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West Coast Antiwar Nonprofit Collaboration

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WEST COAST ANTIWAR

NONPROFIT COLLABORATION

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A Capstone Paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Master of Conflict Transformation at the SIT Graduate Institute in Brattleboro, Vermont, USA.

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Abstract:

While collaboration among nonprofit organizations is happening in both San Francisco and Los Angeles on issues ranging from breast cancer to saving the whales, and while 75% of Americans are opposed to the war in Afghanistan (CNN, 2010), the antiwar movement on the West Coast has come to a standstill. This paper examines the dynamics of West Coast antiwar nonprofits, whether or not they are collaborating, and the advantages and disadvantages of collaboration. A successful collaboration among several antiwar nonprofits, and the combined use of their resources, might stand a better chance of creating a sustainable antiwar movement on the West Coast. This capstone seeks to explore the pros and cons of collaboration among nonprofits and the issues facing nonprofit collaboration and, therefore, the potential for a sustainable antiwar movement.

This paper looks at what the term "collaboration" means to the antiwar nonprofits of the West Coast and uses Social Movement Theory to help shed light on that issue. One single nonprofit organization or coalition does not have the power to bring the war in Afghanistan to a halt.

This paper is comprised of interviews with individuals who are heavily involved in the antiwar movement. Their accounts, as well as a wide framework of both antiwar and nonprofit collaboration literature, guide the research. With the antiwar movement steadily on the decline since 2003, does collaboration among antiwar nonprofits pose a potential answer to the vast majority of the public's quest to end the war in Afghanistan, and allow for a sustainable antiwar movement?

Introduction

The quintessential successful peace movement is synonymous, in the American mind, with the protests against the Vietnam War in the 1960s. Zinn (2003) explains that: "in the course of [the Vietnam] War, there developed in the United States the greatest antiwar movement the nation had ever experienced, a movement that played a critical part in bringing the war to an end." When one studies the antiwar movement of the 60s and 70s, it is hard to imagine the comparative lack of action being taken against the war in Afghanistan only 30 years later.

The current antiwar organizations on the West Coast are astonished at the lack of support for an antiwar movement. The nonprofit sector contained far fewer organizations in the 70s, but it has since evolved into an amazing vehicle for championing social justice causes like an antiwar movement. Unlike in the Vietnam era, today's activists are equipped with tools like digital cameras, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and cellular phones for rapid communication of images and information and to call for rapid assembly. Yet, even with technology and advances in organizational structures, the antiwar movement on the West Coast has little or no momentum.

In order to be taken seriously, an antiwar movement must be organized and well planned, so that its message and demands will not be lost in chaos or confusion. But what sort of organizational structure is needed in order to achieve a strong antiwar movement? Would a modern antiwar movement look like the current Occupy Wall Street demonstrations, the antiwar protests of the Vietnam era, or a completely new breed of movement altogether? What philosophy would guide a modern antiwar movement? These questions are essential to contemplate especially when, despite widespread national and international interest and support, Occupy Wall Street is still referred to as "a protest movement without clear demands, an identifiable leadership, or an evident organizational structure." (Washington Post, 2011) This is

the antithesis of what any social movement wants as its legacy.

Salamon (1994) points out that nonprofits have taken the lead in social movements: "virtually all of America's major social movements, for example, whether civil rights, environmental, consumer, women's or conservative, have had their roots in the nonprofit sector." Especially on an issue like ending wars, government and corporate support are unlikely to materialize. Foundations may find that their individual or corporate sponsors do not support antiwar activism. This means that the antiwar nonprofits that are central to any antiwar movement are predictably dependent on small, individual donors and, predictably, face funding shortages in times of economic downturn. A potential answer to this problem is collaboration among nonprofit organizations.

Because no single nonprofit organization can form a cohesive, large, and effective antiwar movement, it appears that nonprofit organizations will have to collaborate with each other. Collaboration is not easy, especially for nonprofit organizations that are now competing against each other for dwindling foundation and limited government funding. Unfortunately, cooperation and collaboration are rare. Speaking of the nonprofit sector in general, the UCLA School of Public Affairs stated that "only 25 percent are collaborating with other nonprofits as a way to cut costs and only 4 percent have merged with another organization." (Hyeon Jong Kil, 2010). The research questions that guide this study and capstone are: Why do antiwar nonprofits not seem to be collaborating with each other on the West Coast? What are the risks and rewards for nonprofit collaboration? And most importantly, what is needed in order to create a sustainable and effective antiwar movement in the United States?

The Need for an Effective Antiwar Movement in the United States Today

The United States has been at war for approximately 99 years of its existence. These 99

years include 24 military engagements, which lasted an average of 3.6 years. The U.S has been

engaged in 40 years of war or military activity since the Civil War. (Douglas, 2001) Well-known

generals have stated that the war in Afghanistan is likely to continue almost indefinitely, and to

create new enemies of the United States in the process. General David Petraeus is quoted in the

book, *Obama's Wars,* as saying:

> You have to recognize also that I don't think you win this war. I think you keep
> fighting… You have to stay after it. This is the kind of fight we're in for the rest of our
> lives and probably our kids' lives. (Woodward, 2010, p. 332)

Former General Stanley McChrystal has referred to one effect of the current reliance on high-

technology unmanned drone attacks as "Insurgent Math." "Insurgent Math" means that, for every

innocent person the U.S. kills, ten more people turn into enemies of the U.S. (Hastings, 2010).

General McChrystal has also referred to the situation in Afghanistan as a "Bleeding Ulcer."

Afghanistan's nickname, "The Graveyard of Empires," has proved correct in the sense that the

current war has not been expedient, cheap, or fruitful in securing the safety of any nation or

person.

The U.S war machine has proven effective in sustaining wars for longer and longer

periods of time, getting the American public to support the wars, initially at least, and dividing

the antiwar factions from the rest of society. In an analysis of antiwar coalitions in the 2007-09

time period, Heaney and Rojas state that "the withdrawal of Democratic activists changed the

character of the antiwar movement by undermining broad coalitions in the movement and

encouraging the formation of smaller, more radical coalitions." (Heaney and Rojas, 2011).

Obama's Presidency effectively stopped the antiwar movement because those who had worked

so hard to get him elected found themselves unable to criticize his lack of action with regards to

ending the war in Afghanistan. As Tom Hayden observed, "the peace movement has a new

adversary in front of them, he's intelligent, speaks the language of the peace movements and is trying to reach out to the center-left of the country with his message. It's much more formidable to argue with Barack Obama than it was with Bush or Cheney." (Linthicum, 2009, para 5) Obama's Presidency is one of many hurdles that Heaney and Rojas emphasize as being serious obstacles to cooperation among antiwar groups.

The antiwar movement has often been divided along the racial, theological, gender, and socioeconomic divides that fracture American culture today. Boyer and Dubofsky (2001, p.287) explain that the government's use of pre-existing racial and class divisions in the1863 Conscription Act, which enabled rich men of military age to buy their way out of military service during the Civil War, "stirred growing protest that culminated in the New York City Draft riots." The ramifications of the Conscription Act could be felt during World War I, World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. The draft used during the Vietnam War employed a social division that had not been used explicitly in any war before or since: education.

> The Vietnam War prompted passage of the Military Selective Service Act in 1967, which differed from its predecessors in permitting education deferments for males between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six. The social inequality of this provision, combined with the growing unpopularity of the war, caused riots and demonstrations. (Boyer and Dubofsky, 2001, p.287).

Social inequalities such as race, class, and education were the catalysts and antecedents of the bloody riots during the Civil War and some of the protests during the Vietnam War: these societal divisions created schisms within the protests against the war in Vietnam, as well. According to Steve Phillips, "there were limitations on the influence of the anti-war movement. It was badly affected by internal divisions, such as that between radicals and liberals, and it was never united in its aims or actions." (Phillips, 2001, p.229).

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have been fought without a draft, and have involved a

relatively small number of service personnel. The general population sees few images of the

horrors of war. While prosecuting these wars abroad, the U.S. has taken its attention and revenue

away from domestic needs. In the words of historian Marilyn Young:

> The U.S can destroy Iraq's highways, but not build its own; create the conditions for
> epidemic in Iraq, but not offer healthcare to millions of Americans. It can excoriate
> Iraqi's treatment of the Kurdish minority, but not deal with domestic race relations; create
> homelessness abroad but not solve it here; keep a half million troops drug free as part of a
> war, but refuse treatment of million of drug addicts at home...We shall lose the war after
> we have won it. (Zinn, 2003)

Although articulated in 1989 in regard to the first U.S war in Iraq, this statement directly applies

today. The American government is neglecting the needs of its own citizens in order to fight this

war in Afghanistan. The U.S. population's disapproval of the war in Afghanistan is at an all time

high -- 60% and rising, according to a 2010 CNN report. Thus, there is a pressing need for an

effective antiwar movement.

