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Barriers Between Effective Transnational Changemaking: Relationships between INGOs and Moroccan NGOs

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ABSTRACT

This paper seeks to explore the relationships held between international non-governmental organizations, primarily based in the West, and Moroccan NGOs. The existing literature on the topic explores the ways in which international NGOs can both benefit and harm domestic NGOs, which seek to fix issues not thoroughly addressed and solved by the state or by the market, such as issues of gender-based violence, female education, and lack of rural healthcare. The data gathered was organized into two types of relationships; financial and non-financial. Financial relationships between INGOs and NGOs were often depicted as crucial in enabling critical projects, such as the first women's shelter in Morocco and supplying transportation to decrease dropout rates of female students in rural areas; however the fine print restrictions imposed often took away from the end goal. Non-financial relationships between INGOs and NGOs took many forms, and included INGOs with both field offices in Morocco and those without. The consensus drawn from non-financial collaborations was that Moroccan NGOs perceived these to be effective only with true and thorough collaboration, often depicting accounts of a horizontal relationship rather than the traditional power dynamic present in the literature. When INGOs did not have offices or staff in Morocco and made little attempts at horizontal or thorough collaboration, Moroccan NGOs tended to hold negative perceptions.

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Introduction

International non-governmental organizations (such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Freedom House) are universally influential, especially with regards to their utilization of internet platforms to disseminate stories, photos, and campaigns to the general public. Accusations made by these organizations are used to pressure or shame governments into changing their tactics, especially surrounding human rights abuses, as well as bring awareness of such injustices to the larger global community. Funding given to domestic organizations by large INGOs can be critical in enabling changemaking practices. Moreover, data collected by these groups are utilized in deciding foreign policy and aid objectives, as well as shaping global opinions on ongoing atrocities. I was first introduced to Amnesty International's and Freedom House's annual reports on each country (specifically the "Freedom of the Press" and "State of the World's Human Rights" reports) through a first-year collegiate assignment, and have been referred back to them countless times since.

The sources of such information, and how this information is produced, must be taken into account when looking at these reports. These organizations (like any other) have inherent objectives and goals, such as self-preservation and institutional growth. In order to continue shining light to human rights violations being committed worldwide, these organizations must obtain enough funding to continue conducting research and enacting campaigns. There is a large body of research on these organizations and how their mandates and goals influence the crisis and situations they bring attention to, or choose to avoid. These decisions ultimately shape the discourse and body of thoughts and attentions in the human rights community, which has grown exponentially, to

include not only flagship organizations such as Amnesty International, but a global grassroots network of individuals engaged through social media and technology.

This research project is focused on the impact and relationships between international NGOs and Moroccan NGOs. What are the perspectives held by Moroccan NGOs on the benefits (or lack of) of the work being done by these INGOs? What types of collaborations between international and domestic organizations are present in the Moroccan civil society sector? What challenges arise in these collaborations? Are these collaborations effective in creating change in Morocco?

Abd Allah Ahmad Naim's idea of "human rights dependency" argues that governments of developing countries are more likely to respond to international pressure than bottom-up pressure from local (domestic) NGOs. Furthermore, these domestic NGOs tend to seek publicity and funding from these international organizations, rather than from and within their own countries. Thus, it is crucial to examine the relationships between these two types of organizations – to identify the strengths and weaknesses – so these collaborations can become both more effective and more ethical.

This research project is expected to be limited in depth, given the overall time constraints. From start to finish, this project took place over a period of four weeks. With more time allotted for the project, deeper access to the organizations may have been obtained, as well as larger, more in depth array of interviews. Based on the existing literature of the subject, the following hypotheses were formed:

Hypothesis 1: Moroccan NGOs would perceive INGOs to be acting on objectives of institutional survival or donor priorities, rather than in the best interest of their beneficiaries (Moroccan NGOs)

Hypothesis 2: Moroccan NGOs would perceive collaborations with international organizations as ultimately beneficial in achieving their institutional goals

In this paper, you will find (in order) a review of the existing literature on the subject, the methodology employed during the project, and the findings, divided into two sections: financial collaborations, and non-financial collaborations. The appendices include copies of IRB consent forms, as well as interview questions employed during conversations with Moroccan NGOs, and then with international organizations. The bibliography contains all primary and secondary sources.

