The Union des Populations du Cameroun and Third World Internationalism:
Solidarity, Cooperation, and Abandonment, 1955-1970

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Abstract:

Beginning in the early 20th century, and culminating at the Bandung conference in 1955, the Third World began to consolidate itself as an international bloc around a philosophy of self rule and international solidarity. Cameroon’s *Union des Populations the Cameroun* (UPC) embraced this project from its inception, and maintained a strong internationalist agenda throughout its existence as it struggled for Cameroon’s independence, first from French trusteeship, and then from what was, in its view, an illegitimate neo-colonial government. International solidarity was not merely a rhetorical tool for the UPC, but was rather an essential part of their strategy to achieve their national goals. The party attempted to put the objectives of Third World solidarity in to practice through a number of projects, most notably in the cultivation of personal and political relationships between the party’s elite and emerging Third World Leaders, and educational and military exchange. This work is intended to provide a body of historical evidence of the participation of the UPC in the Third World Internationalist Movement.

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I. Introduction:

One hot morning in November, I found myself shoulder to shoulder with the blue-and-orange uniformed students of class 5A at the Mario Academic Complex in Yaoundé. The lesson was Cameroonian History, and I sat on a bench at the back of the class with my head resting against the cool cement wall. The lecturer detailed Cameroon’s colonial history, and arriving at the mid-twentieth century, he paused and, turning from the chalkboard, asked the class, “Who can give me the definition of nationalism?” The room was silent for a moment until the boy seated next to me stood and said, “Nationalism is an extreme love for one’s country, a want to support and preserve one’s country, patriotism.” There was silence again, and then a girl rose quietly from her seat in the far corner of the room. “Nationalism,” she said, “is the desire for freedom and liberation.” The two students had, knowingly or unknowingly, presented vastly different perspectives on nationalism; the first posited the state as the natural expression of a nation, and therefore something that precedes nationalism. The second, while perhaps still recognizing the state as an essential element, views nationalism as the struggle not to preserve the integrity of the nation-state, but rather to establish a representative state for a nation. Both perspectives are, of course, valid, but they are indicative of different historical circumstances.

Historically speaking, early African nationalism was much more in line with the ideology of liberation. The nationalisms of great post-World War II leaders like Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Jomo Kenyatta, Leopold Senghor and others, were simply various articulations of the reclamation of an African identity; each was a demand for and affirmation of the humanity and dignity of African people denied by centuries of slavery and imperialism.¹ In this sense proto-nationalism was anti-imperialism, the struggle for the formation of nation-states and a reaction against foreign domination, and should therefore not

be confused with the European nationalist formula of the early eighteenth century. Unity was central to the nationalist doctrine, and international solidarity was viewed as a vital part of the struggle for independence and equality. Julius Nyerere, the former president of Tanzania, expressed this vitality in 1963, when he said “African nationalism is meaningless, is anachronistic, and is dangerous if it is not at the same time Pan-Africanism.”

This thrust toward unity and anti-colonialism was not limited to Africa alone. Nationalist movements were also developing and succeeding in Asia in the mid-twentieth century, in such places as India, Vietnam (then Indochina), China and Indonesia. Newly independent nations on both continents were emerging into an international context that was polarized by the Cold War, and both blocs were eager to extend their influence to the rest of the world, the West by continued colonial and neo-colonial domination, and the Soviet bloc by strategic support of anti-colonial movements. It was under these circumstances that the idea of solidarity among independent Afro-Asian states, or Third World Internationalism as it would later come to be called, developed as a method for supporting ongoing liberation movements and protecting emergent states.

The history of Cameroon’s nationalist movement and independence is, in some ways, representative of the larger history of African nationalism. The Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC), Cameroon’s first indigenous political party and the territory’s foremost nationalist movement until its interdiction in French Cameroon in 1955, struggled to remove Cameroon immediately and entirely from colonial control by organizing and educating the population internally, and by working at the international level to push the French Administration to accelerate the independence process. However, Cameroon’s independence was also a somewhat unique case in the African context. According to Frédéric Augustine

Kdock, the UPC’s current Secretary General, “In terms of the struggle for national liberation, Cameroon is the only country where the nationalist leaders were eliminated and the nationalists ground down in such a way that DeGaulle could choose whoever he liked [to lead the country].” Indeed, the French administration did everything in its power to prevent the UPC from achieving its stated goals in Cameroon, ultimately resulting in severe repression and the banning of the party in the mid-1950s.

As a result of this particularity of Cameroon’s nationalist movement, any study of the UPC’s international actions, especially from 1955 onward, is necessarily a study of Third World Internationalism. Rather than eliminating the nationalist threat, the intensified effort to suppress the UPC on the part of the French pushed the party to rely heavily on support from the exterior, particularly within the framework of Afro-Asian cooperation. The UPC continued its activities, with much of the leadership in exile, publicizing their cause and soliciting political and material support for the party militants that would remain clandestinely in the country and conduct a protracted guerrilla conflict that lasted well beyond Cameroon’s negotiated independence.

Much of the previous research conducted on the history of the Union des Populations du Cameroun has focused on the party’s activities at the national level, specifically during the period of the maquis conflict. The aim of this study, therefore, will be to provide a basic history of the UPC’s participation in the Third World Internationalist project, with specific focus on the concrete manifestations of solidarity that were the linchpin in the UPC’s activities both sous maquis as well as abroad. The paper will begin with a brief synopsis of methodology, as well as some of limitations and challenges of studying the internationalism of the UPC. The following section will provide more detailed background information on Third World Internationalism, Cameroon’s history, and the UPC. Finally, the findings on the
UPC’s engagement of Afro-Asian solidarity will be presented in two thematic sections; the first will examine the development of the UPC’s diplomatic and political relationships with the Third World, and the second will focus on more tangible aspects of cooperation that these relationships produced, particularly with concern to educational and military aid.

II. Methodology

The subject of this study grew out of a curiosity about a particular document in Yaoundé’s national archives. The document is a notice to the French authorities in Yaoundé dated May 12th, 1959, that details the expulsion of Felix Roland Moumie, then the president of the UPC, from Egypt. Moumié had been living in Cairo for two years in 1959, and Egypt’s president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, was one of the primary architects of the Afro-Asian movement, and was well-known for his support of progressive nationalist movements. What could have caused this rupture between the UPC, and the country which had been so generous to it and so sympathetic to its cause? Was Moumié’s expulsion from Cairo a premonition of the demise of Third World Internationalism, which many scholars argue was doomed from its inception, and was largely defunct by the 1970s? With these questions raised, the UPC’s international efforts were suddenly transported to the center of the history of Third World Internationalism, and the disintegration of the Third World Project was reflected in the story of the UPC’s ultimate failure to affect the changes it believed necessary for Cameroon’s development.

Connecting these two stories seemed relevant for a number of reasons: First, to contribute to the discourse on the significance and viability of the Third World project and to further illuminate the history of the UPC. There is also a certain urgency, I feel, to the study

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3 Literally translated from French, sous maquis means “under brush,” and is a term used to refer to the UPC’s clandestine activity in Cameroon, particularly clandestine military activity.
4 ACNY-1AC439. “Expulsion de MOUMIE du Caire.” This document is reproduced as an appendix at the end of the paper.
of the shortcomings of both Third World Internationalism and the UPC. The recent confluence of the peak of American directed globalization and global financial crisis creates significant opportunities for resistance to “bad” capitalist globalization, which will necessitate an engagement of and interplay between the global and the local similar to what was employed, or at least attempted, by Third World Internationalists. This project is intended to be the first step in such a study.

Studying the UPC’s interactions with Third World Internationalism proved to be a challenge. Much of the information on the subject is to be found outside of Cameroon— in the archives of the colonial administration in France, and in the various countries that cooperated with the UPC. Furthermore, many of the people who were involved with the party before 1970 are no longer living or are living outside of the country, and those who are still in Cameroon are spread over various parts of the country. Finally, the history of the UPC is immense and complicated, and difficult to grasp in the space of just a few weeks.

My methodology was largely an attempt to work around these challenges, and involved sifting through history books, archived documents, and theses, and meeting with researchers at the University of Yaoundé I who conduct their research on the UPC. This was helpful in collecting background information, and for building a general knowledge of the party’s history. Occasionally, a meeting or my secondary research would produce a reference to the international cooperation of the party, in the form of an invitation for a UPC leader to travel to a particular country, or the mention of military or economic aid. I would then search for biographical information about the people involved in the event, and incorporate any applicable information into detailed questionnaires, which I designed individually for each of my four interviewees. Given the relatively small number of informants, and the importance of their knowledge to the project, I conducted long, in-depth interviews with each informant.
Occasionally, opinions would diverge on the specific details of UPC history. Incidentally, Moumié’s expulsion from Cairo is also a prime example of some of the frustrations I encountered of this nature. Marthe Moumié, who moved with her husband as he toured the progressive Third World nations, and lived in Cairo until 1959, denies that her husband was exiled from Egypt, and attributes their subsequent move to Conakry to the ascension of a sympathetic government which was closer to Cameroon, and therefore a better fit for the nationalist aims of the UPC. However, Théophil Nono stated that a significant part of the UPC office in Cairo was expelled, while Frédéric Augustine Kodock asserted that it was only Moumié who was asked to leave the country. As, especially given the constraints of time, it is impossible to gauge the accuracy of any of these arguments relative to the others, I have tried to indicate those facts which have been similarly contested in my work.