Vietnam and Afghanistan: War and Peace efforts

In order to gain a better understanding of the peace movement, it is useful to compare the

antiwar movements during the Vietnam and Afghanistan wars. Their similarities begin with the

fact that neither Vietnam nor Afghanistan wanted U.S forces or assistance on its soil in the first

place. A declaration of war was never made, and the U.S military presence in Vietnam stemmed

from the desire to avoid the threat of communism reaching American soil. President George W.

Bush, on the other hand, declared war against the Latin verb, "terror," all of the synonyms

related to "terror," and those who commit or hide those involved in acts of terror. President Bush

made his message clear to all those who commit acts of terror in his 2001 speech after the events

of 9/11:

> These demands are not open to negotiation or discussion. The Taliban must act
> and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists or they will share in their
> fate... (CNN Transcriptions, p. 3, 2001)

The fact that both terror and communism are concepts, rather than a specific group of people, creates a fascinating parallel between the two wars. While the casualties from Afghanistan are significantly fewer than those in Vietnam, the Los Angeles Times reported that the "progress" in Afghanistan, where U.S forces are fighting a savvy opponent on foreign and hostile turf, as in Vietnam, is equally negligible. (Linthicum, 2009, Para 9)

The differences between the ways that the U.S public is allowed to view the Afghanistan war and press coverage of the Vietnam War must also be noted. One key difference is in the control of the media: President George W. Bush did not allow journalists and photographers the free reign in Afghanistan that they were accustomed to in Vietnam. This censorship continues today and means that the U.S. public no longer tunes in to visceral images of warfare, as it did in the era of the Vietnam War. The images of the war in Afghanistan are a great deal more sanitized. When asked to compare the experience of covering the Vietnam War versus the Afghanistan war, renowned photojournalist, Nick Ut, who took the iconic photo of a naked girl running down the road, crying after her village had been burnt, replied:

> …it's the graphic images from battlefields that had greatly affected public opinion about the war in Vietnam. Those are true depictions of wars. There are no such things as clean and simple wars… The Pentagon has instituted a tight policy to restrict and control the movements and images produced by war photojournalists and videographers. (Julian Do, 2011, Para 3)

The American public's exposure to the reality of the Vietnam War through journalism and the draft had a vast impact on the way people perceived the war. Even though there was no formally structured, overarching anti-war organization per se during the Vietnam War, there was an efficient, mass-scale antiwar movement that effectively countered what many American people thought to be an unjust war. The images of the Vietnam War, accessible to the public at that time may have helped make up for the fact that -- aside from a few coalitions and groups --

there was no umbrella organization to rally under but, rather, disturbing photography that brought the rising death tolls and military excess to the doorstep of the American people. With the war in Afghanistan, the average American can avoid images and news of the conflict quite easily. There is no draft, and no images of dead bodies, injured soldiers, or dead civilians for the American public to see. Describing the conditions for photojournalists in Afghanistan and Iraq, one photographer said:

> I was about to go, but my friends who had been there advised me to stay. Most became frustrated because of the many restrictions on photography. Dead soldiers, no. Body bags, no. Injured soldiers, no. Civilian deaths, no. 7 (Julian Do, 2011, Para. 5)

The war in Afghanistan does not hit home for a large percentage of the U.S population, unlike the war in Vietnam. One of my interviewees stated it best when he said, "most people still have theirs." He is referring, among other things, to the fact that there is a much smaller portion of the population in the armed services than in other times.

> At least partly as a result of the Afghan war's vastly reduced casualties -- and the absence of a draft -- opposition to the war in Afghanistan has been muted; public opinion is split on Obama's plan, but antiwar sentiment is neither as widespread nor as deeply felt as it was in 1968. (Linthicum, 2009, Pg. 20)

The smaller number of casualties and smaller portion of the population serving, the lack of a draft, the lack of media images displaying the realities of war, and the small percentage of the American public with any first-hand involvement with the war in Afghanistan have all contributed to smaller antiwar demonstrations and greater apathy toward stopping the war.

Knowledge of how to mobilize people, create a platform, and create a vehicle for social change is needed in order to galvanize a sluggish activist contingent into action. Social Movement Theory provides a useful framework for understanding how social movements arise, analyzing what makes them fail or succeed, and tracing the lifespan of a social movement in the

public attention.

Literature Review: Antiwar Literature, Nonprofit Collaboration Literature, and Social Movement Theory

This literature review aims to combine literature about nonprofit collaboration and antiwar-related collective action. This requires the merging of two distinct bodies of research analysis so that the reader can envision the possibility of an antiwar movement being organized by the collaborative efforts of antiwar nonprofits. The literature review also provides an auxiliary narrative to the interviews for this capstone, and an additional resource to find answers to my research questions: Why do antiwar nonprofits not seem to be collaborating with each other on the West Coast? What are the risks and rewards for nonprofit collaboration? Most importantly, what is needed in order to create a sustainable and effective antiwar movement in the United States?

Literature Review Introduction and Guide

The first section of this literature review, "Organizations for Peace: What their mission means," talks about the history of antiwar nonprofit organizations and their philosophies. The "Social Movement Theory" section explains the theory behind what makes social movements succeed or fail, and introduces readers to the works of Heaney, Rojas, Tarrow, and Tilly as prominent thinkers not only on Social Movement Theory itself, but also on how it pertains to the antiwar movement. The next section, "Nonprofit Organizations and Collaborations," samples the literature on the pros and cons of collaboration among nonprofit organizations and on what collaboration between nonprofit organizations entails. "Successful Social Movements in Historical Context" is comprised of literature on successful social movements of the past, and the themes that can be found in all stories of social movement success. The section of this literature review titled "Antiwar Nonprofits Must Listen and Collaborate" examines current literature on

why nonprofit collaboration must happen, for the sake of both the nonprofit sector and the antiwar movement. The relationship between the nonprofit sector and funding foundations that encourage collaborations will be examined and explained in the section titled "Foundations." The last section synthesizes Social Movement Theory, literature on nonprofit collaboration, and antiwar movement literature in relation to current antiwar organizations.

Organizations for Peace: What Their Mission Means

The Director of Development of a nonprofit called Peace Talk,[1] which specializes in placing pressure on key senators and other political figures in order to both end the war in Afghanistan and bring about the swift close of the nuclear era, spoke of the values and belief system of the Peace Talk organization when he said, "we push for the end to the war in Afghanistan and nuclear weapons because our donors don't have the time or energy to do it." (Quote from Peace Talk Development Director, 2011) This particular organization is the direct product of a successful collaboration between two nonprofits, each of which was started during the Cold War, well before the proliferation of NGOs seen today. Both of the organizations achieved amazing results in terms of anti-nuke and anti-war activism, individually, before combining forces in 1993. This particular collaboration happened because the grant money for a mass project dedicated to ending the age of nuclear weapons dried up. The two organizations decided to collaborate in order to stay in business and achieve their common goal. The product of this 1993 nonprofit collaboration still heads a steering committee of roughly twenty other anti-nuke nonprofits. The need to achieve common goals and the passion to do so are common reasons why nonprofit collaborations take place, and why these collaborations can be successful. The goal of this nonprofit now is not very different from the original goals of the two parent

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[1] Peace Talk is a pseudonym for a real organization in Los Angeles. E.G, S.F, O.T and like initials, are also pseudonyms to protect the identities of my interviewees.

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organizations: to stay ahead of budget and to deliver the goods to the donors and to the nation.

Despite differences in mission, staff size, relationship with donors, and financial situation, the attitude of service towards the donors and communities they serve seems to be a common mindset and philosophy in the antiwar nonprofit sector. In *Contesting Patriotism: Culture, Power and Strategy in the Peace Movement,* Maney, Woehrle and Coy assert that "activists must convince targeted elites, bystanders and reference publics to break with consensus and assume greater risks, even when such risks are regarded as unnecessary, futile, and counterproductive. Challenging hegemony in the context of legitimated political closure invites incomprehension, ridicule, and intensified repression." (2008, p. 165) Targeting elites and assuming great risks to end the war in Afghanistan is not an easy concept to fathom. However, the rewards are worthwhile, and the simple answer to what can bring the troops home is something that activists think of quite often: social capital and money.

