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Social Entrepreneurship in Egypt: Turning Revolutionary Ambition into Tangible Results

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SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN EGYPT

Turning Revolutionary Ambition into Tangible Results

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PIM 70

A Capstone Paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Masters of International Education at the SIT Graduate Institute in Brattleboro, Vermont, USA

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Social Entrepreneurship in Egypt

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Chris Blackwood 07/27/2012

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ABSTRACT

Social Entrepreneurship in Egypt: Turning Revolutionary Ambition into Tangible Results is a research paper that seeks to provide a model for sustainable social entrepreneurship (SE) development in Egypt and the surrounding Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The research consists of two primary areas: 1) the field of SE as a whole, along with traits shared by successful social enterprises, and 2) the modern Egyptian context, and the integration of best SE practices in the country and surrounding region during the modern revolutionary era. This is a paper that focuses on social change, and thus several social change theories are examined and used to both understand the changes that have taken place in Egypt, as well as corroborate the proposed SE approach to catalyze those changes. Information was obtained from a thorough literature review along with a trip to Egypt, which entailed interviews with leading social enterprise incubators in the country, as well as a survey that was distributed to social entrepreneurs throughout Egypt.

INTRODUCTION

In early January 2011, the people of Tunisia and Egypt erupted in popular uprisings, leading to the ousting of the corrupt regimes of Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak and igniting a progressive upheaval that continues to resonate throughout the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region today. Under the building strain of discontent with unemployment, political repression and poverty, the events that unfolded in Egypt and Tunisia reflected the dissatisfaction and lack of economic and entrepreneurial opportunities for the Arab world's bulging youth population.

In the 12 months following the revolutions known as the "Arab Spring," international attention focused on meeting immediate needs in the region, such as preparing for free and open elections in after many decades of rule from a single party that was routinely unchallenged. Despite these efforts and the high levels of motivation for change throughout the region, insufficient effort has been invested in addressing the problems that led the uprising, such as poverty, unemployment, and a lack of democracy (Ordu et. al., 2011).

Today, the youth of the MENA region are bursting with entrepreneurial energy and the ardent desire to build a better future. Yet their hope has been hindered by the realization that opportunities to turn this ambition into real-world solutions are extremely difficult to come by. Despite the Tunisian, Egyptian, and surrounding populations being highly educated as a whole, with a large number of college graduates, it is extremely difficult for these graduates to find work. Today, the average unemployment rate for youth of working age in Egypt is 25%, 30% in Tunisia, and is about the same in surrounding countries (Schumpeter, 2012).

For much of the youth population in this region, the best hope for both employment and addressing social issues is to start their own small business. However, government-owned banks and business incubators support only elites, are extremely centralized around capital cities, and do not provide the support that small businesses need to succeed. The maze of bureaucracy along with the high start-up fees required to start a small business daunt budding social entrepreneurs, and deter non-elite and inexperienced entrepreneurs from starting their own businesses. Furthermore, despite the high percentage of youth with college degrees, little, if any, of the formal traditional education system in the region provides the necessary knowledge and skills to turn a good idea into a viable business plan (Ordu et. al., 2011).

The focus of this research has been on efforts to create greater opportunities for social enterprise development in Egypt, and focus particularly on the development of enterprises that lead to more participatory civic engagement, which I see as fundamental to the development of social entrepreneurship (SE) in the region. I have compared efforts that have been attempted in the field, in Egypt, the surrounding region, and in other post revolutionary regions. I have identified commonalities between efforts that have succeeded, as well as those that have failed.

The question that I have addressed with this research is: *what is the most viable model for SE development, especially the development of civil society organizations (CSOs) that will lead to an increase in inclusive civic engagement in Egypt after the Arab Spring?* My hope is that results of this research could potentially help provide a framework for organizations that wish to pursue programs that address the problems that led to the Arab Spring.

SE DEFINITION AND DELIMITATIONS

SE is a concept that has yet to be defined in a manner in which everyone agrees. Since its development as a concept, there have been many different definitions of it, all of which relate to engaging in an initiative that works towards socially desirable outcomes. In general terms, which is how I will be referring it due to its variance, it is “a process involving the innovative use and combination of resources to pursue opportunities to catalyze social change and/or address social needs” (Mair & Marti, 2006, pp. 1). Greg Dees, who has often been referred to as the father of social entrepreneurship education, draws on the thinking of the 20th century economist Joseph Schumpeter when arriving at a definition. Schumpeter argued (via Bornstein & Davis, 2010) that entrepreneurs “improve the capacity of society and provide for the creative destruction that propels economic change” (Bornstein & Davis, 1, 2010). Dees proposes that social entrepreneurs do the same for social change, creatively utilizing existing human and material resources in a community to improve its capacity to address problems (Bornstein & Davis, 2010).

Indeed, it is this creative use of resources that appears to be the most essential component of any successful social business. One could certainly attempt to pursue a social entrepreneurial initiative without finding new ways to use what already exists in a community, but history indicates that such an initiative would be short lived, unsuccessful, and thus not qualify as SE. Praszkiec and Nowak (2012) argue that a deep understanding of social systems in the context of the target community (which is needed for this creative use of resources) is central to the effectiveness of social entrepreneurs, and can even substitute for the lack of resources needed for a direct, immediate impact.

Pushing for change directly by applying an external force strong enough to overcome the resistance of the social system stands in sharp contrast to the entrepreneur's catalytic approach, which relies on facilitating a natural process. In other words, instead of acting against the system, social entrepreneurs, aided by their deep knowledge, use the forces within the system to achieve change by searching for the smallest and simplest possible impulses and rules (Praszkier & Nowak, 50, 2012).

Given the inherent dependence on context within this broad definition of SE and the many variants of SE definitions that result from it, SE as a field of research can be viewed through a large variety of frameworks. For the sake of this research, I will be focusing on SE in the context of the Egyptian revolution, during a period with a transitional government and a massive youth population with an ardent desire to address social issues.

This research is not intended to provide new speculations for the broad field of social entrepreneurship. Nor is it aimed to suggest that its findings pertain to all eras. The political climate and surrounding milieu of Egypt is changing quickly, and thus these findings can only pertain to the current time during which they have been obtained. Additionally, given the focus of this research on social enterprises that aim to increase employment for youth, its findings may not necessarily apply directly to other types of social enterprises (i.e. health focused, environment focused, etc.).

LITERATURE REVIEW

The Egyptian Context

Given that SE as a field of research is still relatively new, there remains much that has yet to be explored within it. Continuing with the definition of SE as a process that can take place in a variety of contexts, it is SE within many of these contexts that has yet to be researched thoroughly. There is, however, a fair amount of research that has been done on development and growth initiatives within specific contexts, including that of the MENA region. The article by Yousef, (2004) entitled “Development, Growth and Policy Reform in the Middle East and North Africa since 1950,” for example, which reviews the history of development in the MENA region after World War II, focuses on issues which are specifically relevant to current political and economic reform development. Furthermore, it suggests what should be focused on in the future in order to meet social and economic needs. In the article, it is shown that the immense labor force growth in the region from 1970 to 2010, which is substantially larger than any other region in the world, corroborates the need for a mass development of entrepreneurship initiatives. Yousef’s (2004) article uses research on the past, present and future of education and employment in the region to project the following:

The total labor force of the Middle East region totaled some 104 million workers in 2000 and is projected to reach 185 million by 2020. Creating 80 million new jobs as well as absorbing a significant segment of those currently unemployed entails doubling the current level of employment within two decades-or creating as many jobs in the next 15 years as was done in the last 5 decades (pp. 102).