III. Background:

Creating the Third World: Pan-Africanism and Afro-Asian Cooperation

At the turn of the 20th century, the American writer and intellectual W.E.B. Dubois gave the closing remarks at the Pan-African Conference at Westminster Hall in London, in a speech entitled “To the Nations of the World.” In this speech, Dubois extended the American color line⁶ to the world, arguing for the existence of a similar line that separated the “Darker Nations”⁷ from their European and American counterparts, stating,

The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line, the question as to how far differences of race…are going to be made, hereafter, the basis of denying to over half of the world the right of sharing to their utmost ability the opportunities and privileges of modern civilization.⁸

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⁵ I have included these meetings as informal or semi-formal interviews in my references, but have not cited information I received in these meetings in the body of the paper unless it was confirmed by a primary informant.
⁸ Ibid.
United by a common experience of racial humiliation, cultural domination, political domination, and economic exploitation under European and American slavery and imperialism, Dubois and other Pan-Africanists felt that Africans—both on the continent and in the Diaspora—shared a common psychology and philosophy, which should form the basis for political and cultural solidarity aimed at teaching the Western world its ills and securing freedom and equality for the people who found themselves on the wrong side of the color line.

The ideology of Pan-Africanism was largely transmitted through Dubois and other “New World” intellectuals, in conjunction with a number of African thinkers, most notably Dr. Wilmot Blyden and Bishop James Johnson. Between 1900 and 1945, six Pan-African conferences were held, uniting leaders and intellectuals of African origin from Africa, the United States, and the Caribbean. The influence from the United States and the Caribbean, and the nature of British colonial administration, which was more indirect and allowed for slightly more political expression in its African colonies than French, Belgian or Portuguese administrations did, meant that English was the language of expression for the Pan-Africanists. Consequently, it was primarily rising political leaders in British Colonies who would embrace the idea of Pan-Africanism, and become prominent in the movement. By the mid 1950s, a number of African territories were succeeding in gaining independence from colonial domination. The independence of these countries marked an important change in Pan-Africanism; the movement, which had originated as a movement of intellectuals and thinkers, would take on increasingly political overtones. By the time Ghana, the first sub-Saharan colony to break with its European colonial administration, achieved independence in

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9 Shivji, p. 4.
12 Akintoye, p. 121.
1957, Pan-Africanism was, while still retaining the ideology of global African unity, a movement of independent states cooperating to fight colonialism and create unity on the continent.

Many Pan-African thinkers saw Pan-Africanism and Pan-Asianism, which was developing along a similar trajectory to Pan-Africanism throughout the twentieth century, as mutual global struggles. Despite racial and cultural differences that excluded them from a Pan-African identity, Asia and the Middle East had also suffered centuries under colonial and imperial domination, were largely subject to the same conditions, and therefore had a claim in the international solidarity necessitated by the color line.\textsuperscript{13} It was not until the movements took on a more directly political, state-centered, aspect that the two movements coincided to form the Afro-Asian bloc. Culminating in the Bandung Conference in 1955, the Afro-Asian bloc ultimately consolidated itself around the same common oppression that Pan-Africanism used to unite the experiences of Africans in different parts of the world. In an attempt to de-emphasize the vast differences between the particular problems of individual nations, Third World Internationalism mobilized an identity based on a fundamental opposition of two groups defined in dialectical terms, with powerful “civilized” nations on one side, and Afro-Asian polities on the other. This binary was reproduced on a number of different levels, in terms of race (White versus Non-White), imperialism (colonizer versus colonized), economics (developed versus underdeveloped) and international political power (those with power versus those without).\textsuperscript{14} In varying combinations, these dialectic relationships were the underpinnings of the Third World as both a concept and a movement.

Malik Bennabi, an early theoretician of the Afro-Asian movement, notes however, that the mere existence of common oppression throughout the post-colonial world does not


necessarily predicate the concept of the Third World, as such. The combinations of opposing identities that characterized global power dynamics simply reflected a political reality, and did not correspond to a transnational consciousness on the part of Afro-Asian populations. In this way, the project of Third World internationalism can be understood as an effort to create both an Afro-Asian consciousness (in other words, to create the Third World as an international unit) and subsequently, a politics of international solidarity within the Third World aimed at equalizing the international power of nations. Such a transnational consciousness was, however, difficult and slow in coming. Pan Africanism and Pan Asianism were separated geographically by the Sahara and the Indian Ocean, psychologically by the memory of the Atlantic slave trade, as well as by very real racial tensions, that divided Black Africans from “White” North Africans and Asians. Consequently, the unifying ideological justification for the Afro-Asian movement would necessarily have to be a common perspective on their political futures.

The Bandung Conference is generally understood to be the first concrete iteration of Third World ideology. The conference, held from April 18-24, 1955 in Bandung Indonesia, gathered the leadership of twenty-nine independent African and Asian states and eight observers, among them a number of African states that were not yet fully autonomous. The goal of the conference was to promote Afro-Asian cooperation in economic, cultural and political matters, and to oppose colonialism and imperialism “in all its forms,” arguably an implicit reference to both the more traditional forms of colonialism proffered by the West, and Soviet intervention in the colonial and post-colonial world. Despite the organizers’ statement preceding the conference that it sought neither to create a “Third Bloc” nor lay the groundwork for an Afro-Asiatic organization, the ten-point communiqué that resulted from the conference would go on to become the guiding principles of Third World

15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., p.24.
internationalism. The resolution was passed unanimously, and adhered of all of the participants to its stipulations, which included: respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations, respect for fundamental human rights, racial and national equality, abstention from the interference in the internal affairs of other states and abstention from exerting pressure on other states, mutual cooperation, and respect for justice and international obligations, among others. The “Spirit of Bandung,” or a politics based on the Ten Points, would go on to be the foundation of the Organization of Afro-Asian Solidarity, the Non-aligned Movement, and the various other Afro-Asian conferences that followed Bandung.

Colonial History and the Founding of the UPC

In 1916, in the final stages of World War I, the Anglo-French forces of central Africa succeeded in ousting the German administration from Kamerun, which had been a colony under German control since 1884. After a short-lived attempt at administrative condominium, or joint military administration, German Kamerun was partitioned along the Picot line, which separated the territory into two parts, running from north to south. The western part of former German Kamerun was occupied by the British and administered as part of Nigeria, and the French were given control of the eastern part of the territory. The occupation of German Kamerun ended formally in 1922, when the League of Nations evaluated the territory. The League of Nations evaluation resulted in the classification of French and British Cameroon as Mandated territories, whose administration was trusted to France and Britain, respectively. The mandate system was designed to move colonial territories toward independence, based on a system of socio-cultural and economic classification. In theory, a territory could make improvements in both of these areas in order to move closer to autonomy and independence, but in practice, the mandate was little more than a more palatable legal name for direct

17 Boutros Ghali and Dreyfus, p. 60.
colonial administration. After the dissolution of the League of Nations during World War Two, the two Cameroons would become United Nations (UN) trust territories. The trust system was almost identical to the League of Nations mandate, and the territories were once again entrusted to British and French colonial powers by the UN in 1946, with the expectation that they would be prepared for autonomy and independence.

Throughout this process, a significant nationalist tendency was emerging among French Cameroon’s educated elite, who had been exposed to the ideas of liberty, equality and self determination, and who were aware of France’s legal obligations to Cameroon as a trust. On April 10th, 1948, a group of twelve professionals, syndicalists and intellectuals led by Julius Ngom met at a café in Douala. Around a table at “Chez Sierra,” the twelve men would draft the statutes of Cameroon’s first indigenous political party, effectively creating the Union des Populations du Cameroon. According to the constitution they drafted at this first meeting in Douala and submitted to the French authorities for approval and legalization, the goal of the party was to “unite all the populations of Cameroon with the aim of raising their standard of living.” Once the party had been legalized, a new set of statutes for the party was released. Under these new statutes the party based its platform on three principal demands: immediate independence, immediate reunification, and no foreign interventions into Cameroonian domestic affairs.

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21 Tonjé, p. 40.
Early Internationalism and the Interdiction of the UPC in French Cameroon

Cameroon’s legal status as an international trust, and the ideology of solidarity propounded by movements such as Pan-Africanism and Negritude undoubtedly contributed to the international vision present in the party from its founding in 1948. Ruben Um Nyobe, the first secretary general of the UPC, describes the significance of the UPC in Cameroon as follows:

Before the creation of the UPC, the world was closed for Cameroon, just as it remained ignored by the world…from a political point of view, only the voices of the administration and the elected officials in favor of colonialism were able to make themselves heard domestically and internationally.  

The party’s mission was, therefore, twofold. Not only would it organize and educate Cameroonians about their rights, but it would also serve as a mouthpiece, exposing the wrongs of French colonialism in Cameroon, and imperialism in a more general sense, to the exterior. Much of the UPC’s early international interactions were driven by this responsibility, and the leadership of the party was extremely vocal in denouncing French repression in Indochina (now Vietnam), and American armament and intervention in West Germany.  

Almost immediately after its founding, the UPC joined the Rassemblement Democratique Africain (RDA), then headed by Félix Houphouët-Boigny. The RDA was an organization that grouped the representatives from the local assemblies of each of the associated French territories in West and Central Africa in order to put pressure on the French government to accelerate the independence process for its African colonies. When the RDA was created in 1946, the French national government was a coalition government, and the French Communist Party (PCF), which opposed colonialism, had several seats in the national assembly. This created an opportunity for the African representatives of the RDA to form an alliance with the


PCF, in order to increase its influence on French colonial policy. Despite the fact that the UPC had no representatives in the Cameroonian local assembly, the party became the Cameroonian branch of the RDA, where the UPC first initiated its relationship with the French Communists.\textsuperscript{27} The UPC was heavily involved in the leadership of the organization, with Um Nyobe serving as the RDA’s vice president until 1955.\textsuperscript{28}

The international aspect of the UPC’s struggle for independence also brought its leadership before the United Nations a number of times in the early 1950s. In 1952, Ruben Um Nyobe was selected as part of a Cameroonian delegation that would appear before the UN Trust Council, to argue the case of the \textit{Union des Populations du Cameroun} before the assembly. He returned again in both 1953 and 1955 to accuse France of failing to fulfill its obligations to Cameroon, stipulated by article 76b of the United Nations trust statutes, which stated that France should be preparing its trusts to move “rapidly” toward independence.\textsuperscript{29}