The financial cost that Noam Chomsky's book, *Chronicles of Dissent*, cites as a key factor in bringing the troops home from Vietnam, would not have succeeded in doing so without the efforts of the American people and their ability to put pressure on the Nixon administration. In *Decline and Discontent: Communism and the West Today*, Paul Hollander (1992) emphasized the financial cost of current wars: "the costs of policing the world -- whether it be in interest of cheap oil or high oil company profits, or to promote the ideology of free enterprise -- will place a crushing burden on the U.S economy." (P. 280.) Although it was written during Desert Storm almost twenty years ago, Hollander's critique of both the U.S' "policing of the world" and the "reassertion of U.S supremacy" for commodities like cheap oil is still relevant today.

While some aspects of U.S. military endeavors appear not to have changed at all, the way in which social movements are understood has changed greatly in the years since the

Vietnam War. In particular, Social Movement Theory is useful in understanding what would make an antiwar movement successful.

Social Movement Theory

Social Movement Theory studies the cycles, stages, key players, and patterns that occur in social movements. The insights of Social Movement Theory can be used so that antiwar movements can benefit from the successes and failures of movements past. What has worked for social movements and what has not, what key leadership roles must be filled, and the delicate issue of timing, all play crucial roles in the antiwar movement's future. Social Movement Theory is a large and complicated set of interrelated terms, ideologies, patterns of thought and definitions which are used to help those who study social movements understand better what they are looking at, when observing a social movement. Social Movement Theory helps explain why antiwar movements are not flourishing today, and gives insight into how a war-weary society can foster an antiwar movement. In this capstone, Resource Mobilization Theory-Paradigm, Structural Theory, and the Structural-Strain Theory will all be explained, in conjunction with the Antecedent Process Outcome Framework, and used to discuss the antiwar nonprofit organizations of the West Coast.

In order to understand and apply Social Movement Theory, one has to understand Resource Mobilization Theory, which is often referred to simply as "RMT," and also the contrasting Structural Theories. Briefly put, RMT studies individuals and Structural Theory studies organizations. Both are useful in the context of the antiwar movement today, and in order to fully grasp Social Movement Theory, and use it to the fullest capacity, one must understand Resource Mobilization Theory-Paradigm, Structural Theory, Structural-Strain Theory and Protest Cycles.

RMT and Resource Mobilization Paradigm, which is referred to as "RMP," are the same theoretical concept, labeled as paradigm and theory for different uses. RMT looks at individual people as activist agents, and looks at the people who comprise social movements as individuals. RMT "attempts to explain social movements by viewing individuals as rational actors that are engaged in instrumental actions that use formal organizations to secure resources and foster mobilization." (McCarthy, Zald, Crawford 1987, Para 4). In dealing with social movements during the 1960s, "resource mobilization theory became the dominant paradigm… because it was better able to account for the 1960s cycle of protest than previous theories of collective behavior." (Steven Buechler (1993), p.217-35)

When looking at collaboration among antiwar nonprofits today, RMT can be extended to treat the antiwar nonprofits themselves as individuals with collaborative abilities. However, RMT has two distinct variants, depending on whether RMT is being referenced in the Social Movement Theory context (which RMT is, unless specified otherwise), or in its sociological version. The sociological variation of RMT looks more like Structural Theory (discussed below), because its application is to organizations versus individuals. Because of this focus on organizations, this version of RMT has greater potential for insights into collaboration among organizations. (Tarrow et. al. 1998)

Although Structural Theory and Structural-Strain Theory sound similar, the aspects of Social Movement Theory that they comprise are very different. Structural Theory considers social movements as being directly related to or coordinated through an organization or formal governing structure. Structural-Strain Theory states that social movements form spontaneously because a group or multiple groups of people are triggered by an event or the notion that something is wrong in their society. (Pliler, 2004, para 8.) In the particular case of antiwar

nonprofits, Structural-Strain Theory would focus on the individual people showing leadership and working to build a united front through collaborative efforts, not the antiwar nonprofit organizations.

In order to grasp fully why antiwar organizations are not collaborating yet, in the same way that individuals can, the Antecedent Process Outcome Framework is helpful. The Antecedent Process Outcome Framework is one that illustrates the five dimensions that are essential for nonprofit collaboration. These dimensions are the building blocks for a successful collaboration, ranging from the most basic to the most advanced: Norms of Trust and Reciprocity, Mutuality, Organizational Autonomy, Administration, and Governance. As with any structure, building from a solid foundation is critical: Norms of Trust and Reciprocity, Mutuality and Organizational Autonomy serve as the foundation for the higher structure, which is comprised of the two dimensions of Governance and Administration. The antiwar nonprofit organizations cannot collaborate according to this framework, because they lack the Norms of Trust and Reciprocity, Mutuality, and Organizational Autonomy. Therefore, Administration and Governance in a collaborative capacity cannot now be realized, because there is not that foundation upon which nonprofit collaborations are built.

Furthermore, keeping the Antecedent Process Outcome Framework's dimensions in mind, if the individuals in the antiwar movement cannot get along, then organizations and consequent collaborations cannot form, thus making Structural Theory, and the organizational aspects of the Antecedent Process Outcome Framework, inapplicable. Structural-Strain Theory and Resource Mobilization Theory and Paradigm are applicable in the context of this capstone because they rely on individuals to make the movement successful. Structural Theory and the sociological model of Resource Mobilization Theory and Paradigm are not applicable, because

their use is contingent on organizations collaborating and getting along, which is not happening.

Sidney Tarrow's study of Italian Protest Cycles in the 1960s and 1970s brought forth the concept of the Protest Cycle, another key term for understanding Social Movement Theory. Protests Cycles resemble a theoretical framework as opposed to a lone theory. Tarrow's 1998 work, *Protest Cycles*, argues that social movements have periods of both activity and dormancy in society's conscience. Activity means that the vast majority of the public is thinking, for example, about the Occupy movement rather than Save the Whales right now. Save the Whales is at the bottom of the Protest Cycle whereas Occupy is at the top. Protest Cycles also differ by cultural context. Peterson (1989) defines the differences between American and European Protest Cycles when she contrasts "the American approach, which concentrates on the mechanisms by which movements recruit participation, i.e. resource mobilization, and the European structural approach which focuses on how social problems are transformed into social movements." (P. 419.)

Two of the leading thinkers and renowned Social Movement theorists are Charles Tilly and Charles De Benedetti, who both define a social movement as a sustained interaction consisting of people who are mobilized in the name of one particular interest, to make demands on the power-holders. (De Benedetti, citing Tilly, 1984) Tilly and De Benedetti's definition may refer to either the individual people or the organizations. The fluidity of their definition is one of the reasons why Resource Mobilization Theory and Structural Theory are both needed in order to understand Social Movement Theory in the antiwar nonprofit context. De Benedetti was a great champion of Structural Theory as a method to be applied by organizations who wanted to collaborate for political gain and collective action. If RMT is used to build connections among individuals, and those individuals, in turn, connect their respective organizations, then both RMT

and Structural Theory are applicable. As Yang Su explains, "the paradigm focuses squarely on purposive and strategic actors and identifies the available resources, opportunities, ideas, and action repertoires to act collectively." (Su, 2011, p. 252) From Su's definition, it is clear that the paradigm is not only useful in looking at a social movement like the antiwar movement, but also in looking at nonprofit collaboration efforts, particularly the identification of available resources and pooling of ideas and repertoires to act together collectively.

In summary, Social Movement Theory pioneers, Peterson (1989), Tarrow (1998), Lichbach (2011), Heaney (2009) Traugott (1998), Su (2011), McCarthy (1987) , and DeBenedetti (1990) all subscribe to Social Movement Theory as a very useful method of study, but each individual has his or her own view of the best ways to create and maintain social movements.

Organizational Models For Antiwar Leadership

What organization could possibly lead and organize the many people and resources that are needed for an antiwar movement? More importantly, which type of organization in the U.S would or could actually want to organize and lead an antiwar movement? A for-profit business relies on direct sales and the exchange of goods and services for financial gain, which does not provide a business model that would best serve or be served by supporting a movement. The nonprofit sector, however, relies upon the financial support of foundations and people who believe in and support the cause the nonprofit is working for. This is by far the best organizational model for the antiwar movement.

The nonprofit sector has played a crucial role in educating the public about what is happening to the civilians of Afghanistan and the families of U.S soldiers. NGOs often play critical roles in documenting human rights abuses, advocating accountability for past and present offenses, and educating the public to the horrors of war. They can also play an important role as

critics of government action, and sometimes lead their own investigations into past human rights abuses. (Naidoo, 2009, p. 20)

To raise money from foundations, nonprofit organizations often need to convince the foundations of their success in following their mission statements. Increasingly, also, foundations support collaboration among the organizations they fund, in order to eliminate duplication of services and to create synergies. Foundations play an important role in pressuring nonprofit organizations to collaborate.

