

Fall 2016

Demise From Within: Factionalism in Maoist Parliamentary Politics in Nepal

Jehdeiah Mixon

SIT Study Abroad, jmixon@colgate.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection

 Part of the [Asian Studies Commons](#), [Other Political Science Commons](#), and the [Politics and Social Change Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Mixon, Jehdeiah, "Demise From Within: Factionalism in Maoist Parliamentary Politics in Nepal" (2016). *Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection*. 2503.

http://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection/2503

This Unpublished Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the SIT Study Abroad at SIT Digital Collections. It has been accepted for inclusion in Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection by an authorized administrator of SIT Digital Collections. For more information, please contact digitalcollections@sit.edu.

Demise From Within: Factionalism in Maoist Parliamentary Politics in Nepal

Jehdeiah Mixon
Academic Director: Daniel Putnam
Advisor: Ganga B. Thapa, Ph.D.

Colgate University
Sociology

South Asia, Nepal, Central Development Region, Kathmandu
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for Nepal: Development and Social
Change, SIT Study Abroad

Fall 2016

ABSTRACT Over the last decade, the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoists Center (CPN-Maoist Center) has suffered from fragmentation. Currently led by Prime Minister and chairman Prachanda, tensions within the CPN-Maoist Center have resulted in former CPN-Maoist Center chairman Mohan Baidya splitting with the party in 2012, followed by former Prime Minister Dr. Baburam Bhattarai in 2015. Prachanda, Baidya and Bhattarai, who are credited for igniting the Maoist People's War (1996-2006), now lead three separate political factions within parliament. Standard explanations for the splits point to ideological differences as the basis of the splits, due to the CPN-Maoist Center's history of factionalism along ideological lines. This study investigates the conditions which led to the splits between Maoist War leaders Prachanda, Bhattarai and Baidya, examining the extent of which these splits are a product of ideological differences.

KEYWORDS: Maoist • political parties • factionalism

For the Immortal Martyrs of the People's War

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank Dr. Ganga Thapa for his guidance and mentorship throughout this process.

To Bimala Dahal, Rakshya Dahal, Rabindra Dahal and Shreya Dahal, thank you for welcoming me into your home with open arms and filling my days with joy and laughter.

My thanks to Dan-ji for his continued support throughout the development of my research topic. I would also like to thank Mina-ji and Sanjib-ji for their help with translation.

Thank you to all those who donated their time, energy and insight for this study.

Table of Contents

Introduction5
Methodology	1 7
Research Findings21
Discussion/Analysis	32
Conclusion	34
Glossary of Terms36
Appendices37
Bibliography	41
List of interviews	42

Introduction

The Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist Center (CPN-Maoist Center) has a turbulent history of internal party conflict. Led by Prime Minister and chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal (better known by his *nom de guerre* “Prachanda”), the CPN-Maoist Center has suffered a series of party fractures, with a number of academics attributing the party’s division to ideological differences amongst leaders. In 2015, former Prime Minister Dr. Baburam Bhattarai¹ (2011-2013) split with the CPN-Maoist Center, to form his own political party, Naya Shakti Nepal (NSN) (which translates to “New Power Nepal”) (Himalayan Times 2015a; Agence France-Presse 2016). Before Bhattarai, former CPN-Maoist Center senior vice chairman Mohan Pokharel Baidya (*nom de guerre* “Kiran”) left the party in 2012, forming the Communist Party of Nepal-Revolutionary Maoist (CPN-Revolutionary Maoist) (Aashar 2012). Prachanda, Bhattarai and Baidya, who are credited with launching the Maoist People’s War² against the Parliamentary Democracy in 1996, now all stand divided (Dixit 2012). Owing to these splits, the CPN-Maoist Center has suffered major setbacks in national politics, losing the government majority in the 2014 Constituent Assembly elections, reducing the party’s national standing to third and weakening the party structurally (Upadhyay 2014).

The CPN-Maoist Center has had many vital successes as a party. In 2006, ten years after launching the People’s War, under the military leadership of Prachanda and the guidance of communist ideologues Bhattarai and Baidya, the CPN-Maoist

¹ After the formation of Naya Shakti Nepal, Bhattarai publicly renounced his *nom de guerre*, “Laaldhwoj” (which translates to “carrier of red flag”) (Himalayan Times 2016c).

² The People’s War was fought from 1996 to 2006 (Basnett 2009).

Center—formally known then as the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-Maoist)—was successfully able to end the the 240-year-old Hindu monarchy (British Broadcasting Corporation 2013; Upadhyay 2014; Himalayan Times 2016a). Thereafter, parliament declared Nepal to be a federal democratic republic (Thapa and Sharma 2009). Subsequently, during the post-war elections of 2008 the CPN-Maoist Center was able to garner the majority vote from the public, winning 120 out of 240 (first-past-the-post) parliamentary seats, thus assuming power (Agence France-Presse 2016; Election Commission of Nepal 2008). Despite this outcome, the CPN-Maoist Center has been unsuccessful in altering the historical relations of multi-layered oppression in Nepal—the motive force behind the decade long war—with former CPN-Maoist Center leaders Bhattarai and Baidya, establishing new political forces (Dahal 2008).

Since the signing of the peace accord between the Maoists and government in 2006, the future state of the Maoist movement and the nation-state of Nepal, has troubled a number of academics and policymakers alike. Given the historical denouncements from Maoist communist parties in Nepal, the standard explanation for why Bhattarai and Baidya split with the Prachanda-led CPN-Maoist Center is largely attributed to ideological differences between the leaders (Sharma 2016; Thapa 2003). However, both Bhattarai and Baidya are known as the ideologues of the party, with all three leaders sharing a common agenda during the insurgency (Thapa 2003; Adhikari 2014). These causal explanations do little to illuminate neither why they choose to split (Mishra 2008; Lawoti 2009).

This study investigates the conditions which led to the recent splits between Prachanda, Bhattarai and Baidya, the orchestrators of the Maoist People's War. Through a combination of literature review and personal interview surveys, this study examines the extent to which these splits are a product of ideological differences.

The structure of this study is organized as follows; section one is dedicated to contextualizing the study and providing the historical background of the CPN-Maoist Center. This is followed by a review of literature on the Maoist Movement in Nepal, factionalism within the CPN-Maoist Center and political happenings in Nepal. In section three, research methodology and method of data analysis are detailed. Subsequently, research findings and analysis are presented. Finally, I conclude with a summary of my research, with the hopes that this study contributes to the greater understanding of the splits between Maoist insurgency leaders Prachanda, Bhattarai and Baidya, factionalism within the CPN-Maoist Center and Nepal's domestic political situation.

❖ *Historicising the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist Center*

Understanding the factionalism within the CPN-Maoist Center and recent splits between Prachanda, Bhattarai and Baidya requires a recognition of the conditions from which the party emerged. The original Communist Party of Nepal³ (CPN) was formed in 1940. Yet, the origins of the communist movement led by the CPN-Maoist Center⁴ extend back to the late 1960's. At that time, political parties were banned in Nepal and the country was ruled by King Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev (1955-1972) through

³ The present-day Prachanda-led Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist Center's roots trace back to the original Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) (Thapa 2003).