As the party’s leadership was publicizing the question of Cameroon’s independence at the international level, the UPC was also enjoying a growing popularity in Cameroon itself. A series of campaigns in the various regions of the country, and increasing dissatisfaction with French policy saw UPC membership burgeon in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Alarmed by the immense popular appeal of the UPC’s radical message, the French administration, led by André Soucadeaux and later by Roland Pré who replaced Socadeaux as Cameroon’s high commissioner, began to take steps to prevent the UPC from gaining power and influence in the colony.\textsuperscript{30} The French administration organized alternate delegations to the United Nations to negate the testimony of Um Nyobe, and contest his ability to speak for all Cameroonians, and a

\textsuperscript{26} Fanso, 11-22-2008. After the Brazzaville Conference convened by the French in 1944, local electoral assemblies were created in the French African Colonies, whose representatives could then participate as observers in the French national assembly.
\textsuperscript{27} Fanso, 11-22-2008.
\textsuperscript{28} Fanso, 11-22-2008; Ekemeyong, veuve Moumié, 11-19-2008.
\textsuperscript{30} Fanso, 11-22-2008.
series of electoral frauds kept the party from gaining seats in the local assembly, even in regions where they were extremely popular.\textsuperscript{31}

As early as 1952, it was clear to the UPC that the French were not going to allow them to impose their agenda on Cameroon through the normal political channels.\textsuperscript{32} The UPC’s strategy at the national level became increasingly militant throughout the early 1950’s, relying more and more on civil unrest, strikes and boycotts to make its message heard. The party was also facing difficulties in the RDA. In 1950, the PCF had been ousted from their seats in French national assembly and the governmental opposition coalition that the RDA had relied on previously dissolved. Houphouët-Boigny decided to steer the \textit{Rassemblement} toward a more moderate politics of cooperation. Dissatisfied with this choice and without any possibility of cooperating with an administration that clearly wanted to see the UPC eliminated from Cameroonian politics, the UPC and the RDA became increasingly estranged from one another. In 1955, Um Nyobe was removed from his position as vice president, and the UPC was officially asked to leave the organization.\textsuperscript{33}

As the twenty-nine nations in attendance at the Bandung conference were drafting their statement of solidarity and support for anti-colonial movements, the UPC and a number of related syndicates and youth organizations were signing a document reaffirming their commitment to the UPC’s platform of immediate independence and reunification in response to the violent French repression of a series of strikes staged in Douala from January to April, 1955.\textsuperscript{34} These strikes precipitated the occupation of Bassaland\textsuperscript{35} in southern Cameroon by French forces coming from Dakar and French Equatorial Africa, and violent conflicts in this area, particularly in Douala and Yaoundé, and resulting hundreds of deaths in May of the same

\textsuperscript{31} Ekemeyong, veuve Moumié, 11-19-2008.
\textsuperscript{32} Frédéric Kodock, private interview, 11-24-2008.
\textsuperscript{33} Fanso, 11-22-2008.
\textsuperscript{34} Tonje, pp. 76-77.
\textsuperscript{35} Bassaland can be roughly approximated as the region between Douala and Yaoundé.
year.\textsuperscript{36} Seen as one of the primary instigators of the unrest, the UPC was officially outlawed in French Cameroon on July 13\textsuperscript{th}, 1955. This decision would send much of the party underground to begin the Maquis conflict under the leadership of Ruben Um Nyobe, and a significant portion of the UPC’s leadership, including the party’s president Félix-Roland Moumié, Ernest Ouandié and Abel Kingue, joint vice presidents of the party, and ten others into exile in British Southern Cameroon.

IV. Political and Diplomatic Cooperation

Afro-Asian Cooperation: 1955-1960

The party’s banning in 1955 marked a significant change in the UPC’s engagement of Third World internationalism. Prior to the UPC’s expulsion from French Cameroon, the leadership focused their internationalist efforts on gaining legitimacy, and influencing the French government via the UN, the RDA, and a handful of other smaller organizations. Once the party was outlawed, the UPC had to rely much more on an increasingly organized Third World network for political aid, as well as support for the armed struggle being waged inside Cameroon.\textsuperscript{37} The footings for this transition were already in place for the UPC; the brutal French repression of the strikes in Douala in the spring of 1955 solicited letters of support to the leadership of the UPC from both Kwame Nkrumah, the prime minister of Gold Coast (now Ghana), and Abdel Gamal Nasser, the president of Egypt. Both letters expressed condolences for the families who were affected by the violence, and condemned the French reaction to the strikes. Nasser also noted in his letter that Egypt sent a petition to the United Nations in favor of the UPC. The events of Douala in May also caused the Indian delegation to the UN to intervene vehemently on behalf of the UPC, protesting French colonial policy.\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{36} Kodock, 11-27-2008.
\textsuperscript{37} Théophil Nono, private interview, 11-21-2008.
\textsuperscript{38} Mbembe, p. 106.
The UPC members who had been exiled from French Cameroon set up offices in Kumba, British Cameroon, where they continued their activities. Quickly however, the French administration convinced British Cameroon that the UPC was also a threat to the stability of their territory, and the thirteen members of the Kumba office were forced to seek political asylum outside of Cameroon in 1957. The group contacted India, Ghana, the Sudan, and Egypt to request admission into the country, and as Khartoum was the first to respond positively, the group took up residence in the Sudan for a period of approximately six months. There, they were welcomed by the Sudanese government, which provided for their housing and expenses, including the continued publication of the UPC’s journal *La Voix du Cameroun*, and offered political counsel to the party, sharing the newly independent state’s efforts to become self-sufficient. Nkrumah, now the president of an independent Ghana, renewed his ties with the UPC, making a diplomatic visit to Khartoum to reiterate his support for the party.

In 1956, Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, effectively defeating the French and English interests that dominated the important trade route. This event secured his position as a champion of both Afro-Asian cooperation and anti-imperialism. In the same year, the headquarters of the Organization of Afro-Asian Solidarity were moved to Cairo, now a veritable Mecca for both African nationalists and Third World internationalists. Martha Moumié, the wife of Félix Roland Moumié and one of the exiled members of the UPC, explained the attraction of Nasser’s Egypt to a struggling nationalist movement, “When we saw that Nasser could nationalize the Suez Canal, could resist the French and the British and win, we said to ourselves, *this* is someone who can really help [the UPC].”

The Egyptian government accepted Moumié’s request, and the group moved its base of operations to Cairo. The *Upécistes* were given a villa in the Zamalek quarter of Cairo that had

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41 Pouhé, p. 41.
been abandoned by an English businessman after the nationalization of the Suez Canal, and each of the thirteen asylees received a pension from the Egyptian government. Cairo proved to be the staging ground for the UPC’s international relations. Through the Afro-Asian movement, the UPC was put into contact with nearly all of the Third World. This network allowed the party to project its message well beyond the African continent and build diplomatic relationships with independent states that could offer political, economic or military aid to help it achieve its national goals.\textsuperscript{43} Within this context, the leadership of the UPC was also able to interact with anti-colonial activists from all over the world. In this sense, international solidarity was not only expressed in diplomatic or material aid, but also in a close network of personal relationships between Third World leaders. Such was the case with Abel Kingue and Ernest Ouandié, who built a close friendship with Nelson Mandela, and with Félix Roland Moumié, who befriended Frantz Fanon, the famous anti-colonial intellectual who was, like Moumié, a psychiatrist by trade.\textsuperscript{44}

The UPC was quickly incorporated into the Afro-Asian secretariat, and set up an official office at the organization’s headquarters, which contained the individual offices of nationalist movements from all over Africa, including South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC) and the \textit{Front National de Liberation} (FLN) of Algeria. Each movement carried out its own individual activities, and also cooperated by sharing ideas and strategies in joint meetings. Nasser was able to negotiate a place for the UPC in various Afro-Asian conferences, even securing observer status for Moumié and a delegate of Algeria’s FLN to a meeting of African heads of state in Accra in 1958.\textsuperscript{45} The UPC offices at the Secretariat focused primarily on publicizing the situation in Cameroon, continuing to publish \textit{La Voix du Cameroun}, and holding “sensitization” meetings in various neighborhoods around Cairo, at which they educated the Egyptian population about their particular struggle and about the

\textsuperscript{43} Fanso, 11-22-2008.
\textsuperscript{44} Ndeh Ntumazah, \textit{A Conversational Autobiography}. Bamenda : Patron’s, 2001, pp. 712-714.
importance of the Egyptian government’s commitment to Third World Solidarity. Nasser also accorded the party a slot on Egypt’s national radio, Radio le Caire, which the party used to broadcast political propaganda and dispatches on events in Cameroon, and denounce French policy in Cameroon and abroad.  

As part of his duties as President of the party, Moumié traveled extensively throughout his time in exile, sometimes to attend Afro-Asian conferences, sometimes at the invitation of foreign leaders, and still others in an attempt to multiply the UPC’s diplomatic liaisons. Consequently, many of the close international relationships that the UPC would come to depend on owe their existence, at least in part, to him. The UPC’s relationship with the People’s Republic of China, one of the party’s greatest advocates, is just one example. In 1958, Moumié made the first visit by a UPC leader to China at the invitation of the Chinese Committee on Afro-Asian Solidarity, where he was received by the prime minister, Chou en Lai. China, led by Chou, had been one of the major actors at the Bandung Conference and readily supported the UPC, providing funding, military training, and diplomatic support to the movement. The UPC’s relationship with China continued to be strong, as Moumié made several trips there between 1958 and 1960, followed by a number of other UPC delegations.