Key Terms

NGO: NGOs, or non-governmental organizations, are independent organizations without government control or influence (though they may receive government funding), typically established to address some type of social or political problem. Sheila Carapico (2000) defines NGOs in the Middle East as "agents of political, economic and social change, influencing the allocation of scarce resources in their own societies and the images national regimes project".

Civil Society: The World Health Organization defines civil society as "the space for collective action around shared interests, purposes and values, generally distinct from government and commercial for-profit actors." The civil society can also be referred to as the third sector, distinct from government and the market.

Existing Literature

The literature pertaining to NGOs is vast, with objective historical accounts of how and why these types of organizations proliferated in the late 1980s, the impact of organizational structures and mandates, the types of work done by such organizations, and case studies of specific instances of gross human rights abuses and the resulting response of the human rights community and specific INGOs. In this review, I will focus more on the rise of the civil society sector and NGOs, key internal problems affecting international NGOs and how they function today, and current external threats facing NGOs and other human rights organizations – such as the rise of populism and increased governmental crackdown on funding. Appropriate solutions to these issues, as argued for by the current body of literature, are also included.

The rise of the civil society sector and the explosion of non-profit, non-governmental organizations that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s is largely attributed to the failures of both the state and the market to alleviate issues such as poverty, and to contribute towards efforts at democratization and the promotion of a belief in fundamental human rights. Human rights organizations such as Amnesty International also grew exponentially during the time, using policies of "naming and shaming" to highlight international human rights abuses, beginning with those committed by the state (and later grew to include abuses by other perpetrators, such as spouses and

families in cases of gender based violence) (Ulltveit-Moe 2006, Wagle 1999). Under the umbrella term of non-governmental organizations, there exists several differentiations, primarily, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), which are typically headquartered in the global North, and domestically based NGOs, which focus on issues within the country of origin.

Despite well-intentioned origins, a number of key issues began to arise within the civil society sector - specifically with the work of INGOs - such as unequal funding structures and extractive relationships with domestic NGOs, as well as advocacy tactics.

INGOs, which are often institutionally based in the global North, typically receive substantially larger grants than domestic NGOs, on the basis that these domestic NGOs don't have the capacity to handle the funding effectively (Barber and Bowie 2008). These funds can come from Western governments, foundations (such as the Ford Foundation), or individual donors and grassroots donations. Furthermore, the funds often come from wealthy Western donors, who value English speakers and standards of Western business practices when making large sum donations. Large organizations, as a means of institutional survival, can become dependent on donors and in the process may become contractors for these donors, rather than independent organizations themselves. (Banks and Hulme 2012).

The donors themselves can engage in problematic acts, like writing contracts that allow for premature, sudden withdrawals of funding, leaving reliant domestic NGOs and their beneficiaries and staff hanging, participating in costly visits to the project sites (which takes efforts away from the goals in order to cater to the said donor), and pushing project goals towards the unsustainable short term. (Barber and Bowie 2008, D'Arcy 2019).

International NGOs partner with domestic NGOs when given grants, creating a top-down power structure, where the money and influence are concentrated unequally in international organizations. These structures are problematic in nature, with some instances of INGOs requiring extreme standards and imposing Western business practices that are asymmetric with non-western NGOs. These standards are difficult to meet for smaller NGOs and can arbitrarily absorb institutional efforts. Furthermore, local NGOs may not be credited appropriately for their contributions, allowing the INGO to receive disproportionate press and exposure for any successes. This then leads into a cycle of INGOs receiving more funding, continuing to get (disproportional) amounts of credit for their successes, and thus more press and resulting funding (as domestic NGOs are left behind).