Common Traits in Successful Social Enterprises

There is research from Alvord, Brown, & Letts (2004) that has comparatively analyzed SE initiatives in a variety of countries, and has highlighted common traits of effective practices. This Harvard University study entitled “Social Entrepreneurship and Societal Transformation: An Exploratory Study,” highlights common characteristics of successful SE initiatives, which are identified within a framework that focuses on three aspects: characteristics of innovations, characteristics of leadership and organization, and approaches to scaling up and societal transformation. The commonalities identified in the characteristics of innovation, which is an area that I will be focusing on in my research, all relate to their initial approach, which, in all cases of success, began with a basic form that shaped their identities. These approaches take the form of building local capacity, disseminating a package of innovations that serve a widely distributed need (i.e. small loans) and building a movement, all of which are defined and exemplified in the case studies used in the research (Alvord et al., 2004).

While my research corroborates the need for all three of these approaches in order for social enterprises in Egypt to be successful, it is the approach of building a movement that I will focus on the most within this aspect. This approach involves forming alliances that mobilize grassroots efforts to challenge abusive or elite institutions. These alliances are not limited to other social enterprises, and are actually most effective when diversified among types of organizations (public, private, technology based, education based, etc.). Given the Egyptian context, which I will elaborate on later in this paper, this appears to be the most needed approach for social enterprises in the country, and is likely to be the most impactful.

As for the aspect of scaling up and societal transformation, which is the other area of focus in my research, prior analysis (as cited by Alvord et al., 2004) has identified three major patterns identified for increasing the scale of impact of successful SE initiatives: a) expanding functions and services to provide services and benefits to more people b) expanding functions and services to change the behavior of other actors with wide impacts to primary stakeholders, and c) initiating activities that change the behavior of other actors with wide impacts, scaling up impacts indirectly. As all of these patterns are pertinent to my research focus, I will be discussing all three within the context of Egyptian social enterprises, and particularly Egyptian social enterprise incubators, later in this paper.

The concept of building local capacity is a common theme in research on successful SE initiatives. Mair and Marti (2006) support this in their article, and write that successful SE initiatives use creative approaches which utilize resources that are already present in the communities in which they take place. This often takes the form of uniting CSOs with established partners that can assist in technological and marketing development. Research has indicated that such creative approaches are more impactful and sustainable over time than efforts that rely primarily on external support (Alvord et al, 2004).

According to Jed Emerson, the director of the Robert Foundation's Homeless Economic Development Fund, while mainstream business entrepreneurs fail due to a lack of capital and a lack of management skill, the only reason that social entrepreneurs fail is due to a lack of management skill (the ability to create these strategic partnerships and creatively utilize resources). Emerson uses the history of his own social enterprise to illustrate this point, writing that the Homeless Economic Development Fund, an initiative that seeks to expand economic opportunity for the homeless through the creation of social

business ventures, came in under budget each of its first three years because the director could not find enough organizations with the capacity to successfully execute enterprise development (Emerson, 1996).

The assertion that social entrepreneurs do not necessarily need a consistent flow of external capital, and that what is most important is how management utilizes resources is perhaps most effectively illustrated by the fact that two of the most groundbreaking examples of SE came from Bangladesh, one of the poorest countries in the world. Bangladesh was created in the wake of the deadliest cyclone ever recorded and a war of independence in 1971. 500,000 people died from the Bhola cyclone in 1970, more than 1,000,000 people were killed by the Pakistani army in 1971, and starvation and disease eradicated 2,000,000 more (Bornstein & Davis, 2010).

As a result of the devastation, the international development arena focused its attention on Bangladesh, creating an inundation of funding through traditional government to government, top-down development methodologies. As it often does with such an approach, money was siphoned off at every level, and some estimated that as little as 10 to 20 percent of it actually reached the poor. However, when deployed to help finance, but not manipulate, citizen organizations that were founded by local social entrepreneurs produced some highly positive changes. The Grameen Bank (“Bank of the Villages” in Bengali) and the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) are the most famous examples.

The Grameen Bank was established as a for-profit, anti-poverty bank whose majority shareholders were women in the villages it served. BRAC is a non-profit

organization that is active in health care, microfinance, social, and economic development, which has since become the largest non-government development organization in the world. While both of these organizations did begin with initial funding, they both put trust in the capacity of locals, and refused any funding with paternalistic intent. They experimented continuously with variations of microfinance and continued to grow and improve over time.

BRAC is now present in all 64 districts of Bangladesh, with 37,000 non-formal primary schools and more than 70,000 health volunteers. The Grameen Bank is present in 2,565 locations across the country, with 22,149 employees who are making a difference with social enterprises aimed at addressing health, education, sustainable agriculture, and other social issues. Bornstein & Davis (2010) expound on the impact of these organizations:

Today, despite Bangladesh's enduring poverty, its continuing saga of corruption and factional violence, and its vulnerability to cyclones and floods, the country has managed to expand its economy, reduce poverty by half, achieve significant improvements in maternal and child health, and increase rates of primary education. Except for Sri Lanka, it is the only South Asian country that has achieved parity in school access between girls and boys. Close to a fifth of Union Parishad officials (locally elected government administrators) come from families served by the Grameen Bank or BRAC. In recent national elections, more women voted than men (pp. 17).

Why Context Matters- An Example

Despite the success of the Grameen and BRAC models in Bangladesh, these models do not work in all contexts. For example, attempts to apply the Grameen model in India, a neighbor of Bangladesh, have resulted in far more damage than positive outcomes. Its founder Muhammad Yunus believes in avoiding the use of foreign capital and relying heavily on collective ownership, with the belief that foreign funding leads to more profit maximizing methods while distorting the aims of an organization. This belief is clearly put to practice in the bank's approach, with 95% of ownership by the local poor, and 5% by the government ("A Short History of Grameen Bank," n.d.).


This approach works well in Bangladesh, where the banking laws are lenient enough for the bank's microfinance initiatives to only be financed by local depositors. However, in India, a country with much stricter banking laws, the elimination of the option of using capital markets for funding is extremely limiting. Local banking regulations make micro lenders incapable of accepting donations, which forces them to turn to local banks or government grants. As Muhammad Yunus says, these sources of capital are usually corrupt, insufficient, unsustainable, or just too expensive. The result of micro finance attempts in India has thus led to substantial debt of many borrowers of these micro loans. This debt has gotten so bad, in fact, that many Indian citizens have resorted to suicide as the only way to escape repaying these loans. In the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, there were 14,364 reported suicide cases in the first nine months of 2010, with the vast majority said to be because of inescapable debt (Lee & David, 2010).

This example underscores the importance of context when designing SE models. While empowering the local people to improve their own communities is something that is seen as positive everywhere, it doesn't work when the method for empowerment is in fact rendering a poor community even poorer.

Types of SE

While Grameen and BRAC serve as the most popular examples of social entrepreneurship, they are certainly not the only models that exist in the realm of the field. The common thread between all types of social ventures is that the intended mission is to solve a social problem in such sectors as education, health care, environment, poverty, and the environment. The chart on page 15 depicts the territory of these social ventures within the typology of ventures.

