

Fall 2013

# Disturbing the Peace: SALW in Post-Conflict Sudan and South Sudan

Kylin Mueller  
*SIT Study Abroad*

Follow this and additional works at: [https://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp\\_collection](https://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection)



Part of the [African Studies Commons](#)

---

## Recommended Citation

Mueller, Kylin, "Disturbing the Peace: SALW in Post-Conflict Sudan and South Sudan" (2013). *Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection*. 2525.

[https://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp\\_collection/2525](https://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection/2525)

This Unpublished Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the SIT Study Abroad at SIT Digital Collections. It has been accepted for inclusion in Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection by an authorized administrator of SIT Digital Collections. For more information, please contact [digitalcollections@sit.edu](mailto:digitalcollections@sit.edu).

# Disturbing the Peace: SALW in Post-Conflict Sudan and South Sudan

Kylin Mueller  
Fall 2013

**SIT Study Abroad**  
a program of World Learning



Switzerland: International Relations and Multilateral Diplomacy  
Dr. Gyula Csurgai  
Dr. Alexandre Lambert



*The*  
**UNIVERSITY**  
*of* **VERMONT**

College of Arts and Sciences  
Global and Regional Studies  
History (Middle East, Africa, Asia, Global Concentration)

## Abstract:

According to the Small Arms Survey, there are an estimated 875 million small arms and light weapons (SALW) in circulation across the globe. All countries, as well as numerous non-state armed groups, have access to these types of weapons. There are both legal and illegal means of obtaining such weapons, and they can be used for a variety of purposes<sup>1</sup>. While SALW do have a range of legitimate uses, these are also the primary instruments of violence used in most internal and inter-communal conflict.<sup>2</sup> This study aims to address negative impacts that access to these types of weapons has on the human security and development of impoverished and underdeveloped regions. To do so, this research shall focus on one region in particular.

Access to SALW has had a particularly destructive impact on Sudan and the new nation of South Sudan. The proliferation of SALW, especially by non-state actors (particularly armed groups and civilians) is an important factor in the escalating violence of the Sudan region<sup>3</sup>. In order to understand the harmful role that small weapons play in Sudanese conflict, it is crucial to understand the history of this conflict and its sources. Much of the armed conflict in this region occurs as a result of ethnic or political divisions that simply grow beyond government control. This violence, worsened by the ease with which portable SALW are obtained, creates a myriad of problems for the region. Development stagnates, and in some cases ceases completely. Human security diminishes for people living within the direct conflict zone, as well as beyond the country's borders. It

---

<sup>1</sup> Small Arms Survey, "Weapons and Markets,"

<http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/index.php?id=122> (accessed November 10, 2013)

<sup>2</sup> Peter Hazdra, *Small Arms- Big Problem* (Vienna: Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie, 2007), 15.

<sup>3</sup> Human Security Baseline Assessment, "Arms and Ammunition Tracing Desk,"

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures/arms-and-ammunition-tracing-desk.html> (accessed November 9, 2013)

is important that adequate measures be taken to reduce the danger that SALW create in Sudan and South Sudan. Many organizations believe that the best way to do this is through disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, also known as DDR. This paper provides some alternatives to traditional DDR strategies.

## Preface:

I chose to study this topic after my experiences visiting northern Uganda in 2012. I saw firsthand the impacts that poverty and corruption can have on the security sector of a developing region. While there, I met the son of the late rebel leader John Garang. Hearing his son's story inspired me to learn more about the Sudanese Civil War and the current status of Sudan and South Sudan. My interest in military history and development prompted me to learn more about small arms and light weapons in these destitute regions. This paper has given me the opportunity to explore all of my interests, and gain a better understanding of the situation in Sudan, South Sudan, and many other post-war developing countries.

### Acknowledgements:

My work on this paper has allowed me to learn an incredible amount not only about Sudanese history, but also the impact of ethnic rivalries and political conflict on national development. My work on the small arms trade has taught me a great deal about the ways that legal and illegal weapons dealings can have far-reaching consequences in any society. The broad themes addressed in this paper will no doubt be of great use for developing my future in global studies, history, and international relations. For their help with my research, I would like to thank both of my academic directors, Dr. Gyula Csurgai and Dr. Alexandre Lambert. I would like to thank Aline Dunant for all of her academic support over the entire semester. I would especially like to mention David Atwood, Ivor Fung, Himayu Shiotani, and my anonymous source at the GCSP for making time to discuss this project with me. They provided a great deal of direction and background information that supplemented everything I have learned. My thanks also go out to my friends and family, for being a constant source of encouragement during this whole process.

## **Table of Contents**

Abstract.....	2
Preface.....	4
Acknowledgements.....	5
Introduction.....	7
Defining SALW.....	10
Origins and Transit.....	10
Case Study: How did Arms Proliferation Happen in Sudan and South Sudan?.....	12
Second Sudanese Civil War.....	12
Darfur.....	15
Intertribal Violence in South Kordofan.....	18
South Sudan.....	20
Jonglei State.....	21
Small Arms and Human Security.....	25
Small Arms and Development.....	27
Challenges to Traditional DDR.....	28
How to Improve DDR Programs for Sudan and South Sudan.....	31
Conclusion.....	34
Bibliography.....	36
List of Acronyms.....	39
Map.....	40

## Introduction:

This study will focus on the destructive nature of small arms proliferation in post-war societies. In order to gain a realistic, effective understanding of their effects, it is necessary to examine both how those arms get into the wrong hands after armed conflict has ended, as well as the direct and indirect results of their presence. This investigation shall review specifically the role of small arms and light weapons in Sudan and South Sudan. A great deal of the existing research on this topic comes from the Small Arms Survey. This independent research project serves to gather information on all facets of small arms proliferation, and serves as a resource for governments, researchers and non-state organizations alike. It provides case studies on specific countries that face a problem with small arms proliferation. It does so not to criticize those governments, but to expose the realities and identify the factors that drive these realities. From the desk of the Small Arms Survey, one learns the definition of a “small arm and light weapon” and also the main routes of transit for these products. This is important to understand the overarching themes that can be found in the Sudan and South Sudan proliferation issue. A great deal of information for this analysis comes from another desk of the Small Arms Survey, the Human Security Baseline Assessment Project (HSBA) for Sudan and South Sudan. This program deals specifically with small arms security and armed violence in Sudan and South Sudan. The HSBA has published a number of working papers, such as “My Neighbor, My Enemy: Intertribal Violence in Jonglei” and “Reaching for the Gun: Arms flows in South Sudan.” The HSBA papers provide a more specific perspective on small arms, particularly in regards to Sudan and South Sudanese populations. The current analysis seeks to integrate the information available from the Small Arms Survey projects with details about the impacts of small arms on human security and development in Sudan and South Sudan.

After describing the problems that come from the presence of small arms, this analysis will introduce some potential ways that the traditional DDR process can be refined to best solve the small arms problem in Sudan and South Sudan.

When exploring these articles, a number of themes emerged that influenced the direction of my research. I have developed a number of research questions that this paper seeks to answer. These are:

- What defines a small arm/ light weapon (SALW)?
- How do SALW get spread to developing/war-torn countries?
- How did weapons become so easily available in Sudan and South Sudan?
- What are some examples of their negative impacts on Sudan and South Sudan?
- How do we solve this problem?
- How should traditional DDR methods be shaped to fit Sudan and South Sudan?