⁴ During this time, the CPN-Maoist Center was still formally named the Communist Party of Nepal.

the *Panchayat raj*⁵ system. However, the CPN-Maoist Center still remained active underground. Later, due to ideological differences the CPN split vertically along party lines: pro-Soviet vs. pro-Chinese groups. During that time, the communist movement in Nepal was in chaos with various groups organizing on their own, many leaders either in jail or exile in India. After a failed armed uprising was attempted by a group of young rogue communist working in Jhapa district (in 1971), some of the old guard—many newly released from prison—tried to re-establish order to the communist movement, marred by factionalism. In 1974, the old guard came together to hold Communist Party of Nepal's Fourth Congress (CPN-Fourth Congress), which would later grow into a party under the same name, becoming an essential force within the communist movement over the next decade. In 1983, due to inner-party disagreements over who the main enemy of the party was, the CPN-Fourth Congress split leading to the formation of the Communist Party of Nepal-Masal (CPN-Masal). In 1985, the Bhattarai-led CPN-Masal underwent further division, resulting in the formation of the Communist Party of Nepal-Mashal (CPN-Mashal) led by Baidya. In 1989, Prachanda would assume leadership from Baidya, becoming the general secretary of the faction (Thapa 2003; Upreti 2008).

During the 1990's, the CPN-Fourth Congress and other communist groups unified to fight the *Panchayat* system, forming the United Left Front (ULF). After toppling the *Panchayat* system, smaller parties within the ULF quit the Front in protest,

⁵ *Panchayat raj* which translates into "rule of five assemblies," was the political system of Nepal from 1960's to 1990's. In Nepal, the *panchayat* system had four tiers, functioning at the village, town, district and national level. Traditionally, each caste-group in Nepal would form its own *panchayat* or council of elders, with a portion of the assembly members being chosen by the next tier *panchayat*, to serve in the following tier *panchayat* (Savada 1991).

finding their input suppressed within the coalition. One of the parties to leave the ULF coalition was the CPN-Fourth Congress, forming a new alliance with the Prachand-led CPN-Mashal, creating the Communist Party of Nepal-Unity Center (CPN-Unity Center).

Nineteen ninety-one marked the first multi-party election held since the people's movement against the *Panchayat* system. Under the banner of the United People's Front (UPF), the CPN-Unity Center decided compete in the polls, as an attempt to reach a larger audience, while also using the elections as a forum to critique the parliamentary system. To much surprise, under the banner of the UPF the CPN-Unity Center won nine seats. However, this victory was short-lived. In 1994, the party split between a Prachanda-led faction which championed for an armed uprising and one which pushed for a more cautious path to revolution. This breakup was reflected in the national political front of the UPF, as both factions contended for recognition from the election commissions. The Bhattarai-led faction of the UPF aligned with Prachanda and Baidya. In turn, they were denied recognition by the election commission, boycotting the 1994 elections in response. In March of 1995, the Prachanda-led CPN-Unity Center faction renamed itself the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-Maoist), formally adopting the doctrine of armed struggle, following the revolutionary ideology of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism⁶ (MLM) (Thapa 2003).

⁶ Also known as "Prachanda Path."

Literature Review

Despite their extensive history of party division, the CPN-Maoist was still able to secure the parliamentary majority in the post-war elections of 2008 (Thapa 2009; Agence France-Presse 2016). The overwhelming public support of the Maoist was attributed their ability to mobilize support, through their strategic use of communist ideology which centered the rights of marginalized groups (ie. women, indigenous nationalities and *Dalit*⁷). Through conducting political education which challenged traditional norms and practices which reaffirmed social hierarchies, the Maoist enabled oppressed groups to imagine a revolutionary alternative to their oppression. By recognizing the plight of marginalized groups, the Maoist were not only able to incorporate “fluid groups” like the *Dalit*, indigenous nationalities, women and unemployed youth into the armed struggle, but win the support of the public which transferred to the 2008 elections (Lawoti 2009; Basnett 2009).

❖ *Post-Insurgency Unification Process*

After winning the parliamentary majority in 2008, there seemed to be a consensus amongst CPN-Maoist leaders that mass party unification was needed to ensure that their goal of establishing a socialist people’s republic of Nepal succeeded. At this time, Prachanda was credited for unifying several communist party splinters, forming the Seven-Party Alliance (SPA). The mission of the SPA was to form a consensus government after the 2008 constituent assembly, working together to write a new constitution “that would pave the way for a people’s republic, socialism and

⁷ In the Hindu caste system, *Dalit* or “broken people,” are regarded ritual impure, occupying the lowest position in the caste system (Dalit Solidarity 2016).

communism” (Lawoti 2009; Himalayan Times 2008; Mishra 2008). In 2009, after a joint meeting of CPN-M and CPN-Unity Center central committee members was called, they decided to name the new alliance the Unified Party of Nepal Communist-Maoist (UCPN-Maoist) (South Asian Terrorism Portal 2016). However, this period of unification was short lived.

❖ *Baidya-Prachanda Split*

With Baidya choosing to leave the UCPN-Maoist in 2012—taking along 45 of 149 central committee members—attempts of mass party unification were halted (Aashar 2012). Baidya ascribed the splits to the UCPN-Maoist party’s leadership, which had “annihilated the achievements” of the decade long’s People’s War. According to Baidya-allied breakaway faction leader Khadga Bahadur Bishwakarma: “When [UCPN-Maoist] entered into [the] peace [agreement], there was a challenge to retain the party’s revolutionary spirit. Until a couple of years ago, Prachanda was clearly allied with us, but he deviated from it. After all shorts of attempts, we concluded that there’s no alternative but to form a new party” (British Broadcasting Company 2012). Baidya’s faction has dubbed Prachanda and Bhattarai—who at the time was serving as Prime Minister—as “Red Traitors” and “Neo-Revisionists,” accusing them of “compromising on the objectives of the People’s War” (Ghimire 2012). Baidya’s criticism stemmed from Prachanda’s and Bhattarai’s failures to produce a new constitution in the mandated period. The constitution was supposed to serve as a stepping stone, putting the Maoist a little bit closer to establishing a people’s republic. Yet, before the signing of the current constitution, Prachanda shifted party lines, aligning

himself with the Nepali Congress (NC) and Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist-Leninist (CPN-Unified Marxist-Leninist). As a result, the document reversed many of the party's achievements on inclusion (Jha 2016). Baidya's criticism also stemmed from Prachanda failing to "ensure that former Maoist fighters were integrated into the army 'in a respected manner'" (British Broadcasting Company). After declaring his split, Baidya called for "revolutionary forces" to join his new party calling it "a beginning of a new chapter in the country" (British Broadcasting Company 2012).

When Baidya declared his split from the CPN-Maoist Center⁸ and the formation of his new party, he claimed that unity with the UCPN-Maoist was still possible if Prachanda and Bhattarai corrected their past mistakes. Years since the split, Prachanda has reached out to Baidya's party in attempts to reunify. Baidya, hesitant to reunite with the CPN-Maoist Center, cited ideological differences as the reason. In a six-page appeal to the Thapa-led (pro-unity) faction of the CPN-Revolutionary Maoist, Baidya claimed that Prachanda's unification efforts were a ploy to rid Nepal's Communist movement of revolutionary ideology, which Baidya accuses Prachanda and Bhattarai of straying from after coming to power (British Broadcasting Company 2012; Sedhai 2016; Himalayan Times 2016b).