Figure 1: Typology of Ventures



Source: http://highered.mcgraw-hill.com/sites/dl/free/0070277664/852475/Timmons_Chapter_07.pdf

Social purpose ventures (figure 1, quadrant 1) seek to solve these social issues through for-profit approaches, and thus typically have an economic impact on the market. The for-profit Egyptian organization SEKEM (Ancient Egyptian for “vitality from the sun” is a good example of this venture type. Founded by Dr. Ibrahim Abouleish in 1977 with the goal to turn an arid part of the Egyptian desert into a vibrant, self-sustaining agricultural business, SEKEM is now the largest social purpose organization in the country, with a handful of income-generating companies that aid in its social pursuit. In its 35 years of operation, its mission has gone from one that is primary focused on

sustainable agriculture, to one that encompasses a variety of fields, such as holistic education and health care, creating jobs with equal work opportunity, and research in natural and social sciences to help perpetuate sustainable development. (<http://sekem.com/node/71>, 05/20/12). SEKEM's primary source of revenue is from trading companies, which grew from 37 million pounds in 2000 to 100 million in 2003. It is also extremely well connected, with an established network of more than 2,000 farmers and partners in its other aforementioned areas of interest (Abouelish, 2004). While SEKEM is driven by a social incentive, it is also highly profitable with an impact that is highly economical.

The other primary form of social venture (figure 1, quadrant 4) is known as an enterprising nonprofit. This term is used due to the common misunderstanding that not all social entrepreneurs start nonprofits, and not all nonprofit organizations are entrepreneurial. While they are both hybrid models, Grameen and BRAC mostly fall into this category, in that they are sustained by their profits, and use those profits to make a measurable impact on society without much extra revenue beyond what is spent to foster that impact. BRAC, for example, is 80% self-funded through a variety of commercial enterprises, including a food product and dairy chain of retail stores called "Aarong," and puts the profits of these stores directly into small loans for its participants (Bornstein & Davis, 2010). The reason that both BRAC and the Grameen bank are considered hybrids is due to their substantial impact both socially and economically. Most social ventures, in fact, do not fall neatly into either of these categories, and rather somewhere in between (Zacharakis, Spinelli, & Timmons, 2011).

Social Change Theories and Why They Matter in Egypt

It is due to the vast complexity of social problems that social change must be approached creatively, and by those who have extensive knowledge of the community they are attempting to impact. The complex social-system change that is fostered by social entrepreneurs is called the complexity approach. It is through this approach that social entrepreneurs become catalysts of social change, exerting a disproportionately small force with surprisingly limited resources to create significant change. Rather than using the resources needed to address a problem directly by overcoming the resistance against social change, social entrepreneurs use the forces that are already present in that resistance to achieve change by finding the smallest and simplest solutions (Praszkier & Nowak, pp. 50, 2012).

This approach can easily be seen as used by the Egyptian protesters in the popular uprisings in January of 2011 that ousted then-President Hosni Mubarak and comprised the beginning of the Arab Spring. With the use of social media such as Facebook and Twitter, along with the Qatari satellite network Al Jazeera, protesters were able to use the force of the widespread unhappiness with corruption, unemployment and economic woes to create unprecedented social change. Within merely 18 days of the anti-government street protests organized through the aforementioned media, social entrepreneurs emerged and came together across the country, which led Mubarak to relinquish power to the military on February 11, 2011. The tools were free, and served as a catalyst of a change that was already charged to take place. The protestors required no weapons other than their collective demonstrated dissatisfaction with the government and its policies. It was because of the partnerships and creative solutions to the problem

using the resources that were already in place that such a change could take place (Al Jazeera and Agencies, 2011).

The complexity approach used by social entrepreneurs ties in nicely to the theory of social emergence. As was the case with the Arab Spring, social change can often take on the appearance of substantial change seemingly engendered out of nothing. As Malcolm Gladwell describes in his book *The Tipping Point* (2011), this phenomenon occurs when many lower-level elements interact to a point where there is a transformation into a completely new ecosystem with higher-level sophistication. It is this movement from lower to higher levels of sophistication that is called emergence. The theory of social emergence states that when lower level social elements interact enough, new entities can arise, completely changing the social milieu of a given area. Perhaps the most distinct characteristic of this theory is that it states that substantial change can and does occur independent of any specific controlling body aside from the interactions of elements. Some good examples of this in nature are the formation of ant hills (in which ants are the interacting elements) and the flocking of birds (in which the interacting elements are birds). The Arab Spring serves as a perfect example of this, in which people are the elements whose interactions produce large-scale change (Praszkier & Nowak, pp. 66, 2012).

Another theory of social change that can be applied to the Egyptian context is the Force-Field Theory, developed by social psychologist Kurt Lewin. Lewin first developed the Field Theory which provided “a conceptual framework for understanding social change from the perspective of complexity theory” (Praszkier & Nowak, p. 51, 2012). Force-Field Theory, which is based in that same framework, holds that social processes

are the result of the interplay between social forces, and that the configuration of those forces can be defined as a force field. It states that most forces have counter forces, and that social systems are most often at intersections in which the strength of the forces is equal to that of the counter forces. Lewin (2004) asserts that before taking any action intended for social change, one should carefully assess the forces that influence a given social context, taking into account the forces of change (“locomotion forces” or “helping forces”) and counter forces “barriers” or “hindering forces”). Lewin (2004) stressed the importance of permanence in the change process, noting that change is often ephemeral, with the situation quickly returning to its original state. He stated that “to bring about any change, the balance between the forces which maintain the social self-regulation at a given level has to be upset” (p. 42).

According to Lewin, “a successful change includes three aspects: unfreezing the present level, moving to the new level, and freezing the situation in the new level” (Praszkier & Nowak, pp. 51, 2012). The final level of re-freezing means that simply reaching the third level is not enough to establish permanency and bring about sustainable change: one must work to maintain and preserve that change to prevent the situation from returning to its original state. In the Egyptian context, it appears that the social change process is in between the first and second stages of this model. The social situation has been unfrozen: an oppressive regime has been disrupted by the locomotion forces of the Egyptian people, and done by no controlling entity aside from their own interactions. The second level, however, is still in the process of shaping, and once fully formed will require much support to establish an equilibrium with the hindering forces (i.e. the government and large businesses) in order to attain permanence and reach the

third level of established social change. This is a concept that will be expounded on later in this paper, with the incorporation of field research from Egypt.

Bubbles Theory is yet another social change theory (which is therefore, also a social entrepreneurship theory) that can be applied to the context of the Arab Spring and the social and political transition of Egypt. This theory relates to the dissemination of innovations, particularly when the spread of such innovations is non-uniform, with “bubbles of new appearing in the sea of old” (Praszkier & Nowak, pp. 54, 2012). An analogy used for this process is the process of water transforming to gas in physics. As water heats up towards this substance transformation, small bubbles are first observed. These bubbles, which can be used as a metaphor for social enterprises, connect together, grow in size, and eventually burst at the surface, creating an entirely new state. While these bubbles grow and transform, the old state (gas, which can be used as a metaphor for an oppressive/restrictive society) can still be seen, yet diminishes more and more as the water continues to heat up (Praszkier & Nowak, 2012). This theory illustrates the need for social enterprises to connect, grow, and persist in order to establish a new equilibrium. This theory will also be expounded on later in this paper with the incorporation of field research from Egypt.

The need for the “heat to be kept on,” so to speak, in social change can be illustrated by attractor theory. This theory states that social systems contain a certain equilibrium that free-floating dynamics tend to drift towards. An anthill, for example can get knocked down repeatedly by storms, but be revitalized over and over again by the ants without any driving force. In the same respect, an attempt from a controlling force, such a well financed program from a large international development organization, can

be attempted to revitalize a lethargic community, yet once the pressure is removed all returns to the initial stagnant state. This state of beginning and nearly inevitable return is known as the attractor, since it attracts all states of a system. A failed attempt to remove a society's equilibrium from its attractor is illustrated in figure 2:




Figure 2. *A change in a system's equilibrium is attempted by an external force, which eventually returns to its attractor once the force withdraws.*

As illustrated above, a constant force is required to keep the equilibrium in its altered state once it is moved from its attractor. In phase 2, the equilibrium is nearing a new level, but isn't quite there. When the external force retracts, so does the equilibrium, returning it to its initial state in phase 3 (Praszkier & Nowak, 2012).