In answering these questions, I hope to come up with some of the sources of the small arms problem in Sudan and South Sudan, as well as some possible solutions.

### Research Methodology

To understand this issue, I used a combination of primary and secondary sources. I combined knowledge on the legislation dealing with small arms trade and armed conflict with specific information on Sudanese and South Sudanese armed violence. The personal interviews that I conducted served as a background for my research, and help steer the direction of my study. The Small Arms Survey provided a great deal of resources and working papers on the role of small arms and light weapons in general. The HSBA supplied more specific information on Sudanese and South Sudanese issues. The HSBA collected a number of reports on various aspects of regional instances of SALW use, as well as

information on the origins of these weapons. The nature of my research required a great deal of information about Sudanese and South Sudanese-specific aspects of the arms trade, so this site provided a great deal of my information regarding the origins of regional issues. I combined this information with research about the impact of SALW availability on development, and was able to make conclusions about SALW on the development of Sudan and South Sudan. I then used all of this collected information to make judgments about how to revise current DDR practices to be more productive and effective in the region.

In this way, I formulated my main research questions, as well as a general thesis. This paper shall analyze how small arms and light weapons have become so regularly available in Sudan and South Sudan, the ways these weapons further complicate regional issues, and how it has damaged the development process. I then formulate several ways to revise the arms reduction process to best fit the Sudanese and South Sudanese situations.

## What is a SALW?

Before delving too deep into the issue of small arms proliferation, it is first necessary to define the term “small arms and light weapons.” According to a 1997 UN panel of government experts, SALW are above all defined by their portability. These small, relatively lightweight weapons are easy to transport and distribute, making their proliferation of particular concern. The term ‘small arms’ includes revolvers, self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, assault rifles, sub-machine guns and light machine guns. ‘Light weapons’ refers to heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems, portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems (MANPADS) and mortars of calibers less than 100mm<sup>4</sup>. The term SALW also includes the ammunition for each of these types of arms and weapons; it is a crucial part of the danger of SALW proliferation, and can therefore not be overlooked. As mentioned in the preface, there exist almost a billion SALW in circulation around the world.

## Where Do These Arms Come From? Where Do They Go?

SALW like those used in Sudan and South Sudan are produced by over 1000 manufacturers in almost 100 countries. They are created and transported by a variety of legal and illegal means, and are in high demand by a number of actors. Their small size, combined with the often-times illegal nature of their trade makes tracking and controlling SALW quite difficult<sup>5</sup>. Due to the spread of technology and the ease with which licenses and production rights may be obtained, it is significantly easier for countries to produce these

---

<sup>4</sup> Small Arms Survey, “Definitions” <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/definitions.html>

<sup>5</sup> Small Arms Survey, “Weapons and Markets”

arms much more cheaply, quickly, and in higher numbers than ever before<sup>6</sup>. The top manufacturers of SALW are not the most underdeveloped or corrupt governments, but the top exporter countries such as China, Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy<sup>7</sup>. India, Pakistan and North Korea are major producers as well because of the large domestic market they have for these types of products. There is also a growing trend of small-scale craft production in underdeveloped countries. Some populations living in violent or underdeveloped societies have realized the huge market for these dangerous products, and developed independent means to create them on a small-scale<sup>8</sup>. These types of SALW are often under limited or no government control, and are even harder to track<sup>9</sup>.

Once produced, it is simply a matter of getting these arms to the countries with the highest demand. New and surplus arms are delivered to both state and non-state actors in a variety of legal and illegal routes. According to a Small Arms Survey in 2012, the international small arms trade is worth at least 2.5 billion US dollars. It is because of this that the illegal transfer of such dangerous weapons is so difficult to curtail<sup>10</sup>.

But something must be done. Current estimates indicate that SALW are responsible for 85-90 percent of people killed and injured globally every year. Over 50 percent of the weapons responsible for these deaths were held by non-state actors outside of governmental control.<sup>11</sup> SALW trade occurs in the highest concentration in areas wracked with violence, armed conflict, and organized crime. These weapons only intensify the severity of civil

---

<sup>6</sup> Small Arms Survey, "Producers" <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/producers.html>

<sup>7</sup> Small Arms Survey, "Industrial Production" <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/producers/industrial-production.html>

<sup>8</sup> Small Arms Survey, "Illegal Trafficking" <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/transfers/illicit-trafficking.html>

<sup>9</sup> Small Arms Survey, "Producers" <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/producers.html>

<sup>10</sup> Small Arms Survey, "Transfers" <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/transfers.html>

<sup>11</sup> Hazdra, *Small Arms- Big Problem*, 8.

wars and regional conflicts and add to the stockpiles of dangerous armed groups. They contribute a lethal nature to conflicts that could have otherwise been solved peacefully. SALW escalate violence, often making it much harder, if not impossible to resolve. We see this pattern played out again and again across the globe. In order to understand all the complicated problems that can arise from SALW proliferation, it is most useful to analyze case studies that provide real-world examples. This research shall focus specifically on SALW proliferation in Sudan and South Sudan.

## **SUDAN**

For the purpose of this paper, I shall split the instances of armed conflict in Sudan and South Sudan by country. The first section will focus on examples of violence in Sudan, including the Second Sudanese Civil War, as well as conflict in the border states of Darfur and South Kordofan. The second will concentrate on violence in South Sudan as a result of animosity left over from war. It will also discuss tribal violence in the Upper Nile Region. Each of these examples presents a brief description of an instance of armed conflict, and the ways in which SALW have made it worse.

### **SECOND SUDANESE CIVIL WAR**

Currently, there are approximately 2.7 million SALW in Sudan, and two-thirds of these are circulating outside of government control.<sup>12</sup> Since its independence in 1956, Sudan (and what is now South Sudan) has been engulfed in intense civil conflict. Internal war over resources, power, religion, political representation and self-determination has prevented any degree of lasting peace. This persistent discord deprived the people any type of real

---

<sup>12</sup> Human Security Baseline Assessment, “Arms and Ammunition Tracing Desk”

stability, growth, or development, and wreaked havoc on the country.<sup>13</sup> This war also resulted in the influx of a huge number of SALW to supply the militants on either side.

The Second Sudanese Civil War broke out in 1983 and lasted until 2005 initially over the long-term political and economic marginalization felt by a number of minority groups in Sudan<sup>14</sup>. Due to the sprawling and disorganized nature of the Second Sudanese Civil War, it was extremely simple for smugglers and even ordinary citizens to gain possession of arms left over after the war had ended<sup>15</sup>. Most war-torn areas lacked effectual infrastructure, making it very difficult to secure weapons and ammunition stockpiles according to international best practice standards<sup>16</sup>. The physical security of SALW stockpiles was minimal, resulting in a great deal of misuse and transference of weapons. The war involved a number of non-state groups who were subject to less stringent standards for physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) practices, so the theft and dispersal of weapons outside of governmental control was much less complicated. During the war, members of the SPLA (the army of South Sudan) were allotted one rifle and ammunition, but also frequently obtained more guns that they seized from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Due to the scarcity of suitable ammunition, these guns were rarely used once taken. Instead, they could be easily traded to the members of the community for food or other goods that soldiers desired. The limited PSSM measures made trades like this especially easy for non-state militia groups like the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Due to resource scarcity and consideration of strategic factors, the SPLA placed a greater emphasis on the need for mobility and surprise

---

<sup>13</sup> United Nations Mission in Sudan. "The Background to Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement." <http://unmis.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=515>

<sup>14</sup> Small Arms Survey. "Ad Hoc Arsenals: PSSM Practices of Selected Non-State Actors." *Armed Actors Issue Brief* no. 2 (May 2013): 9.

