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Keeping The Peace: From Bosnia to the Sahel

Jack Fitzgerald

A Capstone Paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Master of Diplomacy and International Affairs at SIT Graduate Institute in Brattleboro, Vermont, USA.

June 1st, 2024

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Abstract

This research has looked to analysis both the evolution and nature of geopolitical conflicts over the past 30 years, and the parallel advancement of long-term humanitarian operations during that period. Long-term United Nations peacekeeping operations have evolved since the end of the Cold-War to be much more political and military in nature. The term humanitarian diplomat is a direct by-product of that evolution. In the first generation of UN peacekeepers, humanitarian actors on the ground were not called on to be political negotiators. However, in the post-Cold War era the role of peacekeeping has shifted to one of peacebuilding within still active conflict areas. This shift demanded that humanitarian missions take on a much more politized role as they were forced to directly negotiate with belligerents on the ground to get supplies and aid convoys to those desperately needing it. Therefore, the findings covered in this research have looked to define the term humanitarian diplomat within the larger political context of emerging multilateralism, geopolitics, and the increasingly multi-polar nature of conflicts in the twenty-first century.

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LIST OF ABBRIVATIONS

Africa-led International Support Mission in Mali.....	AFISMA
African Union.....	AU
Bosnia Serb Army.....	BSA
European Community.....	EU
Federal Yugoslav Army.....	JNA
International Red Cross and Red Crescent.....	ICRC
North Atlantic Treaty Organization.....	NATO
Non-governmental Organization.....	NGO
United Nations.....	UN
United Nations High Commission for Refugees.....	UNHCR
United Nations Multidimensional Intergraded Stabilization Mission to the Central African Republic.....	MINUSCA
United Nations Multidimensional Intergraded Stabilization Mission in Mali.....	MINUSMA
United Nations Mission in South Sudan.....	UNMISS
United Nations Multidimensional Intergraded Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo.....	MONUSCO
United Nations Protection Force.....	UNPROFOC
United Nations Security Council.....	UNSC
United States Agency for International Development.....	USAID
The World Food Program.....	WFP

Introduction

What obstacles, conflicts, and pathways to success are inherent in large-scale humanitarian aid operations? In the post-Cold War era of the past 30 years the role of humanitarian intervention has undergone a systemic shift and the operational role of the United Nations (UN), and humanitarian actors as well, has moved from that of a peacekeeper to a peacebuilder. As the research here will illustrate, during the Cold-War the UN entered its first generation of peacekeeping, often a welcome sight after a period of violent conflict, the UN's operational mandates reflected the stabilization and creation of humanitarian spaces in order to provide relief and recovery post-conflict. However, in the past 30 years the nature of conflict has shifted away from a unipolar architecture to a multi-polar world system. Reflecting this evolution in geo-politics the UN, in the early 90's, entered its second generation. Then the UN forces begin to be deployed to still active "hot conflict" areas such as the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The research here will illustrate that the UN is now entering its third generation, whereby the use of military force, and some degree of political will, must be present to create space for humanitarian actors to operate with a chance of having any long-term success.

Chapter VII of the UN Charter clearly reflects these evolving necessities for engaging militarily and politically an increasingly localized inner-state conflict. Since peacekeeping has evolved into operations in which peacekeepers are deployed into internal disputes, humanitarian interventions have come to be categorized as enforcement measures under Chapter VII. When humanitarian operations require a military and political presence to enable the creation of humanitarian spaces then humanitarian actors will necessarily become humanitarian diplomats as well. One way in which this evolution is manifesting is the current

and ongoing collaboration between the African Union security forces and the UN humanitarian operations in Central Africa. This will be discussed further in conclusion.

The research here will focus on two case studies, first the Bosnian conflicts of the early 1990's, and second the evolving humanitarian crisis in the Sahel region of Central Africa. The goal has been to develop a comparative and theory building research paper. Ultimately illustrating how the further development and utilization of humanitarian diplomacy can be successful in preparing for, confronting, coordinating, and responding to not only humanitarian crisis in future conflict zones, but also to the evolving role of the United Nations in this future. The working thesis statement: for too long humanitarian diplomacy and human rights have been under-utilized in Western foreign policy while military strength and coercive forms of negotiation have been over-used; the increasingly violent and unstable world we are living in is the direct result of such short-sighted and strictly politically motivated policies.