In societies such as Egypt, the state of the old attractor is based on deeply ingrained factors, such as mistrust, inequality, and pessimism, which control the natural equilibrium. In these situations, there is much more than an external force that is needed to break through the counter forces and obtain sustainable change. What is required is a new attractor, which would alter the society's natural balance point. This new societal state would not be established by an external force, but a change in these powerful factors that weigh the equilibrium down (such as

the appearance of trust, equality, and optimism). Figure 3 below illustrates what this would look like:




Figure 3. Phase 1: A society’s heavy counter forces have been altered, creating a modified surface so that the equilibrium can fall into a new balance point, creating a new attractor. Phase 2: The equilibrium is pushed into the new attractor by the collective counter forces that created it. Phase 3: The new attractor of trust, equality, and optimism gains its strength, while the old one loses it. The new ditch increases with time while the old one decreases and becomes irrelevant (Praszkier & Nowak, 2012).

Sticking with the Egyptian revolution as an example, this model provides some clarity as to where the nation stands in its social change process. It appears that the Arab Spring and all the forces that led to it have created a new attractor that the equilibrium is now on the cusp of. What happens in the near future will be vital in determining whether or not this “ball of change” will become nestled in this new attractor and cause it to build its strength, or whether or it will roll backwards to return to the old attractor of mistrust, inequality, and pessimism from which it came.

RESEARCH DESIGN

For my research in applying these concepts to the Egyptian context, I have travelled to Egypt and met with five social enterprise incubators which serve to enable budding entrepreneurs in the region to launch and sustain their small business plans. I interviewed representatives from each of these incubators, asking questions regarding their approaches to SE, as well as the approaches of the fellows for which they assist. Furthermore, I asked them questions concerning difficulties in building and sustaining a social enterprise in the current political climate of Egypt, best practices for them to address those challenges, and questions regarding their perspectives on how the Arab Spring has influenced the SE climate in Egypt and the surrounding region (for a full list of interview questions, please see Appendix A).

In addition, I have surveyed social entrepreneurs who are beneficiaries of the organizations I interviewed, through which I asked similar questions using the online survey distributor *Survey Monkey*. The survey respondents are not from the same organizations of the interview respondents, yet are assisted by them in establishing and maintaining their social enterprises. All survey respondents reported that they are in leading roles in their organizations, such a Director or Assistant Director.

This survey has aided in gaining an understanding of the perspectives of a more diverse population in the region (i.e. not just those capable of leading large social enterprise incubators, but leaders of social enterprises which need the support of these incubators to exist). These surveys consist of many of the same questions asked in the interviews, yet with some differences due to a desire to decrease the time needed to answer them, and an ability to code responses categorically. Unfortunately, I received only eight responses from these surveys, but will discuss

the implications of these responses nonetheless, while keeping in mind the limitations of such few responses (for a full list of interview questions, please see Appendix B).

The chart below provides a brief description of each of the social incubators that I met with in Egypt, including their mission statement and their strategy for accomplishing it:

Organization Name	Organization's Nature/ Focus	Mission Statement	Strategy
The Association for Women's Total Advancement & Development (AWTAD)	Female owned business creation. Focus on providing women with business opportunities.	"Empower and engage the community, to mobilize the role of women as nucleolus development agents, through effectively leveraging Egypt's social and human capital." (http://www.awtad-egypt.org/about.html)	Enables people of all ages (but particularly women) to collaborate with each other and acquire business training and funding through partnerships. Trainees become trainers and outsource expertise.
Ashoka (Arab World Branch)	A large social enterprise incubator that enables people to turn their passion into practice	"Ashoka strives to shape a global, entrepreneurial, competitive citizen sector: one that allows social entrepreneurs to thrive and enables the world's citizens to think as changemakers." (http://www.ashoka.org/visionmission)	Supports social enterprises through collaborative platforms in the fields of education, children at risk, and integrating disabled people into the labor market
Misr Elkheir	Development foundation with 5 sectors- health, education, scientific research, social solidarity, and aspects of social living/engagement (sports, etc).	"To participate in the construction of human rights and the development of education, health and interdependence of social and scientific research and aspects of life. Our dream is to eliminate unemployment, illiteracy, poverty and disease." http://www.misrelkheir.com/About.aspx	Focuses on demographic analysis and coding, followed by development accordingly
Nahdet El Mahrousa	Social Enterprise Incubator	"Engaging and activating Egyptian young professionals in the development and public arenas and in shaping Egypt's future." (http://www.nahdetmasr.org/node/113)	Members (who are both fellows and volunteers) are trained in social enterprise management, and then turn into trainers themselves. Funds and networks are provided to get businesses off the ground.

Silatech	Development org. that provides access to jobs through thought leadership, investment, and innovative technology. Has three pillars for SE development= 1) Policy shift 2) Mindset change 3) Access to \$\$, capital, and markets	“Silatech’s mission is to connect young people, 18-30 years old, with employment and enterprise opportunities. Its commitment is to mobilize interest, investment, knowledge, resources and action to drive large-scale comprehensive employment and enterprise development programmes.” http://silatech.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=129&Itemid=16	Provides budding social entrepreneurs with access to technology, microfinance, and skills development services. Furthermore, promotes the adaptation of policies to stimulate increased employment and economic opportunities.
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FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

After interviewing five leaders of social enterprise incubators in Cairo and receiving eight responses from surveys issued (in Arabic and English) to social entrepreneurs throughout Egypt, I discovered many commonalities in practices, attitudes, and opinions regarding SE and the political transition in Egypt. Here I will discuss my findings from these interviews, along with the implications that I found within them while tying them to the common theories of social change.

Problem with creating SEs in Egypt

Creating a social enterprise in Egypt is not an easy task. There are many challenges that were discussed among the SE incubators I spoke with and corroborated by survey responses, which can be divided into the two categories of human resources and climate. I will begin by discussing the former.

The human resources challenge, which was projected as the more limiting of the two, was said by all interviewees to be linked to one overarching problem: A lack of an established SE network in Egypt and the surrounding region. 75% of survey respondents indicated that a lack of

funding and government restrictions were the primary challenges for creating their social enterprise, with 37% indicating that a lack of partnerships was a primary challenge (with all survey participants selecting at least one of these categories).

As corroborated by research previously discussed, a lack of partnerships is directly related to an ability to obtain funding and to navigate around limiting government restrictions. Therefore, it can be inferred that 100% of survey participants did not have the necessary partnerships in place to get their social enterprises off the ground with ease. In fact, 100% of participants interviewed and surveyed indicated that their social business began with the assistance of a grant or donation(s), which came out of a partnership with a private or public organization. Furthermore, 100% of participants indicated that these partnerships were key to their continued financing. As stated by a Respondent A in response to the survey question regarding how their organization is sustained: “we have our exchange products which we get our funds from, we have financial models with our local chapters and we depend on financial partners from the corporate sector” (Respondent A, personal communication, June 06, 2012). Respondent D exemplified the giving and receiving nature of partnerships, remarking “We have now a good reputation with the donors and we also have a unique approach for civics education and political tolerance, so our beneficiaries carry the positive impact and also transfer it to others” (Respondent D, personal communication, June 05, 2012).

