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Post-Colonial Restructuring of Human Rights Systems in Morocco

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Post-Colonial Restructuring of Human Rights Systems in Morocco

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Abstract

A surge of academic criticism has followed the NGO corporatization trend ('NGOization') of the 1980s. NGOs have been called an extension of neoliberal ideology as they are pressured to depoliticize and corporatize their structures. NGOs have been forced to fit into an international schema of aid work that compromises their ability to bring about impactful change within their own communities. This trend has been cultivated by shrinking neoliberal governments and an intensified reliance on NGOs to fulfill international human rights requirements. This project examines the role of Rabat women's rights organizations within the context of Morocco as a neoliberal state and within the larger international NGO system. This study re-centers the individual experiences of NGO work within Rabat as organizations attempt to function within the damaging manifestations of neoliberalism and colonial feminism that impact the international NGO system. The purpose of this study is to challenge the ways that the international system inhibits the goals and successes of local women's rights groups with conventional aid practices and to amplify the autonomy and vision of the activists working for women's rights in Rabat, Morocco.

Keywords: NGOization, Neoliberalism, Women's Rights Organizations, International NGOs, Postcolonial State

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Abbreviations

IGO: International Governing Organization

INGO: International Non-Governmental Organization

LHRO: Local Human Rights Organizations

NGO: Non-Governmental Organizations

WRO: Women's Rights Organizations

Explanation of Terms

One-third World: Will be used when referencing historically colonial countries. This term challenges colonial power hierarchies and denotes that historically colonial countries hold power within certain contexts without placing these countries in a place of superiority within this text. Used in place of terms such as “First World,” “Western,” “Global North.”

Two-thirds World: Will be used when referencing post-colonial countries. This term places emphasis on the majority status of these countries and peoples and refrains from the power-stripping often associated with terms such as “Third world,” “Global South,” “Oriental.”

World Majority People: Will be used when referring to people who live within the context of racial or colonial oppression. This term empowers and places emphasis on the majority status of these peoples. Used in place of terms such as “People of Color,” “Black” or “Brown” people.

Post-Colonial Restructuring of Human Right Systems in Morocco

Non-governmental organization activity is heavily impacted by the will of the domestic government and population. Local human rights organizations in the MENA region, and all throughout the two-thirds world, have been pressured to depoliticize and corporatize due to the shrinkage of neoliberal governments at the hands of international monetary organizations like the IMF and World Bank. This change has affected all sectors of NGO work, but one area that has faced some of the most dramatic changes is women's rights work. Women's rights organizations have been forced to put movement-oriented activism on the back burner and are instead focusing on international donor-pleasing projects like small-scale legislation and government agency workshops. WROs in Rabat, Morocco are working and striving for change within the damaging manifestations of these systems of power.

The Moroccan Context

Though this study focuses on women's rights organizations in Rabat, it is impossible to discuss that system without first examining the civil society and historical context that it is situated within. As a postcolonial state, Morocco is in a constant state of identity definition. The country is struggling between traditional, pre-colonial values and civil society, and legislation and government structure that mirrors the French colonial period. The general features of Moroccan political life after independence are neo-patrimonialism, inter-elite conflicts, and associations becoming hostage to political parties and state interests.¹ The relationship between the government and the citizenry is being redefined as a result of these political challenges and

¹ Sater, J. N. (*Civil Society and Political Change in Morocco*, 2007), 1

new social groups have appeared as a result of the failures of the old system. These social groups have initiated new discourses which challenge the state's hegemony and inflict political change. Civil Society has become a tool through which the public defends itself from political abuse by political leaders.² MENA civil society has been linked to democratization in post-colonial years because they both peacefully manage competing groups with conflicting interests. Private persons "commit themselves to public issues and policies (voluntarily), issues by which they had only been indirectly affected."³ Formal organizations, such as LHROs and WROs, fall within civil society. Non-governmental actors of civil society have impacted political discourse and decision-making through access to the media, and the mobilization of the populace. These actors have focused their understanding of rights-oriented politics on human rights, women's rights, and Berber rights.⁴ These non-governmental actors are often LHROs and INGOs, which are influenced by one-third world governments through donation requirements and international rights requirements.

One-third world governments have used NGOs as a tool in their international aid programs and in their quest to democratize post-colonial states. A major approach to civil society in the MENA region has been the equating of "civil society with Western-style formal non-governmental organizations in the private and voluntary sector...It is assumed that these NGOs foster political liberalization and democratization 'from the bottom up' or 'from the grass-roots level.'"⁵ NGOs are often vocally oppositional to the regimes of the MENA region. This is a

² Historically in Morocco, the civil society was subject to political interests and power relations. This inhibited the development and effectiveness of the public sphere (Sater 26).

³ Sater, J. N. *Civil Society and Political Change in Morocco*, 10

⁴ "human rights were transformed (after colonization) into citizens' rights with the clear tendency to defend first of all the unity and independence of *La Patrie*" (Sater 44)

⁵ *Ibid.*

fairly new phenomenon, as dissent was marginalized at the outset of the new post-colonial state through the absence of homogenizing elements.⁶

As post-colonial states are downsized, NGOs play a crucial role in the development of “fashionable development strategies.”⁷ Neocolonial, capitalist democracies have become reliant on NGOs to carry out human rights advocacy and legislation development; NGOs who are deemed capable and politically trust-worthy are called upon to assist in the task of social adjustment. In fact, the “steady growth in Arab women’s NGOs can be seen as a sign of the failure of centralized Arab states to bring about social change and development”⁸ because of the government’s reliance on non-governmental forces to bring about systemic change. This work is, of course, tempered by the depoliticization and corporatization that is required by the international NGO system.

Morocco has developed a thriving NGO system in recent years, but that system is struggling for success without real domestic monetary support. When Morocco declared independence from France in 1956, the “evolution of associative activities and the establishment of a public sphere accompanied post-colonial (societal) development.”⁹ Political parties and labor unions became power bases for administrative manipulation, and associations were politicized in relationship to the monarchy. The first human rights league, *Ligue Marocaine des Droits de l’Homme* (LMDH), was established in 1973 after the military coups attempts of 1971-72. The second, *Association Marocaine des Droits de l’Homme* (AMDH), was established in 1979 after it was concluded that LMDH was tied too closely to specific political aspirations. However, the creation of AMDH

⁶ This was a result of the divide-and-rule phenomenon exhibited by the monarchy.

⁷ Alvarez, Sonia E. (*Advocating Feminism: The Latin American Feminist NGO Boom*, December 2, 1999) 182

⁸ Jad, Islah. (*The NGO-isation of Arab Women’s Movements* 2004) 1

⁹ Sater, J. N. *Civil Society and Political Change in Morocco*, 33

was as much a political move as the creation of LMDH just a few years before it.¹⁰ Current NGOs are accused of holding similarly polarizing and dangerous political aspirations by their critics, usually in conjunction with their funding ties to one-third world governments and organizations.

International NGO Politics

These critics may have some grounds, as one-third world organizations are notoriously heavy-handed in their approach to foreign aid. INGOs are seen as a tool of democratization and westernization by these governments and the United States in particular utilizes these organizations as a way to accomplish its “moral mission to champion democracy, rule of law, and good governance.”¹¹ The United States government has increased funding for ‘civil society’ organizations in an effort to ‘democratize’ and ‘modernize’ Arab societies and Arab regimes.¹² This push by the United States is backed by a new, aforementioned development policy titled ‘good governance,’ which is supported by the World Bank, IMF, and most of the European Union. This policy increases pressure on Arab states to introduce more change.