<sup>15</sup> Small Arms Survey. "Ad Hoc Arsenals," 9.

<sup>16</sup> *ibid.*, 2

rather than strong security in permanent storage facilities. As a result, many weapons were kept in hidden places like tree canopies or rock formations that blended into the surroundings<sup>17</sup>. There was little protection against unauthorized access, so it was no doubt considerably easier to smuggle or steal weapons from these facilities than from conventional military stockpiles. Oftentimes, soldiers would distribute guns to elders or chiefs in small communities. Tribal affiliations created the desire to protect their communities from raiding tribes or SAF forces, so extra guns were given out to chiefs or civilians to aid in local defense<sup>18</sup>. It is not surprising therefore, that Sudan has a large problem with SALW proliferation amongst not only non-state groups, but by civilians as well.

The Second Sudanese Civil War was only mildly resolved in 2005 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Unfortunately, all this agreement really did was to temporarily diminish public government military action. It left the status of both states vague, and did little to address the human rights abuses and starvation left over from the war<sup>19</sup>. Under the agreement, the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A accepted a number of protocols. These included agreement on security arrangements, wealth-sharing, power-sharing, resolution of conflict in Abyele, South Kordofan and the Blue Nile states (sites of tribal violence), and also provisions on the eventual self-governance and transitional process for a new state of South Sudan<sup>20</sup>. However, the majority of these protocols have yet to be truly implemented. There was no provision about what to do with arms stockpiles left from the war. The agreement also did not involve a comprehensive cease-fire, so a potential re-emergence of violence was extremely likely. The next few years saw the

---

<sup>17</sup> *ibid.*, 10

<sup>18</sup> *ibid.*, 9

<sup>19</sup> Human Security Baseline Assessment. "Sudan."  
<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures/sudan.html>

<sup>20</sup> United Nations Mission in Sudan, "Background to Sudan's Peace Agreement"

reemergence of outbursts of conflict, especially by tribal and non-state armed groups.

There has yet to be an effective resolution.

The South Sudanese nation became independent on July 11, 2011, but this was not the end of border violence<sup>21</sup>.

## DARFUR

Currently, the Government of Sudan is facing two different conflicts within its borders. The first being fought against a number of Darfur armed opposition groups; the second deals with indigenous rebels in Kordofan. These states retain ties with South Sudan<sup>22</sup>.

Since the Second Sudanese Civil War, relations between the Government of Sudan and Border States have become increasingly tense. Due to their location between Sudan and South Sudan, they are subjected to a great deal of violence and local disruption. For years, groups in the Darfur region of Sudan accused the Government of Sudan of marginalizing Darfur's non-Arab population. Fighting broke out in Darfur in 2003 between the Government of Sudan Forces (SAF) in alliance with Jangaweed militia and other non-Arab rebel groups such as the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in alliance with the SPLM/A<sup>23</sup>. The non-Arab militants are primarily recruited from the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit tribal groups. The attacks in these regions are ethnically related, making them especially violent; the steady access to SALW makes these confrontations even more deadly.

---

<sup>21</sup> Human Security Baseline Assessment, "Sudan"

<sup>22</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> Human Security Baseline Assessment, "Darfur"

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures/sudan/darfur.html>

An estimated 300,000 people have died and 2 million displaced since the Second Civil War outbreak, and fighting continues to this day<sup>24,25</sup>. Widespread atrocities such as the rape and murder of civilians have become commonplace; violence is everywhere. Finding peace in Darfur has since become one of the United Nations' top priorities, and a number of missions and organizations have been created and delegated to the cause<sup>26</sup>. However, the brutality continues. The conflict hasn't improved; it has only evolved, enabled by SALW. The flow of SALW is in direct opposition to international sanctions and a UN arms embargo placed on trade with Darfur intended to stop the supply. There exists ample evidence proving that the arms supplied are not only of the same type as in the past, but new models. This indicates that suppliers have renewed their contracts with Darfur rebel groups and the SAF, willingly facilitating the continuation of the violence.

Some of these arms come from surrounding regions. Darfur is now a battleground for proxy wars by neighboring countries. Chad, Libya and South Sudan were historically affected by events in the Darfur region, and thus asserted their assistance to militant groups across Sudan's borders in attempts to create positive change for their local situations. In general, arms are transported to Darfur through three main vectors: from Libyan government stockpiles, from Chadian Armed Forces stockpiles, and from the SAF domestic supply chain. Today, SAF has become the most prominent of these three<sup>27</sup>. There also exists proof that the militias of South Sudan have provided support to JEM and other non-Arab groups. Seized arms from SAF provide a constant supply to non-Arab militias<sup>28</sup>. There is also evidence of a large number of Chinese manufactured weapons being used in

---

<sup>24</sup> Human Baseline Security Assessment, "Sudan"

<sup>25</sup> Nations Department of Public Information- Peace and Security Section. "United Nations and Darfur: Fact Sheet." (August 2007): 1.

<sup>26</sup> *ibid.*, 2,3

<sup>27</sup> Human Security Baseline Assessment. "Business as Usual: Arms Flows to Darfur 2009-12." Small Arms Survey: Sudan Issue Brief no 20, (September 2012): 3.

<sup>28</sup> Human Security Baseline Assessment, "Arms Flows to Darfur", 4.

the conflict<sup>29</sup>. It is clear that the 2005 arms embargo to Darfur is being blatantly violated, and with few repercussions

Despite the 2005 embargo's issue with effectiveness, it has remained largely unchanged. Its limited geographical scope allows some international manufacturers and suppliers to give arms resources to the Government of Sudan legally, regardless of the knowledge that these arms will more than likely be used in Darfur. A lack of concentration on tracking and security by arms-suppliers has made it quite easy for these weapons to be used to sustain the Sudanese Government's continual violation of UN resolutions on Darfur<sup>30</sup>.

It is clear how easy it is for these dangerous weapons to end up in the wrong hands. Disorganized militias on either side have constant access to SALW and use them at will. As a result, the region continues to be torn apart by all manner of violence. The uncontrolled and sporadic nature of the Darfur conflict is particularly troubling. There have been several attempts to generate peace talks between groups, but these have proved largely unsuccessful. As of 2013, a few new complications have surfaced in the Darfur conflict. In the Jebel Amir area in North Darfur, fighting has become fierce over control of gold reserves, Sudan's most valuable commodity. In South Darfur, tribal confrontation over Acacia gum has led to more inter-communal violence. The fact that these relatively isolated issues can become so violent and bloody is an indication of the dire nature of the situation. Access to military resources and arms has only worsened existing tribal and resource disputes.<sup>31</sup> Inter-tribal and ethnic violence is a historical trend but in previous years it was much easier to solve conflict peacefully when such violent tools were not available. Now, due to the ease with which guns can be obtained, it is extremely tempting to use SALW

---

<sup>29</sup> *ibid.*, 6.