While standard explanations point towards ideological differences being the basis of the Baidya-Prachanda split, other literature suggests that the split was about the control of state power and wealth in the hands of Prachanda (Dixit 2012). While it is alleged that Prachanda tried to delay the splits for as long as possible, neither him nor

⁸ During this time, the CPN-Maoist Center was still formally named the United Communist Party of Nepal- Maoist.

Bhattarai were willing to relinquish their positions as chairman and Prime Minister, a contingency for Baidya's unity. Furthermore, both Baidya and Bhattarai often criticized Prachanda for his monopoly over party resources (Ghimire 2012; Jeevan 2013). In 2011, Baidya released a 18-point leaflet accusing Prachanda of:

- (1) Eclecticism in philosophy.
- (2) On the political front, is seen moving toward rightist reformism and national capitulationism from his centrist opportunism.
- (3) Prachanda recognizes that party's prime contradiction lay with India, its agents and the local feudal forces, but in practice he is acting just the otherwise.
- (4) Prachanda focuses on cooperating with the local forces that favor Indian expansionism and its agents in Nepal.
- (5) Verbally Prachanda stresses on cooperation with nationalists, communists and republicans but in practice he has been cooperating with the Indian expansionists and their cohorts.
- (6) At a time when our territories are being continuously encroached upon and demographic invasion is taking place, Dahal has made the citizenship distribution process flexible.
- (7) Prachanda has supported Indian investments in Upper Karnali and Arun-III hydro-power projects.
- (8) Prachanda is impeding party's fraternal relations with international revolutionary forces, whereas he has also been maintaining relations with class enemies more so, Indian intelligence agents.
- (9) On the issue of financial discipline, [Prachanda] is seen tilted toward corruption. [Prachanda] is seen having the tendency of doing anything — both moral and immoral — for the sake of power, money and prestige.
- (10) Prachanda has deliberately left the party without an accounting system and misused financial means and resources in an individualistic way.
- (11) Prachanda deviated from the party's ideological goals by not launching appropriate programs to counter the party's principal enemy India.
- (12) Despite being said that we would go for a federal system with autonomy to ethnicities, [Prachanda] has emphasized unitary and centralized system.
- (13) Financial irregularities and misuse of resources.
- (14) Self-centric individualistic tendency, intolerance toward those holding dissent abusing his power to silence their voices.
- (15) Fascist tendency: extending relations with the Indian intelligence agencies.
- (16) Disarming the PLA and emptying the cantonments in the name of "regrouping" without forging a national security policy, controlling the open border and setting up a border security force.
- (17) Bourgeois theory of separation of power, and to minimize the participation of people in the judiciary under the pretext of judicial independence, instead of empowering the People's Assembly.
- (18) Agreeing to make appointments of judges by a commission, not by the federal assembly as demanded by the party (Next Front 2015; Nepali Times 2011).

In the 18-point leaflet, two of the 18 accusations against Prachanda explicitly support the explanation that the Baidya-Prachanda split was a product of ideological differences,⁹ with many—if not all—of Baidya’s accusations having the ability to be streamlined to fit into the category of ideological differences. Additionally, two of the 18 accusations also suggest that monopolization of power and resources¹⁰ and corruption could have also been potential reasons for Baidya (and Bhattarai) splitting with the CPN-Maoist Center (Ghimire 2012; Jeevan 2013).

❖ *Bhattarai-Prachanda Split*

A week after splitting with the CPN-Maoist Center¹¹, Bhattarai spoke at an interaction program at Gorkha headquarters, detailing his plan to form a “new political force” launch an “economic revolution” in Nepal (Himalayan Times 2015c). According to Bhattarai, “[He] did not want to split the party. [He] just [wanted] to constitute a new political force” (Himalayan Times 2015b). Yet, it is suggested that the split was highly anticipated; since 2012, Bhattarai has been advocating for “leadership of a new type” (Sharma 2016). The break was delayed due to the prolongment of the constitution drafting process, which Bhattarai is said to have been the breaking point for the Maoist insurgency leader (Agence France-Presse 2016). According to Bhattarai, the failure of the constitution to address the demands brought forth from agitating parties, had created an atmosphere of political instability in Nepal (Himalaya Times 2015). In turn, Bhattarai has said his “new political force” will “fulfill the hope of justice, equality, freedom,

⁹ See points 1 and 2.

¹⁰ See points 9, 17 and 18.

¹¹ During this time, the CPN-Maoist Center was still formally named the United Communist Party of Nepal- Maoist.

identity, liberty and [economic] prosperity of the people” (Agence France-Presse 2016).

Prachanda and Bhattarai are said to have disagreed on many essential issues concerning political line and party ideology, throughout their underground days. Prachanda’s loyalists are said to have often accused Bhattarai of trying to “oust” Prachanda ideologically (Sharma 2016).

During Bhattarai’s prime ministership, his main goal was to carry out an “economic and social revolution.” Many of Bhattarai’s former Maoist comrades accused him of pushing forward a neoliberalist agenda when he signed the Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIPPA) with India, against the decision of the CPN-Maoist Center (Sigh 2011). Under the BIPPA agreement, “workers basic rights and protections [are] waived within ‘special economic zones’...the right of the state to support and promote domestic enterprise...the right of workers to struggle against mistreatment or for basic livelihood and adequate working conditions” are all traded, to “bring in investment” which Bhattarai said was in the best interests of Nepal (Des Chene 2014).

After his stint as Prime Minister, Bhattarai redirected all of his energy into his new political party, gathering over 100 entrepreneurs, industrialists, bankers and traders together, laying out his party’s economic agenda. During this conference, Bhattarai said his new political platform would have “socialist orientation.” Simultaneously, Bhattarai urged the private sector not be concerned with the use of the word “socialism” in the preamble of the constitution saying, ““Even China defines itself as socialist through its

constitution, but it is practicing capitalism” (Himalayan Times 2015c). In the aftermath, Prachanda has accused Bhattarai of “joining hands with the Bourgeoisies,” saying:

Baburam Bhattarai was head of the people’s government during the war and his orders were behind people’s sacrifices and the changes in this country. So, he will not be free of accountability just by saying that he has now taken another path. Therefore, I urge him to join the new Maoist force rather than promote the bourgeoisies...unification is necessary to take what we have started to a logical end (Khatiwada 2016).

Since leaving the CPN-Maoist Center, it seems that Bhattarai has renounced communist ideology saying, “There is no alternative to capitalism in today’s world and we have to follow that...I have to unlearn what I’ve learnt in 40 years and learn something new” (Himalayan Times 2015c). It can be said that it is unclear what Bhattarai means by, “I have to unlearn what I’ve learnt...and learn something new,” as his rhetoric often contradicts itself (eg. “socialist orientation” vs. “...no alternative to capitalism”). However, despite Bhattarai’s use communist terms like “socialist” to describe his political platform, the majority of his rhetoric suggests that his platform mimics a more neoliberal—and therefore anti-communist—ideology.