But this is not to say that NGOs are bad for Moroccan or other two-thirds world societies. NGOs, domestic and international, need to be viewed with their historical and empirical contexts in mind and should not be taken as either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ without first evaluating all of the variables at play. “NGOs have a long history of providing welfare services to poor people in countries where governments lacked the resources to ensure universal coverage in health and education; the difference is that now they are seen as the preferred channel for service-provision

¹⁰ Sater, J. N. *Civil Society and Political Change in Morocco*, 46

¹¹ Thomas, M. A. (*Govern Like Us: U.S. Expectations of Poor Countries*, New York, 2015) 16

¹² Jad, Islah. *The NGO-isation of Arab Women’s Movements*, 1

in deliberate substitution for the state.”¹³ The work that NGOs are doing is not necessarily bad or damaging, but the way that their purposes have changed for the state have put them in a position that challenges their effectiveness and overall success. NGO work must be contextualized within the greater neoliberal society that the work is being developed and performed within.

Postcolonial politics favor certain types of non-governmental actors and activities while ignoring the actors and activities that serve the most vulnerable sub-sects of the population.

These favored NGOs are often international and what many development scholars would classify as ‘leading.’ These leading INGOs are organizations that have received deference from a wide scale of audiences, from international governments, to corporations, to other INGOs. This authority shapes the political constraints it faces and the type of resources that it can access. INGOs often represent the interests of many diverse groups, which tempers the organization’s ability to bring about any real, impactful change. Leading INGOs “moderate their demands, resist radicalism, and find idea(s) that they can sell to multiple interests. Leading INGOs *can* secure change, but these achievements are often ‘vanilla victories’ rather than drastic shifts.”¹⁴ When LHROs accept funds and guidance from leading NGOs, the effects of their work are tempered versions of the possible reality. Power hierarchies exists within the entire international NGO system as well as within each collaboration between INGOs and LHROs.

These collaborations, however, are necessary for work to be done within most two-thirds world countries because of neoliberal government shrinkage and a lack of domestic philanthropic action. Leading INGOs have made themselves invaluable allies to governments in all parts of the world, which impacts how they craft their strategy and how they partner with LHROs. Leading

¹³ Alvarez, Sonia E. *Advocating Feminism: The Latin American Feminist NGO Boom*, 195

¹⁴ Stroup, S. S., & Wong, W. H. (*The Authority Trap: Strategic Choices of International NGOs*, Cornell, 2017)

INGOs seek to expand their international authority, thus expanding their limited set of (often one-third world) values. However, “Other INGOs (and LHROs) *need* leading INGOs to broadcast their work, spreading the insights from their work, getting bigger actors on board, and reframing the message in a more global way.”¹⁵ INGOs supply the LHRO with connections, funds, and information. Smaller INGOs and LHROs tend to be innovative and creative and bring lots of new ideas to the international NGO system, and leading INGOs amplify these works and provide resources and funding so that these plans can be carried out.¹⁶

The problem with this relationship is that, because of leading INGOs relationships with one-third world governments, donors, and the international community, they temper the ideas of LRHOs to fit a certain mold of ‘cosmopolitan’¹⁷ values that are more palatable to their many audiences. “the status concerns of leading INGOs shape the cohesion (or lack thereof) within INGO coalitions and reveal the tensions among INGOs and other partners. Collective collaboration among INGOs might be a welcome choice, but INGO coalitions do not always work.”¹⁸ INGOs often give more deference to state agencies and intergovernmental organizations than they do to the LHROs they are in collaboration with.¹⁹ This is problematic because it means

¹⁵ Stroup, S. S., & Wong, W. H. *The Authority Trap: Strategic Choices of International NGOs*, 39

¹⁶ This is, of course, assuming that INGOs and LHROs have the same values and goals and that the domestic population shares these values and goals.

¹⁷ And by this I mean one-third world and not universal values

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ The INGO theoretical model states that not all advocacy INGOs are motivated primarily by ‘shared values’ with the domestic population. “Instead of the traditional connotation of advocacy INGOs as principled actors working selflessly to help a repressed domestic population with what that population wants but has been unable to get for itself, the model allows for the idea that some organizations are motivated mainly by a private desire to advocate only for what their international donors and stakeholders desire” (Murdie 177).

that neoliberal values are holding precedence over the work of the LHROs that are attempting to bring success to their own communities.

NGO Funding

Another aspect which must be considered in our examination of the context of LHRO work in Rabat are the funding streams that affect their ability to carry out their goals. Global logics of philanthropic appropriateness²⁰ will help explain LHRO reliance on international funding. “International resource mobilization has become the path of least resistance for Southern rights activists. Domestic fundraising is possible but requires substantial investment with uncertain short-term prospects. Southern activists prefer to focus on international funds.”²¹ This is damaging because it de-centralizes LHROs and forces them to rely upon outside sources. Foreign assistance is valuable in small sizes or when there is regime push-back to LHRO work, but in other, less repressive circumstances too much aid undermines local fund-raising incentives. Research has shown that excessive reliance on international funding streams is not a healthy practice for LHROs in the long term because it “weakens, distorts, and divides domestic civil societies.”²² Reliance on local donors, in contrast, “strengthens ties with constituents, deepens local accountability, and reflects domestic priorities.”²³ Despite the benefits of local

²⁰ How and who individuals choose to give. As it currently stands, the logics of appropriateness of donors in one-third world countries pressures them to give to LHROs in two-thirds world countries, while two-thirds world donors do not give because there is no philanthropic culture to do so.

²¹ Ron, J., Pandya, A., & Crow, D. (*Universal Values, Foreign Money: The Political Economy of Local Human Rights Organizations*, 2015) 30

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

donor-ship, however, LHROs are working within a system that pushes them towards international funding streams.

Deeply entrenched routines of giving cause many donors in two-thirds world economies to donate to traditional causes instead of LHROs. This is not because local donors do not see value in the work being done by LHROs, “Southern populations support human rights ideas and organizations, but their philanthropic routines have not adjusted so that donating to LHROs is a socially legitimated option.”²⁴ Scholars have debated the universality of the human rights principals toted by international organizations such as the United Nations, but there is nothing in development studies research that indicates this is true.²⁵ In much of the two-thirds world, donating to LHROs is simply not a part of philanthropic culture.²⁶ Because of this,²⁷ LHROs focus on attaining international aid.

In the two-thirds world, funding from individuals and organizations focuses on ‘charitable,’ not ‘strategic’ forms of aid and activism.²⁸ The philanthropic sector is separated into two categories: the ‘traditional’²⁹ sector, and the ‘modern’³⁰ sector. Because of this divide,

²⁴ Ron, J., Pandya, A., & Crow, D. *Universal Values, Foreign Money: The Political Economy of Local Human Rights Organizations*. 35

²⁵ “Human rights ideas and organizations receive substantial support across world regions, religions, and linguistic traditions, and that citizens in the global South do donate money to charitable causes. We find little evidence that human rights are chiefly a Western concern but do find variation in the way this support is behaviorally enacted. The real human rights divide, in other words, is in philanthropic *routine*, not ideas” (Ron 56).

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ And other factors such as “previous success at international fund-raising, and the high costs of launching new local fund-raising campaigns” (Ron 55).

²⁸ Supporting immediate relief instead of other things like structural change and policy advocacy reforms.

²⁹ Charitable relief through religious organizations (Ron 33).

³⁰ The NGO sector supported by foreign sources (Ron 33).