The Foundations

The Lodestar Foundation, located in Arizona and capable of supporting many nonprofits working for social justice causes all over the country, has a prize to reward nonprofits for successful collaboration. Although the Lodestar Foundation's website does not mention antiwar nonprofit organizations collaborating with each other, this does not mean that such collaborations are being discouraged. It may be that they are under the radar of foundations that support and encourage nonprofit collaboration, like Lodestar.

The Lodestar Foundation website does contain great stories of nonprofit collaboration occurring all over the U.S, for a wide variety of social justice causes. The narratives of how the collaborations came to be, and how they are currently benefiting the communities and cities in which they are located, the names of the collaborators, missions, outcomes, and strategies, are all on the Lodestar website. None of these successful collaboration stories resembles the nearly non-existent collaboration among antiwar nonprofit organizations that my interviewees have described. The Lodestar Foundation's mention of strong results from large-scale nonprofit collaborations in Los Angeles, Oakland, Seattle, and Portland and, on a smaller scale, in Hayward, Campbell, San Jose, San Diego and Bellevue, could mean that collaborations among

West Coast antiwar organizations would have a good chance to win the attention of foundations.

The Lodestar Foundation celebrates and encourages nonprofits' innovative collaborative efforts:

> [We seek] to increase philanthropic impact by encouraging and supporting long-term collaborations among nonprofits working in the same area in order to increase efficiency and/or impact and to reduce duplication of efforts, and the adoption of other sound business practices. (Lodestar, 2011)

To gain recognition from the Lodestar Foundation and other foundations like Lodestar, nonprofit collaborators must form a union that "demonstrates improved effectiveness in achieving social good; represents an innovative response to a specific challenge or opportunity; and exhibits characteristics that would demonstrate that the collaboration is a model for the field, sector, or community." (Lodestar Foundation Website, 2011)

Foundations like Lodestar play a vital role in encouraging nonprofit organizations not only to look out for their own specific interests by doing everything to avoid mission failure, but also to look at how to make nonprofit collaborations that effectively benefit the public.

Conflict Resolution: Ironing Out the Existing Issues

If the antiwar nonprofit organizations were to come to the table and work out the differences between parties or people, they could make a long-term or short-term collaborative effort much stronger. The Conflict Transformation Masters Degree, for which this capstone is a requirement, contains training in the solving of conflicts, arguments or differences between organizations. Conflict Resolution principle dictates that a dispute among organizations or CEOs does not necessarily have to rule out a potential collaboration. When dealt with through methods such as mediation and open communication, not only can conflict be resolved, but it can actually spur creativity among the parties, as discussed by Michele Lebaron and Venshari Pillay in *Conflict Across Cultures: A Unique Experience of Bridging Differences*:

Interestingly, it was our very diversity that provided the sparks to keep us writing and engaged even when we did not understand each other. Sometimes, our collaboration also yielded the opposite of sparks: skraps (sparks spelled backwards) -- those forgotten or buried remnants of ourselves where hurt or pain is lodged until triggered by someone's comment of action (LeBaron 2002). In addressing the sparks and *skraps* among us, we came closer to each other even as our life-paths diverged. (M. Lebaron and V. Pillay, 2004, p.196)

As Lebaron and Pillay mention, diversity of opinion can actually bring out the best in one another, provided that conflicts are openly acknowledged, and that no effort is made to wound or to reopen existing wounds. A respectful disagreement or difference has the power to add to the collaboration, if examined and used to the fullest degree possible. Antiwar organizations should be familiar with the principles of conflict resolution or at least able to develop conflict resolution skills before attempting to collaborate, or burning any potential bridges over a creative or organizational difference.

Social Movement Theory, Nonprofit Collaboration, and the Antiwar Movement synthesized

Conflict Resolution skills can be used among organizations that are willing to discuss matters civilly. However, the apathy or lack of interest on the part of the American public regarding antiwar priorities, and the stagnancy among antiwar contingents is another matter completely. The Heritage Foundation, which has no sympathy for antiwar organizations, is completely on point with its assessment of the current antiwar movement:

The anti-war movement is continuing the charge, but most Americans aren't following. Nor do the anti-war movements share any political coherence. All they have in common is opposition to the war. When that cause goes away, the movement will fall apart. This is already happening with the anti-Iraq war movement. (Carafano, 2008, Heritage Foundation Website)

Essentially, Carafano is saying that the antiwar movement is in a dormant Protest Cycle. He stresses that, if the war is not important enough to the people of the U.S, then there is no movement and thus no reason for nonprofit organizations to collaborate.

The liberal contingent that elected President Obama now appears to be reluctant to press to end the wars that Obama inherited from President George W. Bush. Interestingly, when George W. Bush left the White House on January 4th, 2009, many assumed that his foreign policy issues would leave with him, and that an antiwar president could get the country "back on track," and bring the troops home. For his part, Obama never professed to be able to end the two long, intractable conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, instantaneously – but this did not dispel the popular notion that he would in fact do so. Instead of being the "Peace President" that many had hoped, however, President Obama kept many of Bush's appointees in key positions relating to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. According to Heaney and Rojas:

> President Obama maintained the occupation of Iraq and escalated the war in Afghanistan. The antiwar movement should have been furious at Obama's "betrayal" and reinvigorated its protest activity. Instead, attendance at antiwar rallies declined precipitously and financial resources to the movement dissipated….The election of Obama appeared to be a demobilizing force on the antiwar movement, even in the face of his pro-war decisions. (Heaney, 2009, p. 147.)

President Obama's continuation of Bush's wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq should have been met with outrage, as Heaney claims. However, one unforeseen consequence of Obama's role as the "Peace President" was, at least in part, the evisceration of the antiwar movement: members of the left wing were understandably reluctant to put pressure on a candidate that they had just worked so hard to elect.

Successful Social Movements in Historical Context

Social Movements, studied historically, and scrutinized for common themes that ran through the successful social movements, provide a real resource for modern day activists who want to understand how to be effective. Time and dedication were huge components of successes like the Vietnam antiwar movement, the Civil Rights movement, and the Women's Rights movement. Each of these took many years to culminate in a tangible result, as Social Movement

Theory and history predict. Yet my interviews revealed that many in the current antiwar movement seem to believe that a weekend or weeklong protest is enough to bring the troops home and close down the war complex. The antiwar movement must be sustainable and built to last under adverse circumstances in order to build a sustainable and effective antiwar movement.

Both from the sociological and Social Movement Theory perspectives on RMT, the antiwar nonprofit organizations and coalitions of today are not using the potential for an effective antiwar movement. As exemplified by the actions of the antiwar protestors in the Vietnam era and the stories of collective and heroic actions by ordinary citizens, in Ackerman's (2001) *A Force More Powerful*, the term "resources" includes the citizens, the informal groups, and the coalitions. A current example of an effective social movement involving actors of diverse socioeconomic status, religion, age, and gender is the protests in Egypt. The Egyptian people opposing the Mubarak regime were very different in the habits of their daily lives and their beliefs, but their strongly shared opposition to the regime made collective action possible and incredibly effective. The combined knowledge of Resource Mobilization and Protest Cycles, while not directly correlated to the antiwar movement or nonprofit collaboration, could potentially benefit any future movement. While social movements, collective action and Protest Cycles are not an exact science these studies and insights are incredibly useful for looking at the building of social action and the ramifications for future social actions.

Effective social movements put into nonviolent practice the predominant theme of *"A Force More Powerful"*. Ackerman's (2001) book is an exploration of societies or oppressed groups of people, across cultures and time periods that demanded the end of an occupation or regime through nonviolent means. Nonviolence is particularly powerful because violent opposition is expected by the offending government-body. A nonviolent method of protest is

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harder to retaliate against for the regime, and also strengthens the message of the protest by not

having any violent distractions. The elements Ackerman identifies for a successful social

movement include the following:

*The creation of solidarity among the dissatisfied population

*No time constraints

*The willingness to lose everything, including your life

*The ability to assume great risks

*A uniform sentiment and message that is understood by and strictly adhered to by every

last man, woman and child participating in the movement

*Using nonviolence as a principle and way of being, even when violence looks to be the

only option.

In summary, nonprofit organizations cannot collaborate organically without a great deal of time,

stamina, and political savvy.

Antiwar Nonprofits Must Collaborate!