To look at current and future drivers and trends, the research will begin by looking to the past. First, to rise of universal human rights in the twentieth century and the corresponding rise of international state actors, intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGO's) and how the emerging term humanitarian diplomacy developed and to what degree it has been deployed in conflict zones. The research will further define how humanitarian diplomacy differs from traditional state diplomacy. We will then look at two specific long running and complexed humanitarian crisis were the United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations were deeply involved in managing aid relief and how this management could have been better coordinated with an improved use, and clearer understanding of, humanitarian diplomacy. The research has also examined the evolving role of the UN in large-

scale operations that are moving from peacekeeping missions to peacebuilding missions. The two cases to be examined are both unique and complexed in their own way, but research will show that the development, implementation, and deployment of humanitarian diplomacy would have led to more successful out-comes in each case.

The first case we will examine is role United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) played in their respective deployments in Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia from 1991-95. The second case to be examined will be in the Sahel region of central Africa, the formation in 2014 of the G5 Sahel Alliance and its formal dismantlement in October 2023. Specifically in this case, we will focus on the UN operations in Mali. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was established in 2013 and was officially terminated in July of last year. What obstacles, conflicts and successes did these Peace-Keeping operations face and in what ways were they constructive? In what ways has the UN's mandate, and the introduction of Chapter VII to its Charter, changed large-scale peacekeeping missions over the past 30 years? Finally, could humanitarian diplomacy have played a more dominate and advantages role in these operations.

Although the world has seen many apparent advances in the arena of human rights, notably that they are said to exist at all, a huge gap still separates governmental rhetoric and legal commitment to human rights on one side and the billions of individuals' realization of these rights on the other side. The endurance of crimes against humanity, economic repression, and crippling poverty demands a more critical analysis of what has and has not worked, what

obstacles are routinely persistent in humanitarian crisis, and of new ways to better advance the human rights agenda.

This research paper, therefore, looks to contribute, in a small way, to that ongoing conversation. Humanitarian diplomacy, if better understood and realized, has the potential to positively change the dialogue and evolve not only the human rights agenda, but also in the humanitarian aid theater as well.

Literary Review

Setting the Stage

Human Right's in the Twentieth Century

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948, marked the beginning of universal human rights standards. In its preamble, the UN General Assembly proclaimed the Declaration "*as a goal to which all peoples and nations should aspire*" (United Nations, 1948). The preamble of the Declaration emphasizes the importance of a universal understanding of the nature of human rights and freedoms for their full implementation.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was not intended as an exhaustive catalogue of rights but should be subject to constant further evolution and expansion. In this regard, Eleanor Roosevelt, being part of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights drafting, stated: "We must remember that we are writing a bill of rights for the world and that one of the most important rights is the opportunity for development. As people grasp this opportunity, they will be able to demand new rights if they are broadly defined (United Nations, 1948)." She concludes by predicting that human rights would creep like a "curious grapevine" into public

consciousness around the globe. Largely dismissed at the time as liberal fantasy, her forecast has proven more durable than her critics believed. The assertion that all human beings, no matter nationality, culture, or location, possess inalienable rights simply because that are human is now almost universally acknowledged, if still unreliably enforced. Today, it has become impossible for Western nations to publicly discuss foreign policy, from trade, or sanctions, to the use of military force, without also considering what impact their policies will have on human rights. With only a few exceptions worldwide, North Korea, Myanmar, Tibet and Malaysia, every state actor realizes at least the need to appear to respect human rights. As Columbia law professor Louis Henkin has written, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has become, “the holy writ to which all pay homage, even if sometimes the homage of hypocrisy (Power et al., 2011, p.32)”

While the twentieth century saw previously unconceivable advances in human rights, it also bore witness to an unprecedented magnitude of horrific abuses of those same rights. In the first half of the century the world witnessed two world wars and the Holocaust which claimed seventy-five million lives. Additionally, *after* the 1948 passage of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, we have seen Mao’s brutal cultural revolution, Pol Pot’s genocide in Cambodia, Bosnia, Sudan, and Rwanda. The past century compiled a record of atrocities unsurpassed in any century in recorded history (Power et al., 2011 p.xvi).

Freedom, prosperity, and peace have flourished in many parts of the world, while conflict, poverty, disease, and starvation have ravaged other areas. More than one billion people live on less than \$1 per day. Another two billion live on less than \$2 per day. Globally three out of roughly eight billion people live on less than \$2 per day (World Bank, 2024). Nobel

Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen, through his fascinating and ground-breaking work on the “Capability Theory,” is consistently challenging other scholars, policymakers, and human rights advocates for not giving greater attention to economic and social rights he sees as too often ignored. He asks, “Why should the status of intense economic needs, which can be a matter of life and death, be lower than that of personal liberties (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2011).