LHROs struggle to access local money and rely on philanthropic institutions from the one-third world³¹ that are interested in funding long-term change efforts. Local donors pour most of their money into traditional channels, typically through religious institutions.³² It has been found that, “In countries with large Islamic populations, philanthropic innovators have repeatedly reworked interpretations of *zakat*, taking traditional alms-giving in all manner of new directions.”³³ In order to tap into this form of philanthropic giving, LHRO leaders would have to convince religious leaders that *zakat* can be fulfilled by donating to human rights groups.³⁴ LHRO leaders have realized the intense amount of work this would require and have chosen to focus their energies on more reliable international funding streams for the time being.

Once LHROs are locked into a pattern of relying on international funding, switching to domestic donations becomes more and more costly. It is important, however, that LHROs in Morocco, and other two-thirds world countries, diversify their funding streams, as LHROs often end up crafting their strategies in response to the wishes and goals of their donors. When LHROs accept funds and guidance from leading INGOs, the effects of their work are tempered versions of the possible outcome. The philanthropic logics in Morocco can change, but it requires significant time and investment from LRHOs.

³¹ “According to one recent study, the overwhelming majority of private human rights funding comes from donors in the USA, with Western Europe a distant second” (Ron 33).

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ In Morocco, for example there is ample opportunity for domestic donations. “92% of Moroccans voluntarily fulfill their *zakat* obligation by donating as much as 2.5% of their income to mosques and/or religious foundations” (Ron 51)

Methodology

The aim of this study is to re-center the international aid system's WRO presence in Rabat, Morocco within the context of the country's postcolonial, and neoliberal civil society. I rooted my background research on narratives of neocolonialism and the 'NGOization' of women's rights issues in the MENA region. My research focused on the power dynamics at play in the international aid system between Leading INGOs and LHROs, and the pressure that international donors put on the corporatization of feminist movements. To contribute to this background research, I conducted a qualitative study of the WRO sector in the Rabat area. This study was based on in-depth interviews with representatives of local WROs and observations of the work being done in the Rabat area. I contextualized this within Morocco's historically challenged NGO sector and Morocco's civil society. I hoped to interact with representatives from a wide variety of organizations but was unable to get responses from many of the WROs in the Rabat area. This challenged my research because it limited my understanding of strategies and outlooks within the Rabat WRO sector. I interviewed individuals from two organizations: the President and Founder of *the Federation de la Ligue des Droits des Femmes* (FLDDF) and a representative of *Jossour*.

Despite the small number of interviews I was able to carry out, the information that I received from each interaction was deep and diverse. There were certain barriers, such as language and a lack of connections, that inhibited the relaying of uninhibited thoughts and emotions. However, I was able to spend time in their offices and informally communicate with staff, volunteers, and individuals who supported the work being done by these LHROs. I supplemented these face-to-face relationships with electronic communication and following their websites and social media accounts. I was able to ground my formal communication with these

organizations within the context of their day-to-day operations and the overarching goals of their work.

I analyzed these interviews and observations within the context of Morocco's civil society, the international aid system, and the forms of neocolonialism prevalent within the power structures and funding dynamics of LHRO work. This background research, in tandem with my qualitative study, gave me a better understanding of LHRO's perspectives and experiences and helped me to re-center the human experiences within the complex power systems at play in the international aid system.

Research Design

My research was primarily conducted through the in-depth interview of local women's rights NGOs in the Rabat area. I used one set of questions for each interview in order to get as many perspectives surrounding the issue of power dynamics and funding of WROs as possible. While the aim was to get all of these questions answered, I did allow for fluidity within the interview conversation if that was indicated by the subject's interests and remarks. The interview question template I utilized is included in the appendix of my research paper. I typically asked all of the questions in my general question template. I planned on eliminating the questions about international funding if one of my subject's indicated their organization did not receive international funding but did not need to do so as they all actively use international donor's money in their annual budgets. My questions did not explicitly ask about power dynamics within the INGO system because I felt that I could infer that information from the other questions within the interview for my analysis. I chose to use straightforward language and question

structure so that the translators would have a simpler time getting the question across in its entirety. This was a fairly successful approach and there was seldom need for clarification.

My research participants were given a consent form to read and sign before I conducted the interview. These forms (in English and French) are also included in the appendix. The obtained signatures indicated that the participant knew their participation was voluntary and conditional, that they understood and consented to my use of an audio recording device during the interview, and that I would include quotations from our interview in my final paper. My participants requested that I refrain from using their names in my paper but consented to the use of their title at the organizations. My research participants also did not wish to be directly quoted..

My interviews were completed in Darija, French, and English. One of the in-person interviews I conducted was done in Darija with the translation help of an English studies student from the Université Mohammed V. The Arabic interview was conducted completely in Darija by my translator, who recorded the interview and then gave me a transcript of the translation. The interview was conducted in this way because the translator was unsure of her ability to translate everything fully on the spot. The audio-recording of the in-person interview was taken with the explicit permission of the participant and was used as a translation tool only. The other in-person interview was conducted mostly in English, with some clarification in French when the interviewee was not certain of word choice. I did not have a translator for this interview. The interview was conducted in a more informal setting and manner than the other in-person interview.

Research Site and Subject Population(s)

The subject population of my research were members and representatives of local women's rights non-governmental organizations in Rabat. I chose to study the NGO system in Rabat because many women's rights organizations are based here and there is a lot of rights activism in the city because of its proximity to parliament and the monarchy. It was important to my research that I examined these organization's headquarters because of the nature of my interest in their operation. I knew from past experience that NGO headquarters often deal with funding and partnerships on behalf of their branches as well as the larger organization. I chose to study women's rights groups specifically because I thought studying a sub-group of the larger Rabat NGO sphere would lead to more in-depth conversation and research. I sent out four rounds of emails in English and French to about 20 organizations, visited the organizations during working hours, and used contacts given to me by my project advisor Raja Rhouni to obtain three interviews with three organizations; two in person and one over email.

Limitations, Assumptions and Ethics

I elected to research women's rights non-governmental organizations in the Rabat area. I chose this specific sub-group based on the insurgence of movement surrounding women's legal rights in the MENA region and my personal interest in women's rights in post-colonial societies. This sub-group, while fascinating, is also rather small. This proved to be a problem for me as I went about securing interviews. I had difficulties securing interviews with the NGOs and found that, even if they were willing to discuss their work, many of the organizations could not spare the time or the personnel to interview with me.

Besides the small pool of organizations, the language barrier was my greatest obstacle. Using a translator does alter the structure and atmosphere of an interview. During the in-person interview I conducted with a translator, I was faced with the choice of following a more traditional translation style with inaccurate translation or allowing my translator to conduct the interview and then send me a translated transcript. I elected to do the latter, which stripped my ability to guide the interview as I saw fit. However, I did get a more accurate translation and feel that the participant may have been more open with her responses as she was having a full conversation with another Moroccan woman instead of a researcher from the United States. The language also played a role in my difficulty setting up interviews. I emailed all of the potential subject organizations in French but was unable to speak French well enough to communicate effectively when I visited the individual organizations. My inability to speak Darija also inhibited the information that I received from my interviewees, as they had to speak in their second language or their remarks were filtered through the perspective of another person as they translated the interview.