Indeed, as backed by research on other successful social enterprises (including, but not limited to BRAC, Grameen Bank, and SEKEM), the thing they all have in common is successful partnerships. As Alvord and colleagues (2004) report in their study, “building a movement that mobilizes grassroots alliances to challenge abusive elites or institutions” (pp. 267) is one of the three primary ways proven to achieve sustainable social change.

Without strategic partnerships with like-minded organizations, social entrepreneurs in MENA face many additional obstacles. First and foremost and also linked to all other challenges, is the inability for social enterprises to arrive at a universalized definition of what SE means. As expressed by interviewees, many people in the region do not understand the concept of SE as a hybrid between traditional entrepreneurship strategies and an organization with a socially oriented objective. This lack of a standardized definition means that many potential social entrepreneurs are going about organizing and managing their social enterprises in a manner that does not translate to sustainable SE work.

Too many of these would-be organizations are getting deterred when they are unable to locate a constant flow of capital or cannot come up with the start up fees and additional foundation that is needed when beginning a traditional enterprise. On the other extreme, there are many organizations which underestimate the need for planning and investment when it comes to social enterprises, assuming that such things are not required when not aiming to make a monetary profit. According to the interviewees, the primary cause of this dilemma is that these organizations are simply not communicating with one another.

In addition to a lack of networking, the deficit of formal SE education in schools is directly related to the inability for most people to understand it. There is simply not enough education in Egypt and the surrounding region on how to effectively design and implement a business model, let alone a socially oriented one. While SE education is growing, there is nowhere near enough of it to support the myriad of people with ambition for change. Research by Kirby and Ibrahim (2011) indicates that university students largely lack the knowledge needed to create a successful social enterprise. A survey distributed to undergraduates at the British University in Egypt showed that students are confused about what a social entrepreneur is

or does, and are vastly unaware of existing social entrepreneurs. Furthermore, a sizeable number of students interviewed expressed interest in establishing their own social enterprise (Kirby & Ibrahim, 2011).

This variance of understanding of what SE means is illustrated by some of the survey responses to the prompt: “in your own words, please define social entrepreneurship”, which are written below:

“It is the definition of the core mission of an organization to be helping the society to be a better place through smart and sustainable projects that can give a sustainable impact through providing a certain value to certain segment of people” (Respondent A, personal communication, June 06, 2012).

“Responding to a social need through a program that is managed like a top notch business with success as a goal” (Respondent B, personal communication, June 05, 2012).

“Greater empowerment of people living with HIV/AIDS (PLHA)” (Respondent C, personal communication, June 05, 2012).

“To innovate and create a new social initiative that changes the status quo to be better, and can also be applied in different places” (Respondent D, personal communication, June 05, 2012).

“A project that enables the poor to obtain various resources” (Respondent E, personal communication, June 05, 2012).

As seen in these responses, it appears that respondents are all in agreement that SE is the act of a venture that seeks to accomplish a social goal, whether it is related to alleviating poverty, health issues, or other problems that exist in society. Another common theme appears to be empowerment of populations that are in need of help, and an implication that this is the best way for social enterprises to be sustained. What differs, however, is the scope of the definition, with some responses touching only on specific social issues (such as responses from Respondents C and E), and some much

more broad, (such as responses from Respondents A, B, and D). The means of running such an initiative also seems to vary, from managing it like “a top notch business” to having no mention of how it is run at all.

As for the climate challenge, the primary hindrances for social entrepreneurs appear to be government restrictions and a struggling economy which is highly influenced by the government. Interviewees reported that the restrictions and bureaucratic restraints that were prevalent before the revolution are still very much present. The transitional government has been extremely reluctant to approve new initiatives, which keeps many social enterprises in a stagnant state. Tanner (2012) elaborates: “One of the world’s most oppressive regulatory environments stifles entrepreneurship, business growth, and the development of civil society. The most recent Economic Freedom of the World Report ranked Egypt 80th out of 141 countries” (para 9).

Survey respondents also mentioned government restrictions as being one of the primary challenges for social entrepreneurs in the country today. In response to the question “how have the revolution and political transition impacted your social enterprise?” respondent H reported “it has created complexities with the government and has created many difficulties in obtaining the approval of certain necessities and access to funding” (Respondent H, personal communication, June 05, 2012). In response to the question “what do you see as the biggest challenge facing Egyptian social entrepreneurs today? Respondent B wrote, quite simply, “government restrictions” (Respondent B, personal communication, June 05, 2012).

It appears as if policy makers may be reluctant to offer more opportunity to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) because they have become accustomed to their powerful influence over the economy. Tanner (2012) expounds once again:

State-owned enterprises, especially those run by the military, dominate large areas of the economy. Military and government-run businesses are involved in everything from poultry farming and hotel administration to pest control and automotive repair. These government-run businesses are not fully accounted for in measures of government expenditures (revenues from military companies are a state secret), but are estimated to make up roughly a third of Egypt's economic activity. When this is combined with direct government expenditures, nearly two-thirds of Egypt's economy is under government control (para. 8)

Things often used to assist budding social entrepreneurs

When asked about the ways in which they assisted budding social entrepreneurs with overcoming these obstacles, the interviewees again all immediately mentioned strategic partnerships and networking. It was said that partnering budding social enterprises with other organizations, both public and private, was the most useful thing for these organizations in obtaining everything needed to get their businesses off the ground. From these partnerships, social enterprises are able to gain funding, professional guidance, and most importantly, a better understanding of the field of SE, particularly within the Egyptian context. Indeed, connecting with like minded people working on various aspects of the same larger social issues appears to be an affective Lewinian approach to social change. Connecting with other people with different approaches to the same issue provides a much more thorough understanding of the locomotion and hindering forces that is needed prior to designing a plan for social action.

Connected to partnerships and the benefits they reap are of course, the social enterprise incubators themselves. Through these incubators and the services they provide, fellows gain

access to an entire SE toolkit, including funding, training, SE education, and exposure to the broader SE network.

Survey participants corroborated this finding, with 75% of respondents indicating that a partnership with a technical organization was “very helpful.” Furthermore, it was indicated that a subsidy or grant was fundamental in creating a social enterprise, with 50% choosing “essential- could not have started it without this” as a rating option for that particular tool. Once again, this finding attests to the importance of partnerships, in that these grants or subsidies are engendered through them.

View of the Arab Spring’s impact on SE in the region

Much like the challenges that budding social entrepreneurs face when creating new enterprises in Egypt, the impact of the Arab Spring (which several interviewees commented that they prefer to call the “Arab Awakening”) falls into the same two categories of human resources and climate change, which are both interrelated. I will begin by discussing the former.

All interviewees expressed that the Egyptian revolution has engendered unprecedented levels of ambition in Egypt and the MENA region as a whole. Since January 2011 there have been many new initiatives that have sprouted across the region, backed by a newly found patriotism and passion among citizens. “For the first time, Egyptian citizens feel like that they are capable of making a difference. This feeling of empowerment has largely taken the form of people addressing the problems that led to the revolution to begin with. Many of these initiatives revolve around human rights and the usage of social media as a tool for positive social change” (S. Allam, personal communication, May 07, 2012).

Once again, survey responses are in line with this outcome. When asked how the

revolution had impacted their social enterprise, Respondent A remarked “the student market is now more active and they want to do more things in the country. In some universities they are more open to changes and getting approvals for small businesses” (Respondent A, personal communication, June 06, 2012).