Thus, the existing literature suggests solutions to curb these problems. With regards to donors, contracts should be written that punish or disallow premature funding withdrawal, and donors should be made clear on the impacts of their visits as well as the harms with expecting short term results (D'Arcy 2019). Furthermore, domestic NGOs should seek funding from those they represent; "these organizations must start looking inward rather than solely outward for the resources they need to survive. If citizens are willing to pay for civil society, they may also be more willing to stand by it" (Depuy, Ron and Prakash 2016, 307). With regards to the top-down nature of INGO and NGO relationships, INGOs should focus more on equal relationships, and donors should (and are starting to) donate more directly to domestic NGOs. This both eliminates the harms of the intermediary relationship (Barber and Bowie 2008) and degrades the problematic belief that domestic organizations do not have the capacity to handle large grants.

The traditional "naming and shaming" practices of INGOs, as well as the "boomerang effect" of the transnational advocacy system have been key foci in the existing literature, specifically with regards to whether or not they are effective methods of change making, and furthermore, what quantifies success. Murdie and Davis (2012) claim that the method of naming and shaming is effective when combined with a large presence of domestic human rights institution, and with pressure from third party groups such as foreign governments. The combination of bottom-up pressure from domestic institutions, as well as top-down pressure from other governments (which could affect aid grants and reputation) creates effective change within human rights practices. However, Gresh questions what success looks like in the field of human rights abuses; the femicide of hundreds of women in Juarez, Mexico is attributed to the social unrest resulting from economic restructuring and the *maquiladora* industry. Amnesty International brought awareness to the negligent justice system and suggested for companies to install safety measures for their large population of female workers, rather than bringing attention to the underlying contributory economic factors (Gresh). At the time of writing, while the government had condemned the negligent actors, those responsible for the murders (as well as negligent police officers) had not been punished, and corrections were not made to the contributory economic factors.

The boomerang effect starts with domestic NGOs spreading awareness and information, as well as calls for assistance, to international NGOs and the larger transnational advocacy network. INGOs then respond by bringing in support, funding, and connections to the domestic groups, in exchange for domestic legitimacy. INGOs can also aid in legal and medical funding for victims of state repression. INGO support assists domestic groups in mobilizing grassroots support, such as educating local

populations about human rights practices to increase domestic mobilization and thus increases overall bottom-up pressure (Murdie and Davis 2016). The boomerang approach can also emerge with Northern INGOs appealing to their governments to pressure culpable governments into compliance with human rights standards, adding to the third party pressure in a top-down manner (Keck and Sikkink 1998).

In the Middle East and Northern Africa region, governments began to coopt the human rights movement in the early 1990s, adopting institutions such as the Moroccan Human Rights Advisory Council to "appease and coopt political allies and advisories, both local and international", thus creating GO-NGOs, or government-organized NGOs, or quasi-NGOs (Cardenas and Flibbert 2005, Carapico 2000). Governments worldwide have also begun imposing certain restrictive measures on external sources of funding to non-governmental organizations, such as limitations on how much funding can be received or from whom (Depuy, Ron and Prakash 2016). The rise of populism has also threatened existing human rights organizations, with the decline of the Anglo-American world order, giving strength to the argument that the human rights ideology was imposed by Euro-America (Rodríguez-Garavito and Gomez 2018). Furthermore, (Keck and Sikkink's) boomerang effect has also been losing effectiveness, as the idea of the Anglo-American traditional power centers of the world become eroded (and thus shame from said governments becomes less effective) and nationalism rises (Rodríguez-Garavito and Gomez 2018).

Nonetheless, these external threats challenging human rights organizations have solutions congruent to those argued for in response to the internal problems. Rodriguez-Garavito suggests "we (human rights activists and organizations) must connect with new constituencies, combine online and offline mobilization, and develop horizontal forms

of collaboration between global North and global South organizations" to combat the global threat of populism. Similarly, to curb the presence of extractive relationships between INGOs and NGOs, horizontal relationships and a larger body of domestic grassroots donors must be cultivated.

Methodology

Research Design

I began the research project selecting interviewees based on their employment or prior experience with either an International NGO or a domestic NGO based in Morocco. A majority of the contacts I started came from my academic director Taieb Belghazi and then snowballed out from there; who I interviewed suggested I talk to next. I conducted the majority of the research in Rabat, where a majority of the INGOs held field offices (if they had Moroccan field offices at all), and where a large sample of Moroccan NGOs were headquartered, such as MRA (Mobilizing Rights Association) or AMDH (The Moroccan Association for Human Rights). The locations of the interviews were left up to the interviewees, with the majority of them taking place at their workplace. Because we were discussing experiences they had in their work-life – with interactions between INGOs and Moroccan NGOs – this was fitting.