<sup>30</sup> *ibid.*, 10.

<sup>31</sup> *ibid*

instead of a more peaceful conflict resolution methods<sup>32</sup>. Similar research has been conducted in the Blue Nile and South Kordofan states, proving the occurrence of the same patterns in those regions<sup>33</sup>.

## INTERTRIBAL VIOLENCE IN SOUTH KORDOFAN

In 2011, violence erupted in the Border States between the Sudanese national and paramilitary forces and the northern branch of the SPLM in alliance with some armed opposition groups. This conflict mobilized a huge number of civilians and militants in the region and led to an even greater presence of SALW<sup>34</sup>. Even if a solution is found to the North-South Sudan conflict, it will not be sufficient to end the violence in South Kordofan (one such border state). The issue here is an internal Sudanese problem that impacts the stability of Kordofan and the whole surrounding region.<sup>35</sup>

South Kordofan consists mainly of a number of non-Arab tribes, living in an area called the Nuba Mountains. Since Sudanese independence, the tribes there have been subjected to a number of unjust policies by the Khartoum government. Sudanese laws constantly favored Arab cultures, creating unjust policies like opening up their land for farming investment. As a result, the inhabitants of the Nuba allied more closely with the South Sudan rebel leader John Garang, and his acceptance of the multi-ethnic nature of Sudan (and South Sudan)<sup>36</sup>. As a Nuba land expert put it “the encroachment of mechanized rain-fed farming into the customary Nuba farming land bringing socio-economic devastation was the single most important issue behind the extension of the civil war into

---

<sup>32</sup> Formal interview, Ivor Fung. November 11, 2013.

<sup>33</sup> Human Security Baseline Assessment, “Arms Flows to Darfur,” 1.

<sup>34</sup> Claudio Gramizzi and Jerome Tubiana. “New War, Old Enemies: Conflict Dynamics in South Kordofan,” *Small Arms Survey* (2013): 8.

<sup>35</sup> *ibid.*, 10

<sup>36</sup> Gramizzi and Tubiana, “New War, Old Enemies,” 11.

the Nuba Mountains<sup>37</sup> It is clear then, how customary and cultural elements served as the basis for violence and socioeconomic problems to spread. After the end of the war in 2005, little national attention was paid to this growing dilemma. This ethnically-based problem turned deadly once SALW force was introduced. The severity of fighting was allowed to fester, and the root causes were never addressed. Tensions rose until 2011, when a real war began<sup>38</sup>.

The conflict ravaged the civilian population; over 400,000 people were directly affected. At least 100,000 were moved into refugee camps to escape hunger and starvation in war-torn areas. Many are too frightened to return to their farms, sharply decreasing the amount of food available<sup>39</sup>. Random and unselective bombardment by the SAF in the Nuba Mountains continues, to the point that the Nuba region remains near uninhabitable. The presence of SALW makes the likelihood of violent confrontation infinitely more likely, and makes the situation much worse.

The SAF forces have near unlimited access to weapons through means of legal and illegal trade, despite embargoes and trade barriers. The rebels also have access, using weapons seized from the SAF by the SPLA. In this way, the same people that supply one side of the conflict also supply the other, indicating that arms-suppliers are to a large degree responsible for the terrible devastation of this region<sup>40</sup>. Lately, the Sudanese Government has favored military options over any type of concession to the SPLA, only reinforcing the willingness of militants to support the violent culture of conflict in the Nuba Mountains.

---

<sup>37</sup> *ibid.*, 13.

<sup>38</sup> *ibid.*, 18

<sup>39</sup> *ibid.*, 21

<sup>40</sup> *ibid.*,19

## **SOUTH SUDAN**

Similar patterns of SALW use occur in South Sudan.

Though only a nation for a few years, South Sudan is also plagued by chronic conflict. The location of much of the fighting in the Second Sudanese Civil War, it was subjected to a great deal of upheaval and destruction. Toward the end of the war the issue became not only between the SPLA and the Sudanese Government, but also between the SPLA and various Khartoum-supported militias in the south. Despite numerous attempts by the SPLA leadership to integrate these enemy troops and commanders with the SPLA, they remained largely antagonistic. To this day, the SPLA still struggles to contain the threat of violence from internal enemy militias, as well as some groups of external origins (such as the Lords Resistance Army from Uganda). The constant threat is difficult to control; the South Sudan Police Service (SSPS) is very weak and low on resources, and the SPLA cannot be utilized to its full capacity because some parts of the SPLA (SPLA-North) are still involved with rebellions in Kordofan and the Blue Nile States<sup>41</sup>. This security vacuum left room for a number of armed groups to operate successfully with relatively little interference. The presence of militias, self-defense units, cattle-raiding groups, armed civilians and nomadic communities, (among a great deal of other groups) challenge the safety and security of all those living in South Sudan<sup>42</sup>. A few of these groups include insurgent leaders who have launched numerous rebellions against the South Sudan government and army, destabilizing much of the Greater Upper Nile Region. There has also been an explosion of inter-tribal violence, the worst the region has seen in years.

---

<sup>41</sup> Human Security Baseline Assessment. "South Sudan."

<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures/south-sudan.html>

<sup>42</sup> Human Security Baseline Assessment. "South Sudan."

Each of these instances of violence was fueled by the steady supply of SALW. Since South Sudan's independence in 2011, the ban on material acquisitions to the state was lifted, allowing the government to pursue a number of defense contracts with arms-supplier states. Simultaneously, a great number of non-state groups (tribal, militia, etc.) have begun acquiring illicit weapons at an increasing rate<sup>43</sup>. Where there is conflict, arms will flow<sup>44</sup>. The demand for weapons in South Sudan is enormous, and outside suppliers have had no problem meeting this demand<sup>45</sup>.

This consistent access to weapons has only worsened the already dire situation in South Sudan. The country faces poverty, hunger, and starvation, and this added dimension of violence only makes problems worse. The desperate situation has worsened tensions over land, resources, political representation and ethnic rivalries. The proliferation of guns in itself is not the problem; the problem occurs when increased levels of tension and violence attract the weapons to be used. In a tense situation like that of South Sudan, it is all too tempting to use the ever-present SALW as a method for managing disputes, instead of more peaceful means<sup>46</sup>.

## JONGLEI AND UPPER NILE STATES

The same trend is also demonstrated in the worsening of intertribal violence in Jonglei state, South Sudan. The growing number of armed insurgencies has made the region more volatile and dangerous. The conflicts that have resulted from these rebellions have led to the death of thousands of South Sudanese civilians, and displaced many more. Whole

---

<sup>43</sup> Human Security Baseline Assessment. "Reaching for the Gun: Arms Flows and Holdings in South Sudan." Small Arms Survey: Sudan Issue Brief no 19, (April 2012): 1.

<sup>44</sup> Formal interview, David Atwood. November 19, 2013.

<sup>45</sup> Human Security Baseline Assessment, "Reaching for the Gun" 1.

