/04/04/populist-parties-europe/>.
- Mudde, C. (2013). "Three decades of populist radical right parties in Western Europe: So what?" *European Journal of Political Research*, 52(1), 1–19. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2012.02065.x
- Najy, Cenni. Interview by Ashley Middleton. Personal Interview. Geneva, 16 November 16.
- News Wires. "UN Refugee Chief Warns of Worrying 'climate of Xenophobia' in Europe." *France 24*. June 19, 2016. Accessed November 10, 2016. <http://www.france24.com/en/20160619-un-refugee-chief-warns-worrying-climate-xenophobia-europe>.
- Nilsson, Per-Erik. "'Secular Retaliation': A Case Study of Integralist Populism, Anti-Muslim Discourse, and (Il)liberal Discourse on Secularism in Contemporary France." *Politics, Religion & Ideology* 16, no. 1 (February 17, 2015): 87-106. Accessed November 10, 2016. doi:10.1080/21567689.2015.1012160.
- O'Neill, P.E. "The European Union and Migration: Security versus Identity?" *Defence Studies* 6, no. 3 (September 01, 2006): 322-50. Accessed October 26, 2016. doi:10.1080/14702430601060149.

- Özerim, Mehmet Gökay. "European Radical Right Parties as Actors in Securitization of Migration." *International Journal of Social, Behavioral, Educational, Economic, Business and Industrial Engineering* 7, no. 8 (2013): 2196-200. Accessed November 14, 2016.
- Taras, Raymond. "Approaching the End Times? The Securitization of Paris-and Beyond." *Harvard International Review*. February 27, 2015. Accessed October 26, 2016.
- Togral, Burcu. "Convergence of Securitization of Migration and 'New Racism' in Europe: Rise of Culturalism and Disappearance of Politics." In *Security, Insecurity and Migration in Europe*, edited by Gabriella Lazaridis, 219-37. Farnham, UK: Routledge, 2016. Accessed October 27, 2016. ProQuest ebrary.
- Tsoukala, Anastassia. "Turning Immigrants into Security Threats: A Multi-faceted Process." In *Research in Migration and Ethnic Relations Series: Security, Insecurity and Migration in Europe*, edited by Gabriella Lazaridis, 179-193. Farnham, UK: Routledge, 2016. Accessed October 27, 2016.
- Vinocur, Nicholas. "Le Pen's Revolt against France's Political Class." *POLITICO*. November 12, 2015. Accessed November 10, 2016. <http://www.politico.eu/article/le-pen-rise-revolt-against-france-political-class-elites-far-right-populism/>.
- Wirth, Werner, Frank Esser, Martin Wettstein, Sven Engesser, Dominique Wirz, Anne Schulz, Nicole Ernst, Florin Buchel, Daniele Caramani, Luca Manucci, Marco Steenbergen, Laurent Bernhard, Edward Weber, Regula Hanggli, Caroline Dalmus, and Christian Schemer. *The Appeal of Populist Ideas, Strategies and Styles: A Theoretical Model and Research Design for Analyzing Populist Political Communication*. Swiss National

Science Foundation. National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century. May 2016. Accessed November 8, 2016.