Research Limitations

Of all the challenges posed with the ISP research project, time and language were the two most evident. With four weeks given to conduct the project, reaching out, garnering more and more contacts through snowball methodology, and then setting up interviews, time became the primary obstacle. Furthermore, as I typically met subjects

in their workplaces, they had to fit me into their workplace schedule, restraining both the length of the interview and limiting when (usually scheduled far in advance) it could take place. For example, two of the contacts I reached out to were traveling for work, and wouldn't be back in time to be interviewed in person.

Moreover, given the nature and structure of INGOs (most of which were headquartered in DC or London), the few with whom I was able to garner contact with was over email. Unfortunately, I couldn't obtain interviews with these organizations, but forwarded my questions to be answered (see appendix). My calls to organizational headquarters (based in the West) were unanswered.

If the time span of the project was longer, I believe I would have been able to obtain a larger number of interviews, both from Moroccan sources and within international NGOs. Obtaining more interviews would allow me to get a larger, more in depth perspective and hit a point of saturation in the research, which did not occur during this project timeline.

I spoke to all subjects in English, whether as a primary language or a secondary. I believe this presented an inherent sampling bias, for a number of reasons. Primarily, due to the nature of my relevant language skills, with a small amount of Arabic (not enough to conduct a conversation regarding these topics) and without any French language skills, this restrained the conversations I could have, especially with secondary English speakers. When communicating in French to set up the interviews and meetings, I offered the presence of a translator, which was refused. However, during the interviews, when recording, the subjects were informed they could speak in French, and I could have the information later translated by a classmate who spoke French. Interviewing speakers with limited English vocabulary, I'm sure there were aspects

missed due to the language barrier, which in some instances was alleviated by the option to speak French.

Furthermore, those speaking English are *typically* highly educated college graduates and working for larger organizations may have a different perception of international organizations than non-English speakers working for smaller, rural NGOs. I attempted to counteract this sampling bias by speaking with those who had experience working with both smaller, rural NGOs and larger, urban-based NGOs. Nonetheless, a majority of the interviews took place in urban NGOs, which will ultimately affect the data found. Thus, I would argue that this project became more closely centered on the perspectives and experiences of *urban* Moroccan NGOs with International NGOs.

Ethical Considerations

With regards to consent, all in person interviews began with a discussion of the research project. The subject was then given time to read and sign the consent forms (see appendix). Over the phone and by email, I clarified the goals and intents of the project and in all cases obtained clear consent. In all interviews and conversations, I, the researcher, clarified that the subjects didn't have to answer any question and could stop the interview at any time. At the end of the interview, I reiterated the subject of consent by asking how each subject would like to be referred to in the final paper citations and if they would like anything left out. All anecdotes found in the findings section are left confidential, but interviews are listed in the bibliography (with permission).

All electronic data (such as interview recordings and transcriptions or PDF files of consent forms) was secured on a personal computer in an encrypted folder. All forms

of paper data (such as interview notes or paper consent forms) were stored securely in a safe space.

<u>Findings</u>

The following section is divided into two segments, financial collaborations, and non-financial collaborations. Financial collaborations largely pertain to external funding given to Moroccan NGOs, given through an international NGO as an intermediary. Non-financial collaborations refer to multiple types of collaborations between INGOs and NGOs, with the most effective being horizontally focused collaborations with in-country field offices of larger international organizations, on the understanding that these field offices have two-fold benefits; possessing and employing contextual knowledge while nonetheless retaining the resources of a large international organization. However, non-financial collaborations also degraded the trust between INGOs and NGOs when appropriate financial compensation was absent.

<u>International Funding</u>

The role of international organizations as financial supporters of Moroccan NGOs was largely seen as beneficial, allowing the civil sector to alleviate problems not addressed by the state or the market -- such as female education, shelter from domestic abuse, and the role of women in government. However, the fine print restrictions that came with it could be too strict or take too much energy away from the end goal, especially with regards to small rural-based NGOs.