It was at China’s invitation that a delegation from Union Democratique des Femmes Camerounaises (UDEFEC), a UPC women’s organization, made a trip to China, Indonesia and Vietnam, which had been led to independence from French domination several years earlier by Ho Chi Minh. The three-woman delegation, which consisted of Marguerite Ngoyi, Monique Kamen, and Marthe Moumié, met with women’s organizations in all three countries, in order

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45 Pouhe, p. 38.
to exchange strategy and techniques. The trip culminated in a séance with Ho himself, in which he congratulated the women on their work, and pledged his continued support to the UPC.48

In Africa, Moumié moved regularly between Guinea, newly liberated under Sekou Touré, Ghana, and the seat of the FLN in Algiers. Each of these places, as well as Morocco, Tunisia, Mali, China and the Soviet Union were accorded permanent representatives of the UPC, with the aim of further strengthening relations with the host country. In 1959, after his alleged expulsion from Cairo,49 Moumié moved his permanent offices to Conakry, Guinea, where he was incorporated into Touré’s government as an advisor. In 1959, Moumié was sponsored as part of a Guinean delegation to the United Nations, led by Ismail Touré, the president’s brother, in order to protest ongoing French intervention in the politics of Cameroon, now a nominally autonomous trust territory. Guinea was also an important strategic point of entry and exit from Cameroon. Like many other sympathetic governments, Guinea would provide fake passports to facilitate the travel of UPC leaders, and young combatants and students leaving Cameroon clandestinely for training abroad.50

Ghana, like Guinea, was also an important center of support for the UPC. After winning the Presidency of Ghana, Nkrumah took an even more radical position than Nasser or Touré, acting as one of the leading proponents of Pan-Africanism (Nkrumah would found the Organization for African Unity in 1963, which is still in existence today as the African Union) and taking a much more militant stance toward anti-colonialism. He created the African Affairs Center, in the Airport district of Accra, which grouped together various nationalist movements from sub-Saharan Africa.51 The first All-Africa People’s Conference, which was hosted by Nkrumah, gave a part of the UPC leadership, namely vice president Ernest Ouandié and his


49 There is significant disagreement about the truth of these allegations, as discussed earlier in the paper. It is, however, certain that the UPC maintained a connection with Egypt, as Osende Afana, who had come from France earlier in the year to join Mounie in Egypt, would continue to represent the UPC in the Afro-Asian secretariat in Cairo until 1964.
wife, Marthe, who was the leader of UDEFEC, and Sakeo Kamen, a member of the party’s executive committee, to install themselves in Ghana and set up offices in Accra. In Ghana, as in Egypt, the UPC was given airspace on the national radio frequency, which was used to broadcast dispatches from the party’s leadership and educate the population about the specter of neo-colonialism. Ghana’s proximity to Cameroon and President Nkrumah’s enthusiastic support of the party soon made Accra a center not only for UPC members in exile or in transit to other African or Asian countries, but also for Cameroonian expatriates of all kinds.\textsuperscript{52}

According to Marthe Moumié, it was on a trip to Accra that Félix Roland Moumié made the acquaintance of Patrice Lumumba, the prime minister of Congo-Leopoldville, who was famously one of only sixteen university graduates at the time of his country’s independence. The two ended up becoming close friends, and in 1960 Moumié traveled to Congo at the invitation of Lumumba in order to lend the young, progressive leader support in reconstructing the Congo and help to organize Congolese youth.\textsuperscript{53} Moumié’s stay was cut short by a threat from CIA-supported Mobutu Sese Sekou, then Congo’s army chief of staff, published in the Congolese newspaper, \textit{L’Essor Du Congo} shortly after his arrival in the country: “If I lay hands on him, I will make him a present to the Prime Minister of Cameroon, I will send it to him by special [government] airplane.”\textsuperscript{54}

Having been chased from the Congo, Moumié traveled to Switzerland, where the UPC would occasionally purchase weapons to send back to the Maquis.\textsuperscript{55} However, there is speculation that this particular trip was made to Geneva as part of a mission that Moumié was

\textsuperscript{50} Ntumazah, p. 667.
\textsuperscript{51} Ekemeyong, veuve Moumié, 11-19-2008.
\textsuperscript{53} Ekemeyong, veuve Moumié, 11-19-2008. Madame Moumié stated in her interview that Moumié left the Congo directly for Geneva, however, while the information in her book, \textit{Victime du Colonialisme Français}, attests that he traveled to Accra first, and then continued on to Switzerland.
\textsuperscript{55} Ekemeyong, veuve Moumié, 11-19-2008.
carrying out for Lumumba. On November 2, 1960, Félix Roland Moumié accepted a dinner interview at a lakefront restaurant in Geneva with a “journalist” named William Bechtel, who was actually an agent for the French special services, or the “Main Rouge.” Moumié was called away from the table for a phone call, and imprudently left his glass with Bechtel. After two weeks in a coma in the Cantonal Hospital, the UPC’s president succumbed to a double dose of thallium that Bechtel administered to him by way of his forgotten drink.

The Revolutionary Committee, Ahidjo’s Republic, and the Diplomatic Struggle for the Third World

Moumié’s death left a void in the party’s leadership, both internationally and in the interior of Cameroon. Ruben Um Nyobe’s capture and assassination in the maquis some two years earlier in 1958 had caused a rupture in communication between the leadership in exile and their counterparts waging a guerrilla war against the French forces in Cameroon, causing the latter to plunge into disorder, dissolving into an amalgamation of various autonomous militias. Moumié’s assassination only exasperated this situation, as the portion of the party in the exterior also divided itself into factions that, to the detriment of the party’s success, were never able to fully reconcile themselves with one another.

In early 1961, only a few months after Moumié’s death, Lumumba was also assassinated by Belgian forces with the complicity of his rivals in the Congo and much of the West, which was fearful of the emergence of another “pro-communist” state in Central Africa. Incidentally, Lumumba’s assassination would bring an influx of new leadership into the UPC, as a number of Cameroonian students, who happened to be active members of the UPC branch in Paris, were expelled from France on charges of anti-French subversion after protesting the

57 See Moomie, p. 127; Beti, p. 149; or the Frank Garbely film, *Afrique sous contrôle* for a detailed examination of the circumstances of Félix Roland Moumié’s assassination.
assassination. This action brought both Nguo Woungly Massaga and Michel Ndoh to Accra, where they were installed as permanent representatives of the UPC, and would later be incorporated into the Comité Revolutionnaire created by Ernest Ouandié to direct the UPC after Moumié’s death. After the creation of the Comité Revolutionnaire, Ouandié returned secretly to Cameroon to reorganize and revitalize the maquis, and Woungly Massaga, charged with the UPC’s relations to the exterior, became the primary actor in the international cooperation of the party.

In addition to the effective decapitation of the party, after the assassinations of both Um Nyobe and Moumié and Ouandié’s return to Cameroon, the position of the UPC internationally was also jeopardized by political developments in Cameroon itself. After the UPC was banned in French Cameroon in 1955, more moderate forces in Cameroonian politics took the matter of independence into their own hands, negotiating a cooperative independence for the territory. In 1956, the French instituted the loi-cadre, which dissolved the existing territorial assembly and called for elections. None of the four parties that gained seats in the legislative assembly were able to win a majority, and so the French administration hand-picked the pro-French André-Marie Mbida to form a government as prime minister. In 1958, Mbida was ousted by a vote of no confidence in the parliament, and Ahmadou Ahidjo replaced him as prime minister, again with the consent of the French government. On January 1st, 1960, Ahidjo declared French Cameroon an independent republic, of which he became president.

As Third World internationalism was principally a movement of states, the UPC’s relationship with the movement would complicate itself after Cameroon’s independence under Ahidjo. Throughout much of the 1950s, the party enjoyed the support of “mainstream” Third

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59 Adalaba, p. 43.
63 Ngoh, p. 161.
64 Fanso, 11-22-2008.
World internationalism, being supported at the UN by various countries and enjoying material support from a similarly diverse group. However, Cameroon’s independence in 1960 caused a conflict among the UPC’s international supporters. They were forced to choose between recognizing Ahidjo and initiating diplomatic relationships with the Cameroonian republic, or remaining steadfast in their support of the UPC, which claimed that the country’s independence had “nothing to do with the objectives pursued by the UPC from its creation.”

The choice was made little by little as nations, even those who had been great supporters of the UPC, essentially disavowed the party and recognized Ahidjo. Quickly realizing that the elimination of the nationalist threat would require an attack on the UPC’s sources of international support, Ahidjo launched a two-pronged campaign against the party, attempting to eradicate the party in the interior militarily, and strategically positioning his regime in the international community. Ahidjo’s diplomatic team attempted to create individual relationships with progressive states that were sympathetic to the UPC’s cause by approaching them with offers of political and economic cooperation, and distributing anti-UPC propaganda. The newly founded OAU also proved central to Ahidjo’s diplomatic war against the UPC. The organization was a major source of cooperation between more moderate and radical African states, and from its founding, Ahidjo involved Cameroon heavily in the OAU’s cooperative efforts in an attempt to increase the legitimacy of his regime in the eyes of his peers.

The choice to support the Cameroonian Republic was made for a number of reasons; some countries had other political motives they wished to serve, as was the case with Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and a number of other states, who hoped to include Ahidjo, a Muslim from the north of Cameroon, in a coalition against Israel. Egypt nevertheless retained some ties with the UPC, allowing Osende Afana to remain at his post representing the UPC at the Afro-Asian secretariat in Cairo until 1964, when he was expelled from the country for creating the Afro-

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65 Beti, p. 69, translated from French.
66 Adalaba, p. 56.
Latino American Movement, which the Egyptian government said purposely excluded North Africa. Although still cooperating with the UPC, Ghana and Guinea recognized Cameroon in 1962. In 1963, UPC leaders in Guinea, namely Abel Kingue and Ndeh Ntumazah were arrested and imprisoned for carrying out subversive activities against the government of Sekou Touré.

Ultimately, for many leaders, the choice to both recognize and support Ahidjo as the head of Cameroon’s independent state would be based on the question of precedent. As Third World internationalists were supporting liberation movements and trying to create Afro-Asian solidarity in the international arena, they were simultaneously trying to consolidate their power and stabilize their states at home. Supporting a movement like the UPC, which was not directing its efforts not against the French colonial administration, but against an independent state, could endanger these efforts. Increasingly, the party was forced to rely on a small number of states that were willing to support anti-neo-colonial movements, and was therefore radicalized relative to the dominant strain of Third World internationalism.