Similarly to the Baidya-Prachanda split, ideology factored into Bhattarai’s decision to split with the Prachanda-led CPN-Maoist Center. Given Bhattarai’s public renouncement of communist ideology, I argue that ideological differences was a core contributor to his split with the CPN-Maoist Center. Furthermore, sources suggest that Bhattarai had been planning to split with the CPN-Maoist Center for a while—in hopes of carving an independent path for himself— indicating that personal interests may have

been an underlying reason of why Bhattarai split with the Prachanda-led party. Finally, Bhattarai frequently proposing that his party will be a catalyst for “economic revolution” and “prosperity,” through his party’s economic agenda, which differs in many ways from the original objective of the Maoist insurgency—to establish socialism in Nepal—suggesting that Bhattarai’s agenda has shifted from his former comrades (Himalayan Times 2015; Agence France-Presse 2016)

Research Methodology

In order to understand the factions between Maoist insurgency leaders Prachanda, Bhattarai and Baidya, I employed semi-structured personal interview surveys of political party leaders, mid-level *cadres*¹² and political scientists. All interviews were conducted in Kathmandu, over the course of two weeks. Participants were chosen using opportunity sampling, conducted in a two-tiered manner. The first-tier of participants were selectively chosen¹³ based on their availability, willingness and ability to enhance understanding of the study topic. Using the same technique, the second-tier of participants were chosen based on references from participants in the first-tier. My chosen method comes directly from the exploratory nature of this study and the lack of in-depth and critical sources on post-war Maoist parliamentary politics in Nepal. Furthermore, both qualitative and quantitative methods of data interpretation¹⁴ are employed to establish causal linkages between the splits amongst Prachanda, Bhattarai and Baidya, factionalism within the CPN-Maoist Center and Nepalese politics.

¹² In this study, I define *cadres* as both members and (low to mid-level) workers of a communist organization.

¹³ A list of *intended interview participants* was created, from which the first tier of interview participants were chosen.

¹⁴ See *Data Analysis Methodology* section.

❖ *Participant Political Affiliation*

While all interview participants have some form of background in Nepalese politics, there are two strata of respondents; *first-stratum* and *second-stratum*. The first-stratum of respondents are those who are affiliated¹⁵ with a political party and working within a party as a political leader or mid-level *cadre*. The second-stratum, are those who are not affiliated with a political party and who had never worked within a party. Four out of five participants were politically affiliated, with three out of the four participants belonging to NSN and the final first-stratum participant belonging to the CPN-Maoist Center (see *Figure 1*).

❖ *Personal Interview Surveys Methodology*

All interview participants were given the choice of their preferred interview location, with the hopes that if respondents chose their preferred interview location, they would be more comfortable and open during the interview process. All first-stratum¹⁶ respondents' preferred interview location was their political party headquarters, while the second-stratum preferred his residence. All respondents were formally interviewed one time¹⁷, with the average interview lasting 48 minutes. With participant consent, all interviews were recorded for transcription and analysis purposes. During the interview, additional notes were taken using a laptop. All interviews were semi-structured, meaning some questions were predetermined (with respect to the participant's relation to the study topic), with additional probing (based on the content of participant responses) taking place. Four out of five interviews were conducted individually (eg.

¹⁵ I define *affiliation* as being a member or supporter of a specific political party.

¹⁶ See *Participant Political Affiliation* section.

¹⁷ If additional information was needed, respondents were reached contacted via email or phone.

one interviewer/one participant), with one out of five interviews being conducted dyadically¹⁸ (one interviewer/two participants) (see **Figure 2**). Additionally, four out of five interviews were conducted in English, with one out of five interviews being conducted in a mixture of Nepali and English, at the request of the respondent (see **Figure 3**). This latter interview was recorded and later translated into English, with the help of a translator.

❖ **Data Analysis Methodology**

The collected interviews were listened to, transcribed and then coded using an *a priori code* and *emergent code* hybrid model. All a priori codes are derived from review of literature, from which the conceptual framework, which are *shifts in ideology*, *shifts in agenda* and *corruption* was derived (see **Table 1**).

Table 1. Operational Definitions of A priori Codes

A priori codes	Operational Definitions
<i>Shifts in ideology</i>	Changes or differences in system of ideas forming the basis of political or economic theory or policy.
<i>Shifts in agenda</i>	Changes or differences in motives, objectives or end goals.
<i>Corruption</i>	Abuse of political power, primarily for private gain.

Note: This table has been constructed to show the operational definitions of the a priori codes used in order to enhance the understanding of analysis methodology and research findings.

After conducting a thematic analysis of the collected interview data, the emergent codes that arose are *power* and *clientelism* (see **Table 2**). Emergent codes were marked, based on the frequency of which they appeared in the data, with subject matter

¹⁸ This variation is due to an unforeseen scheduling difficulty, in which the only solution—at the request of the participants—was a dyadic interview.

mentioned by two or more participants being marked as an emergent code. The codes that were most frequently mentioned by multiple respondents and given greater emphasis, were noted as the plausible explanations. The coded responses were then triangulated to minimize the chance of a partial, mistaken or biased analysis.

Table 2. Emergent Codes and Associated Concepts

Emergent Codes	Associated Concepts
<i>Power</i>	Power, position, personal interests.
<i>Clientelism</i>	Close relationships, fixed system, lack of meritocracy.

Note: This table has been constructed to show the emergent codes and the associated concepts from which they arose in order to enhance the understanding of analysis methodology and research findings.

❖ *Limitations of Study*

Interview Sample Size

Data were collected using opportunity sampling, with the duration of data collection taken place for a two week period. My interview sample size is significantly small at five responses. Additionally, the collected data is not representative of all the political factions investigated, as the Baidya-led CPN-Revolutionary Maoist declined to take part in the study. Finally, the party affiliated respondents outnumbered the number of non-party affiliated respondents four to one, with NSN politically affiliated participants represented three out of five participants (see **Figure 1**).

Lack of Prior Research & Reliable Sources on Topic

Although a lot research has been published on development of the Maoist movement in Nepal, there is a lack of in-depth study on post-war Maoist parliamentary politics, with factionalism overall being an under-studied phenomenon. Furthermore, many of the

post-war articles available on Maoist factionalism are poorly written, lacking in-depth and critical analysis. However, I mitigate for this deficiency of in-depth research, by means of thoroughly scrutinizing and cross-reference with multiple sources.

Heavy Reliance on Qualitative Data

This studies relies heavily on qualitative derived from participant interview surveys. The subjective nature of this method of data collection, increases the likelihood of response bias. To minimize the probability of response bias, the use of leading interview questions are avoided. Likewise, a hybrid coding method is utilized to analyze data, with both quantitative and qualitative methods of data interpretation used to establish causal linkages.

Another limitation regarded to reliance on qualitative data is the problem of reporting on such a sensitive topic. The participant interview survey asked questions related to corruption and other forms of hypersensitive matters, which tend to be difficult or uncomfortable people to discuss. However, the study was voluntary. Participants were also given the freedom to skip questions and end the interview at any point.

Research Findings

❖ *Reasons for Splits Between Prachanda, Bhattarai and Baidya*

Shifts in Ideology

The results of the hybrid coding analysis show, *shifts in ideology* was the factor most associated with the splits between Prachanda, Bhattarai and Baidya. With *shifts in ideology*, appearing throughout the responses of three out of five participants. While *power* emerged in the responses of three out of five participants as well, *shifts in*

ideology was given the most emphasis, often explicitly noted as the primary reason (see **Figure 4**). *Shifts in agenda* were associated with both the Baidya-Prachanda and Bhattarai-Prachanda faction. The most emphasis was given to the role of ideological shifts in relation to the Bhattarai-Prachanda split, with the following excerpts from the collected responses illustrate how the finding *shifts in ideology* is presented using representative quotes from interview participants:

Interviewer: How does [Naya Shakti Nepal] identify politically?