A larger urban NGO, based in Casablanca, told me the story of their experience with funding associated with the European Union. They were running a project for the

promotion of women in government, and had a yearlong funding contract which included a promise on the completion of certain tasks each month. However, in November, following the election of these women, those elected were required to attend a number of meetings to decide who would be in certain government bureaus and were thus unavailable for meetings with the NGO. The meetings took place the following month. Nonetheless, the funding restrictions required the Moroccan organization to *return* that portion of the money, as the activity had not been completed in the time allocated (despite it being out of the hands of the said NGO). Out of desperation, because the funds had already been put toward their intended use, the organization was forced ask their members for donations in order to pay back the debt, despite the activity taking place and the end goal being fully accomplished. While there had been a contractual contingency plan if the tasks were to be delayed (where the NGO would file paperwork requesting permission), it was not clear the organization had known about this prior to being asked to return the funding.

This account describes how funding coming from international organizations can be attributed in a top-down structure, where INGOs receive funds from foundations or Western governments, and then 'partner' with domestic NGOs. However, the partnership between these organizations is often not truly equal, as the funding and control lies in the hands of the international organization, rather than in equal control. Thus, when situations occur like the one aforementioned – out of the control of the domestic organization – the unequal aspects of the partnership are revealed.

A different NGO – based in Rabat, focused on women's rights – described how they received funding from INGOs based in Europe to build the first women's shelter in Morocco. The funding grant was for three years in length, and fully funded buying the

property, furnishing it and acquiring all of the equipment necessary to run day to day activities. The funding was critical, and extremely helpful. Nonetheless, after three years, when the funding grant had ended, the NGO had expected the Moroccan government to begin financially assisting the shelter, as all start up costs had been covered. Furthermore, the NGO described how the EU had started funding much smaller projects, typically in rural based organizations, and thus couldn't continue to fund the large project. Regardless, the funding ended and the government failed to contribute financially and the NGO described the struggle it faces financially in keeping the shelter running.

This expectation of government support could be drawn directly from the 2018 Law against the Violence of Women, where the rights of women to be protected from "sexual, psychological, physical, and economic" violence are stated, and to be enforced by the government. Freedom of physical violence can be delivered through these shelters, which protect female victims of domestic violence.

Accounts were also described of international funds (originating primarily from organizations in Spain) which allowed girls in rural villages to remain in school. Female high school dropout rates were high, as schools were often located far from the village and families worried about the safety of their daughters as they walked to school, and thus preferred they stayed home. The government had not solved this issue by providing for transportation, and thus the emerged the space for the civil society sector. The funding allowed local, rural NGOs to purchase buses and bikes, allowing for safe transportation, and consequently for them to remain in school.

Some argued however, these fine print restrictions on funding weren't a bad thing, given the large number of registered Moroccan NGOs, some of which existed

solely to receive subsidies from the government without doing beneficial work. Moreover, I heard the repeated narrative of some NGOs being corrupt, with INGOs being unable to trace where the funding went following delivery, leading to the overall unease of international donors in Morocco, and the stricter implementation of these restrictions and requirements. The argument could be made, with more research done, that the actions of some corrupt domestic NGOs in Morocco have led to the implemented restrictions on all.

Conclusively, the role of international non-governmental organizations as financiers was largely beneficial in the completion and success of these projects. Nonetheless, strict regulations could be detrimental to both the Moroccan organizations and their efforts. While regulations were sometimes viewed as appropriate, due to the number of corrupt Moroccan NGOs, established, ongoing relationships between international and domestic organizations in the civil society, as well as more equalitarian, horizontal collaborations, could build trust and allow for less explicit contracts. Furthermore, Western donors should fund domestic NGOs explicitly, removing the harmful intermediary relationship that can arise between international and domestic organizations.

Non-Financial Collaboration between International and Domestic Groups

The consensus on collaboration and support with international organizations favored organizations with field offices and teams in Morocco rather than those based internationally and attempting collaborations through short visits. In-country field offices (such as that of Amnesty Morocco) allowed these international organizations to

have a greater depth and impact in country, as recognized by the domestic organizations I spoke to, as well as horizontally based collaborations with domestic organizations.