V. Solidarity in Practice

Educational Aid: Le System Boursier

Even before 1960, the organization of the UPC in the exterior was loose, at best. Consequently, the UPC’s international politics were characterized by a number of different, and at times, conflicting directives. It was however, this more general leadership abroad under Félix Roland Moumié that produced, or made possible, the tangible expressions of the politics of Third World solidarity that the UPC embraced and exploited to its benefit. The network of scholarships started by Moumié in the late 1950s and then continued by the Revolutionary

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67 Pouhe, p. 59.
68 Ibid., Pouhe’s informant Jean Clause Njem provides this information on Kingue and Ntumazah’s situation in Guinea, but as Ntumazah recounts it, the two were imprisoned in Ghana, and their imprisonment was ordered by Nkrumah “for their own protection.” See Ntumazah, p.717.
Committee which sent Cameroonian students to Asia, the Caribbean, the Middle East, and the Soviet Union for professional training and higher education is a prime example of this.\textsuperscript{69} Moumié negotiated with the governments of India, China, Vietnam, Syria, Morocco and the USSR to obtain state-sponsored grants for Cameroonian students.\textsuperscript{70} It is estimated that up to one thousand students benefited from this type of aid.\textsuperscript{71}

The system of scholarships directed by the UPC involved not only the cooperation of states that had agreed to receive students, but also an elaborate network of intermediary nations employed to move students from Cameroon to Guinea or Ghana, where the scholarship would be arranged, and then again from West Africa to their respective destinations. These intermediary nations provided refuge to students, and occasionally falsified identification papers to facilitate travel.\textsuperscript{72} Accra became the primary stop for students seeking UPC grants. By the early 1960s, scholarship candidates awaiting placement were the most numerous among the various groups of Cameroonian exiles living in the country. In June of 1961 alone, there were well over one hundred students in Accra waiting to be placed in international universities.\textsuperscript{73} The students formed a small colony in the crowded, working class neighborhood of Nima on the north side of Accra, where they formed a “Central Committee,” whose direction reported directly to the UPC leadership in Ghana, and helped coordinate the application process for educational grants.

The intent of this system of educational exchange, and the conditions for receiving UPC support to study in the exterior, are disputable. Marthe Moumié maintains that grants were given to Cameroonians regardless of ethnicity or political tendencies, as a part of an effort to create qualified professionals and intellectuals so that Cameroon would not have to rely on

\textsuperscript{69} Nono, 11-21-2008.
\textsuperscript{70} Ekemeyong, veuve Moumié, 11-19-2008.
\textsuperscript{71} Kodock, 11-27-2008.
\textsuperscript{72} Kodock, 11-27-2008.
\textsuperscript{73} Abwa, p. 89.
Western expertise in independence. Woungly Massaga notes, however, that the scholarships were often accompanied by a brief political training carried out by the UPC offices in Ghana, which encouraged students to UPC branches in their respective countries of study, and taught the basic principles of political organizing. Massaga does not address the intent of the endeavor. It is possible that the testimony of both Massaga and Moumié is valid and that each is describing a different stage in the development of the UPC’s policy, especially given the fact that Massaga arrived in Accra for the first time almost six months after Félix Roland Moumié’s death. Bakang ba Tonjé presents an entirely different perspective on the foreign grants negotiated by Moumié, qualifying the UPC’s educational program as an “attempt to asphyxiate the government...by depriving it of qualified nationals. [Students were given] the order not to return to Cameroon to serve the regime at the end of their studies.” Whatever the intent of the program, ultimately, it did not bring much benefit directly to the party. After finishing their studies, a great majority of the students sent abroad by the UPC disassociated from the party, choosing either to return to Cameroon to put their training to use in Ahidjo’s republic, or remaining abroad.

Pan-Africanism in the Metropole: The UPC Comités de Base in France

Although Cameroonian students in France were not the direct recipients of aid from Afro-Asian cooperation as students studying in the exterior on UPC scholarships were, these students were essential to the functioning of the UPC in exile. Moreover, Paris was an important point of contact for young intellectuals from all over the former French Empire, which produced a kind of Third-World cooperation in the metropole itself. Cameroonian students studying in France were generally funded by the Cameroonian state, or by the French

75 Abwa, p. 89.
76 Tonjé, p. 118, translated from French.
government. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the atmosphere in French West and Equatorial Africa was such that many African students in France were deeply concerned with the futures of their countries, and followed political events closely from their respective campuses.\footnote{Kodock, 11-27-2008.}

Under such circumstances, various Pan-African cooperative associations such as the \textit{Section des Etudiants Africains}, and the \textit{Fédération des Etudiants d’Afrique Noir en France} (FEANF), as well as regionally focused groups such as the \textit{Union des Etudiants du Kamerun} (UNEK) became important epicenters of political action. FEANF published a journal entitled \textit{L’Etudiant de L’Afrique Noir}, which served as the mouthpiece for the organization, and often published political editorials exposing the brutality of French colonial policy, and cautioning against the dangers of neo-colonialism.\footnote{Kodock, 11-23-2008.}

Outside of the formal framework of these organizations, students often cooperated by distributing flyers or selling merchandise for local wings of African nationalist parties. In this capacity, Cameroonian students, particularly those who were associated with the UPC, worked closely with Algerian students, serving as conduits for banned literature, such as Frantz Fanon’s \textit{Year V of the Algerian Revolution}. Algerian students were too closely monitored to distribute the literature themselves, and so relied on a group of Cameroonian and other African students to sell the books, and then send the proceeds to an anonymous post-office box opened by the FLN.

In Toulouse in 1955, Osende Afana, then a candidate for his doctoral thesis in Economics, founded the first UPC regional committee in France. The group founded by Afana would see various other committees formed in other French cities.\footnote{Kodock, 11-23-2008.} The committee in Toulouse, of which Afana was the president, and the UPC committee in Paris received orders directly from Cairo, and served as an important liaison between the leadership abroad (then Ouandié, Kingue and Moumié in Egypt) and Ruben Um Nyobe, who was in hiding in Cameroon. The UPC leadership would send its correspondence to a post-office box in
Toulouse and the committee would then redirect it to the other party. Joseph Etoundi and Woungly Massaga, both members of the Paris committee, were responsible for the direction of special funds coming from Moumié to finance various party activities. The UPC committees also involved themselves heavily in the affairs of African cooperative organizations in France, with members in the leadership of FEANF at both the national and regional level. In 1956, Osende Afana became the editor-in-chief of *L'Etudiant de L'Afrique Noire*, which allowed the UPC to further intensify its publicity of Cameroon’s liberation struggle.

The day after the announcement of the assassination of Patrice Lumumba in 1961, four thousand African students from all over France converged on the Champs Elysées, Paris’ most famous avenue, to protest the conditions of Lumumba’s death. The spontaneous protest was peaceful, but was, nevertheless, received by the French government as a kind of affront. Despite the fact that the African students’ groups did not organize the demonstration, it was on their shoulders that the accusations of anti-French agitation fell. On February 11, 1961, a warrant for the arrest and expulsion of four student leaders and UPC members was issued. Jean Martin Tchapchet, president of the UPC in France, Michel Ndoh, vice president of FEANF, Joseph Etoundi, treasurer of the UPC in France, and Woungly Massaga, president of UNEK were all forced to take refuge in the Ghanaian Embassy in Paris, until FEANF could safely arrange asylum for the exiles with the embassies that were sympathetic to the UPC cause. Despite the exile of its leaders, the French branch of the UPC remained relatively active throughout the 1960s. In the 1970s, under the leadership of Woungly Massaga, the branch would reorganize and become the center of UPC activities, with the support of *Manifeste National pour l’Instauration de la Démocratie* (MANIDEM), an auxiliary party created by

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81 Abwa, p. 53.
83 Abwa, pp. 63-65.
Massaga in 1974.\textsuperscript{84} The French branches of the two parties served as the only viable exterior liaison from the early 1979 until the political liberation instituted in Cameroon in 1992, with the notable exception of a brief contact with radical opposition parties in Burkina Faso and Mozambique in 1982.\textsuperscript{85}

\textit{Vaincre ou Mourir: The Third World and the ALNK}

Only a few years after Bandung announced the arrival of solidarity as the doctrine of Third World internationalism, the Afro-Asian bloc had already begun to drift apart on a number of issues. Among the first and most serious of the schisms that would occur in the movement had to do with the use of violence as a tool against imperialism. A part of the movement, including several leaders who would go on to draft the Non-Aligned Movement, promoted the spirit of cooperation and peace established at Bandung, and developed a position based on a commitment to non-violence. At the same time however, Pan-Africanism in particular was beginning to embrace a more militant position, as many movements, the UPC included, found that colonial powers were not necessarily responsive to non-violent demands. At a conference of independent African heads of state held in Addis Ababa in 1960, the Casablanca Group, a United Nations-based coalition of eight progressive African states, sponsored a resolution that stated its general support of armed struggle as a method for ridding the Africa of metropolitan control, colonial or neo-colonial. The resolution, which also included a recommendation for the creation of a special fund to help finance such efforts, was an implicit approval of the armed struggle being conducted by the UPC in Cameroon and of other nationalist movements in other parts of the continent.\textsuperscript{86} In 1961, seventy-one of the two-hundred and fifty political parties represented at the All-Africa People’s Conference in Cairo,

\textsuperscript{84} Nono, 11-21-2008.
\textsuperscript{85} Nono, 11-21-2008.
\textsuperscript{86} Pouhe, p. 54.
including the UPC, supported armed struggle as an “indispensable” condition for the liberation of Africa.\(^{87}\)

Unfortunately for the UPC, the vocal support of the armed struggle it was conducting in Cameroon would begin to wane before the material support it promised could be realized. As president, Ahidjo would continue his efforts to liquidate the UPC militarily inside of Cameroon, and diplomatically at the international level, provoking a detente between the party and many of its supporters. Once again, as with educational support from the Third World, the party would have to rely on the diplomatic infrastructure created by Félix Roland Mounié in the late 1950s. The president’s trips to China, Vietnam and the USSR, as well as his close relationship with the FLN and the Egyptian government that hosted him, produced a network of military cooperation that would begin to furnish the party with military assistance in various forms in 1959 and 1960.\(^{88}\)

The People’s Republic of China began to offer UPC combatants military training beginning in 1959, providing a two month formation in the use and maintenance of arms, guerrilla techniques, strategic sabotage, and physical training to UPC members who cycled in and out of the maquis. The Ghana offices of the UPC served as the intermediaries between the maquis and the Chinese government. Militants would stay in a special residence in Accra reserved for combatants going into training, where they were fed and given healthcare. The secrecy demanded by guerrilla conflict forced trainees to stop again in Ghana upon their return from China, where they would wait for an ALNK convoy to arrive from Cameroon to bring them to their post.\(^{89}\) Over the course of China’s seven-year military cooperation with the party, such party leaders as Osende Afana, François Fosso, Emock Elang, and Ernest Ouandié would

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\(^{87}\) Pouhe, p. 56.