Unfortunately, the vast majority of these new initiatives have been ineffective since their creation. Most of them are still in the development and charity phase, and have not been able to move forward due to the aforementioned challenges. There are currently approximately 26,000 registered NGOs in Egypt. Of that number, 4,000 of them are active in some way (with events or activities). Of those active NGOs, only 1,000 of them have recorded a measurable impact (S. Allam, personal communication, May 07, 2012). The ambition is extant, but the ability to turn it into something viable is lacking.

In addition to the change seen in people, the revolution engendered a change in climate that has opened up major new opportunities that never existed before (Shareef, Batata, personal communication, May 09, 2012). One of these changes is that large Egyptian companies are no longer in control. The investment bank EFG-Hermes Holding Company, otherwise known as the Egyptian Financial Group (EFG), is an example of one of these companies. Founded in 1984, EFG “is the premier investment bank in the Middle East and is recognized as the regions market leader in securities brokerage, asset management, investment banking, private equity, and research” (EFG-Hermes, n.d.).

For years, EFG has had close ties with the Egyptian government, as well as ties with other governments in the region. In fact, Gamal Mubarak, the son of the ousted Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, owns a company (Medinvest, Ltd.) that has been in close partnership with EFG for a number of years. At one point, Gamal even sat on the board of EFG. There are

billions of dollars that are estimated to have come out of this partnership and been invested directly into the Mubarak family fortune. These ties have had a powerful influence on the Egyptian economy, and have greatly contributed to the inability for small businesses to gain footing (El-Wardani, 2011).

The revolution has severed these ties, and thus largely put an end to the corruption that has come out of them. “The recent revolution in Egypt, whose people have risen up against corruption, among many things, prompted the Prosecutor General's decision to freeze all Mubarak family bank accounts, including those of Gamal Mubarak” (El-Wardani, S., 2011). Furthermore, other controlling business owners, such as Egyptian former Minister of Trade Rachid Mohammed Rachid have been disempowered. Fearing imprisonment for corruption, Rachid fled Egypt for Dubai on February 1, 10 days prior to Mubarak’s ousting. “Rachid's departure and the recent arrests of top businessmen in some ways represent a victory for Egyptian protesters, who sought to topple Mubarak and punish those who profited under his rule” (Zacharia, 2011).

This disempowerment of such influential powers has opened doors for others not affiliated with the government’s regimes, and thus, has created more opportunities for social entrepreneurs. Some of the candidates for the 2012 election, the first democratic election in Egypt’s history, reflected some of the outcomes of this opportunity. Several of them, such as leftist Khalid Ali and moderate Dr. Abdel Moneim Abou al-Fotouh Abdel have run on platforms that would help support small to medium enterprises (SMEs), which would take the form of government funded business incubators (Pickworth, 2012).

View of the future of SE in the region

Overall, interviewees appeared to be incredibly optimistic about the future of SE in Egypt and the surrounding region. It should be noted, however, that social entrepreneurs are innately optimistic by nature, which could have contributed to this overwhelming positive outlook. Nonetheless, I was provided with ample supporting information that gave good reason to be optimistic.

It was expressed that the newly found sense of empowerment and ownership of the Egyptian people has already been a major accomplishment in the field of SE. Survey Respondent A illustrates this by stating “the revolution is one of the main pillars that will change our society right now because we have a lot of things that we are lacking and if we linked between young people that have smart projects to develop the country and these projects are sustainable that will help the country in the next period” (Respondent A, personal communication, June 06, 2012).

It was said by several interviewees that all that needs to happen now is for the “dots to be connected.” That is, for existing SEs to be linked to one another strategically, and for them to gain access the funds and training that comes out of these partnerships. Furthermore, it is believed that social entrepreneur access to technology will increase through access to grants, which will become increasingly available in the new political climate.

The overwhelming belief from Egyptian social entrepreneurs appears to be that such progress is inevitable. According to Shareen Allam of AWTAD:

There is now no way that the government and large businesses can operate independently of social enterprises and the majority of Egyptian people, whose

social interests they (SEs) represent. The 25% youth unemployment rate in the country will not be supported by governments, foreign or domestic. Outsourcing and interdependence of all three entities is now inevitable, for it is essential for Egyptian society to continue to function. There is nowhere to go but up” (S. Allam, personal communication, May 07, 2012)

Best ways for Egyptian social entrepreneurs to accomplish their goals

The most effective way for social entrepreneurs to overcome the challenges they have faced since last January appears to be, as Shareen Allam puts it, to “connect the ecosystem.” That is, to create a stronger network of NGOs, with sub-groups that focus on targeted issues such as poverty, unemployment, education, or health. In addition, alliances for these sub groups (which could be the sub groups themselves) need to be created across the region in order to strengthen support. Survey Respondent B, whose organization focuses on health issues, touches on how a sub-group could help his/her organization accomplish its goals:

A health focus group could help create a strong awareness program that would educate people about the importance of home health care, and the dignity of being a home health care provider with a reputable organization. This would both reduce the stigma affiliated with health NGOs and get more people involved with our cause (Respondent B, personal; communication, June 5, 2012)

As mentioned previously, research indicates that once this network is established, everything else that social entrepreneurs need to be successful would follow. Trainings would become more widespread, an understanding of SE would become more universal, funding would

be more accessible and targeted, and the budding culture of SE in the region would coagulate into a mass that could be more influential in altering hindering policies. Furthermore, more youth centers could be created throughout the country and serve as hubs to engender this same understanding and training in young people.

This approach of establishing a unified network to progress towards sustainable social change aligns perfectly with bubbles theory. Much like the gas-filled bubbles in a pot of boiling water need one another in order to perpetuate the water to gas transition, Egyptian social enterprises need one another in order to bring about the change from one social state of being to another. As the social enterprises connect to one another, they will in theory continue to grow larger and larger, while emitting positive social change and digging out a new social attractor. As these connected pockets of influential positive social factors such as transparency, equality, and optimism feed off one another and grow, the old attractor, filled with the Mubarak regime's oppressive policies and the hopelessness that resulted from it will become obsolete.

In addition to this network, interviewees indicated that the creation of more SE incubators with a focus on quality and results, as opposed to simply meeting quantitative requirements of donors would be highly beneficial. This, of course, is also something that a network could help with.

Lastly, it was mentioned that more investment in long term development of SE incubators and other social enterprises would help in creating sustainable change. Similar to the strategies of Gameen and BRAC, the interviewees I spoke with all agree that investment in the people and believing that communities are capable of fixing their own problems if given the opportunities is the best way to move forward.

Current Events in Egypt

Given the fast-changing political climate in the country, there have recently been some significant events in Egypt that may have a major impact on the future of SE in the nation. These events have occurred after my return from Egypt, so I was unfortunately unable to incorporate questions regarding them into my interview or survey questions.

The May 2012 elections, the first parliamentary elections in the nation's history, have yielded highly polarized results. In what has been described widely as a "nightmare scenario," out of the 13 candidates who contended, two candidates from highly opposing parties have earned the majority of the votes. This left the Egyptian people to choose between what many consider to be two extremes in a second round- Mohammed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party, and Ahmed Shafiq, former president Mubarak's last prime minister. Amr Moussa, along with other candidates who attempted to capture the center ground, have been knocked out of the race. This divisive outcome, along with a low voter turnout of around 40% of the 51 million strong electorate, has led to what many supporters of the revolution consider to be a catastrophic outcome. George Ishaq, a founder of the Leftwing Kifaya party laments: "It feels as if the revolution never took place. The Brotherhood are despotic and fanatical and Shafiq is the choice of Mubarak. It is a very bad result. The revolution is not part of this contest" (Black, 2012).