This portion of the Literature Review is aimed at highlighting what researchers,

academics, and experts in the field deem to be valid reasons for nonprofits to collaborate with

each other, and the ways in which nonprofit collaboration should be approached. Thomson

(2001) has an excellent working definition of nonprofit collaboration: "a process in which

autonomous actors interact through formal and informal negotiation, jointly creating rules and

structures governing their relationships and ways to decide on the issues that brought them

together; it is a process involving shared norms and mutually beneficial interactions." (P. 25.)

Naidoo argues that, "just as it is better for citizens to act together than alone when

conscientiously fulfilling duties to improve society, so it is better for civil society organizations

to collaborate." (Naidoo, 2009, p. 23.)

It is also important to understand the complications that are inherent in any collaboration. In *Beyond Collaboration* (LaPiana 1999), an expert on the subject of nonprofit collaboration and CEO of the James Irvine Foundation, states that "nonprofit organizations attempting to restructure through mergers, back-office consolidations, joint ventures, or fiscal sponsorships must overcome perceived threats to autonomy and board and staff members' self interests, as well as potential culture clashes." (P. 2). Ostrom (1998) states that complications are to be expected, but that the rewards can be great for those who are patient enough to risk having to start over again:

> Individuals temporarily caught in a social-dilemma structure are likely to invest resources to innovate and change the structure itself in order to improve joint outcomes …[Learning occurs through a] continuous trial and error process until a rule system is evolved that participants consider yields substantial net benefits. (Ostrom, 1998).

Nonprofit Quarterly provides a comprehensive analysis of the many layers of complication that arise with each attempt at collaboration, from the micro to macro scale.:

> The stories of collaboration among national infrastructure organizations are fundamentally stories of collaborations and of the challenges of organizations working together, no matter who is at the table and what they want to achieve…One of the huge frustrations of collaborations, particularly when loosely conceived, is that some players are more collaborating than others, particularly when it comes to how much time and energy the participating organizations will devote. While there is no elixir to make collaborations work, there is a need to think about how to make inter-organizational collaborations exact energy and commitment from all players. (Nonprofit Quarterly, P. 20, 2009)

There are many considerations when choosing with whom to collaborate with as well. Investing in collaboration with another organization also means investing a lot of time in the constant series of renegotiations that a successful collaboration will require. This can cause a lapse in motivation. (Huxham, 1996). Another critical point is made by Thomson (2001a, p.93),

who states that collaboration cannot be rushed, and that it is "energy sensitive" -- which, given what has been said about collaboration in Thomson and Perry's article, means that collaboration requires a lot of energy, time and tenacity to keep going. Collaboration also requires those who attempt it to withstand periods of low productivity while they devote energy and time to building relationships and trust. Thomson also says that, when organizations come to the idea of collaboration through idealism, rather than cost-benefit analysis, they have truly collaborated. (Thomson, 2001 a, p. 93 as cited in Jossey-Bass, p.167.)

In conclusion, "When collaborators have to give something of value, their commitment is more real and sustainable." (Nonprofit Quarterly, et. al.) Collaboration amongst nonprofit organizations requires a great deal from all parties involved, but the difficulties that collaborators must endure, are well worth it in the eyes of Thomson and Perry; Provided those who collaborate do so for the right reasons, and not for a quick fix.

Frameworks

Little or no literature exists concerning antiwar nonprofit collaboration. For this reason, in order to provide a complete framework for this capstone, I have applied the two following theoretical frameworks to solidly ground this capstone in pragmatic thought and practical use.

The Environmental Scarcity Theory Model (Dixon, 1994, p.5) is useful for understanding competition for resources among nonprofits, and the conflicts that can arise among organizations that should be collaborating. With many nonprofit organizations shutting their doors due to funding issues, there is the question of whether there is enough money in the nonprofit sector. In the Population Reference Bureau's (Kennedy, 2001, Para 6) use of Dixon's model, there are three prime instances in which Environmental Scarcity surfaces. The first is Demand Induced Scarcity, where there are simply too many people or organizations, and too little of the resource.

Next, there is Supply Induced Scarcity, which can be exemplified by the Irish Potato Famine, where the staple crop that many relied so heavily on, was no longer edible. The supply of potatoes was no longer good, so many perished as a result. The final type of Environmental Scarcity, Structural Scarcity, is what some see as one of the antecedents for the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Structural Scarcity means that some are given control over, or a majority, a much-needed resource, while others are deprived of it. This was the case with the Belgian colonists favoring the Tutsis instead of the Hutus in Rwanda.

Environmental Scarcity Theory is also closely linked to Relative Deprivation Theory, where an organization or group of people feel deprived because they no longer have the amount of the resource that they used to. All manifestations of Environmental Scarcity Theory and Relative Deprivation Theory are applicable to the plight of nonprofit organizations. Although Dixon's model is based on environmental scarcity, such as clean water or arable land, (Dixon, 1994, p. 5), the model can also be applied to the financial hardships that the nonprofit sector is facing. Communities that rely heavily on nonprofit organizations for advocacy and basic needs will suffer the worst from the failure of nonprofits that try to serve them. Because nonprofits have taken up social justice causes where the public for-profit sectors cannot, diminishing resources for the nonprofit sector will mean a stop to services, outlets for citizens, and many forms of advocacy.

The Antecedent Process-Outcome Framework, which was briefly introduced in the Social Movement Theory portion of the Literature Review of this capstone, will now be examined in greater depth. This particular framework shows what it takes to collaborate, meaningfully, on these five levels (Thomson and Perry, 2006, p. 21). The framework itself outlines the five dimensions of a successful Nonprofit collaboration as:

*Norms of Trust

* Mutuality

* Organizational Autonomy

*Administration

* Governance

I focus specifically on the dimensions of Organizational Autonomy, Mutuality and Norms of Trust in this capstone because without these three dimensions in place, there is no chance for Administration or Governance to form within a nonprofit collaboration. Also, because antiwar nonprofits are not currently collaborating, Administration and Governance do not really apply. The three stumbling blocks or hurdles that antiwar nonprofit collaboration has failed to clear are Norms of Trust, Organizational Autonomy, and Mutuality. (Thomson and Perry, 2006, p.21). Norms of Trust is characterized as everyone acting toward each other in a respectful and collegial manner that facilitates trust and is founded on norms that all parties taking part in the collaboration can adhere to. Mutuality refers to fair and honest treatment of all organizations and parties involved. Organizational Autonomy is one of the hardest dimensions to describe and execute properly because, by definition, collaboration means to give up Organizational Autonomy to some degree.

Thomson and Perry define in a chapter called "The Black Box of Collaboration" the five elements of successful non-profit collaboration (from The Antecedent Process Outcome Framework): Governance, Administrative, Organizational Autonomy, Mutuality, and the Norms of Trust and Reciprocity. (Thompson and Perry, 2010). Here, Thomson and Perry lay out what is needed for nonprofit organizations to collaborate. However, Organizational Autonomy, the middle (third) building block of the Antecedent Process Outcome Framework, is a double-edged

sword in this case. In the quest for enough money and recognition, organizational independence and autonomy are often preferred to collaboration. Garvester Kelley, who writes for the Chronicle of Philanthropy, recently cited the disturbing statistic that only one percent of nonprofit organizations actually admitted to collaborating with one another, as of 2010. Kelley explains that nonprofit leaders may not have the time and skills necessary for effective collaboration:

> The lack of nonprofit strategic collaboration is not necessarily the fault of nonprofit leaders; they are occupied with other pressing matters. These leaders are managing organizations with diminishing resources, increased demand for services, and an understandable desire to serve as many people as possible…Nonprofit leaders are wired to get things done and are not necessarily focused on identifying new ways to structure their organizations to improve service delivery. This requires a different set of skills and the luxury of time for reflection and planning. (Kelley, 2010)

These obstacles to collaboration indicate that collaboration among antiwar groups may not be feasible. Given the current lack of nonprofit collaboration in the antiwar movement, it would be unwise to apply the two dimensions of "Governance" and "Administration" to a situation in which those elements are not present.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

For my research design, I interviewed eleven people from West Coast-based antiwar organizations and coalitions. I interviewed 4 males and 7 females in the following positions: a foundation CEO, an antiwar academic, an antiwar activist, two antiwar coalition members, an Interim Director of an interfaith nonprofit working for peace, the head of one organization's antiwar operations in Southern California, and the founder of a nonprofit antiwar organization. Everyone interviewed was affiliated with the antiwar movement except the CEO of the nonprofit organization. Six of these interviews were in depth, and varying in length. I also conducted three phone interviews and two informal talks, which brings the total number of participants in this

study to eleven people. The five core interviews ranged from 45 minutes to an hour. The telephone conversations lasted from 10 minutes to half an hour. Due to the sensitivity of the subject matter, three people later withdrew their statements, bringing the number of participants to eight. Each person interviewed had well over 8 years of experience with the antiwar movement or a nonprofit organization.