I heard numerous accounts of the benefits of the work done by Amnesty Morocco, which has a field office in Rabat and employs Moroccan staff members. Activities include hosting educational sessions about human rights in schools, holding plays depicting human rights violations to raise awareness around the city, and organizing marches and press releases, such as that against the death penalty.

Furthermore, international organizations, such as Mobilizing Rights Association (MRA), that were based in country, rather than in the global north, held both advantages of strong relationships with domestic organizations as well as in country knowledge to produce effective campaigns. Furthermore, with an international staff, MRA is able access to grant proposals written in languages other than Darija, Fus'ha or French, and collaborate with donors based in the West or in embassies based in Rabat.

International organizations without satellite offices were often described as lacking the local context required to produce effective campaigns. Likewise, it was suggested that international groups should not attempt satellite domestic campaigns, which takes space away from domestic organizations. Instead, they should work on pressuring their own host governments to go through diplomatic channels. Nonetheless, given the current state of the United States, as well as the British, governments such pressure would currently be ineffective.

 In discussions about unequal partnerships between international and domestic non-governmental organizations, some prominent Moroccan associations felt unaccounted for in the larger global discourse, which are often spearheaded by larger INGOs – some of whom publish annual reports on the state of Morocco (and other

nations in the world). These reports are widely circulated and utilized, especially by different governments and other international organizations, despite lacking regular collaboration (or any at all) with the Moroccan NGOs who possess primary knowledge and insights on the topic.

Other organizations said they had been expected by these larger INGOs (and their employees) to act in ways similar to a field office, despite no formal relationship or collaboration; in examples such as asking NGOs to use their established networks to promote campaigns or materials they had no part in creating, or by requesting these NGOs use their time and resources to translate documents, for the sole benefit of the INGO. Furthermore, with regards to the publication of annual reports, Freedom House responded (through email) that while the research analyst [concerned with the Morocco report] may "consult local NGOs to gather information that feeds into the country reports and scores", few to no domestic organizations were cited in their report.

The one caveat to this conclusion was effective and thorough collaboration between international groups and domestic organizations. Domestic organizations argued the importance and effectiveness of collaboration with international organizations, when done horizontally. While the international online petition platform Avaaz is based in New York City, the Union de l'Action Feminine (UAF) described their effective collaboration, in which Avaaz collected over 50,000 online signatures in 2012 in response to the suicide of Amina Filali, a 16 year old who killed herself after being forced to marry her rapist. The online petition protested article 475 of the Moroccan penal code, which allowed for a rapist to marry their victim to avoid persecution, typically to preserve the honor of the victim's family (which would be degraded if the daughter's virginity had been taken prior to marriage). The UAF invited Avaaz

representatives to Casablanca to participate in protests and demonstrations against article 475. The UAF cited their collaboration with Avaaz as critical in pressuring the Moroccan government to overturn the law, which has since been changed.

<u>Conclusions</u>

This project explored both financial and non-financial relationships between international non-governmental organizations and Moroccan domestic organizations. With regards to financial relationships, the fine print regulations and restrictions often (arbitrarily) took away from beneficial relationships and the goals of projects. This was attributed both to maintaining strictly Western styles of business practice, as well as the presence of corrupt NGOs in Morocco, which have degraded trust networks between international and domestic organizations. To minimize the harm done, the literature suggests an emphasis on equal, horizontal relationships between international and domestic organizations, donating directly to domestic organizations to eliminate the harmful intermediary relationship, or incorporating standards of business practices found in the Middle East and Northern Africa region.

The non-financial collaborations held a variety of forms, from creating and sharing common knowledge to educational campaigns and partnerships that create more effective campaigns, such as the protests challenging Article 475. However, the unethical practices and effects of top-down 'collaborations' were more evident, with cases of prominent INGOs asking for pro-bono favors from domestic offices – such as the distribution of materials representing a campaign they didn't create or even collaborate on. The domestic organizations I spoke with felt that they had been largely left out of the international conversation, despite having relevant skills and knowledge

to offer. Moreover, domestic organizations held the perception that they were often treated as a lesser-than partner by international groups, with examples of failures to recognize their contributions in the press or in published materials.