\(^{88}\) Adalaba, p. 46.

\(^{89}\) Abwa, pp. 87-91.
pass through Chinese training camps. China also trained female combatants to send back to the maquis in Cameroon as parachutists.\textsuperscript{90}

The UPC’s military cooperation with Ghana was limited until 1962, when Woungly Massaga, a close friend of Nkrumah’s and the UPC’s leader the country after Ouandie’s return to Cameroon, convinced the Ghanaian president of the need for military training facilities in the country. Prior to this development, the Ghanaian government allowed the UPC to move arms and combatants through the country, but did not contribute directly to the party’s armed struggle.\textsuperscript{91} Nkrumah did however, continue Ouandié’s government pension even after he left Ghana to return to fight in Cameroon’s West Province.\textsuperscript{92} Later in the year, military training camps were created at Mankong and Half Assini, in Ghana’s Eastern Region, which gave politico-military training to UPC militants and a handful of other nationalist liberation movements.\textsuperscript{93}

The UPC’s longstanding relationship with the Algerian FLN would also become a source of military aid to the party in 1962, when Algeria finally succeeded in driving the French colonial administration out of Algeria. The UPC opened an informations office in Algiers, which under President Ben Bella, had opened its doors to any movement interested in fighting for “real” independence.\textsuperscript{94} A number of UPC militants were trained at a camp established in Sakiet, on the Tunisia-Algeria border, and Algeria agreed to direct arms coming from China and Czechoslovakia to the struggle in Cameroon.\textsuperscript{95}

On a trip to Congo-Brazzaville to aid the Congolese “Youth Revolution,” Woungly Massaga came into contact with the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) for the first time. In Brazzaville, Massaga, building on contacts made in Accra, initiated a

\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., p. 47, and Abwa, p. 93.
\textsuperscript{91} Abwa, p. 87-92.
\textsuperscript{92} Pouhe, p. 42.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., and Abwa, p. 129.
relationship with the movement that would, after internal problems in Ghana and China severely reduced their ability to aid the UPC, become one of the party’s primary sources of military support. Massaga finished his duties in Brazzaville, where he was part of a delegation of Ghanaian military officers, and moved to Cabinda in southern Congo to offer his services to Augustino Neto, the leader of the MPLA.\textsuperscript{96} One year later, in 1965, Massaga settled permanently in Cabinda in order to try to organize a second front in Cameroon’s maquis conflict, conducted, like Afana’s effort, from the East of the Country.\textsuperscript{97}

The history of the eastern front, inclusive of both Massaga’s and Afana’s militias, is one that is fairly controversial, and whose events are often contested as much by the people who participated in it as by historians. The specific agendas of each of these two leaders, and the various theories that surround the fates of their respective guerrilla movements are not salient in the context of the UPC’s employment of Third World solidarity. What is, however, important to note is that the opening of the second front, particularly where it concerns Woungly Massaga and his combatants, is indicative of a change in the UPC’s engagement of internationalism, or more correctly said, the Third World’s engagement of the UPC.

The years of 1965 and 1966 saw the termination of three of the UPC’s most established international relationships. In 1965, Ahmed Ben Bella, Algeria’s president since the FLN’s victory in 1962, was deposed by Boumediene, who initiated diplomatic relations and economic cooperation with the Republic of Cameroon shortly after taking power.\textsuperscript{98} This new relationship made further cooperation between Algeria and the UPC all but impossible. Mounting tensions between Kwame Nkrumah and his senior military advisors, who were notoriously antagonistic toward the UPC in Accra, would result in a military coup that ousted the President while he

\textsuperscript{94} Ekemeyong, veuve Moumié, 11-19-2008, and Pouhe, p. 49. Madame Moumié denied the existence of a UPC office in Algiers, and stated that the Upécistes who found themselves their continued their work from their respective residences.

\textsuperscript{95} Pouhe, p. 49.

\textsuperscript{96} Pouhe, p. 51.

\textsuperscript{97} Abwa, p. 129.
was in an airplane traveling to Peking, ending the UPC’s long tenure in Ghana. China too was unable to offer any kind of consistent support to the UPC’s efforts after 1966. In 1966, Mao Tse Tung launched the Cultural Revolution, which completely rearranged the social order of the country, to great economic consequences. While in 1960, the People’s Republic designated more than 500 million francs for the support of the UPC’s armed struggle, after 1966, support for the maquis from China would come sparingly, or not at all to the party. To further complicate things, the network that connected Ouandie and the ALNK in the interior to the leadership in exile would break down in 1965, completely isolating the two parts of the party from one another.

Consequently, as Massaga tried to coordinate his attack on Eastern Cameroon beginning in 1965, he would do it largely without the help of these three countries. Instead, his efforts to recruit and train militants would bring him into a close partnership with the MPLA and through the MPLA, the Cuban government. The Caribbean island, which had undergone a successful socialist revolution in 1959, would step in to fill the void in the UPC’s military aid left by Algeria, Ghana and China. As a part of Ernesto Guevara’s project of “exporting” the Cuban revolution, the Cuban government established contact with both the UPC and the MPLA in the Congo in the mid-1960s. A training camp was established at Cabinda, where two Cuban military specialists helped train guerrillas for both movements.

The UPC sent agents from Cabinda under the guise of traveling watch sellers to recruit militants in southern Cameroon. Agents would give the new recruits a cursory training while in Cameroon, after which, they were transported to a secret UPC base in Brazzaville run by Emock Elang, from where they could be easily moved to Cabinda for training. The office at Brazzaville was often the staging ground for negotiations with the leadership of the MPLA,

98 Ntumazah, p. 668.
99 Pouhe, p. 50.
100 Nono, 11-21-2008.
101 Adalaba, p. 46.
who had agreed to provide arms to defend the Cabinda camp, as well as military training equipment. A group of one hundred UPC militants, including two young Gabonese who were trained to serve as officers, was formed and armed there. Cuba provided the entire column, named “Ruben Um Nyobe,” with “Kalashnikov 9’s” and several air defense weapons. In 1967, the column left Cabinda accompanied by the Cuban military officers, crossing the Congo south to north to install itself on the Cameroonian border, from where it would launch its attacks.103

Despite the fact that much, if not all, of the UPC’s military activity in the East was conducted from the Congo, the UPC’s relationship with the Congo was not particularly strong. In 1966, the Congolese government expelled Afana and his militants into Cameroon after confiscating their weapons, where they were then captured and killed by Cameroonian military forces.104 Under Massaga, the UPC’s installation in the country was tolerated by the government more because the general disorder caused by the political crisis in the Congo did not allow it to address their presence, than because it was supportive of the guerrillas’ cause. Diplomatic and intelligence cooperation between certain parts of the Congolese and Ahidjo’s government severely hindered UPC’s efforts to infiltrate southern Cameroon throughout much of the late 1960s.105 Other Congolese leaders were supporting the UPC, either tacitly or overtly, even as their colleagues were working with the Cameroonian Republic. This resulted in a number of multi-lateral conflicts between the UPC, Cameroon, and various Congolese factions.106

Massaga’s exile from the Congo in 1969 marks the effective end of both the eastern guerrilla conflict, and any meaningful interaction between the UPC and the exterior. Throughout the 1970s the party’s leaders who were still in exile, now completely disassociated

102 Abwa, p. 174
103 Ibid., p. 70.
104 Nono, 11-21-2008.
105 Abwa, p. 184-190.
106 Ibid.
from one another, took refuge in various progressive countries, with Massaga traveling first to Cuba, then to Libya, and Ntumazah and others spending time in Eastern Africa.  

VI. Conclusion

After the failure of the second front, it was clear that Ahidjo had won the diplomatic battle against the UPC, depriving the party of its international alliances and all of its African bases of operation. After nine years leading the ALNK sous maquis, Ernest Ouandié was taken prisoner on August 19, 1970, and executed five months later, after being sentenced to death by a military tribunal in Yaoundé. With the death of Ouandié, the UPC had also lost its military battle, and was forced to retreat into an existence that was, for the most part, strictly rhetorical. The disintegration of what had once been one of the most popular movements in Cameroon’s history can be attributed to a number of factors, and is explained in great variety of ways. From an eclectic standpoint, the sheer power of the French imperial machine behind the territorial administration and later, the Cameroonian state, and the internal organization of the party, which was characterized by the in-fighting between its different factions that followed Moumié’s death, combined with the disavowal of the UPC by its international allies to relegate the party irrelevancy and collapse.

The UPC, a stateless nationalist movement from 1955 onward, was almost entirely dependent on the solidarity propounded by Third World internationalism for both legitimacy and material support. This dependency on a movement which was centered around the interactions of independent states, made the party particularly susceptible to larger currents in international politics, and it is this susceptibility that makes the study of the UPC’s

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108 Tonje, p. 148.
international relations so interesting and so frustrating. In examining the patterns that emerge in the UPC’s relationship with the Third World, first with the diplomatic efforts of Moumié and continued by Massaga under the Comité Revolutionnaire, one quickly comes to realize that the outcome of the UPC’s project was as much a result of international factors that were completely outside of the party’s control, as it was of the party’s internal or diplomatic actions. The convergence of a series of tactical diplomatic ruses on the part of Ahidjo, and a global political climate that was no longer conducive to—or interested in— a Third World solidarity based in ideology unraveled the diplomatic work that the party’s leadership in exile had done to win the favor of the Afro-Asian bloc, and pushed the UPC further and further to the margins of international politics, eventually isolating it altogether.