<sup>46</sup> Formal interview, Ivor Fung. November 11, 2013.

communities have been forced to relocate. It is no surprise than, that many of the South Sudanese have lost all faith in the ability of their government to protect their interests and their lives. This encourages even more rebellion, as groups attempt to create real change in the South Sudanese nation.<sup>47</sup>

For the most part, these rebellions are led by individuals who have taken advantage of local resentment toward the government and the South's weak security sector. Many groups and tribes feel excluded by the government, so it is relatively easy for those opportunistic individuals to use community dissatisfaction to increase their own power. The presence of guns makes it all too simple for these rebellions to turn violent very quickly. Where there are guns, the temptation is always there to use them<sup>48</sup>.

Most of the worst instances of violence in the South are between the Lou Nuer, Murle, and Dinka tribes in Jonglei State. The string of attacks between tribes have grown more and more violent due to easy access to deadly weapons. These conflicts mainly stem from the lack of real governmental services, increased competition over natural resources, the deterioration of traditional structures of leadership in the tribe, and the changing nature of cattle raiding.

Conflict becomes violent as a result (direct or indirect) of the increased access to weapons. Rebel militias, as well as members of the SPLA have supplied a great deal of weapons and ammunition to Jonglei communities. An increase in the frequency and intensity of the attacks, along with a change in targeting tactics (due to new amounts of SALW) have made violent outbursts much more deadly<sup>49</sup>. Cattle raiding has taken on a new degree of seriousness. Once these raids were focused only on obtaining cattle from

---

<sup>47</sup> fighting for spoils- jonglei state.....?

<sup>48</sup> interview, mr fung

<sup>49</sup> Jonah Leff, Human Security Baseline Assessment. "My Neighbor, My Enemy: Inter-tribal Violence in Jonglei" Sudan Issue Brief no. 21 (October 2012): 1.

neighboring tribes; now they have taken on a more ethnically-driven nature.<sup>50</sup> Because of the increased available firepower, attackers now can raid whole villages, killing civilians of all genders and ages. They target NGO facilities, schools, hospitals, and other spaces crucial for the communities' human development. This new era of violence worsens depending on trends in food availability and social conditions, but never truly subsides<sup>51</sup>.

The sources of these weapons are easy to deduce. During the Second Civil War, weapons circulated easily to the SAF-backed militias and SPLA-breakaway groups. But due to some civilian disarmament programs, many of these weapons had been collected by 2012. However, these disarmament efforts were uncoordinated and insufficient, so communities were able to easily re-arm. Armories and stockpiles were not well protected, so looting stocks of the weapons that had been collected was not difficult. Weapons are brought across borders by local militias or shipped in by local traders. They shuttle small arms and ammunition from other states in the country and neighboring nations into town centers; these weapons are available for trade or for cash and are quite difficult to trace.

After the civil war, the country saw a rapid influx of young men returning from war<sup>52</sup>. They returned back to their village still carrying guns and without job prospects. With little direction, they directed their attention at already existing tribal rivalries, and used their weapons in conflicts that had previously been fought in more traditional and less violent ways.<sup>53</sup> The influx of militias brought even more weapons into Jonglei. Some armed militias attempted to persuade youths to join with them and fight the SPLA in return for weapons. Unfortunately for militia leaders, this strategy backfired, and many of the youths used the weapons not to attack the SPLA, but in ethnic rivalries in their communities. The

---

<sup>50</sup> *ibid.*, 1.

<sup>51</sup> *ibid.*, 3.

<sup>52</sup> *ibid.*, 4.

<sup>53</sup> *ibid.*, 5.

SPLA also was one of the main suppliers of weapons to the youth population. After independence, they established a paramilitary force called the “SPLA Youth,” meant to counter rebel militias. However, there exist a great deal of reports indicating that instead of using the weapons for defense of South Sudan, the SPLA Youth traded arms and ammunition for food and alcohol in local markets. This contributed to the proliferation of untracked weapons by civilians<sup>54</sup>.

The increased role of firearms has also had negative impacts on traditional tribal power relations. The influence of elders and tribal chiefs over the youth population has been undermined by the power associated with owning and using firearms. The erosion of traditional leadership destroys the practical conflict mitigation mechanism that was once presided by the community elders<sup>55</sup>.

Overall, it is clear that arms are quite easy to obtain in Jonglei. Residual anger and mounting frustration make the temptation to use SALW for the wrong reasons too strong to ignore<sup>56</sup>. It has been difficult to find a solution to this evolving problem. The seriousness of the issue remains largely ignored by the government and non-state groups<sup>57</sup>. Even when national law enforcement exists, it is too weak to make any tangible improvement in human security and safety<sup>58</sup>.

---

<sup>54</sup> *ibid.*, 4.

<sup>55</sup> Jonah Leff, Human Security Baseline Assessment. “My Neighbor, My Enemy”<sup>5</sup>

<sup>56</sup> interview mr fung

<sup>57</sup> Paul Eavis, “SALW in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region: Challenges and Ways Forward,” *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 9, no. 1 (2002): 254.

<sup>58</sup> Leff, “My Neighbor, My Enemy,” 7.

## THE EFFECTS OF SMALL ARMS PROLIFERATION ON HUMAN SECURITY

In each of the above cases, it is clear that while the SALW themselves do not create the conflict, they worsen and prolong issues, increase lethality of confrontation, and make reconciliation much more complicated<sup>59</sup>. SALW aggravate already existing structural imbalances, creating insecurity and an inescapable cycle of poverty among already vulnerable groups. Since Sudan and South Sudan are already vulnerable to certain risk factors- such as the marginalization of certain ethnic and political groups, rampant unemployment and social inequality- it is all the more likely that violence will emerge as a result of the availability of SALW. <sup>60</sup>

Due to low cost, widespread availability and portability, small arms are also the types of weapons most commonly used in illicit and internal conflict such as gang violence, crime, and civil war. Their long lifespan causes them to be continuously reused and recycled from old conflicts, fueling new ones. In the absence of legitimate political authority and an effective policing sector, the availability of such weapons leads to a widespread culture of violence. <sup>61</sup>. This culture inhibits the healthy growth of development, and the countries cannot flourish. The prevalence of violence has led to higher levels of urban insecurity in North and South Sudan; the increased availability of deadly weapons leads to a direct increase in violent crime and deadly assault. Instead of using traditional and more peaceful means to solve conflict, disputes are settled with deadly force.<sup>62</sup>

---

<sup>59</sup> Eavis, "SALW in the Horn of Africa," 251.

<sup>60</sup> Robert Muggah and Peter Batchelor, co-published with UNDP. "Development Held Hostage: Assessing the Effects of Small Arms on Human Development," (2002): 8.

<sup>61</sup> *ibid.*, 21.

<sup>62</sup> Eavis, "SALW in the Horn of Africa," 253.

Resource scarcity, political marginalization, and ethnic rivalries create tension between communities, which is unleashed via lethal weapons<sup>63</sup>. An increasing number of civilians (as opposed to combatants) are directly targeted and killed by small arms. Even after war has ceased, the number of casualties per year has only marginally declined<sup>64</sup>. Violence does nothing but spur more violence and hatred, creating a cycle that cannot be undone. While this large number of weapons still exists among militia and civilian populations, it will be near impossible to solve any of the issues plaguing Sudan and South Sudan.