K. Devkota: It is an alternative party: not leftist, rightist, communist, non-communist. It is a conventional ideas [kind] of political party. The ideas, only [...] could divide the society, they could not produce the solution. That's why, we came to the conclusion that...capitalism, socialism, communism, anti-communism, Marxist, non-Marxist they [...] divide the society. We need to have a kind of solution. That's why we created an alternative party. Alternative party is...an idea. The idea is not following debate and discussion, but for solution. That's why this is a solution oriented party.

Interviewer: If we can go back to the ideology of Naya Shakti Nepal. You said, it's not left or right, but it is a frontist alternative party. What exactly does that mean?

K. Devkota: Until now, everybody will ask, "You are leftist, you are rights, you are communist, you are non-communist?" It is because the tradition and tendency of the formation of the party is the same. That's why, this is a very genuine question...If you fix yourself in one ideology, the ideology will be static. A fast moving society and static ideology will be a contradiction. It will never serve. For a fast moving society, the ideology also has to be developed. If you are not willing and able to develop the ideology, rather you stuck on the old world - 18th, 19th and 20th century ideology - is it possible to solve the problem of the 21st century? No, that's why...the ideology has to be developed, with the fast moving society. That's why we are not confined to any kind of ideology.

Interviewer: So, it's a mixture of ideologies?

K. Devkota: [pointing at feet] Let's say, this is the left [points at left foot] and this is the right [points at right foot]. If you try to walk with only your left leg, accidents will happen. Same thing if you try with only your right, same thing will happen. Left and right! If you want to move forward, walk left and right! Left and right! That is the frontist, development of ideology, along with the fast moving society.

Me: Do you ever see Naya Shakti Nepal reuniting with the CPN-MC?

K. Devkota: I don't think so. It is because of ideological things. [...] if [CPN-MC] thought that, "Oh, the situation has already been changed, continuation of the destruction oriented—struggle oriented party—will no longer work" and changed their mind and join[ed] with us, maybe. Otherwise, we are here. We don't have any plans to shift to the MC. But MC people...if they thought that the right analysis—concrete analysis—of the concrete situation, which is the core value of Marxism...if they came closer to that point, they would change and they would join us. Otherwise...not possible. (Khimlal Devkota, Personal Interview Survey, November 10, 2016)

Interviewer: In your opinion, have the Maoist played a positive role in Nepal or a negative one.

G. Thapa: [...] Since the formation of communist parties, they weren't even united ideologically. There was division from the very beginning - pro-China, pro-Russia and other factions. [There was a] Pro-Indian faction also.... At that time, there was also ideological differences also.

Interviewer: ...[You mentioned] the Maoist [Center] have disappointed a lot of the country...do you see more people becoming royalist, wishing that the monarchy was back?

G. Thapa: ...I don't even think that these Maoist [Center] will come as a big party. The problem we still have is that things are divided by ideological and political polarization [in reference to Prachanda, Bhattarai, Baidya and other Maoist parties]. (Ganga Thapa, Personal Interview Survey, November 11, 2016)

Interviewer: Prachanda, Baidya and Bhattarai agreed on everything ideological [during the insurgency?]

D. Gurung: During the insurgency they all agreed, but later things changed. When it came to the process, while they all had similar thoughts, they did not completely agree on everything. Yet, there were not fractions like now. It was after the peace agreement things slowly began to fall apart. The problem between Prachanda and Baidya, the problem was that the system should have been changed but it wasn't. The monarchy was gone, which was positive but other things in the system didn't change, like there still isn't a republic established and Baidya wasn't happy about this. Secondly, we were against semi-colonialism, but even after the monarchy was gone semi-colonialism had not ended. In fact, semi-colonialism grew and grew, now it's a new colonialism, with Indian expansionism dominating Nepal. Things are not going in the right way. There is a lot of compromising going on in the new government, that was Baidya's criticism against Prachanda. But Bhattarai had very different thoughts. He thought Nepal became liberal, because the monarchy was gone and Nepal became democratic.

Some of Prachanda's thoughts used to match Baidya's and some of his thoughts used to match Bhattarai's, he walked a centrist line. It was difficult to unify because of Baidya's different thoughts, Prachanda's centrist thoughts and Bhattarai's strange thoughts.

Interviewer: *In your opinion why did Bhattarai and Baidya split with the CPN-MC?*

D. Gurung: According to Bhattarai he has quit communist philosophy. He does not believe in it and is not following communist philosophy anymore. He does not believe in Marxism-Leninism-Maoism anymore, that is why he is not in a communist party. But Baidya still keeps saying that we should follow communist philosophy. In the present situation unification between Prachanda and Baidya could happen, because Baidya still follows communist philosophy.

Interviewer: *In your opinion are there any other reasons why they split [with the CPN-MC]?*

D. Gurung: There might be secondary reasons, but the main reason was because of ideology.

Interviewer: *Do you ever see Baidya and Bhattarai re-uniting with CPN-MC?*

D. Gurung: Between Baidya and Bhattarai there is a possibility of unity. But it is less of a possibility in Bhattarai's situation, because Bhattarai is not following any communist philosophy. Yet, I believe in he realizes his mistake, rethinks and revises his decision to not follow communist philosophy it may be possible. So far he has not done this, so I do not think he will return. He is still saying he quit Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. If this is the case, than it is not possible. (Dev Gurung, Personal Interview Survey, November 17, 2016)

Power

Power was the second factor most associated with the factions between Prachanda, Bhattarai and Baidya. *Power* appeared throughout the responses the same amount of participants *as shifts in ideology* did. The fundamental difference was that less emphasis was placed on *power* as the source the splits, with *power* often emerging after *shifts in ideology* and in a few cases *shifts in agenda* (see **Figure 4**). The

following excerpts from the collected responses illustrate how the finding *power* is presented using representative quotes from interview participants:

Interviewer: Can you explain more about those characteristics [by Prachanda during the time of the insurgency]?

K. Devkota: [...] Dr. Bhattarai was always thinking about democracy, economic prosperity and the upliftment of the condition of the people...Prachanda—unfortunately—was very focused on power. During, that time monarchy was in power. Once the monarchy took over, even during that time, Dr. Bhattarai always focused on the three issues I've already mentioned...Prachanda said that, "Oh, power is very near to monarchy. Compromise with the monarchy and we can grab the power. Politics for the power." Dr. Bhattarai said that it would be a critical mistake.

Interviewer: You said a couple of times that Bhattarai was focused on democracy and Prachanda was focused on power. [...] What kind of power was Prachanda focused on?

K. Devkota: In our context [...] position always attracts power, respect, money—everything. Position. That's why everyone is a 'famous position' mongler. [...]That's why Prachanda thought that, at any cost we need to be in power. If—according to Prachanda—[...] if we changed the party, if we changed the agenda, than there will be no guaranteed to be in a position of power. If position is lost, than everything will be lost. No money. No respect. No power. That's the thing.

Interviewer: Do you ever see Naya Shakti Nepal reuniting with the CPN-MC?

K. Devkota: I don't think so. [...] Prachanda and UCPN-MC which very much focus on power, position and continuation of the same party, that felt pride that this is the party who fought against the monarchy, who achieved the republic, fought against the authoritarian government and achieved federalism. That's why they are very much proud of that party. They don't want to change! (Khimlal Devkota, Personal Interview Survey, November 10, 2016)

Interviewer: In your opinion, have the Maoist played a positive role in Nepal or a negative one.