I had many assumptions prior to beginning my research. One assumption was that the conception that Moroccan NGOs (and by extension Moroccan's themselves) lack agency and vision was false. The colonial, racist notion that world majority people lack agency has never been a part of my research. This project was conceptualized with the assumption that Moroccan NGOs require more agency than is currently being allowed them by their governments, international partnerships, and donors in order to be successful in their long-term goals. I assumed that, like the women's rights organizations that I have interned for in the United States, Moroccan NGO's abilities are tempered by the resources they are able to acquire and the laws that they are held subject to. I sought to answer my hypothesis that these same pressures exist for

Moroccan NGOs and wanted to learn more about how their situations differ from the organizations that I have worked with in the past. Another assumption that I made during my research was that the organizations would and could answer my questions somewhat freely without fear of retribution from donors or the Moroccan government.

For the purposes of my research, I assumed that the individuals I interviewed were answering my questions truthfully. I know that this may not be the case, as these participants were individuals looking out for the best interests of their own organization as well as their own. As a student from the United States researching neoliberalism, there are certain power dynamics that I cannot mitigate. I must assume, for the purposes of my research, that the goals and priorities I stated before each interview gave my participants enough peace of mind about my reason for speaking with them that they felt comfortable sharing their true thoughts and beliefs. I recognize the impact that the historical manifestations of inequality and colonialism has on Moroccan society and that vulnerable civil actors like NGOs must be especially aware of the implications of an outsider questioning these structures and what it may do to their ability to function within that system.

My positionality as a researcher factors into my assumptions and this project's ethics more than any other factor. I was born and raised in the United States. This has shaped my perspectives and the way that I am viewed by the rest of the world. My education has been predominantly Western, Euro-centric, and from the perspective of an imperial power. I am a product of that education, and, although I may challenge this hegemony as much as I can, it shapes how I view the world. As I am studying neoliberalism and imperialism within the INGO system, this positionality colors my perceptions of this issue. The United States has the largest

international aid program in the entire world.³⁵ I cannot ignore the way that this impacts my research. However, I have also spent the entirety of my undergraduate career studying systems of power and neoliberal structures and I have learned how to challenge my surroundings and my own systems of belief. I bring those tools to my research as well as my continued observation of my own assumptions and positionality.

Another limitation that I assumed I would face during my research is that I would be taking more than I could give to my participants. To begin to mitigate this, I aimed to center the voices of local NGO workers and pay homage to the things they are trying to accomplish within Rabat and Morocco at large. I agreed to include a paragraph describing the work they do and the things they aim to change in my findings section. Another way I tried to mitigate this was through making the interview process as comfortable and convenient as I could for the participants. This is another reason that I conducted an interview via email. I was also sure to clarify the purpose of my research so that my participants could make an informed decision about whether or not my work aligned with theirs and their organizations. I understood that all I could offer my participants was a listening ear and a truthful representation of their thoughts, opinions, work, and goals. The point of my research is to re-center the perspectives of Moroccans doing important aid work within their own community and amplify their perspectives about their organization's needs and goals for the future.

When I decided to research women's rights organizations, I anticipated that there would be some reluctance to speak with me on the part of the organization representatives. I thought that WROs would face censure from the government and other opponents if they were critical of international aid. I did not find this to be the case, however. The participants were candid about

³⁵ Thomas, M. A. (Govern Like Us: U.S. Expectations of Poor Countries, New York, 2015) 9

their experiences with international funding and partnerships. However, to ensure that my participants could make an informed decision about whether or not to share their experiences, I very clearly discussed my research topic before beginning the interview with each of my participants. We discussed their expectations of confidentiality and I was sure to stress my respect for their boundaries.

Literature Review

This study is founded in a basis of research surrounding the experience of women's rights organizations in post-colonial, neoliberal societies, notions of colonial power hierarchies in human advocacy work, and the effects of the corporatization of NGOs in the 1980s. These topics contextualize the work being done by Moroccan women's rights groups and the ways that international funding streams affects the work they produce.

Women's NGOs

Women's rights are a hot topic in Moroccan civil society at this time. A large amount of political discourse and decision-making has centered around this topic in the general populace and within the regime itself. LHROs and INGOs have exerted their control on this issue through the use of mass media, and mobilization of political and economic factors. The regime has become reliant on women's rights organizations³⁶ as it attempts to circumnavigate the expectations of the international community and the diverse range of traditional and liberal beliefs within Morocco.

This is a common occurrence for LHROs and WROs around the globe, and especially in the two-thirds world. WROs have become 'gender experts' rather than citizen's groups advocating for women's rights, which puts a block between the government and the needs and lives of their populace. "Neoliberal states and IGOs (inter-government organizations) often view INGOs as *surrogates for civil society*, assuming they serve as 'intermediaries' to larger societal

³⁶ "the term 'feminist NGO' (or women's rights organization) has come to denote particular kinds of groups with distinctive orientations and practices...[they are] characterized as having functionally specialized, paid, professional staff and, sometimes, a limited set of volunteers, receive funding from bilateral or multilateral agencies and (usually foreign) private foundations, and engage in pragmatic, strategic planning to develop reports or projects aimed at influencing public policies and/or providing advice...to the grassroots women's movements and varied services to low-income women" (Alvarez 185).

constituencies. *States increasingly subcontract feminist NGOs to advise on or execute government women's programs.*³⁷ Neoliberal, capitalist states have become increasingly reliant on NGOs to carry out human rights advocacy and legislation development. This dependency has pushed WROs in two ways: into a place of public prominence, and away from their past movement-oriented activities.³⁸ Pressure from neoliberal states forces WROs to change the ways that they function within their own societies.

This change has caused many WROs to adopt a hybrid identity, which foregrounds “critical feminist advocacy...(and pushes) a wide range of movement-oriented activities to...the backburner.”³⁹ This reorientation of priorities has been dangerous for the women that WROs advocate on behalf of. Women who live within the most marginalized identities in their societies are falling through the cracks of these hybridized WROs. WROs hybridity has allowed them to play a critical role in “‘advocating feminism’ by advancing progressive gender policy agenda”⁴⁰ and “articulating vital political linkages among larger women’s movement and civil society constituencies.”⁴¹ This has both positive and negative consequences. Experts on individual fields with women’s rights have access to the law-making process and other processes within civil society but the state’s tendency to turn to WROs as gender experts also reduces their work to public debates and technical process instead of allowing them to diversify their strategy and long-term goals.

³⁷ Alvarez, Sonia E. *Advocating Feminism: The Latin American Feminist NGO Boom*, 181

³⁸ This push from their past feminist-movement orientation is a factor in WROs ‘NGOization’ which will be discussed later in this section.

³⁹ Alvarez, Sonia E. *Advocating Feminism: The Latin American Feminist NGO Boom*, 182

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

WROs are often viewed as intermediaries to larger societal constituencies by neoliberal states and IGOs. This is problematic because the range of WROs that get selected to be part of the conversation is small and often influenced by the interests of the state. Many individuals and groups, particularly those that are publicly critical of the government, are “denied direct access to gender policy debates and thereby effectively politically silenced.”⁴² As governments subcontract more WROs to carry out women’s rights reforms, the WRO community has less ability to critically monitor the government’s actions and request more thorough legislation and programming.⁴³

Gender has become part of the conversation surrounding “modern” good governance. It is seen as a power-neutral indicator of development rather than an issue of power hierarchies, unequal opportunity and quality of life between men and women.⁴⁴ This is challenging for neoliberal states because of the wide-spread downsizing of their government budgets and political reaches. Neoliberal states must rely on WROs to advise them on gender matters. “Feminist NGOs’ technical involvement in policy assessment, then, does not necessarily translate into effectual gender policy or women’s rights advocacy and...NGOs’ growing contractual relationship with the State may in fact compromise their effectiveness in advocating for feminist reforms.”⁴⁵ WROs are freely consulted as experts who can ‘evaluate’ policies and programs instead of as movement-oriented, forward-moving organizations. WROs stop facilitating citizen experience in order to focus on policy design.