Beyond simply racking up a high death toll, the availability of SALW creates a great deal of socioeconomic and human security problems for the region as well. The overall quality of life diminishes due to prevalence of criminal activity. As a result, this has serious implications on labor productivity, the value of property investment, the cost of goods and services, and the success of the tourist industry<sup>65</sup>. It places a huge economic burden on the country; medical clinics and hospitals spend a great deal of time and resources on caring for gunshot victims, when more could be spent on the prevention of disease and treatment of disability. In Sudan and South Sudan, rebel group insurgencies and tribal warfare have contributed to the deterioration of social and health services. NGO and medical facilities are often the targets for attack. This not only impacts the feeling of safety of medical and peacekeeping officers, but also inhibits the ability of such organizations to operate. Without such facilities, civilian access to healthcare and social services is extremely limited. Patients have little or no access to health services, and the facilities that do exist are over-stretched.

---

<sup>63</sup> *ibid.*, 253.

<sup>64</sup> Muggah and Batchelor, "Development," 17.

<sup>65</sup> *ibid.*, 6.

The public health sector has deteriorated, which restricts possibilities for health interventions and contributes to the spread of infectious disease in the region<sup>66</sup>.

## THE EFFECTS OF SMALL ARMS PROLIFERATION ON HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

All of these factors are directly linked to Sudan and South Sudan's ability to develop as nations. Human development stagnates when the infrastructure, health, and security sectors are not working properly. Effects of SALW on human development come in the form of direct and indirect impacts. Direct refers to the immediate deaths and injuries that result from armed violence. Indirect impacts include criminality, displacement, deterioration of public services, reduced economic activity, and the erosion of a state's social capital<sup>67</sup>. Both direct and indirect impacts influence the overall quality of life in a country, as well as its ability to develop properly.

Society functions best in a productive and healthy environment where people feel safe enough to steer their focus outward, instead of on protection of personal property and getting enough food to eat. The climate of terror in Sudan and South Sudan inhibits people from creating the conditions necessary to foster societal development<sup>68</sup>. This climate of fear has facilitated the breakdown of informal norms of trust and cooperation between people and communities. It inhibits families from feeling a normal sense of social cohesion and personal mobility. Personal protection becomes the foremost consideration instead of the importance of political participation or societal improvement<sup>69</sup>.

Due to the state's lack of ability to control armed violence with police or military services, armed violence is hard to contain. The rising toll of civilian deaths makes it more difficult to determine the distinction between internal war and criminal activity for both

---

<sup>66</sup> *ibid.*, 6.

<sup>67</sup> *ibid.*, 8.

<sup>68</sup> *ibid.*, 11.

<sup>69</sup> *ibid.*, 22.

experts and those involved in the violence. Weak states such as North and South Sudan have thus experienced rising levels of armed criminality and localized violence. The general increase in violence does nothing but encourage civilians to seek out more and more weapons for protection. They purchase arms in self-defense, and with such a culture of violence, it is difficult not to use them<sup>70</sup>.

Community violence determines whether people can live in their own homes, earn a living, have legal protection, or have access to health and education<sup>71</sup>. The feeling of being unsafe in one's own home is a cause of forced displacement. Whole communities in North and South Sudan have migrated away from their traditional homelands. This changes the entire nature of communities and tribal relations. It also disrupts normal economic activities, and can result in even worse situations for the migrants. They are often forced to flee to areas with less geographic resources, making development even more difficult<sup>72</sup>. These inabilities keep people from human security, and thus impact national security and development as a whole.

## CHALLENGES TO DDR

Violence does not stop once armed conflict and war 'ceases. When SALW are improperly managed and misused, social services suffer, traditional culture and tribal structure dissolves, the economy deteriorates, trust between communities disappears, and murder and violence continues. In a continent like Africa, where borders are porous and only exist because someone drew them on a map, these issues have a tendency to spill across state

---

<sup>70</sup> Muggah and Batchelor, "Development," 22.

<sup>71</sup> United Nations Development Program, "Republic of Sudan DDR Programme: Overview," 3.

<sup>72</sup> Muggah and Batchelor, "Development," 27.

borders<sup>73</sup>. This threatens the peace and stability of neighboring countries as well<sup>74</sup>. It is clear that something must be done.

When dealing with small arms proliferation, there is a general consensus in the international community that the best means to solve the problem is through disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs. These normally involve measures introduced after a conflict has ended, aimed at promoting the easy transition of combatants back to civilian life. It also incorporates aspects of weapons reduction through legislation and practical approaches to reduce the incentives for possession, rather than actual destruction of weapons<sup>75</sup>. However, the same types of DDR programs do not work for every region. Sudan and South Sudan face a number of unique situations that inhibit these types of 'best practice' programs from working effectively.

The CPA in 2005 set a timeline for the DDR program in Sudan, to be finished by 2011. Unfortunately, the program did very little in terms of weapons reduction or the successful demobilization of combatants. A very small percentage of the targeted adults even entered the program. Due to an absence of agreement by stakeholders, mismanagement and inefficiency, the program failed to achieve any real results. There exists a growing amount of research that shows that the number of arms collected do not necessarily lead to better security or boosted civilian confidence. Those weapons that are collected are often left in storehouses with insufficient security. The failure to truly destroy collected weapons only contributes to the 'recycling' of arms back into civilian hands.<sup>76</sup> There has been no real impact on the security in South Sudan, and the size of the SPLA

---

<sup>73</sup> Formal Interview, David Atwood.

<sup>74</sup> DDR in post conflict, no magic bullet 241

<sup>75</sup> Robert Muggah, "No Magic Bullet: A Critical Perspective on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Weapons Reduction in Post-conflict Contexts," *Round Table* 94, no. 379 (2005): 242.

<sup>76</sup> Muggah, "No Magic Bullet," 245.

army has not decreased as was planned<sup>77</sup>. The reason for this failure is that the DDR ‘best practices’ do not fit every situation. They aren’t really applicable to the situation in Sudan and South Sudan, and thus have not succeeded<sup>78</sup>.

The situation in Sudan and South Sudan involves a number of complicating factors. Part of the DDR process involves reintegration of soldiers back into communities where they can find a job and be involved in the economy. However, due to scarce resources and limited job opportunities, there is very little for the soldiers to return to. The families they left behind have often been forced to relocate or scattered as a result of conflict, so it is very hard for the soldiers to even retain links to family members that could help them or include them. There is also the problem of child soldiers. Many were too young when they joined that they have not retained an “adult” status in the community; they have no formal education or basic skills to use in the job market. The communities they return to have strict cultural and traditional norms, and those that have been away for too long at an early age will not fit in when they return.

The war tore apart the land and communities, so the towns are often too weak to support the influx of soldiers returning from war, leading to increased competition, and fostering resentment and poverty among the village. Economic reintegration is also a challenge due to the very limited infrastructure of Sudan and South Sudan. The population returning to towns will find it increasingly hard to survive in areas so desperate for food, water, and social services. Existing tensions between Sudan and South Sudan also make the situation very precarious. When South Sudan separated from Sudan, the Sudanese economy suffered considerably. A loss in oil production of more than 75%, combined with

---

<sup>77</sup> Jonah Leff, Human Security Baseline Assessment. “Failures and Opportunities: Rethinking DDR in South Sudan.” Small Arms Survey: Sudan Issue Brief no. 17, (May 2011): 1.

<sup>78</sup> *ibid.*, 1.

international sanctions, foreign debt, and a decrease in foreign investment has led to a serious economic crisis. These economic issues complicate the DDR efforts from running smoothly<sup>79</sup>.