Most of these solutions are issued for, both in the existing literature as well as in this paper, international organizations. This is because they oftentimes hold the power, both in terms of recognition (in the media) and finances. To hold the power in such relationships, which are ultimately formed for the betterment of societal issues, means that organizations must take a critical look at the ethics of their practices and hold active responsibility in working towards fair practices.

The collected data disputes the first hypothesis, "Moroccan NGOs would perceive INGOs to be acting on objectives of institutional survival or donor priorities, rather than in the best interest of their beneficiaries (Moroccan NGOs)". In the majority of the interviews, respondents held the impression that international institutions were acting on the same objectives as domestic organizations – attempting to fix the societal issues at hand. However, it was clear that while organizations were not perceived to be acting *directly* on donor priorities, fine-print restrictions imposed through the top-down power structure ultimately took away from the end goals of the projects.

The second hypothesis, "Moroccan NGOs would perceive collaborations with international organizations as ultimately beneficial in achieving their institutional goals" was supported in some cases and disputed in others. The domestic organizations I spoke to tended to perceive benefits through financial collaborations or thoroughly collaborative non-financial coordinations. However, the domestic organizations I spoke to argued that non-financial collaborations, such as an expectation of pro-bono labor,

ultimately took efforts away from their own institutional goals and degraded trust in international organizations.

Retrospectively, the limitations of the study are primarily the time span and the resulting amounts of data collected. A broader range of data, with more interviews and surveys conducted in both international and Moroccan organizations, would further explore the types of relationships that are present in the Moroccan civil society. Furthermore, given the massive variety within both domestic and international organizations – the organizational structures, institutional goals and mandates, types of governments present in host countries, and funding structure – all relationships are subject to variation, both temporally and between specific organizations. Thus, the types of relationships explored here (financial and non-financial between international and domestic Moroccan organizations) may be different in other countries, even of those demographically similar to Morocco. Thus, future research should analyze these relationships in more depth and within other states, finding out similar styles and structures of what creates effective collaboration and produces change, and what doesn't.

Future research should also explore the relationship between external funding structures and hybrid regimes (such as Morocco's). Within my own interviews, I found variations in sentiments about the trends of the Moroccan government and their regulations and interventions regarding foreign funding. While some divulged that it appeared the government was getting stricter, perhaps following the general rise of populism and government crackdown on human rights organizations (see Rodriguez-Garavito and Gomez 2018), others disagreed.

Nevertheless, the project attempted here is far from complete and should be carried out to further lengths and depths in the future. The information gathered (and to be gathered) holds relevance both to domestic and international organizations, as well as the larger community -- which both benefits from and evaluates the actions done by the civil society sector. Ultimately, what produces the need for the civil society sector is the lack of government and market regulation or ability to solve the issues at hand. Nonetheless, given the current state of global politics and the rising trends of populism and declining government support for human rights organizations, the civil society sector will have at its hands both continual and new problems for which to find solutions; society at large would benefit from more ethical and sustainable collaborations in the search for said solutions.

Appendices

Appendix A: Interview Questions

Base Interview Questions for Moroccan NGOs / those with affiliation

1. What international organizations has this organization collaborated with? Can you tell me a little bit about these projects?
2. From your perspective, what impact do you think international NGOs (such as Freedom House, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, etc) have in Morocco? On change and reform?
3. Do you think the work of INGOs (such as Freedom House's or Amnesty International's annual reports, or the Moroccan campaigns they conduct) have an impact on members of the government?
4. Do you think the Moroccan government is more open or perceptive to challenges or critiques by domestic NGO actors, International NGOs, or third parties? Why?
5. What kind of support (if any) do you get from these groups?
6. What challenges do you typically perceive in these interactions?
7. How could these interactions and coordinations be improved? How could they be made more effective?
8. What impact do you think these INGOs have in the region?
9. What are your thoughts on the Moroccan government asking consulates and embassies to inform them of any funds given to Moroccan organizations?
10. Can you tell me about how the Moroccan government perceives NGO interactions with INGOs?
11. Is there anything else I should know?