⁴² Alvarez, Sonia E. *Advocating Feminism: The Latin American Feminist NGO Boom*, 183

⁴³ “Growing numbers of feminist organizations seem to have been driven to focus their energies and resources on more technical, less contestatory activities, to the actual or potential detriment of more effective national or international policy advocacy and other modalities of feminist cultural-political intervention” (Alvarez 183).

⁴⁴ Alvarez, Sonia E. *Advocating Feminism: The Latin American Feminist NGO Boom*, 192

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

This focus switch is ironic because WROs are often heralded by neoliberal governments as intermediaries between the government and female constituents. Neoliberal governments “circumvent the need to establish public forums or other democratic mechanisms through which those most affected by gender policies might directly voice their needs and concerns.”⁴⁶ This is problematic because WROs that are openly critical of the government are seldom ‘designated partners’ of the state. This means that those organizations most willing to challenge the state’s damaging opinions on marginalized peoples are not invited to the conversations that impact those peoples’ lives.

Despite all of these problems, however, WROs are necessary to the women’s movement and the amplification of issues that affect women around the world and have learned how to produce results despite the barriers they face. International donors have played a hand in the corporatization of WROs, as they insist on measurable outcomes and ‘policy relevance’ before committing money to NGOs. WROs have learned to circumnavigate these constraints and keep in regular contact with their target populations by executing state programs and evaluating the effects of new policies. WROs are working to enact real, sustainable change even though their work has been relegated to gender planning ‘quick fixes.’⁴⁷ The good and the bad are intertwined and interdependent. NGO work must be contextualized within the greater neoliberal society that the work is being developed and carried out within. Their work is effective because they aim to mobilize ideas, not just people.

⁴⁶ Alvarez, Sonia E. *Advocating Feminism: The Latin American Feminist NGO Boom*, 194

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

Neocolonialism in Human Rights Work

The pervasive violence of neocolonial ideologies within the international human rights system is based on the postcolonial, racist mentalities of one-third world individuals and organizations bringing ‘civility’ or ‘modernization’ to communities in the two-thirds world. It is often assumed in INGO work that human rights principles as they are understood in the one-third world are universal. This mentality is especially prevalent in the United States of America.⁴⁸ The U.S. has historically accepted only one form of governance: “the provision of public goods and services impersonally to all citizens by a democratically elected government that governs according to law.”⁴⁹ Americans believe their governance ideal is a “moral vision of government,”⁵⁰ and thus believe that such a government is ‘good’ and others are ‘bad.’⁵¹ Americans have a strong investment in their governance ideal because it is central to American national identity. Americans have an “inability to recognize that (their) singular notion of governance is not available to (or wanted by) everyone.”⁵² The U.S. is not alone in this notion of moral governance however, it is an ideal shared by most one-third world governments. To many

⁴⁸ “The United States in particular believes that it has a moral mission to champion democracy, rule of law, and good governance, and politicians routinely appeal to this conviction when they justify their international actions to the domestic public” (Thomas 16).

⁴⁹ Thomas, M. A. *Govern Like Us: U.S. Expectations of Poor Countries*, 9

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ There is an assumption that one-third world countries, America specifically have Moral Authority. “*Moral authority* is defined as power derived from the belief that activists are “not only (objectively) right in the sense of providing accurate information but also morally right in the purposes for which such knowledge is harnessed” (Murdie 36).

⁵² Thomas, M. A. *Govern Like Us: U.S. Expectations of Poor Countries*, 16

one-third world organizations and governments, democratization is humanitarian aid, and it is a constant element in one-third world foreign engagement.⁵³

This is particularly true in the MENA region. The United States and other one-third world countries have spent a lot of time and money in the last few decades to bring about “democratization” and “modernization.”⁵⁴ This intervention often arrives in the form of increased funding for ‘civil society’ organizations. The growing number of INGOs and LHROs in the MENA region has been seen “in the context of a broader development trend that views NGOs as a vital vehicle for social change and democratization.”⁵⁵ One-third world funding streams causes one-third world, neoliberal values to be pushed onto LHROs by leading INGOs.⁵⁶ Cosmopolitan (‘universalist’) values are more likely to attract a wider range of support, making them attractive for leading INGOs and necessary for LHROs. This is problematic because LHROs are tempering their strategies to fit into a neoliberal, colonialist narrative. This ‘strategy filtering’ damages the work that LHROs do and damages their ability to relate to and reach their intended constituents.

Furthermore, it is usually assumed that Leading INGOs are doing the work that they are doing with the best interests of all parties in mind. *This is not always accurate.* “The main human rights NGOs were very much outgrowths of Western liberal internationalism and looked mainly

⁵³ “Because these are cultural beliefs about what governments do, should do, and how they work, we tend to make the same mistakes over and over again” (Thomas 15).

⁵⁴ Jad, Islah. *The NGO-isation of Arab Women’s Movements*, 1

⁵⁵ Jad, Islah. *The NGO-isation of Arab Women’s Movements*, 1

⁵⁶ There is a resemblance between “colonial discourses and that of some contemporary Western feminists. (They) devalue local cultures and assume that there is only one path to the emancipation of women, namely the path of ‘adopting Western models’” (Jad 5)

outward to identify abuses in Communist and Third World countries.”⁵⁷ The idea that all INGOs are fundamentally different from for-profit organizations in their motivations is not correct.⁵⁸ The advocacy put forth by Leading INGOs for universal values does not inherently mean that their goals with respect to those values are similar.⁵⁹

INGO processes of human rights work are often inherently imperialist and colonial. The very act of the professionalization of human rights work puts a price tag on the well-being, quality of life, and very existence of an individual or community. The corporatization of knowledge for INGOs is largely drawn from the one-third world’s sources and assumptions.⁶⁰ One-third world governments and IGO funding agencies resource INGOs as a policy strategy to democratize the two-third world’s neoliberal regimes. These INGOs work within the systems of violence that were created by one-third world actors that work to subjugate world majority people and the governments of the two-thirds world. INGOs tend to “operate in ways which accept capitalism (and neoliberalism and colonialist power structures) rather than seeking to transform the system *altogether*.”⁶¹ Neoliberal regimes manage to keep existing power structures intact while promoting change and development through the use of INGOs tempered by one-third world monetary restrictions⁶² and depoliticization. INGOs have become driven by “notions of polite

⁵⁷ Choudry, A. (*NGOization: Complicity, Contradictions and Prospects*, London, 2013) 4

⁵⁸ Murdie, A. (*Help or Harm: The Human Security Effects of International NGOs*, Stanford, 2014) 22

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Choudry, A. *NGOization: Complicity, Contradictions and Prospects*, 6

⁶¹ Choudry, A. *NGOization: Complicity, Contradictions and Prospects*, 6

⁶² “Donor funding from NGO (mainly based in the North, and often themselves heavily reliant on state support) or governments, often expressed as sub-contracting relationships, or foundations/trusts. Funding criteria and reporting guidelines place a heavy burden of expectations on organizations which may not have the capacity to do the administrative work associated with this, nor fit neatly into the criteria, guidelines and goals set by funders” (Choudry 17).

reformism and self-interest in the maintenance of their organization and funding relationships,”⁶³ ultimately serving dominant notions of politics and economic structure.