Because of time constraints and the extent of experience with the topic, the questions posed also ranged. During interviews that were short due to time constraints, the interviewees were asked about nonprofit collaboration and the antiwar movement. The questions differed depending on whether the participant was a member of a nonprofit, a foundation member, or an academic. Approximately six primary questions were asked of the participants regarding their history with the antiwar movement and the nonprofit world, what collaboration means to them, and what they think about the capabilities of the antiwar movement.

Open-ended and clarifying questions, as well as two-way conversations regarding the antiwar movement, played a critical role in both establishing a rapport between the interviewee and myself and allowing the interviewee a chance to speak on matters that may not have been directly related to the questions, but that were related to the study. I made notes during all of my interviews in a journal that is kept confidential. After listening to all my interviews the first time, I wrote down ideas, notes, and important quotes, and then transcribed the interviews. Technical difficulties with the voice recorder made the last part of the very last interview murky, until it finally broke. All of the other interviews came out fine, and were fairly easy to transcribe. After reviewing and transcribing the interviews, I looked for parallels between what all the interviewees had said, and ways in which their statements agreed or disagreed with the literature in the review in the post-interview phase. The consolidation and analysis of the information

gained during these interviews informed and led my entire body of research -- both what

questions were answered directly by participants and what questions were glazed over or

avoided. I then began looking for answers within those interviews to my research questions.

Researcher Weaknesses and Strengths in this Study

Examining the strengths and weaknesses of one's research abilities is the only way to get

to be a better researcher. This section will examine the benefits of the researcher being

extroverted and knowing the antiwar community and nonprofit sector well, and the

disadvantages of being an outsider to the West Coast antiwar movement.

One of the largest weaknesses of this capstone paper was the simple fact that there is not

a clear-cut definition of what "collaboration" among nonprofits is. There is no term that all the

experts can agree on, much less the nonprofits of the West Coast. The questions that were

avoided by my interviewees or glossed over, hindered the data gathering, because information

was being held back. Another weakness that I expected going into the study was that, despite my

work on the West Coast, I was still an outsider. I belonged to no organization and I was not from

Los Angeles, Oakland, Portland, Seattle, or anywhere on the West Coast, for that matter -- but I

was the one asking the hard questions. But, ultimately, whatever my outsider status on the West

Coast, those I chose to interview put their faith in my antiwar background, and rapport.

My status as an outsider may in fact have benefited the research. Brannen (1998) asserts

that researchers' success in obtaining interviews, especially about sensitive topics, may be

influenced by the relationship between researchers and respondents. She argues that researchers

may facilitate their access to respondents if they cast the interviews within a "one-off"

relationship -- a transitory, as opposed to in-depth, association, which assures anonymity.

Respondents may have less fear, and therefore will be more forthcoming, if they believe they

will never cross paths with the researcher again. (Holstein and Gubrium, 2003)

Brannen makes an excellent point, and one that proves valid in my research. The preconceptions of being an outsider with regards to research for this study were proven wrong. This was a challenge that could have easily become a weakness, but anonymity, as Brannen states, tends to make interviewees more honest and forthcoming. Being an outsider means that you, as a researcher, are less trustworthy, but also less likely to be biased by your organizational affiliation. My interviewees were, for the most part, candid and knowledgeable about most of the questions I asked. At least two of the interviewees told me that they would be willing to have their names used because they knew that they already had FBI files. However, I did exercise caution in keeping my interviewees' identities confidential.

Among the interviewees, there was an academic whose insight and big-picture analysis of the antiwar movement brought another dimension to this study altogether. The analysis of the obstacles facing the antiwar movement that the academic interviewee gave not only solidified and validated the necessity of this kind of research, but also helped to explain the wider lens through which the antiwar movement is viewed in academia, as compared to how it is viewed from within.

FINDINGS

The findings section of this capstone is far richer and fuller of parallels than anticipated. The research questions are the spine and nervous system of this capstone, so it is vital that the questions run all the way through. The research questions for this capstone are: Why do antiwar nonprofits not seem to be collaborating with each other on the West Coast? What are the risks and rewards for nonprofit collaboration? And, most importantly and thus most difficult to answer: what is needed in order to create a sustainable and effective antiwar movement in the

United States? The literature review spoke to the questions of risks and rewards for nonprofit collaboration. The findings resulting from interviews also provide insight to this question.

The U.S Culture of War

Only one of my interviewees talked directly about the difficulty facing an antiwar movement in a country that celebrates its military triumphs with so much fervor. Even though only one interviewee in this study attested to it, anyone working for peace knows what it feels like. One of the interviewees in my study described the prevalent U.S military culture perfectly, after being asked about what it would take to end the war in Afghanistan and create a sustainable antiwar movement.

> It really requires a fundamental change in our culture and in our view of reality in the world. That is really is a leap for humanity, not just for Americans but we need that. Right now, we are…we are a profoundly militarized country, and our culture is a militarized culture. It's like the air we breathe or fish in water. It's so pervasive we don't even see it. And it is becoming increasingly so. And until we can wake up or step back and see how this invaded our consciousness and our culture, we're going to be susceptible to war as a solution or incarceration. (D.L.)

D.L. is referring to the U.S culture that celebrates war, and a public that is so immersed in it, that the society cannot fathom a different reality. Mindset differences, in the particular case of this research, include those who oppose the war but love President Obama, conservative enclaves who no longer support the war but do not want to betray their party's wishes, and those who have yet to form an opinion on the matter, just to name a few.

Words that are commonly associated with the antiwar groups of Los Angeles are "scattered" "fragmented" "factional" and "small." According to interviewees O.C., E.G., and S.F., stated in various ways, the factionalism and lack of exchange among organizations is a reality.

The "Peace President"

President Barack Obama was voted into the Presidency by 68% of first-time voters, 66% of voters under thirty years old, and a staggering 95% of African-American voters. (Schiffres, 2008). To many, the articulate and erudite Obama was the embodiment of the antidote, cure, or vaccine that was needed to save the U.S from its wars of the past eight years. Obama did not actually claim that his presidency would be the magic bullet for the wars in Afghanistan or Iraq. However, the perception that he would be the antithesis of George W. Bush allowed the antiwar movement to rest on its laurels, when the work was only beginning. In light of what is known about Protest Cycles, could the antiwar movement in the U.S have hit the perfect storm with the arrival of a peace president and a downward phase of the Protest Cycle? Was the hypothetical perfect storm exacerbated by the current lack of foundation funding, leading to the disarray of the nonprofits that could ostensibly launch a movement? Although these questions cannot be answered in anything but a purely speculative manner, the idea provides a fascinating aspect to Social Movement Theory and the nature of the public conscience.

The Diversity Issue

The antiwar movement, like many movements before, has socioeconomic and racial divides -- especially between the mostly white nonprofit CEOs and the populations sending soldiers to Iraq and Afghanistan. D.L. explains how this dynamic effects the movement: " in order to be effective, the movement needs to diversify in race and class, and there's a real stuck-ness in our ability to do that…you know?" (D.L.). As discussed in the second section of this paper, titled "The Need for an Effective Antiwar Movement," the racial and socioeconomic differences between who is running a nonprofit organization or movement and the communities hit hardest by the wars effect the ability for nonprofit organizations to do meaningful outreach. Hard discussions about race, gender, age, class, and sexuality must be had within the

organization itself, and between the organization and community leaders, in order to establish

trust and community within the antiwar movement and between the antiwar movement and the

public.

A movement that does not include the voices of those suffering directly from the war in

Afghanistan will lack a connection with the practical realities it seeks to change. Schmitz and

Stroup attest to the importance of social justice within the nonprofit sector and, thus, within any

movement that the nonprofit sector organizes. They specifically emphasize race and ethnicity in

this connection:

> The pipelines both into the nonprofit world and within it must explicitly promote the
> attraction, retention, and advancement of those who are underrepresented in leadership,
> especially people of color. The focus on race and ethnicity does not deny that women,
> people with disabilities, and gay workers face challenges at nonprofit groups. For
> example, women make up 73 percent of the workforce, but still too often face glass
> ceilings The continued lack of people of color in leadership positions at major
> community and national organizations, however, is especially appalling considering the
> constituencies served by most of these organizations. (Schmitz & Stroup, 2005)

The same racial, educational and socioeconomic issues that divide our nation also

divide the antiwar war movement, and hamper its ability to be effective.