It is clear that after 1955, the UPC engaged Third World internationalism more out of practical necessity than an allegiance to the ideology of solidarity. However, the eventual abandonment of the UPC by its Third World supporters calls into question the viability of the Third World project more generally, and highlights the fact that all of the Third World internationalists mobilized the universal “Spirit of Bandung,” at least to a certain degree, in the service of particular interests.
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Appendix I: Glossary of Abbreviations

ALNK : Armée de Libération Nationale du Kamerun
CNO : Comité National d’Organisation
CR : Comité Révolutionnaire
FEANF : Fédération des Etudiants d’Afrique Noire en France
FLN : National Liberation Front
MANIDEM : Manifeste National pour l’Instauration de la Démocratie
MPLA: Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
OAU: Organization for African Unity
PCF: French Communist Party
RDA: Rassemblement Democratique Africain
UDEFEC: Union des Femmes Camerounaises
UN : United Nations
UNEK : Union Nationale des Etudiants du Kamerun
UPC : Union des Populations du Cameroun
USSR : United Soviet Socialist Republic
Appendix II: Interview Questions

Interview Questions for Marthe MOUMIE
19 Novembre 2008
Ebolowa, Cameroon

1. It seems to me that the UPC had an international vision from its inception. Ruben Um Nyobe wrote in his “Rapport Présenté au Premier Congrès de l’UPC”:
   Before the creation of the UPC, the world was closed for Cameroon, as it remained ignored by the world...from a political point of view, only the voice of the administration and the elected officials in favor of colonialism were able to make themselves heard domestically and internationally.
   In other words, the UPC’s mission was two-fold: to project the ills of French colonialism to the exterior, but also to educate the Cameroonian people, and to inculcate in them an anti-colonial consciousness that extended beyond the immediate borders of Cameroon. Could you elaborate a little on the reasons why this international mission was so important for the UPC?

2. Were there any writers, intellectuals or other political leaders that inspired these ideas of international solidarity?

3. For the UPC, was international solidarity imagined in terms of race, class, colonial history, or some combination of these factors?

4. The importance of internationalism and African cooperation is apparent in the official writings of the party— one sees internationalism come up almost as often as nationalism. This however, is primarily at the level of theory. How was the UPC’s philosophy of mutual support in the anti-colonial struggle manifest in the party’s actions?

5. To what countries did the UPC receive or give support as a part of this internationalist project? In what forms?

6. The UPC was banned in British Cameroon in 1957, and thirteen party leaders and members from the office in Kumba were exiled to Khartoum. What were the party’s activities in the Sudan?

7. From Khartoum, the party moved to Egypt. What were the reasons for this move?

8. Once in Cairo, the exiles were incorporated into the secretariat of the Afro-Asian Movement. What were the specific activities of the secretariat, and what did the UPC do for the organization?

9. Was it Nasser’s government or the secretariat that supported political refugees financially in Egypt? Was the situation similar in other countries?

10. Who else was exiled in Cairo with you at the time? Was there a community of nationalists from various countries there?
11. You mentioned in your book that you had experienced racism in Egypt. Do you think that the problem of racial discrimination had an effect on Afro-Asian cooperation in a more global sense?

12. What was the relationship between the UPC and the Rassemblement Democratique Africain (RDA)? What were the specific activities of the UPC in the RDA?

13. When the UPC was expelled from the RDA as a result of the new, more moderate ideology of Houphouët Boigny and the Rassemblement, what changed for the party? Did the party feel the loss of the support of the RDA?

14. Who was sent on the UPC’s delegation to the Congrès Mondiale des Partisans des la Paix in 1952? What were the activities of the UPC in relation to this group?

15. The Organization for African Unity (OAU) of Nkrumah was a point of tension between the more moderate and radical ideologies of decolonization. How was the UPC received by the OAU? What was the relationship between Ahiédo and the OAU as a result of Nkrumah’s support for the UPC and other more radical groups?

16. How did the relationship between the UPC and Ghana develop before the independence of Ghana? And after?

17. I’d like to return briefly to Egypt; I’ve heard a little about the radio transmissions of the UPC on Radio le Caire. Can you tell me any more about this?

18. Who was the audience of the radio transmissions? What about the journals that the party published, like the Voix du Cameroun?

19. What other methods of communication were employed to connect the internal branch of the UPC to the leaders abroad? What was the relationship between the two levels of the party? Was information about international actions spread throughout all levels of national party membership?

20. Ernest Ouandié gave a radio speech in Vietnam, on La Voix de Vietnam in 1958. Were there other attempts to publicize Cameroon’s independence struggle and build international solidarity through international public media?

21. Can you tell me a little bit about your relationship with Mme Abolo? What were her activities with the party?

22. What about Marthe Ouandié and Marguerite Ngoyi?

23. You and your husband traveled extensively during the period of your exile, to Algeria, Guinea, the Congo, Vietnam, Ghana—all in the general framework of Afro-Asian cooperation. China was the destination for a number of visits; what type of support did China give to the UPC to aid its cause?

24. During the anti-colonial period, it was rare to find an anti-colonial movement that did not have some kind of contact with, or support from Moscow or Beijing. The UPC is certainly no exception to this rule; the party’s rhetoric has strong Marxist-Leninist
undertones, and it also received support from the USSR and the People’s Republic of China. However, the UPC maintained a strict policy of non-alignment, insisting that it was neither socialist nor anti-socialist. In your opinion, what was the nature of the relationship between the UPC and the socialist bloc? (Cuba, China, Vietnam, the USSR)

25. Do you think that the ideological differences between the USSR and China that complicated the Third World Internationalist movement on a more global scale affected the UPC’s activities?

26. Conversely, what was the relationship between the UPC and the capitalist world?

27. Is it fair to say that the UPC was really non-aligned?

28. Were other members of the party traveling in the same way? If so, can you give me some examples?

29. I’m fascinated by the meeting between the UPC women’s organization and Ho Chi Minh that you describe in your book. Can you tell me a little bit more about what happened there?

30. How did Vietnam support the UPC?

31. The relationship between Egypt and the UPC seemed to be strong and amicable. However, I found a document in the National Archives that said that the UPC was forced to leave the country in 1959. What is the story behind the party’s (supposed) exile from Egypt?

32. After the UPC left Egypt, did the party maintain a relationship with Nasser’s government or the secretariat in Cairo?

33. From Egypt, you left for Conakry. Did all thirteen members of the party who had been in Cairo remain together?

34. Was the integration of Moumié into the government of Sekou Touré an effort to support the international goals of the UPC (the elimination of colonialism, liberation, and resisting neo-colonialism), or rather a part of a kind of reciprocity between Touré and the UPC?

35. Moumié went with a Guinean delegation to the United Nations. Can you describe the role that Afro-Asian solidarity at the UN played in the struggle of the UPC for the independence of Cameroon? How did it change after independence, when a pro-France Ahidjo took power?

36. Moumié was invited by Lumumba to help organize youth in the Congo. What was the relationship between these two leaders?

37. What were Kingue and Ouandie doing after the party left Egypt?
38. The UPC engaged in military exchange with a number of Third World countries, sharing guerrilla soldiers and techniques with other anti-colonial struggles. Which countries received UPC soldiers?

39. Were they armed by the UPC, or by the receiving group?

40. Ndeh Ntumazah, Woungly Massaga and others trained UPC militants as well as other soldiers. For example, Ntumazah trained UPC soldiers and Massaga traveled all over the world exchanging guerrilla techniques. What was the goal of these exchanges? Was it effective? Who financed these exchanges?

41. Speaking of Ndeh, you mentioned that when Boumediene took power in Algeria that many exiled nationalists had to leave the country, however Ndeh said in his book that he represented the UPC in Algeria under Boumediene, and that they had a close relationship. What was the reason for these inconsistencies?

42. In Cairo, Moumié had a meeting with the Egyptian agent Mohamed Fathi al-Dib, who trained FLN militants in Algeria, in which the two spoke about how Egypt could help the UPC in this regard. Did anything come of this meeting? What did Egypt do for the UPC in terms of material support?

43. Can you explain the system of educational exchange directed by the UPC? How were students chosen to study in other countries? Were there conditions of participation to study on a UPC directed scholarship? How many students participated? How many (Which) countries participated? Who financed the scholarships? What were the benefits of the program to the party?

44. The Third World Internationalism of Bandung and the Non-Aligned Movement is often accused of being an elite movement. Was the internationalist project of the UPC immune to these accusations? What efforts were made to extend the international vision of the leadership of the party to the level of the people?

45. What was the relationship between Moumié and the French? Was there any attempt to reconcile the leadership of the UPC with French policy?

46. What measures were taken by Ahidjo to try to integrate the exiled UPC members into his government?

47. What concrete efforts were made by Ahidjo’s government to hinder the activities of the UPC at the international level? What was the diplomatic relationship between Ahidjo’s government and the countries that were pro-UPC?

48. Were there differences between the militants of the UPC in regards to the future of the party and Cameroon? The UPC sent two delegations to the Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers in 1964. What effect did the factionalization of the party have in terms of its national and international activities?

49. Do you think that Third World solidarity was a good strategy for the UPC? What were the problems? What were the advantages? Is Third World Internationalism still relevant and important?
1. Before we talk politics, it’s important that we know a little bit about who you are. When and where were you born? Who are your parents? What did you study?

2. That would mean that you experienced the period leading up to Cameroon’s independence. What effect did these experiences have on your political ideas?