Beyond these economic constraints to reintegration, there is also a huge psychosocial element that inhibits ex-combatant demobilization in Sudan and South Sudan. In order for demobilization to work, there need to be adequate psychological services to make soldiers re-accustomed to civilian life. Men who have been bush-fighting for all of their lives do not easily transition away from their violent lifestyle. Adequate counseling and career services need to be in place for demobilization to work properly, or else soldiers will simply return to their life of violence by joining militant groups or crime gangs<sup>80</sup>.

In addition, the loyalty and responsibility that is such a large part of the military, especially the SPLA, makes many soldiers very reluctant to join the DDR process. They do not understand why they were chosen to demobilize, often feeling rejected<sup>81</sup>. There is also the issue of pension and salary; the SPLA now pays a significant portion of the GoSS budget to its soldiers, removing almost all motivation for combatants to demobilize as part of the DDR process<sup>82</sup>.

## ALTERNATIVES TO TRADITIONAL DDR

These complications require attention. The typical DDR best practices do not work in this unique scenario. Poorly targeted development and humanitarian assistance often only serve to fuel conflict; it allows the suffering to prolong, and diverts people from their

---

<sup>79</sup> United Nations Development Program, "Republic of Sudan DDR Programme: Overview," 2.

<sup>80</sup> Formal interview. Anonymous State Department official at GCSP. November 19, 2013.

<sup>81</sup> National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (NDDRC). "Challenges." <http://www.ssddrc.org/ddr-in-south-sudan/challenges.html>

<sup>82</sup> Muggah, "No Magic Bullet," 8.

normal economic activities. It is easier to divert aid away from the intended beneficiaries in situations where the region is run by corruption and informal economies<sup>83</sup>. In the absence of a coherent political and economic framework, disarmament programs cannot be successful<sup>84</sup>. Thus, a new brand of weapons reduction and demobilization must be created. This must include participatory and locally appropriate responses that acknowledge the challenges associated with availability and misuse<sup>85</sup>.

A central part of the effort should not be focused on containing the import of weapons, but to attack the culture that fuels the demand itself. Programs that aim at shaping the perceptions of weapons can help decrease the desire for weapons, and ultimately contribute to the destruction of the culture of violence. Public awareness and sensitization campaigns make peace education voluntary, which would give more ownership of the program to its participants<sup>86</sup>. Currently, there are a number of programs in neighboring countries that focus on this type of “mental disarmament.” The focus is on changing the mindset of the population to acknowledge that weapons are not solutions to the problem, helping to foster a culture of peace. Peace education programs like those carried out in other developed African countries target schools and military training centers for hubs of peace education. Peace is a subject in school, and it includes topics of gender and minority violence to attack the root causes of the violence problem<sup>87</sup>. This class, along with the implementation of psychological and social support for ex-combatants, attacks both the cause and the results of violence and warfare<sup>88</sup>. Such programs would no doubt be invaluable in Sudan and South Sudan. Military personnel and young adults are

---

<sup>83</sup> Muggah and Batchelor, “Development,” 14.

<sup>84</sup> *ibid.*, 9.

<sup>85</sup> *ibid.*, 9.

<sup>86</sup> Muggah, “No Magic Bullet,” 24.

<sup>87</sup> Formal Interview, Ivor Fung.

<sup>88</sup> Ryan Nichols, *DDR in Sudan: Too Little, Too Late?* (Geneva: nbmedia, 2011): 49.

often some of the worst instigators of violence, so their education on the importance of peace is vital.

While the current DDR program has made some small strides in Sudan and South Sudan, but is extremely costly for relatively little progress. In order to make actual long-term change, the money could instead go to livelihood programs or a pension fund for ex-combatants. This provides a reasonable alternative to the salary that soldiers earn working in the military, giving them more of an incentive to demobilize. This would play to the interests of the SPLA for its members, and hopefully aid in creating lasting solutions. By making the SPLA as well as SAF and Government of Sudan key players in the weapons reduction and demobilization effort, it ensures that the program address the actual needs of the civilians and ex-combatants. It also leaves the possibility of appropriate modification if needed, and gives more ownership to the people on the ground<sup>89</sup>.

In order to facilitate these changes, there needs to be an increased level of dialogue between people on the ground and international actors. Aid organizations need to be able to get accurate information from community and religious leaders to provide assistance that is feasible and locally appropriate. These leaders can also provide conflict analysis, and early warning of rising tensions to help prevent outbreaks of violence. International actors can also act as mediators between antagonistic groups in Sudan and South Sudan. Trusted intermediaries can be put in place to facilitate dialogue between these groups and reduce the potential for conflict. By establishing a working dialogue between these groups, more progress can be made in the peace process<sup>90</sup>.

There should also be an effort to harmonize legislation regarding arms use and transfer between Sudan, South Sudan, and neighboring countries. This means making sure

---

<sup>89</sup> *ibid.*, 47.

<sup>90</sup> Formal Interview, Anonymous.

that minimum standards in regards to SALW are compatible across the region. This lessens the ability of groups or individuals to exploit differences in the legal and regulatory systems regarding SALW control and management. There would be fewer loopholes through which the illicit arms trade can continue<sup>91</sup>. In order to ensure that change is actually made, all parties must agree on the terms and procedure for the process<sup>92</sup>. To do so, DDR (or an alternative) must be a central component of peace agreements, not simply an afterthought.

While these are only a few simple ideas to improve the arms reduction efforts in Sudan and South Sudan, they can act as a jumping-off point for other programs. Improved communication, providing incentives for voluntary demobilization, peace education, and harmonization of legislation would all work toward the application of effective and locally appropriate solutions for the SALW proliferation problem.

## CONCLUSION

In a post-war society, SALW proliferation continues a cycle of violence from which it is very hard to emerge. These weapons are passed to civilian hands through a number of different vectors. Despite arms trade embargos and sanctions, there continues to be a great deal of new and recycled weapons introduced to the region. These weapons are distributed among the civilian population to either serve as protection, or as a means to contribute to rebellions or intertribal attacks. Sudan and South Sudan provide examples of some of the many ways in which weapons can be misused and mismanaged. They have complicated the peace process, especially in Border States like Kordofan and Darfur. They are the source of worse social, cultural, political and economic conditions all across both countries. Although

---

<sup>91</sup> James Ndung'u, "Harmonizing Small Arms Control Legislation: Selected Case Studies from the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa," (2001): 9.

<sup>92</sup> Jonah Leff, "Failures and Opportunities: Rethinking DDR in South Sudan," Small Arms Survey: Sudan Issue Brief no. 17, (May 2011): 10.

global instruments to exist to deal with arms trade issues, they do not have enough depth of influence to be useful on the ground. There must be a system in place that works not only from an international perspective, but also processes that work operate on national, local, and individual level<sup>93</sup>. This means integrating these global systems of arms management with community and state-level mechanisms for tackling arms proliferation. In order to properly manage this issue, the traditional DDR process must be refined to fit the Sudan and South Sudan situation. Local and national institutions, such as the GoSS, SPLA, and Sudanese Government must all be involved in some level of arms management. By making these institutions more connected with arms reduction efforts, it is more likely that effective change and legislation can be created. These new efforts must also be in harmony with the policies of surrounding countries, reducing the possibility for arms distributors to take advantage of legislative loopholes.