Concepts of Power and Ability: Willingness to Do What it Takes

This section on power and ability comprises many aspects of Social Movement Theory,

history of U.S warfare, and Ackerman's study on the importance of nonviolence in social justice

endeavors: All of these individual elements must be brought together in order to fully understand

the power dynamics at play in the antiwar movement and nonprofit collaboration. D.L. has a

wide breadth of experience in the antiwar movement, nonprofit organizations and media. Her

knowledge and wisdom support and acknowledge what Social Movement Theory and the idea of

Protest Cycles in America predict. "I think we need to believe we can do it, I think a lot of times

people in peace and justice don't really believe, deep down that we can do it… We need an

educated, we need educated people involved in the movement, 'educated' meaning

understanding how movements work, how change happens. It does not happen overnight."

(D.L). The workings of movements can be found, in part, in Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly's

writings on social movements and protest cycles. Knowledge of their teachings is a source of

power for those trying to build movements that champion antiwar issues. However, not

everyone is educated in the theory of social movements. Racial, socioeconomic, and educational

issues boil down to power inequity: who has it and who does not. Naidoo explains this power

gap within nonprofit organizations:

> The power gap between the often better educated and technically more skilled leaders of organizations, especially those who in a professional capacity…It is therefore critical that power differences are acknowledged up front rather than pretending everybody is starting from a level playing field. (Naidoo, 2009)

> The power gap, which Naidoo refers to, can also be seen in the populations that were

drafted for the Vietnam War and the communities that now send the largest proportion of combat

troops to the United States' wars. There was, for the most part, agreement among the

interviewees that time, patience, persistence and solidarity are the four key critical components

to building a strong antiwar movement. A popular misconception underestimates the time it takes

to enact lasting social change.

> After the Iraq war started, all these people said 'but I went and demonstrated that day…' It's not going to stop because you demonstrated one day. It just doesn't work like that…there were a number of conditions that had been coming into play, that finally were in the right configuration….It worked but it didn't just happen. (D.L.)

D.L.'s comment about unrelenting hard work, day after day that goes into making a movement

successful agrees with principles from Social Movement Theory and Peter Ackerman's book, *A*

Force More Powerful (2000). There is also the mental component that many interviewees

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mentioned. That is, the participants have to believe that their movement is worthy of the effort that they are putting forth. Those working in the antiwar movement on the West Coast agree with Ackerman and Tarrow that those in the movement must believe in it with every fiber of their being, in order to build a successful movement.

Education

When asked what made a sustainable antiwar movement from a coalition standpoint, interviewee O.T. speaks to the need of antiwar factions to educate one another, and to listen to people of diverse backgrounds in order to be better informed: "education so they can stay informed, you know because I think that's the strength of a coalition. As individuals, there's only so much we can manage, but when you have a lot of people, representing a lot of organizations who are working on specific issues and they bring that to the table you gain all that additional knowledge that you can't as an individual, so [that] helps form strategies that are much more relevant." O.T.'s comment agrees with D.L. regarding the importance of education among activists.

Geographical Differences

The difference between nonprofit organizations and the populations they serve is also present in the geographical space between one nonprofit or coalition and its constituents. Heavy traffic, hectic lifestyles, and the number of miles between constituents and groups in certain cities on the West Coast have made meeting regularly increasingly difficult. The geographical challenge was discussed by three of my interviewees as a real issue when it came to collaborative efforts:

> The problem with LA, different from like DC or San Francisco or New York is it's so spread out, it's a multiple of cities, so you think you're in a big place but you know like, even in New York we've got like Brooklyn for Peace, New York City for Peace, you know it's, LA just doesn't have like those kind of identity things so great for it…The way

it works best is the vigils, you try to do something bigger than that in the community …
San Pedro has a great peace organization, and Long Beach and San Fernando Valley and
Pasadena, and they're mostly non-affiliated, you know they're mostly just communities
getting together to be a vigil. (O.C)

Geography, lack of diversity, and differences in philosophy all serve as deterrents to
collaborations. The vastness of a city like Los Angeles, where it is hard to reach the public for an
event, or constituents for a meeting, looks deceptively easy to navigate. But differences in
organizational or personal philosophy, together with the fact that drivers in Los Angeles spend
an average of 63 hours in traffic per week (McGrath, 2011) and the lack of communication
among different segments of the population, can serve to derail any potential peace movement.

Reflection Upon The Antiwar Movement Collaboration Efforts Thus Far

One major similarity in all of my interviews was the view that collaboration among
antiwar nonprofits and coalitions is needed desperately in order to bring the wars to an end. But
the fact that the interviewees agreed that collaboration is needed does not mean that their ideas
about collaboration align or that all of their constituents would agree with collaboration efforts.
The story was different when I heard E.G. give the following responses to a question on
collaboration: "Collaboration has been tried, people have tried it….but…" and "I don't have the
answer to your questions." When discussing my research questions in professional and informal
settings, I was repeatedly given the following recommendation, especially by those who had
lived on the West Coast for a long time: "Oh, you're into conflict resolution?" Talk to E.G." E.G.
is "The Antiwar Man" in the West Coast antiwar community; he knows everything regarding
antiwar-peace collaborations or antiwar anything at all, the finer points of Howard Zinn's works,
nonprofits, etc. E.G. said that there had been a sort of "falling out" between two antiwar
organizations a few years before my interview with him. One of the coalitions involved in this
incident has a philosophy based on overthrowing American imperialism, and the other is

dedicated to uniting different faiths against violence. Both oppose the war, but clearly there are clashes in their philosophies and ideas that put a strain on any collaborative effort. E.G. had heard varying accounts through several sources. Apparently one or both of the organizations were refusing to share credit for a specific event. This incident has led to reluctance to collaborate between the two organizations.

Organizational Autonomy Paradox

S.F, one of my phone interviewees, whose background is academic, pointed out a prime example of why the middle segment in the Antecedent Process Outcome Framework, Organizational Autonomy, is one of the hardest to reckon with for nonprofit and social justice organizations. Military Families Speak Out might not tackle the same range of issues that ANSWER does. ANSWER wants to abolish imperialism and the military, whereas Military Families Speak Out just wants to bring the troops home and have them receive adequate care. These two antiwar organizations may have very different visions of what "antiwar" means, and of how it is to be achieved. Understandably, ANSWER and Military Families Speak Out, will probably never collaborate. Organizational Autonomy and the complications that this dimension brings to collaboration, can be seen clearly in this example.

Social Movement Theory: Informality vs. Formality

One of my interviewees, S.F., who studies the antiwar movement, brought up themes that none of the other interviewees did. S.F raised the issue of why antiwar groups may choose informal co-operations like the Occupy movement instead of more formal co-operations. As an example of a formal cooperation, S.F. pointed to the Synergos Collaboration Project. Synergos is a formalized collaborative project, dedicated to ending homelessness and poverty by empowering community leaders to take action. Synergos is comprised of several organizations,

(Synergos Institute, 2011) which combined, and inevitably gave up some of their organizational autonomy for a greater purpose. It now is an example of success among nonprofit organization seeking to collaborate, formally. S.F brought up the point that some may prefer an informal method of working together to avoid incidents like the "falling out" he described between two antiwar organizations over a jointly-planned event. Because most of the interviewees for this paper were embroiled in the struggle to both keep their own organizations afloat in these hard times, and to really push for antiwar action, their ability to step back and see the larger picture of what is going on, at a distance, was and is understandably hampered. S.F. alone also pointed out that the government was not paying attention to the large antiwar protests and that this left activists and frustrated citizens feeling disempowered.

S.F boldly pointed out that in the policy area it is really difficult to make a difference under the best of circumstances. In S.F's view, the antiwar movement during the Vietnam War was successful because enough soldiers were dying that the basic order of the U.S public was under threat. Enough people were disobeying the societal order through protests and draft resistance that President Nixon felt threatened. S.F. also pointed out that that there are real constraints on ending the current wars: extraction is tricky, and the policy and political constraints are very real. In his view, the "End the War Now" slogan is not as effective as it was in the Vietnam War era.