Leading INGOs often hold the imperialist, colonial notion that their strategies for ‘fixing’ two-thirds world societies should follow a certain set of universal, ‘cosmopolitan’ values. However, if a domestic population does not hold the same values and doesn’t approve of the work being done on their behalf, “the success of the effort can be severely curtailed.”⁶⁴ Some INGOs believe that international norms and universalist values should dominate advocacy work regardless of whether or not the domestic population wants it.⁶⁵ Domestic support of INGOs and the projects they carry out is essential to the long-term, sustainable success of human rights work. The problem is often not in the work itself, but rather in the way that is it invested and created, to whom the aid is offered, and how it is carried out by the INGO.⁶⁶

NGOization

‘NGOization’ has been defined as the “institutionalization, professionalization, depoliticization and demobilization of movements for social and environmental change.”⁶⁷ It is the civil society’s reaction to democratization and the fight for human rights within the post-colonial two-thirds world. The NGO boom in the 1980s and 90s propelled NGOs into the public eye and away from movement-oriented activities. It was a strategic response to the return of electoral politics during the democratization of the two-thirds world.⁶⁸ It was not simply an

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Murdie, A. *Help or Harm: The Human Security Effects of International NGOs*. 244

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Jad, Islah. *The NGO-isation of Arab Women’s Movements*, 5

⁶⁷ Choudry, A. *NGOization: Complicity, Contradictions and Prospects*, 1

⁶⁸ Alvarez, Sonia E. *Advocating Feminism: The Latin American Feminist NGO Boom*, 182

increase in formal structure, but the promotion and sanctioning of specific movement forms and practices.⁶⁹ The corporatization of human rights work has largely happened due to the restrictions and values of international donors and neo-liberal states.⁷⁰ NGOization is the transition of WROs and other LHROs from movement-oriented, constituent-focused organizations to tools in the democratization of two-thirds world civil society.

NGOization impacts LHROs' ability to critically monitor government activity and jeopardizes the goals and successes of human rights movements. "The ability of NGOs to articulate approaches, ideas, language, and values that run counter to official orthodoxies...may be compromised and their willingness to speak out on issues that are unpopular with governments will be diluted by their growing dependence on official aid...increased reliance on State funding may lead NGOs to lose their critical edge."⁷¹ This is damaging for the LHRO sphere in many two-thirds world countries because it has resulted in a concentration of power and liberalization of LHRO promoted values.

LHROs have begun to promote the values that are pushed by the IGOs, INGOs, and one-third world states that support them financially. This set of values is complicit to state and private-sector interests and undermines "local and international movements for social change and environmental justice and/or oppositional anti-colonial and anti-capitalist politics."⁷² LHRO's unwillingness to confront capitalism or historical manifestations of colonialism and imperialism because of the interests of their international donors results in a compartmentalization of

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ "Donors have had a strong hand in skewing the feminist movement field toward more technical-professional endeavors" (Alvarez 202)

⁷¹ Alvarez, Sonia E. *Advocating Feminism: The Latin American Feminist NGO Boom*, 198

⁷² Choudry, A. *NGOization: Complicity, Contradictions and Prospects*, 2

international issues, which eventually pits world regions and individual LHROs against each other for international funds and the attention of the world stage.

LHROs and WROs have dealt with the pressure to corporatize their structure and projects by creating hybrid strategies and identities. NGOized WROs have “developed expertise in gender policy advocacy while retaining a commitment to movement-oriented activities aimed at fostering women’s empowerment and transforming prevailing gender power arrangements.”⁷³ WROs have been at the forefront of critical feminist advocacy and policy development and have kept relationships with their constituencies by studying policy effectiveness and carrying out state-sponsored aid programs. WRO’s creativity and inventiveness has allowed them to keep contact with movement-oriented goals and successes without fully divorcing themselves from their essential state or international funding stream partners.⁷⁴

⁷³ Alvarez, Sonia E. *Advocating Feminism: The Latin American Feminist NGO Boom*, 182

⁷⁴ “The Good NGOs-Bad NGOs binary does not do justice to the dual or hybrid identity of feminist NGOs, their two facets as technical-professional organizations that are once integral parts of feminist movements” (Alvarez 176).

Results and Analysis

I build upon this background research of theoretical ideology and historical, societal, and international context with three interviews. In exchange for completing each interview, I promised to include a brief synopsis of the two organization's work, successes, and goals for the future. I will provide a summary of my conversations with each individual by identifying and focusing on the broad themes that were discussed. Each WRO I interviewed had a unique perspective and opinion to offer and different understandings of their priorities and concerns within the LHRO sphere. After outlining the organization's goals and projects, I will discuss the interviews in the context of four themes: Perspectives of Local Organizations, Role in Civil Society, Relationships with International Actors and Funding, Positionality within the International Sphere, and Goals for the future.

the Federation de la Ligue des Droits des Femmes (FLDDF) was founded by a Moroccan woman in Rabat over 25 years ago. The federation defines itself as “a feminist movement for permanent education on civic values and equality bringing together men and women, concerned with working together with the purpose of changing social relations based on male domination and discrimination, and establishing a culture conducive to the promotion of respect for human rights principles for all.”⁷⁵ FLDDF seeks to be an open movement for men, women, and civil society organizations to work together towards gender equity. FLDDF promotes women's rights in “accordance with universal human rights principles and standards” and works towards

⁷⁵ The Federation De La Ligue Des Droits Des Femmes. *FLDDF*. Rabat.

democratization and rule of law in regard to women's experiences in Morocco.⁷⁶ FLDDF has two main pillars: social outreach and education; and political mobilization, which they use to guide their work towards equal opportunity for all people in the country.

Jossour was created in 1995 by a group of women looking to promote women's rights in Morocco. Their goal is to increase the female presence on the national political stage and in the economic, social, cultural, and legal fields. They are working to promote the number of women in decision-making positions in order to better the lives of all women. They are working towards these goals by partnering with other organizations and academics and by hosting educational sessions, conferences, and carrying out projects in conjunction with their partners all over the country. They issue policy notes and memorandums, participating in council sessions, organize field research, and set up workshops.

Perspectives of Local Organizations

The organizations that I spoke with had seemingly similar perspectives. The organizations were nation-wide, with members in most major cities and in some rural areas.⁷⁷ The organization's staff is comprised of mostly women, mostly upper middle aged, and seemingly middle class. The staff all speak Arabic and French, and some (the receptionists and some others) speak English. The organizations work towards universalist principles of human rights through social outreach and education, political mobilization, policy creation, and hosting think tanks.

⁷⁶ The Federation De La Ligue Des Droits Des Femmes.

⁷⁷ FLDDF has offices in Casablanca, Mohammedia, Rabat, Salé, Temara, Marrakech, Larache, Fkih ben Saleh, Ourzazate, Guelmim, and Tilila. *Jossour* is in Rabat but regularly conducts projects throughout the country.

Several aspects of this positionality can be analyzed with the context of my background research in mind. The identities of the individuals that work at these organizations (specifically their high level of education and language abilities) speak to the influence of the organization's international partnerships and the necessity of one-third world language skills and business strategies in WRO work in Rabat. The organizations' structure and strategy mirrors that of many international organizations and the individual from the FLDDF stated that their international partners recommended they seek out employees and projects that would be attractive to international donors.

Role in Civil Society

These organizations view themselves as a tool for the women of Rabat (and Morocco as a whole) to strengthen their capacities and as safe spaces for women to discuss the violence and discrimination that they experience. The women that I talked to discussed focusing their projects and goals around the needs of society as they were presented by the women they worked with. I also heard a lot of comments about the organizations' need to connect with men as well as women in order to address violence and discrimination against women. My interviews revealed that the WROs view themselves as an intermediary between the international community and Moroccan women as well as between the Monarchy, Parliament and Moroccan women. All of the organizations I worked with consulted for or were frequent presenters in front of committees and ministries of the Moroccan government.