G. Thapa: [...] The Maoist came as a force in 1996, when several factions united to become one Maoist party [in reference to the CPN-MC] and then they started the Maoist movement. During that time also, there were different factions within the party, led by Baidya, led by Bhattarai, led by Prachanda and other small groups when they united. But, in the eyes it was not divided before 2006. So there were pro-Indian, pro-Nepali and these kinds of things. When they [in reference to Prachanda, Bhattarai and Baidya led CPN-MC] came to power...you know that

when a party comes to power, you know that there will be problems? Everyone wants to be in power, to be minister or something like that. So it was not an ideological division as such, I don't think. [...] First, when Baidya splitted there was a problem of money. The Maoist accumulated huge amounts of money from local sources - capturing and killing many people - and encroaching many properties on the village level. All the money was in Prachanda's name. [...] One of the reasons they splitted were for power. Second, was for wealth.. [...] Basically, not ideological differences. I think in Nepal there are not ideologically decorated—of course there are ideologies—but they never followed this Marxist, Leninist and Maoist. Right now they have a lot of explaining to do, they have lots of money, power and some kind of relations. They do not drink any local drinks here; they go only for scott drinks or high level drinks. Basically, it was not ideological and was not purely for power. (Ganga Thapa, Personal Interview Survey, November 11, 2016)

Interviewer: *In your opinion are there any other reasons why [Prachanda, Bhattarai and Baidya split]?*

D. Gurung: There might be secondary reasons [...] it could have been because of personal egos, like who is getting what position in government. Third, individual interests. But those are small reasons, the main reason is because of ideology. (Dev Gurung, Personal Interview Survey, November 17, 2016)

Shifts in Agenda

The results of the hybrid coding analysis indicate that *shifts in agenda* was another secondary factor which contributed splits between Prachanda, Bhattarai and Baidya. *Shifts in agenda* were reflected in the responses of by two out of five interview participants, coming third in terms of its predominance in the collected data (see **Figure 4**). *Shifts in agenda* were only mentioned by respondents affiliated with the Bhattarai-led Naya Shakti Nepal. *Shifts in agenda* were only mentioned in relation to the Bhattarai-Prachanda faction. The following excerpts from the collected responses illustrate how the finding *shifts in agenda* is presented using representative quotes from interview participants:

Interviewer: *Can you explain more about those characteristics [by Prachanda during the time of the insurgency]?*

K. Devkota: Yea. Basically, Dr. Bhattarai was always thinking about democracy, economic prosperity and the upliftment of the condition of the people. These are the issues, democracy, development and improved conditions. These three issues, related with the democracy and democratic parties very close to democratic parties. Prachanda —unfortunately—was very focused on power. During, that time monarchy was in power. Once the monarchy took over, even during that time, Dr. Bhattarai always focused on the three issues I've already mentioned, democracy, development and economic prosperity. Prachanda said that oh, "power is very near to monarchy. Compromise with the monarchy and we can grab the power. Politics for the power." Dr. Bhattarai said that it would be a critical mistake.

Interviewer: *...why did you leave (CPN-MC)?*

K. Devkota: ...In the Nepalese context, one to three. First, the agenda of the politics has been changed, after the promulgation of the constitution...[and] the agenda changed. Second[ly]...Nepalese politics has been starting to fight against the establishment, for the struggle, for the movement, for the dismantling of the establishment. But, right now...is already started for construction... development, second reason. Third reason, we fought against the system...Now, we need to fight against the condition of the people. So, by these [...] reason...agenda of the politics have already been changed [...]. Now, this is a completely new situation and with a new situation, old political parties and a continuation of the old conventional political party will not work. Let's say UCPN-Maoist, why we [in reference to him and Bhattarai] split? UCPN-Maoist was funded to fight against the establishment, fight against the monarchy, fight against the authoritarian system, fight against the exclusionary system, the Hindu kingdom [...]. Now, everything we have achieved and again, continuation of the same party doesn't make any sense. An objective of the foundation of the UCPN-Maoist was different...to fight, to dismantle, to remove. Again, continuation of the party means again agenda must be a continuation...Now, the [...] agenda has also already changed. So, we need to have a new political party and what we [in reference to him and Bhattarai] tried first, we tried our best to change the whole party from destruction to construction, development and economic development, first. We failed. Secondly, we tried with like minded people within the party, we tried our best. Second, we succeeded. Some of us were within the party of the UCPN-Maoist, like minded people we came out and we started. [...] It is not actually splitting, it is a new initiation ...new initiation of the political party for economic prosperity. [...]Not only UCPN-Maoist, all the other political parties also, they never talked about development. They never talked about economic prosperity, but now the major agenda is economic prosperity, for that purpose we need to have a fresh political party. That's why we started [Naya Shakti Nepal].

Interviewer: *It seems that Prachanda and Bhattarai had a lot of ideological disagreements from the beginning, so why do you think Bhattarai stayed with the CPN-MC so long?*

K. Devkota: [...] Actually, it's not a rivalry, the major understanding was that after the promulgation of the constitution, the agenda of the party would be changed. By changing the agenda, the agenda-based party would also need to be changed. That was a basic and tacit understanding between Prachanda and Dr. Bhattarai and it was endorsed in our party [in reference to the CPN-MC] document also. But, when the promulgation of the constitution, Prachanda was very much a powermonger. He felt power would be safe in continuation of the situation and party. Bhattarai said that, "Whatever safe or not doesn't matter. This is the right time to change the party's structure—objective—because the agenda has changed. The situation has been changed, that's why Dr. Bhattarai and we thought that with the promulgation of the constitution, this is the right time to initiate a new phase of political party and a new kind of political party, with a new agenda. (Khimlal Devkota, Personal Interview Survey, November 10, 2016)

Interviewer: *Why did you decided to join to Naya Shakti over the CPN-MC, seeing how you were never politically affiliated until now?*

R. Dhakel: [...] the agenda of the other party was to form the constitution in their favor, so we [in reference to Naya Shakti political leaders and *cadres*] see no vision in the party now for further development. So, that was the peak of the party's agenda because that was the major agenda they have taken when they started. So when they reached their agenda, that was one level fulfilled. We don't see that they can go any further now, because that was the only agenda at the central level that they were proposing and when it was met, there was a derailment about what next action they should take. (Revat Dhakel, Personal Interview Survey, November 10, 2016)

❖ *Negative Results*

Corruption

Contrary to my working hypotheses derived from my conceptual framework (eg. *corruption* as a potential factor of Baidya-Prachanda split), *corruption* did not emerge in the collected data as potential reason for the Baidya-Prachanda split or the Bhattarai-Prachanda split. Alternatively, *corruption* arose as a theme within CPN-Maoist Center party politics as a whole. CPN-Maoist Center party corruption was mentioned in the responses of three out of five interview participants (see **Figure**

4). The following excerpts from the collected responses illustrate how the finding *corruption* is presented using representative quotes from interview participants:

Interviewer: *So a lot of people [...] suggest that the Maoist are corrupt [and that] they no longer practice revolutionary ideology, they are now like the bourgeois...To what extent do you [find this to be] true.*