Base Interview Questions for International Organizations (INGOs)

1. What Moroccan NGOs does [this organization] get its information from (for example, to be published in an annual report)? What other sources does the MENA research team gather its information?

2. Is there a research team in the ground in Morocco, or gathering data from abroad? If from abroad, what are the perceived limitations in information gathered?

3. Does [this organization] collaborate with Moroccan NGOs in coordination with domestic efforts led by such NGOs?

4. What are some of the perceived challenges by the research team of coordinating and working with Moroccan domestic NGOs?

5. What impact does [this organization] believe they have in Morocco? With whom, and what types of impact?

6. What impact and significance does [this organization] believe they ought to have, and aim to have in the region? With whom, and why?

7. Does the research team perceive pressure to coordinate with the current standards of International Human Rights rhetoric, that may be many steps of ahead of the dialogue in Morocco and in the MENA region?

8. What evidence of success (from broad institutional goals) does [this organization] perceive in Morocco? What is [this organization's] measures of success (if any)?

9. Is there anything else I [the researcher] should know on a related level?

Appendix B: Consent Forms

(available in English and in French)

Consent Form – English

Statement of Consent

Purpose of Study

The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between international non-governmental watchdog organizations (such as Amnesty International, Freedom House, and Human Rights Watch) with Moroccan domestic non-governmental organizations. The research aims to analyze the impacts of such organizations on the other's work, the perspectives held, and the likewise.

Duration and Elements of Study

The study will be conducted over a period of 4 weeks. It will include observations of participants as well as interviews and fieldwork.

Risks
The study has no foreseeable risks for participants.   However, if you feel uncomfortable with the observation or interview process at any time, you are free to terminate your involvement.

Compensation
Participation in this study will not be compensated, financially or otherwise. However, your assistance is greatly appreciated by our research team.

Confidentiality
Every effort to keep your personal information confidential will be made in this project. Your names and other identifying information may be changed in the final write-up, and will only be known to the research team.

Participation

I, the undersigned, have read the above statements. I affirm that my participation in this study is voluntary and understand that I am free to withdraw my consent at any time without penalty.

_____   _____
                       Signature   Date

I recognize that this study involves interviews and/or observations that may be audio-recorded and transcribed.

_____   _____
                       Signature   Date

Research Team:

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Researchers may be contacted by e-mail or telephone for any reason.

Consent Form - French

Déclaration de consentement

L'objectif d'étude
Le but de cette étude est d'examiner la relation entre les organisations non gouvernementales de surveillance (telles qu'Amnesty International, Freedom House et Human Rights Watch) avec les organisations non gouvernementales marocaines. La recherche vise à analyser les impacts de telles organisations sur le travail des autres, les perspectives exprimées, etc.

La durée et les éléments d'étude
Cette étude sera dirigée pendant une période de quatre semaines. L'étude inclura les observations et les interventions des participants en incluant leur travail sur terrain.

Les risques
L'étude n'a aucun risque prévisible pour les participants. Cependant, si vous ne vous sentez pas confortable avec le procédé d'observation ou d'interview, vous êtes libre de terminer votre participation.

Compensation
La participation à cette étude ne sera pas compensée, financièrement ou autrement. Cependant, votre aide est considérablement appréciée par notre équipe de recherche.

Confidentialité
Tout effort de maintenir votre information personnelle confidentielle sera fait dans ce projet. Vos noms et toute autre information d'identification peuvent changés dans la description finale, et seulement connue à l'équipe de recherche.

Participation
Je soussigné, …………………………………………, confirme avoir lu les rapports ci-dessus et compris que ma participation à cette étude est volontaire tout en ayant la liberté de retirer mon consentement à tout moment sans pénalité.

_____   _____
               Signature   Date

J'ai pris conscience que cette étude puisse comporter les entrevues et/ou les observations qui peuvent être enregistrées et transcrites.

_____   _____
               Signature   Date

Team de recherche

Les chercheurs peuvent être contactés par E-mail ou téléphone pour n'importe quelle raison ;

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