These self-perceived Civil Society roles are very interesting within the context of my research. In some capacity, these organizations are staying as close as they can to movement-oriented action. By opening up their facilities and events as 'safe' spaces for women to discuss

their trauma and fears, WROs in Rabat are enacting radical activism that strays from the wishes of the regime and challenges the hegemony of traditional WRO or INGO work. This kind of activism falls in line with Alvarez's observation of hybrid WROs in neoliberal two-thirds world countries. The WROs in Rabat are challenging the hegemony required of them by the regime and by their international donors and transforming the work they do into movement-oriented activist spaces.

The WROs are also challenging the hegemony of the INGO system by trying to focus their projects on the needs communicated to them by the women they work with, and not by the government or their international donors. This can be very challenging as I have discussed earlier in this paper. By selecting projects which do not always fall in line with the expectations and requirements of the government and international donors, the WROs demonstrate their hybridity and creativity within Moroccan civil society. An example of this hybridity is the organization's recognition of the importance of connecting with men (especially young men⁷⁸). This is not a common goal for IGOs and INGOs and shows the importance of movement-oriented projects to Rabat-area WROs.

The perception that the WROs have of themselves as mediators between the international stage, the government and the Moroccan public also falls in line with my background research. When I asked what populations the WROs usually had contact with, I was told that the organizations dealt with young women, female students, working mothers, and elderly women. This leaves out a lot of the female population such as women with disabilities, migrant women, homeless women, LGBTQ+ folk etc. This means that these populations are not being represented

⁷⁸ Jossour specifically targets young men to help reduce toxic masculinity and the number of adult men with harmful stereotypes of women.

to the government or to the international INGO system, allowing issues that affect these specific populations to fall through the cracks.

Relationships with International Actors and Funding

All of the WROs that I interviewed have international partners. These partners provide funding, strategy, and international recognition.⁷⁹ The WROs I interviewed told me they were funded by associations and organizations advocating for the same issues (namely women's rights). I was told that funding has a huge effect on the work that the WROs do because it affects the power they have with the Moroccan government, their professional aspirations, and the size of the organization's reach within the country.

The international partners of the WROs of Rabat are a necessary part of their annual budgets. I was told in my interviews that the Moroccan government won't give LHROs funds, so they rely on the money given to them by international donors. According to my participants, the Moroccan government only gives funds to Islamic organizations or organizations with very traditional perspectives and goals. This means that a very large portion of the LHROs in Morocco rely on international funding streams to function and address human rights issues in Morocco.

This is problematic because the INGOs, IGOs, and private international donors that provide funds have their own agendas of democratization and universalist values. This impacts the human rights sphere in Morocco and can inhibit the ways that LHROs connect with their

⁷⁹ FLDDF works with several big-name international partners such as Intermon Oxfam as well as other governments' women's and human rights ministries. Jossour partners with international universities and research forums.

constituents. However, because of the Moroccan government's refusal to allocate funds to this important work, the hands of WROs and other human rights organizations are tied.

Positionality within the International Sphere

As I stated before, all of the organizations I interviewed have international partners. This means that their work has some recognition internationally. The WROs have attended international conferences and the home-base of their international partners. The WROs, however, generally do not feel that the Rabat NGO system is very affective. When I asked why, I was told that the Rabat system does not get enough attention in Morocco if they are not specifically affiliated with the government and that they sometimes feel 'neglected' by their international partners.

This is harmful not only to the NGOs, but to their ability to do successful and sustainable work within their community. Partnerships and coalitions between LHROs cause some of the most sustainable forms of change within the systems of violence that affect people's lives. When LHROs feel that the local systems they are working within are broken, they look elsewhere for support. This de-centers the systems of human rights work and pushes more power into the hands of the international organizations that inhibit and control the work being done.

Goals for the Future

At the end of each interview, I asked my participants what their goals for the future were for their organizations, for the WRO system in Rabat, and for the state of women's rights in their community. I was told by one participant that she hoped her organization would not have to exist someday.⁸⁰ I was told by another that she hoped her organization could complete all of their goals each year and work toward a new set instead of constantly dealing with crisis work that delayed their big projects. All of the women I interviewed would like to see more coalition work within the WRO sphere in Rabat, within Morocco, and within the WRO sphere in the larger MENA area. All of the participants expressed that they want women to be able to seek an education, find work in their desired professions, seek adequate healthcare for themselves and their families, and lead happy and successful lives. They want equality between women and men and they want no woman to have to live within the system of violence that permeates Moroccan society.

⁸⁰ Because women no longer needed advocacy or furthered education.

Conclusion

The WROs that I worked with had very similar experiences as human rights organizations in Rabat, Morocco. They both worked with INGOs, IGOs, and international governments. They both used those international connections as resources for funding and strategy. They both consulted for or presented in front of various facets of the Moroccan government. They also shared the ultimate goal of bringing about equal opportunity and better quality of life for Moroccan women. The organizations fit into my background research of the experience of WROs a two-thirds world context and expanded and humanized my understanding of that research.

My research shows the importance of adapting a hybrid identity for LHROs when working within two-thirds world contexts. The pressures that come from international partnerships and domestic state approval can compromise the mission of LHROs, so finding ways to break free from the hegemonies of that system is integral to the success of the LHRO's goals. INGOS must temper their requirements and recognize the ways that their partnerships harm LHROs, as their coalitions often compromise the work being done in two-thirds world countries by local human rights organizations.

I would recommend that future research explore the coalitions that exist in women's rights work in Morocco, as this was brought up often in my interviews and could bring light to ways that the Moroccan LHRO system could become more independent of international funding

streams. I have also included a list of ways that WROs and their donors can work towards more sustainable, responsible funding relationships based on the research I have done on this subject.

WROs in two-thirds world countries must continue to adapt to their place in neoliberal, post-colonial societies. I offer several solutions to the issues facing WROs in two-thirds world countries as they work to reconcile their identities as hybrid organizations and to the international community as they seek to work with WROs to improve the quality of life and social situations of women in the two-thirds world. One: The problem is not the aid itself, but the intentions behind it, the way it is conditioned, and who it is offered to. Donors must work with LHROs as equals, listen to them as experts on the issues that fester within their societies, and seek organizations that critically challenge the structures that marginalize peoples and communities. Two: Donors should work towards establishing funding criteria that would strengthen hybrid identities and enhance WRO's ability to follow movement-oriented projects. Three: WROs and INGOs must work together to change philanthropic routine in two-thirds world cultures. The human rights ideas exist and are supported by two-thirds world countries, but LHROs must find a way to tap into the available resources within their own communities. Four: Local WROs must find and engage with counter-hegemonic spaces in order to move themselves away from the damaging effects of NGOization. Counter-hegemonic spaces step away from 'project-centered logic' and 'results-driven logic' and towards 'process-oriented' logic.⁸¹ Five: INGOs must recognize that cooperation and agreement from the domestic population is necessary to successful human rights work. They must work with the established values of the

⁸¹ Alvarez, Sonia E. *Advocating Feminism: The Latin American Feminist NGO Boom*, 198

community in order to see any real, sustainable change.⁸² INGOs and international donors must realize that the domestic population do not have to be passive participants in human rights work.⁸³

⁸² The best way to do this, of course, is to consult and partner with LHROs who know the community and the context of the issues being addressed.