To make what already seemed like a discouraging election outcome to many even worse, two weeks later, and just several days prior to the second round of voting, Egypt's highest court ruled the Islamist-dominated parliament to be dissolved because one-third of its members were elected unlawfully. This dramatically hindered the political ascent of the Muslim Brotherhood, and safeguarded the presidential candidacy of former Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq. In addition,

it strengthened the forces linked to Egypt's old regime, and significantly raised the stakes in the runoff of the two candidates.

In addition to the Islamist parliament, the parliamentary ruling has dissolved the modest system of checks and balances that Islamists and revolutionaries (both in strong opposition of the Mubarak regime) had attempted to build since the revolution. In addition, it has aborted a committee appointed to draft a new constitution that would define the powers of the incoming president and the parliament.

The constitutional judges who were involved in declaring this ruling were appointed by Mubarak, and are members of a judicial system that is seen as wary of Islamists. The Islamist parliament asked the court to rule on a law passed by them to ban senior officials from Mubarak's National Democratic Party from political involvement for a decade. It ruled that it was unconstitutional. This denial of power to the opposition party was seen by many as a military coup in effect by many (Londoño, & Fadel, 2012).

The second round of voting for the two remaining candidates yielded highly disputed results. While the initial vote count gave the appearance that Mursi had won, Shafiq and his supporters also claimed victory. For a week, the Higher Presidential Election Commission recounted votes as protesters crowded Tahrir Square maintaining a vigil in opposition of the series of military decrees, which they say are designed to reduce the power of the Muslim Brotherhood and imbed the power of the military.

On June 24, 2012, it was finally announced that Mursi had been declared the official winner, with 51.73% of the vote, marking an historic landmark in Egypt's history. Supporters of Mursi flooded Tahrir Square, celebrating and chanting "down with the military rule!" Meanwhile, Shafiq supporters gathered in a northern suburb, screaming, crying, and holding their

heads in despair. Kevin Connolly of the BBC says that Mursi's victory is a "moment of profound change for Egypt", remarking "The Muslim Brotherhood that has seen many of its members put in prison, now has one of its leaders being sent instead to the presidential palace" (The Associated Press, para. 10, 06/24/12). Despite the belief's of Shafiq's supporters of the contrary, Mursi has promised to have inclusive leadership and has courted secular and Christian voters (The Associated Press, 06/24/12).

FINAL CONCLUSIONS

From my research, I have come to several conclusions, and have arrived at a model for SE development in Egypt that I believe needs to be applied for a more sustained social change process in the country. These conclusions are summarized below.

The Challenge

Research indicates that there are many challenges facing Egyptian people today. An unprecedented youth bulge, high unemployment rates, government corruption, and centralized control have all led the nation to a poor economic state. In order for the economy to support its growing workforce, the amount of jobs in the country must double in the next two decades. Furthermore, the first parliamentary election that the nation has ever had- an event that many believed to be the final chance for Egypt to rid itself of Mubarak-era politics, resulted in polarized options: a near tie between an Islamist controlled government, or a government that many believe will be a return to the Mubarak era. While the Muslim Brotherhood declared victory in the end, much of the nation remains highly disappointed in the outcome, fearing that

an Islamist controlled government will be even more authoritative and limiting than the Mubarak regime was.

The Opportunity

Given the January 2011 Egyptian uprisings and the outcomes of the revolution, an inflection point has been created. The climate in Egypt has shifted, severing ties between government and businesses and empowering the people with a new found drive to address the factors that led to the revolution. This new climate has the potential to turn the aforementioned challenges into leverage for social change. The youth bulge can be transitioned into an advantage of strength in numbers. A widespread understanding of the corruption that exists can be used for recruitment of more people in the social change movement, which has more opportunity to gain footing without a government that is entirely in control of the country's economy and businesses. Even with the recent election outcome, the nation's citizens remain empowered for change. Now that they have seen what they are capable of when unified, they are far more capable of making change a reality.

Since the revolution, myriad new initiatives have been created, showing massive signs of this budding change. However, the majority of these initiatives have been unsuccessful, in that they are led by people who lack the basic training, understanding of the field, and funding to turn their ideas into viable business models.

The Hindrance in Taking Full Advantage

There is a disconnection between many SE initiatives with similar missions as well as technical organizations, and the government and private sector in general. Without established

partnerships between such organizations, many blind spots in the social change climate are created. Critical agents of change, as well as hindering counter forces are overlooked.

According to Lewin's Force Field Theory, these factors must be well assessed and taken into account when implementing a social change initiative. The inability for Egyptian social entrepreneurs to identify these factors leaves many holes in the metaphorical "blanket of change" that change makers are attempting to drape over the country. These holes also consist of a lack of understanding of the field of SE, which has led to varied SE approaches which are often diffuse and unsustainable. In addition to a hindrance in understanding the climate, being disconnected from the social change movement vastly limits the possibility of budding social enterprises to locate the funding and organizational training required for any organization to be sustainable.

The Solution

In order to overcome the counter forces that hinder the social change process in Egypt, the gaps that exist between social entrepreneurs and aiding organizations need to be connected. A SE culture must be established. A unified force of social change must be engendered to keep the "ball of change" moving toward the newly established attractor, before it rolls backwards into what it was prior to the revolution. The number one way for new social businesses to gain access to the finances, training, and understanding they need to move forward in their trajectory is through strategic partnerships. Through these partnerships comes everything else that is needed to establish a successful social business.

Given the above stated, I believe the most impactful SE model in Egypt is an organization that serves as a catalyst for connecting the dots and establishing a SE culture throughout the country. This organization would consist of a network that seeks to facilitate

communication between mentors, angel investors (affluent individuals who provide capital for a business), social enterprises and other SMEs. Within this network there would be sub-groups, which would focus on specific SE areas that would enable social businesses to refine their specialties and share best practices and pertinent information. Mentors could do the ground work in establishing this network, while serving as liaisons between SMEs and the organizations which have the capacity to provide them with the tools needed to succeed, as well as each another. As bubbles theory states, when these “bubbles of change” connect, they will become more powerful (gain the training, understanding, and funding needed to be successful) and grow in power as the previous the attractor loses influence. Connecting the gaps will enable Lewinian thinking, giving social enterprises a better understanding of surrounding context and make them more viable.

While there are a variety of ways to go about designing this model, I believe that an online forum with supplemental meetings, trainings, and conferences would best serve its purpose. The Egyptian uprising of 2011 was organized in large through social media and demonstrates its transformative capacity, and its potential to engage users both on and offline. Just like the revolution itself, this approach would fall in line with the complexity approach of social change, by exerting a disproportionately small force with surprisingly limited resources to create significant change. As social change theories suggest, sustainable change must come from a variety of locations within, using creativity, unity, and resourcefulness as its leverage. This approach would accomplish all of these criteria.

As for funding, I believe that this initiative could be engendered and sustained from a variety of income sources. After presenting the rationale and its projected impact, I believe that many international donors, both private and public, would be interested in supporting such a

proposal. Indeed, it was a smaller scale mentor model that enabled AWTAD to gain its footing as a viable organization through a grant from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Furthermore, I believe domestic donors would be eager to participate, due to the potential to expand their own networks and increase their ability to meet their own goals in doing so. In addition, membership fees could be required, which would be inexpensive enough for new, low-income organizations to afford, yet enough to make the network self-sustaining.