K. Devkota: [Devkota chuckled] Million dollar questions. Actually, during the time of 2000, one document has been passed, "Development of Democracy in 21st Century". [...] In this document - it's a very short document - in this document it says that if the party is not controlled by the people, the party will be corrupt and it will take an autocratic form. [...] Then after, people became corrupt, autocratic and they always focused on power, rather than people's prosperity and economic development and the country's best interest...and that's the truth. Two things, when we came into power—being the largest party—then issues came up. Inside and outside two issues came up, cantonment...almost thirty plus thousand PLA were confined in a cantonment and the government had supplied money for feeding them and the corruption happened with that money. Another issue came up, with all the Maoist [Center] party leaders during the peace process and when they came to power, they became corrupt. Rampant issues came up. The party itself initiated and formed two separate commissions, in the party. One led by [...] responsible for investigating the cantonment issues. Another, by [...] responsible for investigating the property of the party leaders. Both commission reports almost identified the corrupt people and corruption. Time and again, they insured they would be punished, but it never happen. Now, the commission report is nowhere. [...] gentleman he died, he is no more now and the commission report is also no longer public. It is not me saying this, it is what the report says. (Khimlal Devkota, Personal Interview Survey, November 10, 2016)

Interviewer: *In your opinion, have the Maoist played a positive role in Nepal or a negative one.*

G. Thapa: [...] when Baidya splitted there was a problem of money. The Maoist accumulated huge amounts of money from local sources—capturing and killing many people— and encroaching many properties on the village level. [...] All the money was in Prachanda's name. (Ganga Thapa, Personal Interview Survey, November 11, 2016)

Interviewer: *What part if any does corruption play in Nepalese politics and Maoist party politics?*

D. Gurung: Even in this communist party [in reference to CPN-Maoist Center, people aren't able to be true communist. So those who aren't real communist, they might be corrupt. It's an individual problem, not a communist party problem. The people we have guided in this party accept communist philosophy and practice it. [...] In general, many people say they are communist but do not practice as a

communist should, they prioritize their personal interests. Those people in the party [in reference to CPN-Maoist Center] might act corruptly. (Dev Gurung, Personal Interview Survey, November 17, 2016)

❖ *Nepalese Political Culture*

The primary objective of this study was to identify the causes of the factions between Maoist insurgency leaders Prachanda, Bhattarai and Baidya. Thus, participant interview survey questions were formed with this objective at the core. Participant responses that aligned with the primary objective had predominance in the collected data. The second most predominant responses appertaining to the general nature of Nepalese political culture, in which *power* and *clientelism* are reflected within the collected data (see **Figure 4**).

Power

Power was the emergent code reflected in the collected data, with three out of five respondent's reference *power* in the general context of political culture in Nepal (see **Figure 4**). The following excerpts from the collected responses illustrate how the finding *power* is presented using representative quotes from interview participants:

Interviewer: *You said a couple of times that Bhattarai was focused on democracy and Prachanda was focused on power. [...] What kind of power was Prachanda focused on?*

K. Devkota: [laughs] In our [in reference to Nepali politics] context, position...position always attracts power, respect, money - everything. Position. That's why everyone is a "famous position" mongler. If I am in position, you came to me [laughs]...anybody of respect would be comfortable to give respect to me and then anybody else will come with me, with money also. That's a basic tendency of the Nepali politics. (Khimlal Devkota, Personal Interview Survey, November 10, 2016)

Interviewer: *In your opinion, have the Maoist played a positive role in Nepal or a negative one.*

G. Thapa: [...] you know that when a party comes to power, you know that there will be problems? Everyone wants to be in power, to be minister or something like that. (Ganga Thapa, Personal Interview Survey, November 11, 2016)

Interviewer: *What part if any does corruption play in Nepalese politics and Maoist Center party politics?*

D. Gurung: Communist philosophy is anti-corruption. Communist philosophy is against corruption, but all people can't be communist. Even in the communist party, people aren't able to be true communist. So those who aren't real communist, they might be corrupt. It's an individual problem, not a communist party problem. The people we have guided into this party accept communist philosophy and practice it. So it depends on how many people accept and follow communist philosophy. In the communist party's philosophy it says the party should not be corrupt. But the corruption in it is connected to private properties and individual interests amongst communist leaders. Communist philosophy should be ranked higher than personal interests in the party. In general, many people say they are communist but do not practice as a communist should. They prioritize their personal interests... (Dev Gurung, Personal Interview Survey, November 17, 2016)

Clientelism

Finally, *clientelism* was the second most predominant emergent code reflected in the collected data. The theme of *clientelism* emerged in the responses of two out of the five interview survey participants, in association with political culture in Nepal (see **Figure 4**). The following excerpts from the collected responses illustrate how the finding *clientelism* is presented using representative quotes from interview participants:

Interviewer: *I've read, along with the corruption that is found in Nepalese politics, many articles say that clientelism one of them. How have you seen this played out in parliamentary politics?*

K. Devkota: [...] Our conclusion is that Nepalese political parties change—not as a change agent—into a center of corruption. MC now has 200..2,000 plus central committee members. The central committee members decided that they are not allowed to work. They are not allowed to work. It means the party will feed them. The party doesn't have any income. The party exploits the

commission. The party nominates some of them to state power, they will feed the party cadres, some commission agents, some tenders, some bureaucrats, some businessmen with whom they have those type of relationships with and they will feed them. That means corruption—center of corruption. The political parties have come a center of corruption. We [in reference to Naya Shakti Nepal] came to conclusion that this is the main problem and correction needs to start from ourself, from the political parties itself, political leaders themselves. That's why we started being transparent. (Khimlal Devkota, Personal Interview Survey, November 10, 2016)

Interviewer: *[You mentioned] the Maoist have disappointed a lot of the country... do you see more people becoming royalist, wishing that the monarchy was back?*

G. Thapa: In India there are good things. In India—when I was there— there is a fixed system. The senior most person will be the principal, whoever he or she may be. The next senior most will be the vice-principal. There is no politics! Senior most in the department will be the head of the department. It will be for two years. After two years, the next senior most will be the head of the department. This system was introduced by the British in India. In every field also, if there are competent persons within the institution bring them up! But right now, what is happening [in reference to political happenings in Nepal] is if you have a very close relationship with your resource minister you will be the electricity board chairman, without having any experience. So we have to discourage any political appointment in technical fields.

Interviewer: *Do you think clientelism plays a role in Nepalese politics?*

G. Thapa: This is very sad one of the very biggest factors is also is clientelism...doing for the...house and horse! First house, family, relatives, nephews, brother and sister-in-law. They want to give some kind of benefits and post. For example, the son of Prachanda is the also the secretary of Prachanda. The prime minister's son, is the secretary of the prime minister. This kind of clientelism is there. This is one of the big problems! First, house and horse means that they want to make money for themselves. Second, the want to make money for the party. Third, they want to give the pride to their followers. This has been happening since 1990, this isn't a new thing here. Even before 1990 it was a one-party system, where certain people benefitted. After that also, those who were related to the leaders and the party... (Ganga Thapa, Personal Interview Survey, November 11, 2016)

Discussion/Analysis

❖ *Patterns in Data & Implications of Research Findings*

Shifts in ideology was the a priori code most associated with the factions between Prachanda, Bhattarai and Baidya. This finding supports the working hypothesis (eg.

shifts in ideology as a primary factor), derived from the study's conceptual framework based on the analytical hypothesis presented by Sharma (2016), Sedhai (2016) *Himalayan Times* (2015c) and (2016b). In the collected data, *shifts in ideology* were presented with more emphasis in relation to the Bhattarai-Prachanda split, than the Baidya-Prachanda, though the data shows ideological differences played a role in both splits. I contend the reason for this nuance is due to the drastic switch in Bhattarai's ideological orientation. Unlike Prachanda and Baidya, who profess to follow the communist ideology of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, Bhattarai has renounced communist ideology entirely. Instead, practicing—what has been described by NSN party spokesman Khimlal Devkota as— “frontist” ideology (Khimlal Devkota, Personal Interview Survey, November 10, 2016).