⁸³ These solutions are analyzed from my understandings of my background research and interviews with local WROs in Rabat, Morocco. I do recognize that I am in no way an expert in this field or community.

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Basic Interview Guide

What projects are your nonprofit currently working on?

Are these projects in conjunction with any other organizations?

What are the primary goals of your organization?

How does your organization decide what issues need to be addressed?

How is your organization funded?

Does funding ever affect the projects your organization works on?

Are you currently/have you ever worked with international organizations?

Have you ever received monetary support from international organizations?

Has the organization's involvement with international groups ever negatively affected your work?

When does international funding become a concern for your organization or the Rabat NGO system?

What are your personal perceptions of international money in Moroccan NGO work?

What is the general attitude held by Moroccan NGOs regarding international organizations?

Do you think foreign money is a good thing for the Moroccan NGO sphere?

Is the current NGO sphere successful?

What does success mean to your organization?

How do you think the NGO sphere needs to change to be more successful?

Interview Consent Form – English

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of this study is to re-center the perspectives of local human rights advocates within the neocolonialism of the international NGO sphere and problematize the removal of autonomy and agency by conventional NGO structures.

STUDY PROCEDURES

Your participation will consist of an interview and will require approximately one hour of your time. I will be taking an audio recording of the interview. Please indicate if you do not wish to be audio-recorded.

POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS

There are no foreseeable risks to participating in this study and no penalties should you choose not to participate; participation is voluntary. During the interview you have the right not to answer any questions or to discontinue participation at any time.

POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO PARTICIPANTS AND/OR TO SOCIETY

This study is meant to question worldwide societal norms and power structures but will have no immediate effect on Moroccan society or your organization.

CONFIDENTIALITY

Any identifiable information obtained in connection with this study will remain confidential. I will delete the recordings of these interviews within one week of their completion. The notes from these interviews will be kept on a passcode-protected computer. I will reveal no personal information except for the name of the organization and the first name of the interviewee (I will use a pseudonym if the subject requests).

When the results of the research are published or discussed in conferences, no identifiable information will be used.

PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL

Your participation is voluntary. Your refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You may withdraw your consent at any time and discontinue participation without penalty. You are not waiving any legal claims, rights or remedies because of your participation in this research study.

“I have read the above and I understand its contents and I agree to participate in the study. I acknowledge that I am 18 years of age or older.”

Participant's signature _____ *Date* _____

Researcher's signature _____ *Date* _____

Consent to Quote from Interview

I may wish to quote from the interview with your either in the presentations or articles resulting from this work. I will use a pseudonym (fake name) if you request me to in order to protect your identity.

Initial one of the following to indicate your choice:

_____ (initial) I agree to...

_____ (initial) I do not agree to...

Consent to Audio-Record Interview

Initial one of the following to indicate your choice:

_____ (initial) I agree to...

_____ (initial) I do not agree to...

RESEARCHER'S CONTACT INFORMATION

If you have any questions or want to get more information about this study, please contact me at hanskr05@luther.edu or my advisor at rhouniraja@yahoo.com.

RIGHTS OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANT – IRB CONTACT INFORMATION

In an endeavor to uphold the ethical standards of all SIT proposals, this study has been reviewed and approved by an SIT Study Abroad Local Review Board or SIT Institutional Review Board.

If you have questions, concerns, or complaints about your rights as a research participant or the research in general and are unable to contact the researcher please contact the Institutional Review Board at:

School for International Training
Institutional Review Board
1 Kipling Road, PO Box 676
Brattleboro, VT 05302-0676 USA
irb@sit.edu
802-258-3132

Interview Consent Form – French

BUT DE L'ÉTUDE

Le but de cette étude est de recentrer les perspectives des défenseurs locaux des droits de l'homme au sein du néo-colonialisme de la sphère des ONG internationales et de problématiser la suppression de l'autonomie et de la représentation par les structures des ONG conventionnelles.

PROCEDURES D'ETUDE

Votre participation consistera en une interview et demandera environ une heure de votre temps. Je vais prendre un enregistrement audio de l'interview. Veuillez indiquer si vous ne souhaitez pas être enregistré audio.

RISQUES ET INCONVÉNIENTS POTENTIELS

La participation à cette étude ne comporte aucun risque prévisible et aucune pénalité ne devrait être infligée si vous choisissez de ne pas participer. La participation est volontaire. Pendant l'entretien, vous avez le droit de ne pas répondre aux questions ni d'interrompre votre participation à tout moment.

AVANTAGES POTENTIELS POUR LES PARTICIPANTS ET / OU LA SOCIÉTÉ

Cette étude est destinée à remettre en question les normes sociales et les structures de pouvoir dans le monde entier, mais n'aura aucun effet immédiat sur la société marocaine ou votre organisation.

CONFIDENTIALITÉ

Toute information identifiable obtenue dans le cadre de cette étude restera confidentielle. Je supprimerai les enregistrements de ces entretiens une semaine après leur achèvement. Les notes de ces entretiens seront conservées sur un ordinateur protégé par mot de passe. Je ne révélerai aucune information personnelle à l'exception du nom de l'organisation et du prénom de l'interviewé (j'utiliserai un pseudonyme - faux nom - si le sujet le demande).

Lorsque les résultats de la recherche sont publiés ou discutés lors de conférences, aucune information identifiable ne sera utilisée.

PARTICIPATION ET RETRAIT

Votre participation est volontaire. Votre refus de participer n'entraînera aucune pénalité ni perte d'avantages auxquels vous avez par ailleurs droit. Vous pouvez retirer votre consentement à tout moment et mettre fin à votre participation sans pénalité. Vous ne renoncez à aucune réclamation, droit ou recours juridique en raison de votre participation à cette étude de recherche.

“J'ai lu ce qui précède et je comprends son contenu et j'accepte de participer à l'étude. Je reconnais que j'ai 18 ans ou plus.”

Signature du participant _____ Date _____

Signature du chercheur _____ Date _____

Consentement à la citation de l'entrevue

Je souhaiterais peut-être citer l'entretien avec vous, que ce soit dans les présentations ou dans les articles résultant de ce travail. Je vais utiliser un pseudonyme (faux nom) si vous me demandez de protéger votre identité.

Une des initiales suivantes pour indiquer votre choix:

_____ (initial) J'accepte...

_____ (initial) Je ne suis pas d'accord pour...

Consentement à un enregistrement audio

Une des initiales suivantes pour indiquer votre choix:

_____ (initial) J'accepte...

_____ (initial) Je ne suis pas d'accord pour...

Coordonnées du chercheur

Si vous avez des questions ou souhaitez obtenir plus d'informations sur cette étude, veuillez me contacter à l'adresse hanskr05@luther.edu ou mon conseiller à l'adresse rhouniraja@yahoo.com.

DROITS DU PARTICIPANT À LA RECHERCHE - COORDONNÉES DE LA CISR

Afin de respecter les normes éthiques de toutes les propositions de la SIT, cette étude a été examinée et approuvée par une commission d'examen local de la SIT pour les études à l'étranger ou une commission de révision institutionnelle de la SIT. Si vous avez des questions, des inquiétudes ou des plaintes concernant vos droits en tant que participant à une recherche ou à la recherche en général et si vous ne parvenez pas à contacter le chercheur, veuillez contacter le Comité d'examen institutionnel à l'adresse:

École de formation internationale
Comité d'examen institutionnel
1 chemin Kipling, case postale 676
Brattleboro, VT 05302-0676 USA
irb@sit.edu
802-258-3132