Going back to common traits of successful social enterprises discussed earlier, this model would include every successful factor presented. Concerning characteristics of successful innovations, it would seek to build local capacity, disseminate a package of innovations that serve a widely distributed need, and more than anything else, it would build a movement. As for scaling up and societal transformation, the three major patterns identified for increasing the scale of SE impact would be in place: more functions and services would be provided to benefit more people, functions and services to change the behavior of other actors with impacts to primary stakeholders would be expanded, and activities that change the behavior of other actors with wide impacts would scale up impacts indirectly.

Final Thoughts

The social and political environment in Egypt and the surrounding region is now changing faster than ever before. The 2011 revolutions, beginning in Tunisia and quickly spreading to Egypt and elsewhere in the MENA region, appear to have opened up the flood gates of social change across much of the Muslim world. Shortly after the Tunisian revolution, the people of Egypt, Libya Bahrain, Syria, and Yemen came together in similar fashions to protest similar injustices that led to a widespread unhappiness and obstruction in the attainment of basic

desired social outcomes. While obstacles to revolutionary success still exist in most of these countries, remarkable progress which many doubted was even possible, has been achieved in all of them (The Associated Press, 2012).

This extraordinary social change effort, while highly impactful in the relatively short amount of time that has passed since its beginning, is far from over. The people of the MENA region are now “awake,” and aware of both the corruption of their government (or now former government) and the power that they have as citizens when united to make a change. However, this “awakening” is not enough. In order for the change that has begun to be a lasting one, there must be persistent change-making forces coming from within these countries. These forces must band together and help one another to become a unified force which is more powerful than any government, and not stop in their change making efforts until new norms are established, while the former ones are diminished.

Time is of the essence. With the Egyptian election resulting in low voter turnouts and a runoff between two candidates who represent regimes that many view as counteractive to the original vision many held of a post-revolution era, the optimism and ambition that has led many Egyptian citizens to get involved with making a change in their country could be waning. The more the Egyptian government begins to resemble the former Mubarak regime and the more it gains in power, the more the change process will lose its momentum. The people of Egypt are tired, and are less likely to repeat a similar uprising if there is a belief that things will simply return to the way they were. The time for the social enterprises of Egypt and surrounding countries to band together is now. The sooner that linkages are formed between the initiatives that do exist, the sooner that large scale change with the same level of impact as the revolutions themselves will permeate throughout the MENA region and change societies for the better. The

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people of MENA are awake. Now they must act as one to stay that way, and continue to evolve until the environment resembles their desires and becomes the norm.

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APPENDIX A

Social Entrepreneurship (SE) Interview Questions

- 1) What is the name of your social enterprise?
- 2) What is the nature of your social enterprise?
- 3) What is your role within your social enterprise? (Your job title and a brief description of your work duties)
- 4) In no more than a few sentences, please describe your professional experience (i.e. Bachelor's degree in engineering, five years of work experience in management, etc.).
- 5) How did your social enterprise begin?
- 6) How is your social enterprise funded and sustained?
- 7) Were there any difficulties in creating your social enterprise? If so, what were they, and how were they dealt with?
- 8) What was used to assist your organization in its development (i.e. a subsidy, a strategic partnership with a technical organization, strategic business training, active labor market programs, etc.)
- 9) Of those items mentioned, which did you find the most useful, and why?
- 10) What have you seen as being the most helpful tool in assisting your clients in establishing their social enterprises? (if applicable)
- 11) How has the Arab Spring and the political transition in Egypt affected social entrepreneurship in the region (how has SE in the region changed since the revolution)?
- 12) What are the implications of the Arab Spring on the future of SE in the region?
- 13) Of the options below, please select the degree to which each social entrepreneurship characteristic applies to your social enterprise. **1=** A strong characteristic of your organization
5= Not a characteristic of your organization at all
 - a. Uses innovations that mobilize existing assets of marginalized groups
1 2 3 4 5

Social Entrepreneurship in Egypt

b. Emphasizes systematic learning

1 2 3 4 5

c. Works to build bridges among diverse stakeholders

1 2 3 4 5

d. Works to build capacity at a local level

1 2 3 4 5

e. Other (please name and describe characteristic)

1 2 3 4 5

12) What is the one thing that you believe would be the most helpful in increasing the ability of your social enterprise and its clients (if applicable) to reach its/their goals?

13) What do you see as the biggest challenges facing Egyptian social entrepreneurs today?

14) What do you see as the best way for social entrepreneurs to address these challenges?

15) What do you believe is the most effective way for foreign money (i.e. US Department of State funding) to be spent in addressing these challenges?

16) Where do you see the future of social entrepreneurship in Egypt, along with the role it will have in shaping Egyptian society?

APPENDIX B

Social Entrepreneurship Survey Questions

- 1) What is the name of your social enterprise?
- 2) Of the options listed below, please select the description that best matches the social issue that your organization works on:
 - a) Education
 - b) Health
 - c) Agriculture
 - d) Environment
 - e) Independent Media
 - f) Civil Society
 - g) Poverty
 - h) Other (please specify)
- 3) What is your role within your social enterprise? (Your job title and a brief description of your work duties)
- 4) What is the highest level of education you have completed?
 - a) Primary School
 - b) Secondary school
 - c) University (Associates Degree)
 - d) University (Bachelors Degree)
 - e) Graduate School (Masters Degree)
 - f) Post Graduate School (Doctorate Degree)
- 5) How many years of experience do you have in running a business?
 - a) Less than 1 year
 - b) 1-2 years
 - c) 2-3 years
 - d) 3-4 years
 - e) 4-5 years
 - f) More than 5 years
- 6) Of the options below, please select the option that best describes the difficulties that you encountered in creating your social enterprise:
 - a) Lack of funding
 - b) Lack of management training
 - c) Government restrictions

Social Entrepreneurship in Egypt

- d) Lack of partnerships
- e) Other (please specify)

7) Where does the majority of your funding come from? (Please check all that apply)

- a) Government organization grant(s)
- b) Non-government organization grant(s)
- c) Individual donors
- d) Membership fees
- e) Other (please specify)

8) How is your organization sustained?

9) How much did each of the options below help you in the creation of your social enterprise? Please select one rating for each, or N/A if you did not use the item listed (5= Essential-could not have started it without this/ 1= not helpful at all)

a. A subsidy or grant (from public or private donor(s))

1 2 3 4 5

b. A strategic partnership with a technical organization (i.e. an information technology company)

1 2 3 4 5

c. A strategic partnership with a government organization

1 2 3 4 5

d. A strategic partnership with another type of organization

1 2 3 4 5

e. Strategic business training

1 2 3 4 5

f. Public employment services (such as small business incubators)

Other (please specify and indicate rating) _____

1 2 3 4 5

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10) Of the options below, please select the degree to which each social entrepreneurship characteristic applies to your social enterprise (5= A strong characteristic of your organization/ 1= Not a characteristic of your organization at all).

a. Uses innovations that mobilize existing assets of marginalized groups

1 2 3 4 5

b. Emphasizes systematic learning

1 2 3 4 5

d. Works to build bridges among diverse stakeholders

1 2 3 4 5

e. Works to build capacity at a local level

1 2 3 4 5

f. Other (please specify and indicate rating) _____

1 2 3 4 5

11) In your own words, please define social entrepreneurship

12) How have the revolution and the political transition in Egypt impacted your social enterprise?

13) What do you see as the biggest challenges facing Egyptian social entrepreneurs today?

14) What is the one thing that you believe would be most helpful in increasing the ability of your social enterprise to overcome these challenge and reach its goals?

13) Where do you see the future of social entrepreneurship in Egypt, along with the role it will have in shaping Egyptian society?