Power was allocated as a secondary reason for the factions between Prachanda, Bhattarai and Baidya. Although *monopolization of power* was proposed earlier in the study as a potential factor, based on the information dispensed in Gilmore (2012) and (Jeevan 2013), *power* was not added to the conceptual framework of the study. This decision was made due to the articles' partisan presentation of information. In spite of this, *power* was a common theme that emerged from the data. While *power* was a significant theme referenced in context to Nepalese political culture, it was mostly emphasized specifically in the context of the Bhattarai-Prachanda faction by interview survey participant Khimlal Devkota. While Devkota's alignment with Bhattarai (and NSN) must be taken into consideration when evaluating his claims against Prachanda, his characterization of Prachanda as a “powermonger,” corresponds with Gilmore

(2012) and Jeevan (2013), which states that Baidya and Bhattarai often criticized Prachanda for his monopoly over party resources.

Shifts in agenda was another secondary factor associated with factions between Prachanda, Bhattarai and Baidya, coming emerging as third in terms of its predominance in the collected data. This finding supports the working hypothesis (eg, *shifts in agenda* as a potential factor of the Bhattarai-Prachanda split), based on information presented in *Himalayan Times* (2015) and Agence France-Presse (2016). All responses coded for *shifts in agenda* were acquired from NSN affiliated participants, affirming that *shifts in agenda* was a factor specific to the faction between Bhattarai and Prachanda.

Conclusion

❖ *Suggestions for Future Research*

Much research remains to be done of topics related factionalism, in the Nepalese context. While my researched touched upon this issue, the complexity of this subject matter calls greater in-depth analysis. Future works includes, a comparative in-depth study of factionalism with respect to Maoist oriented parliamentary political parties in Nepal. While each Maoist parliamentary party can be studied separately at each node, understanding factionalism within Nepalese revolutionary politics requires an in-depth historical examination of Maoist political parties individually, in relation to each other and the greater Nepalese political system as a whole.

❖ *Summary*

This study is a product of the analyzation of factionalism between the Maoist insurgency orchestrators Prachanda, Bhattarai and Baidya. While standard explanations attributed

the splits to ideological difference or *shifts in ideology: power* and *shifts in agenda* was found to have influenced the factionalism between Bhattarai, Baidya and the Prachanda-led CPN-Maoist Center. *Shifts in ideology* was found to be the primary reason for the Baidya-Prachanda split, *power* playing less of a significant role in the split, with *shifts in agenda* not indicated to have been a factor in Baidya's decision to leave the CPN-Maoist Center. On the contrary, *shifts in agenda* was the primary reason why Bhattarai split with the Prachanda-led CPN- Maoist Center, followed by *shifts in ideology* and *power*.

Glossary of Terms

Nom de guerre: an assumed name under which a person engages in combat or some other activity or enterprise

Panchayat raj: the political system of Nepal from 1960's to 1990's. In Nepal, the *panchayat* system had four tiers, functioning at the village, town, district and national level. Traditionally, each caste-group in Nepal would form its own *panchayat* or council of elders, with a portion of the assembly members being chosen by the next tier *panchayat*, to serve in the following tier *panchayat*.

Cadres: both members and (low to mid-level) workers of a communist organization.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Tables

Table 1. Operational Definitions of A priori Codes

A priori codes	Operational Definitions
<i>Shifts in ideology</i>	Changes or differences in system of ideas forming the basis of political or economic theory or policy.
<i>Shifts in agenda</i>	Changes or differences in motives, objectives or end goals.
<i>Corruption</i>	Abuse of political power, primarily for private gain.

Note: This table has been constructed to show the operational definitions of the a priori codes used in order to enhance the understanding of analysis methodology and research findings.

Table 2. Emergent Codes and Associated Concepts

Emergent Codes	Associated Concepts
<i>Power</i>	Power, position, personal interests.
<i>Clientelism</i>	Close relationships, fixed system, lack of meritocracy.

Note: This table has been constructed to show the emergent codes and the associated concepts from which they arose in order to enhance the understanding of analysis methodology and research findings.

Appendix 2: Figures

Figure 1. Participant Political Party Affiliation




Figure 2. Participant Interview Survey Type




Figure 3. Language for Interview Conduction




Figure 4. Codes Indicated in Participant Responses (In reference to splits)





Figure 5. Codes Indicated in Participant Responses



Bibliography

- “Bhattarai to Form a New Political Force,” The Himalayan Times. 2015a. <https://thehimalayantimes.com/nepal/bhattarai-to-form-new-political-force>
- Basnett, Yurendra. “Politicization of Grievances to Political Violence: An Analysis of the Maoist Movement in Nepal.” Working Paper Series. (2009): 1-33.
- Dahal, Dev Rah. “Current Political Situation in Nepal,” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Nepal. 2008. http://www.fesnepal.org/reports/2008/seminar_reports/paper_drd_berlin.htm
- “Ex-PM Bhattarai Gives up ‘red’ pseudonym as well.” The Himalaya Times. 2016a. <http://thehimalayantimes.com/kathmandu/ex-pmbaburam-bhattarai-gives-up-maoist-pseudonym-as-well/>
- Mishra, Rabindra, “Maoist Alone Can Run this Country.” The Nepali Times. 2008. <http://nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=15197>
- “Mr. Dahal You are Guilty,” Nepali Times. 2011. <http://nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=18304>
- “Nepal Maoists: Faction Breaks Away from Governing Party,” British Broadcasting

Corporation. 2012. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-18504403>

“Nepal’s Former PM Baburam Bhattarai Announces New Party,” Agence France-Presse.2016.<http://www.ndtv.com/world-news/nepals-former-maoist-pm-baburam-bhattarai-announces-rival-new-party-1418195>

“The Revenge of the Radicals,” Nepali Times. 2012.
<http://nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=19408>

Sedhai, Roshan. “Baidya’s lieutenants set to rejoin Dahal,” The Kathmandu Post. 2016.
<http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2016-05-11/baidyas-lieutenants-set-to-rejoin-dahal.html>

Thapa, Deepak. Understanding the Maoist Movement of Nepal. Kathmandu. Modern Printing Press, 2003.

Thapa, Ganga & Sharma, Jan. “From Insurgency to Democracy: The Challenges of Peace and Democracy-Building in Nepal.” International Political Science Review. (2009): 205-219.

List of interviews

Devkota, Khimlal. 2016. Interview with author. Kathmandu, November 10, 2016.

Devkota, Shree and Dhakel, Revat. 2016. Interview with author. Kathmandu 14, 2016.

Gurung, Dev. 2016. Interview with author. Kathmandu 17, 2016.

Thapa, Ganga. 2016. Interview with author. Kathmandu, November 11, 2016.