What role, and what responsibilities, do scholars, policymakers, human rights advocates, and intergovernmental and non-governmental agencies have to not only promote human rights but also to expand and develop further the progress that has been made thus far? What strategies and tactics will advance human rights in the years and decades ahead? Governments, international organizations, NGOs, and scholars need to work together to design effective strategies moving forward. As the two case studies researched here clearly illustrate, all too often the response by governments, NGO’s and the business community to a humanitarian crisis is applied inconsistently and implemented ineptly. Rarely have governments and the humanitarian sector engaged in serious and sustained analysis of human rights policies. In short, if a key challenge of the second half of the twentieth century was gaining universal acceptance of the idea that human rights existed or mattered, *the* key challenge for the decades ahead is to identify the policies and actions that most effectively realize human rights (Power et al., 2011. p. xv).

The History of Humanitarian Diplomacy in Theory and Application:

As an emerging term, the literature defining humanitarian diplomacy is narrow and varied. One common theme the term does have across the literature is that its development and rise is fundamentally linked to the evolving nature of twenty-first century conflicts. In the first generation of UN peacekeepers, humanitarian actors on the ground were not called on to be political negotiators. However, in the post-Cold War era the role of peacekeeping has shifted to one of peacebuilding within still active conflict areas. This shift demanded that humanitarian missions take on a much more politicized role as they were forced to directly negotiate with belligerents on the ground in order to get supplies and aid convoys to those desperately needing it. Therefore, the literature covered in this research has looked to define the term humanitarian diplomat within the larger political context of emerging multilateralism, geopolitics, and the increasingly multi-polar conflicts of the twenty-first century.

The Red Cross and Red Crescent (ICRC) defines humanitarian diplomacy as “a strategy for influencing the parties to armed conflicts and others - States, non-State actors and members of civil society. Its purpose is purely humanitarian, and it is carried out through a network of sustained relationships - bilateral and multilateral, official and informal” (Red Cross Red Crescent, n.d.). Ultimately, humanitarian diplomacy is persuading decision makers and opinion leaders to act, at all times, in the interests of vulnerable people, and with full respect for fundamental humanitarian principles.

For the ICRC, humanitarian principles include such fundamentals as impartiality (assistance according to the severity of need), neutrality (activities without political or other extraneous agendas) and independence (the obligation to resist interference with key principles). Each principle is to one degree or another under stress when humanitarian

organizations seek to carry out their mandates in settings of armed conflict (Red Cross Red Crescent). Impartiality is tested by situations such as the former Yugoslavia, when UNHCR, in exchange for access to Muslim areas, was under continuous pressure to distribute relief supplies from the Sarajevo airlift to Serbian populations in amounts exceeding their proportionate need. Neutrality comes under pressure when assistance is viewed as taking sides in a conflict, either by aid agencies, which are perceived as supporting one protagonist, or by recipient authorities, which seek to parlay assistance into international endorsement of their cause. Again, the Yugoslavia experience is a case in point. Independence is jeopardized when agencies are denied the necessary freedom to conduct operations and monitor distribution. The constraints faced by United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Protection Force UNPROF, the World Food Program (WFP) and other agencies in the former Yugoslavia constituted a threat to independent humanitarian action (United Nations, 1996).

In recent years, the gradual elaboration of regulations for international relief has paved the way for a broadening of the legal framework and scope of humanitarian diplomacy. The literature illustrates many differences and contrasts between traditional diplomacy and humanitarian diplomacy. Traditional diplomats' function within a "regime", understood as a set of "social institutions composed of agreed-upon principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures that govern interaction of actors in specific issue areas (Sage Journals, 1994)." Having had their postings vetted with the authorities in advance, they present their credentials on arrival and act on instructions from their capitals, conveyed with specific rules of engagement and time frames and overlaid with expectations of regular and detailed reporting.

Diplomats in each country-in-crisis represent something of a “community”. They undertake joint initiatives on issues— formerly political and military matters but now increasingly economic and sometimes even humanitarian— of interest to their respective governments (See Minear and Smith, 2007, *Humanitarian Diplomacy Practitioners and Their Craft*, also Annan K.A., 2000 *The Peace Prescription* and Behr and Gordenker, 2005, *The United Nations Reality and Ideal*).

In addition to functioning in a still evolving landscape without clear ground rules and sanctions, humanitarian diplomacy is marked by an urgency that does not regard sovereignty with the deference of traditional diplomats. In the canon of most diplomatic corps and in foreign service handbooks, the treatment of a nation’s civilians has traditionally been the sole discretion of the relevant state authorities (Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy, 2013). Only recently with the implementation of Chapter VII to the UN Charter has the failure to exercise the positive obligations of sovereignty come to be viewed as a matter with implications for international peace and security, thereby opening up to international review and redress such practices as the massive violation of human rights and the widespread denial of access to people in grave need (Minear, 2013, p. 16).