This study provides a snapshot of SALW impacts on Sudan and South Sudan. In order to gain a fuller understanding of the issue, it may be valuable to examine the trends in other post-war nations; this type of research would no doubt be invaluable to the creation of future international legislation regarding the arms trade. If any changes to local DDR efforts are made in Sudan and South Sudan, it will be necessary to follow up on any impacts as a result of these changes. How well are Sudan and South Sudan adapting to legislation and arms reduction program changes? Are these programs targeting the right people? How can more changes be made in the future to address any shortcomings?<sup>94</sup> By answering these types of questions, and analyzing the differences each change in policy creates, it will be possible to create a DDR and arms reduction policy that works for Sudan and South Sudan.

---

<sup>93</sup> Informal interview. Himayu Shiotani. November 18, 2013.

<sup>94</sup> Interview with Himayu Shiotani

## **BIBLIOGRAPHY**

Anonymous. Interview with author. Formal. GCSP headquarters, Geneva. November 19, 2013.

Atwood, David. Interview with author. Formal. Small Arms Survey headquarters. November 19, 2013.

Eavis, Paul. "SALW in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region: Challenges and Ways Forward," *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 9, no. 1 (2002): p 251-260

Fung, Ivor. Interview with author. Formal interview. Palais des Nations, November 11, 2013.

Gramizzi, Claudio and Jerome Tubiana. "New War, Old Enemies: Conflict Dynamics in South Kordofan," *Small Arms Survey* (2013): p 1-58.

Hazdra, Peter. *Small Arms- Big Problem: A Global Threat to Peace, Security and Development*. Vienna : Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie, 2007.

Human Security Baseline Assessment. "Armed Groups in South Sudan."  
<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures/south-sudan/armed-groups.html>

Human Security Baseline Assessment. "Arms and Ammunition Tracing Desk."  
<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures/arms-and-ammunition-tracing-desk.html>

Human Security Baseline Assessment. "Border/Disputed Areas"  
<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures/borderdisputed-areas.html>

Human Security Baseline Assessment. "Business as Usual: Arms Flows to Darfur 2009-12." *Small Arms Survey: Sudan Issue Brief no 20*, (September 2012): p 1-10  
<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB-20-Arms-flows-to-Darfur-2009-12.pdf>

Human Security Baseline Assessment, "Darfur"  
<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures/sudan/darfur.html>

Human Security Baseline Assessment. "Darfur's Armed Groups."  
<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/darfurs-armed-groups.html>

Human Security Baseline Assessment. "Fighting for Spoils: Armed Insurgencies in Greater Upper Nile." *Small Arms Survey*, no 18 (November 2011): p 1-10

Human Security Baseline Assessment. "South Sudan."  
<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures/south-sudan.html>

Human Security Baseline Assessment. "SPLA-N Weapons and Equipment, South Kordofan, December 2012."  
<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/arms-ammunition-tracing-desk/HSBA-Tracing-Desk-SPLA-N-SK-Feb-2013.pdf>

Human Security Baseline Assessment. "Sudan."  
<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures/sudan.html>

Human Security Baseline Assessment. "Supply and Demand: Flows and Holdings in Sudan."  
<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB-15-arms-flows-and-holdings-in-Sudan.pdf>

Human Security Baseline Assessment. "Reaching for the Gun: Arms Flows and Holdings in South Sudan." Small Arms Survey: Sudan Issue Brief no 19, (April 2012): p 1-10.  
<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB-19-Arms-flows-and-holdings-South-Sudan.pdf>

Human Security Baseline Assessment. "Women and Armed Violence in South Sudan."  
<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/south-sudan/womens-security/HSBA-women-and-armed-conflict.pdf>

Leff, Jonah. "Failures and Opportunities: Rethinking DDR in South Sudan." Small Arms Survey: Human Security Baseline Assessment, Sudan Issue Brief no. 17, (May 2011): p 1-9

Leff, Jonah. "My Neighbor, My Enemy: Inter-tribal Violence in Jonglei." Human Security Baseline Assessment: Sudan Issue Brief no. 21 (October 2012): p 1-10

Marsh, Nicholas. "Two Sides of the Same Coin? The Legal and Illegal Trade in Small Arms," *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 9, no. 1 (2002): p 217-226

Muggah, Robert. "No Magic Bullet: A Critical Perspective on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Weapons Reduction in Post-conflict Contexts," *Round Table* 94, no. 379 (2005): p 239-252

Muggah, Robert and Peter Batchelor, co-published with UNDP. "Development Held Hostage: Assessing the Effects of Small Arms on Human Development," (2002): p 1-40

Ndung'u, James. "Harmonizing Small Arms Control Legislation: Selected Case Studies from the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa." (2001). p 1-38

"Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control, and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa" (2004)

National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (NDDRC). "Challenges." <http://www.ssddrc.org/ddr-in-south-sudan/challenges.html>

Nichols, Ryan. *DDR in Sudan: Too Little, Too Late?*. Geneva: nbmedia, 2011.

Shiotani, Himayu. Interview with author. Informal. Café in Veille Ville, Geneve. November 18, 2013.

Small Arms Survey. "Ad Hoc Arsenals: PSSM Practices of Selected Non-State Actors." *Armed Actors Issue Brief* no. 2 (May 2013): p 1-13

Small Arms Survey. "Armed Violence." <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/armed-violence.html>

Small Arms Survey 2010. "Back to the Brink: Armed Violence in Southern Sudan." Small Arms Survey 2010: Chapter 11 Summary. <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2010/en/Small-Arms-Survey-2010-Chapter-11-summary-EN.pdf>

Small Arms Survey. "Definitions." <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/definitions.html>

Small Arms Survey. "Further Weapons Seized from SAF in South Kordofan." <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/arms-ammunition-tracing-desk/HSBA-Tracing-Desk-SAF-weapons-SK-July-2012.pdf>

Small Arms Survey. "Illicit Trafikking." <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/transfers/illicit-trafficking.html>

Small Arms Survey. "Producers." <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/producers.html>

Small Arms Survey. "Transfers." <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/transfers.html>

Small Arms Survey. "Weapons and Markets." <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/index.php?id=122>

United Nations Department of Public Information- Peace and Security Section. "United Nations and Darfur: Fact Sheet." (August 2007) p 1-5 [http://www.unis.unvienna.org/pdf/UN-Darfur\\_fact\\_sheet.pdf](http://www.unis.unvienna.org/pdf/UN-Darfur_fact_sheet.pdf)

United Nations Development Programme. "Republic of Sudan DDR Programme: Overview." p 1-9. <http://www.ddrsummit.com/SDDRCUNDP-overview.pdf>

United Nations Mission in Sudan. "The Background to Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement." <http://unmis.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=515>

## **LIST OF ACRONYMS**

SAS- Small Arms Survey

HSBA-Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan

SPLM/A-Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army

DDR-disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

PSSM-physical security and stockpile management

GoSS-government of South Sudan

SAF-Sudan armed forces

SALW-small arms and light weapons

CPA- Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005)

JEM-Sudan Justice and Equality Movement

SSPS-South Sudan Police Service

SPLA-N-Sudan People's Liberation Army-North

UN-United Nations