S.F. also brought up hard logistical questions, like "do we want to pull out of Iraq and Afghanistan right now, considering all the issues that may cause?" Activists can have very little effect on these questions. He also stated that it is very hard to make a difference now, in terms of convincing politicians to listen to the issues that the antiwar activists are talking about. Behind the war in Afghanistan, he said, are many powerful people who feel a stronger adherence to their

vested interests, than to listening to the people who oppose the war. When powerful people care

less about an issue then activism is easier. As stated by S.F., E.G. and in Noam Chomsky's

Chronicles of Dissent" (1992), something needs to be threatening the social order in order to get

politicians engaged. Mike Gravel describes the Pentagon Papers incident as just such a threat:

> The controversy of the Pentagon Papers, as perhaps no other single event in modern
> history, served to dramatize what little progress, if any, was made by the nation toward
> achieving its espoused goal of an open government and how contemptuously the citizens'
> right to know has been regarded…espoused by the contents of this remarkable study,
> made possible the commission of a monstrous crime upon the American people: the
> waging of an unnecessary, undeclared war in a foreign land and the reprehensible
> usurping of congressional powers. (Gravel, 2008, p.91)

Social movements and social justice issues, according to both S.F and Tarrow, are not permanent

fixtures in the public's conscience. While there were huge demonstrations against the

Afghanistan war for several years, eventually the public got frustrated with the lack of political

ground gained, lost interest, and moved on. Issues that "go away" are not pervasive in the public

conscience any more, and thus are not ripe for starting a social movement. This is exemplified by

the fact that antiwar newcomers' attendance at rallies has declined steadily since 2003 and

progress has stalled. Heritage Foundation writer, James Carafano (2008) openly states his belief

that the antiwar movement is going nowhere fast, and that nobody really cares. (Carafano, 2008,

Para 5.)

An Academic Perspective on Social Movement Theory within the Antiwar Movement

Social Movement Theory assures us that loss of interest in a social justice issue is

common. S.F. gave credit to the antiwar movement, when he said that antiwar sentiment had

been a rallying cry for a solid five or six years. There is a fascinating disconnect between the

views of S.F., the academic interviewee, Sidney Tarrow's Social Movement Theory, and the

Heritage Foundation's James Carofano's views on the antiwar movement's disappearance from

public attention. The lack of people interested in the antiwar movement at the moment may have more to do with Tarrow's Protest Cycles, which predict that any particular issue will reach its pinnacle of popularity, than with Carafano's view that people never were or will be interested in the antiwar movement again. According to S.F., being at the bottom of a Protest Cycle, combined with President Obama's inauguration, could have combined in just the right way to make the antiwar efforts go dormant. The perfect storm or trifecta of antiwar apathy stands: the perceived "Peace President" getting into office, the Antiwar movement at the bottom of the Protest cycle, and a lack of funding for nonprofit organizations. One protester I spoke with said that informal coalitions and collectives have the passion and the heart, but that there is a need for organization to make sure that everything really gets done.

Collaboration in the Antiwar Movement and the Hurdles of Personality

Collaboration was viewed as necessary by all of the interviewees, although their definitions of collaboration and what is needed to create a sustainable and thus effective antiwar movement in the United States varied widely. There is no doubt that trust was lacking in the movement when two prominent organizations fell out with each other. E.G. pointed out the conundrum that there is great agreement, as reflected in every article, book, and interviewee that I have consulted, that collaboration is needed between antiwar organizations -- but nobody knows how to start it off or how to do it. E.G. also stated his observation that the people who comprise the peace movement are not necessarily all equipped to act peacefully towards each other:

> "[The] antiwar-peace movement… is made up of people…Just because they're against the war doesn't mean they're all perfect or they all have their act together or they're all even peaceful…. A lot of people in the peace movement don't have that much inner peace and so there's a lot of fighting that goes on, infighting, and there's a lot of…ego involved and that's why my favorite actors are people that aren't like that, my favorite are kind of ego-less, humble and do the work and don't try to be the main person of the main

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group. (E.G.)

The personality issues within the antiwar movement and the dynamics at play are as critical to the study and understanding of a faltering antiwar movement as the issues of geography, diversity, and philosophy discussed earlier in this section. The issues facing other nonprofits that are attempting collaborative efforts are not exactly the same as those facing a struggling antiwar movement. E.G.'s statement about ego-less and humble people doing the best work undoubtedly also speaks to which people are likely to be able to collaborate.

The Answer to the Toughest Question

From Social Movement Theory, stories of successful movements, the literature on antiwar organizations, first-hand accounts from Vietnam war protestors, and my interviewees, I would offer the following points as answers to the question of what is needed in order to create a sustainable and effective antiwar movement in the United States. Organization, strategy, genuine interest and passion, stamina, determination, money, and the willingness to make sacrifices of time and livelihood, are needed for an antiwar movement to be successful in the U.S. Belief that peace is possible is critical. The study of previous social movements and Social Movement Theory is helpful to any group of people who endeavor to make a lasting impact through their movement. These are the ingredients that the antiwar movement in the U.S does not seem to have enough of at the moment.

For proof that sustainable and effective movements are possible, one need only look at the Occupy movement as an illustration of the fact that if there are enough passionate people, tent space, and willingness to organize and endure police brutality for their cause, they can have an effect. The Occupy movement has made the University of California at Davis Chancellor think resignation is a good idea, forced Oakland's Mayor Quan and the police in her own city to

have powerful disagreements, and has spread worldwide. It is not clear at this point what this movement's long-term effect will be, or whether this movement is sustainable. Occupy has shown Social Movement Theorists and aspiring activists alike that there is no power like that of determined, frustrated, angry and intelligent citizens with tents, time, and fervent zeal, and that with or without nonprofit organizations, the kind of collaboration among people that is needed in order to build an antiwar movement is right in front of us, and completely possible.

Discussion and Conclusion

The findings revealed within these interviews were varied and rich. Broader themes included the educational role of nonprofit organizations, personality conflicts among the peacemakers, diversity and equality issues, the importance of understanding social movements, and the theories behind that understanding, geography, and the risks and rewards of collaboration. I was surprised by how dearth of literature on this particular subject.

Many more questions have arisen for me, while writing the paper itself, making me wish that I had asked more follow up questions regarding the responsibility of nonprofit organizations to educate the public. This theme arose only during the collation and most basic writing of this paper's outline. My recommendations would be for nonprofit organizations in the antiwar movement to talk not only with each other, but also with academics, foundation CEOs, and community leaders. Collaboration requires people who can learn and gain just by talking to one another. Diversity, personality, and economic issues only have the chance of being solved when there are people dedicated to conflict resolution and working as one. There is a very real need to examine the glorification of war violence, as opposed to honoring those who have fought and died by finding ways to learn from past conflicts and to implement peace. While there are no certain answers about what it takes to create a sustainable and effective antiwar movement, a

clue to the right direction lies in the Occupy movement and its struggles, triumphs, defeats and wins. As the antiwar movement tries to move forward, we must look at what is working. My most fervent hope and ambition in writing and researching this paper is for it to contribute, in any way possible, to a solid, sustainable and effective antiwar movement, and to nonprofit collaboration. The research for this paper should be put to use by those who are thinking of starting a social justice endeavor through nonprofit collaboration, by the antiwar movement, or by a social justice endeavor that requires a mass movement in order to succeed.

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Letter of Consent Given to Participants of this Study:

Dear Interviewee,

You are invited to participate in a research study that is being conducted by Rosalind Sipe, who is a student at the SIT Graduate Institute in Brattleboro Vermont. The purpose of this research is to examine the antiwar movement in Los Angeles as defined by the non-profits and coalitions that work for it, and to examine the ties of collaboration among these organizations. Approximately 6 subjects between the ages of 18 and 40 years old will participate in the study, and each individual's participation will last approximately 45 minutes to an hour. The study procedures include face-to-face interviews.

This research is being done in order to examine what does and does not work for movements in Los Angeles, and to look at ways in which the antiwar movement could be more effective through collaboration among nonprofits and coalitions. If you would like or need more information on my study please contact me at 301 219 7474 or Rosalind.sipe@mail.sit.edu; you may also reach SIT (my university) at 802-258-3333

Please state your consent with being audio recorded and your interview material being used in my thesis project on Antiwar nonprofit and coalition collaborations below. But first read the material below. If you have any questions, concerns, or discomforts about such an interview, please let me know immediately. You are under absolutely no obligation to be interviewed, and this is your choice. Nobody will hear the audio recording read this paper except the professors, the students of School for International Training, and myself. The audio-recorder and the tapes are kept in my room, under lock and key. This audio recording will be destroyed immediately after the research is complete. If you disapprove of what you have said, please say so, and I will immediately delete it from my material.

You have the right to refuse questions, to maintain complete and total anonymity, and to refuse this interview for any reason without explanation. Speaking with me about Antiwar nonprofits and coalitions in collaboration with one another is strictly by your own choice. I appreciate your thoughts, input, and ideas, and request that you ask me questions about my research, your interview, or anything that raises concern or makes you uncomfortable.

I have read the above and I understand its contents and I agree to participate in the study. I acknowledge that I am 18 years of age or older. I also give my consent to be recorded and to allow that tape to be used in a classroom presentation.

Interviewee Signature:

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