3. How did you become a member of the UPC? What attracted you to the party? What were your activities with the party?

4. It seems to me that the UPC had an international vision from its inception. The UPC’s mission was two-fold: to project the ills of French colonialism to the exterior, but also to educate the Cameroonian people, and to inculcate in them an anti-colonial consciousness that extended beyond the immediate borders of Cameroon. Could you elaborate a little on the reasons why this international mission was so important for the UPC?

5. For the UPC, was international solidarity imagined in terms of race, class, colonial history, or some combination of these factors?

6. The importance of internationalism and African cooperation is apparent in the official writings of the party– one sees internationalism come up almost as often as nationalism. This however, is primarily at the level of theory. How was the UPC’s philosophy of mutual support in the anti-colonial struggle manifest in the party’s actions?

7. To what countries did the UPC receive or give support as a part of this internationalist project? In what forms?

8. After 1957, the UPC was banned in British Cameroon, and party leaders and members were exiled. This created, in effect, two levels of the party- one operating in secret inside of Cameroon, and the other carrying out the struggle at an international level. What was the relationship between these two groups? Was there collaboration? Was information about the party’s international activities available at all levels of the UPC’s membership? What methods of communication were used to connect the interior with the exterior?

9. During the anti-colonial period, it was rare to find an anti-colonial movement that did not have some kind of contact with, or support from Moscow or Beijing. The UPC is certainly no exception to this rule; the party’s rhetoric has strong Marxist-Leninist undertones, and it also received support from the USSR and the People’s Republic of China. However, the UPC maintained a strict policy of non-alignment, insisting that it was neither socialist nor anti-socialist. In your opinion, what was the nature of the relationship between the UPC and the socialist bloc? (Cuba, China, Vietnam, the USSR)
10. Um Nyobe made several trips to the UN, and Moumié also represented the UPC with a Guinean delegation to the United Nations. Can you describe the role that Afro-Asian solidarity at the UN played in the struggle of the UPC for the independence of Cameroon? How did it change after independence, when a pro-France Ahidjo took power?

11. The UPC engaged in military exchange with a number of Third World countries, sharing guerrilla soldiers and techniques with other anti-colonial struggles. Which countries received UPC soldiers?

12. Ndeh Ntumazah, Woungly Massaga and others trained UPC militants as well as other soldiers. For example, Massaga traveled all over the world exchanging guerrilla techniques. What was the goal of these exchanges? Was it effective? Who financed these exchanges?

13. Can you explain the system of educational exchange directed by the UPC? How were students chosen to study in other countries? Were there conditions of participation to study on a UPC directed scholarship? How many students participated? How many (Which) countries participated? Who financed the scholarships? What were the benefits of the program to the party?

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6. The UPC was banned from British Cameroon in 1957, and exiled briefly to Khartoum before leaving for Egypt. Once in Cairo, the exiles were incorporated into the secretariat of the Afro-Asian Movement. What were the specific activities of the secretariat, and what did the UPC do for the organization?

7. In her book, Victime Du Colonialisme Français, Marthe Mounié notes that she experienced racism during her stay in Cairo. Do you think that the problem of racial discrimination had an effect on Afro-Asian cooperation in a more global sense?

8. What was the relationship between the UPC and the Rassemblement Democratique Africain (RDA)? What were the specific activities of the UPC in the RDA?

9. When the UPC was expelled from the RDA as a result of the new, more moderate ideology of Houphouët-Boigny and the Rassemblement, what changed for the party? Did the party feel the loss of the support of the RDA?
10. The Organization for African Unity (OAU) of Nkrumah was a point of tension between the more moderate and radical ideologies of decolonization. How was the UPC received by the OAU? What was the relationship between Ahidjo and the OAU as a result of Nkrumah’s support for the UPC and other more radical groups?

11. Returning briefly to Egypt, I’ve heard a little about the radio transmissions of the UPC on Radio le Caire. Can you tell me any more about this? Who was the audience of the radio transmissions? What about the journals that the party published, like the Voix du Cameroun?

12. What other methods of communication were employed to connect the internal branch of the UPC to the leaders abroad? What was the relationship between the two levels of the party? Was information about international actions spread throughout all levels of national party membership?

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14. Do you think that the ideological differences between the USSR and China that complicated the Third World Internationalist movement on a more global scale affected the UPC’s activities?

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18. Ndeh Nnumazah, Woungly Massaga and others trained UPC militants as well as other soldiers. For example, Massaga traveled all over the world exchanging guerrilla techniques. What was the goal of these exchanges? Was it effective? Who financed these exchanges?
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20. Can you explain the system of educational exchange directed by the UPC? How were students chosen to study in other countries? Were there conditions of participation to study on a UPC directed scholarship?

21. How many students participated? How many (Which) countries participated?

22. Who financed the scholarships?

23. What were the benefits of the program to the party?

24. Third World Internationalism of Bandung and the Non-Aligned Movement is often accused of being an elite movement. Was the internationalist project of the UPC immune to these accusations?

25. What efforts were made to extend the international vision of the leadership of the party to the level of the people?

26. What concrete efforts were made by Ahidjo’s government to hinder the activities of the UPC at the international level? What was the diplomatic relationship between Ahidjo’s government and the countries that were pro-UPC?

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28. Do you think that Third World solidarity was a good strategy for the UPC? What were the problems? What were the advantages? Is Third World Internationalism still relevant and important?
1. At our last meeting, you described to us your experiences at the University of Poitiers and the University of Toulouse where you studied beginning in 1955. 1955 was a very important year in the history of Cameroon- there was the repression in Douala in May of that year, followed shortly thereafter by the banning of the UPC and the beginning of the maquis conflict in what was then French Cameroon. Internationally, in April 1955, twenty-nine Asian and African countries met in Bandung, Indonesia, at a conference that would ultimately become the first formal articulation of the Afro-Asian Movement. In November, the FLN launched a protracted struggle against the French administration in Algeria. Moreover, the world by this point was already completely submerged in the Cold War. Would you speak to us a little about the atmosphere among African students in France at the time? How did this confluence of global and local events at that particular moment effect your politicization as a young Cameroonian student just beginning his studies abroad? Were there certain writers or intellectuals that had a particular influence on your political ideas? What did Afro-Asian solidarity and the Spirit of Bandung mean for African students? What was Cameroonian – or African- nationalism for you at the time? What was, in theory or in practice, the relationship between nationalism and internationalism?

2. It is generally understood that the African students in France were highly organized, and also very political. They published a journal, “La Voix de l’Afrique Noir” and cooperated in various organizations. What activities were carried out in order to support the various independence struggles that were going on at the time, in Algeria, in Cameroon, and in francophone West Africa? What was the relationship between different student groups – for example, African students and Asian students?

3. Students were an important component of UPC activities during the independence struggle. Students funded by the Cameronian state, like yourself, gave essential support to the movement, which precipitated the retraction of several students scholarships, perhaps most notably Osendé Afana. There were also scholarships secured by Felix-Roland Moumié, the president of the UPC, that sent Cameronian students abroad to study in China, in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. In your opinion what was the contribution that students made to the UPC’s project? How many students in France were involved with the UPC? How did the network of scholarships put in place by Moumié function? Since the party was underground in Cameroon, could students apply for scholarships from within the country? How did they leave the country to study abroad? How many students received scholarships? How were students chosen to receive funding? What was the aim of this network?

4. Can you describe the activities of Osendé Afana during this period? How was the UPC “comité de base” established in France? How did it work? What were its responsibilities? How did you communicate with the leaders of the UPC in exile in Cairo and elsewhere, and with the branch of the party engaged in the maquis conflict?

5. In a more general sense, one of the criticisms leveled against the Afro-Asian Movement is that it was a movement of elites. Effectively, the leaders of the movement
failed to extend their internationalist vision to the level of the people they represented. Do you think that the UPC was immune to these types of criticisms? What was the nature of the communication between the leaders in the exterior—the internationalists—and the UPC “sous maquis”?

6. I understand that the UPC sent several party members for military training in China in 1958-1959. After the death of Moumié, what was the relationship between China and the UPC like? Who was primarily responsible for this relationship? Do you know how the military training was conducted? What techniques or strategies were imparted to the militants? How many underwent the training? Were there other countries that gave similar aid to the UPC? What did countries that were sympathetic to the UPC do to help them continue their struggle in Cameroon?

7. In 1961, Cameroon became formally independent under the leadership of Ahmadou Ahidjo. Shortly thereafter, you returned to Cameroon to work with the government as an economic specialist. How did you make this decision? How were you received by the government?

8. It seems that Cameroon’s independence under Ahidjo marks the beginning of one stage of the development of the UPC’s politics and strategy. Another example of such a change could be the outlawing of the party in 1955. How would you characterize the evolution of the policy of the UPC from 1948 to 1970, particularly in regards to its international interactions?

9. Do you think that Afro-Asian solidarity was a good strategy for the UPC? What were the problems? What were the advantages? Is Afro-Asian still important or relevant?

10. At a certain point in its history, the UPC began to break apart into different factions. In 1964, the party was even represented by two delegations at the Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers. What was the effect of this factionalization on the party as regards its national and international actions?

11. In your opinion, what caused the failure of the UPC’s nationalist project in Cameroon? Is it possible that this failure is linked in some way to the party’s international relations?
Appendix III: Changing Leadership in the UPC

Founding Members (*Chez Sierra, Douala, 1948*)
Jacques Ngom
Jacques Biboum
Georges Yémi
Guillaume Hônd
Guillaume Bagal
Emmanuel Yapp
Charles Assale
Leonard Bouli
Manga Mado
Moumé Etia
Theodore Ngosse
Raphael Nkoudon

Executive Committee (1948)
*President:* Félix Roland Moumié
*Vice President:* Abel Kingue
*Vice President:* Ernest Ouandié
*Secretary General:* Ruben Um Nyobe
*Treasurer:* Innocent Kamsi

Revolutionary Committee (1962)
*President:* Ernest Ouandié
*Vice President:* Abel Kingue
*Members:* Castor Ossende Afana
Michel Ndoh
Njiawue Nicanor
Diye Ndongo
Nguo Woungly Massaga