In contrast to its better-established counterpart, humanitarian diplomacy is more improvisational and *ad hoc*, more opportunistic and *ad hominem*. The vaunted humanitarian imperative does not open all doors. When push comes to shove, humanitarian institutions have limited muscle. They lack the authority and the capacity to impose economic or military sanctions, although they on occasion recommend their imposition (Minear, 2013, p.32).

The skills needed for effective humanitarian diplomacy are not only specific on the regional and national levels but also increasingly extensive on the political level. According to

Larry Minear, in his book, *Humanitarian Diplomacy, Its Practitioners and Their Craft* on the individual level these skills include; “An understanding of international humanitarian law, a sense of the drivers and dynamics of a given conflict in its own cultural setting; an ability to provide leadership across the diverse and often in chaotic humanitarian sector; a familiarity with past efforts, successful or otherwise, to open up and maintain humanitarian space; a battery of interpersonal qualities; and a keen sense of timing” (Minear, 2007, p.13).

Among humanitarian actors, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Society (ICRC) has made the most thorough-going institutional commitment to humanitarian diplomacy. The thrust of its work is at the field level, where ICRC delegates have considerable autonomy in managing negotiations with “belligerents” and in making determinations regarding the continuation or withdrawal of programs and personnel under threat (Minear, 2007, p.13). The ICRC has seven abiding principles: Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality, Independences, Volunteer Service, Unity, and Universality. Humanity, which under pins all other principles, is defined as:

- Suffering is universal and requires a response: it cannot be met with indifference.
- Respect for human dignity is paramount in everything the Movement does. It implies helping and protecting others regardless of who they are or what they have done.
- The Movement protects life and health by promoting international humanitarian law, preventing disaster and disease, and undertaking life-saving activities, from first aid to the provision of food and shelter (International Committee of the Red Cross, n.d.).

Such underlying principles maintain the ICRC's moral compass and provides an outline for how humanitarian diplomacy can take a flexible but unified approach to principles and their *ad hoc* implementation in a pragmatic localized situation.

On the ground level we repeatedly see at the event of a major disaster or conflict that hundreds of large and small NGOs from all over the world tend to rush to the site of the emergency to begin on the ground assistance. Many of them are new and have little or no previous humanitarian experience. For instance, in 1992 UNHCR was designated by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali as the lead UN agency for the delivery of humanitarian assistance in the former Yugoslavia. As a result, almost the entire humanitarian operation in Bosnia was coordinated by UNHCR. By the end of 1995 there were over 250 NGO's operating under the UNHCR 'umbrella'. The only major humanitarian organization to operate outside the UNHCR framework was ICRC (The United Nations High Commission for Refugees, n.d.)

This complicates international coordination and aid delivery effectiveness. Additionally, on the diplomatic and regional level, diplomacy involving advocacy and awareness-raising is directed at a wide range of national and international actors that are often far removed and unaware of the need for humanitarian assistance. To deter this lack of coordination the ICRC have developed awareness raising campaigns to inform members of parliament about International Humanitarian Law or disaster management regulations. Moreover, in 2011 the ICRC published a manual outlining its guidelines for a humanitarian diplomacy focused primarily on awareness raising and advocacy, with a view to always ensuring access to victims of crises (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2011).

Humanitarian diplomacy can also be thought of as an instrument to promote disaster preparedness, risk reduction and recovery, and peace and development. The concept of security has become much broader and no longer refers exclusively to military threats. For more on this notion see Sloan J, 2011, *The Militarization of Peacekeeping in the Twenty-First Century*, General Rose, 1995, *Fighting for Peace* and Biddle, S, 2004. *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle*. As countries feel exposed to multiple future threats, such as terrorism, pandemics, trafficking, migrations, and climate change, many governments consider that the only effective response is the integration of political, military, and humanitarian means.

Background on Cases

Bosnia 1991-1995

The first case to be examined will be in the Balkans in the early 1990's. The UNHCR's role as the lead humanitarian agency in Bosnia from 1991-95 provides many examples of how future aid crises would benefit from the implementation of a form of humanitarian diplomacy to coordinate the collaboration more successfully between aid groups and more productively negotiate with belligerents.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, the Balkan states of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia became a part of the People's Republic of Yugoslavia, a communist country held together by its leader Josip Broz Tito. By the end of the Cold War Serbians, Croatians and Muslim Bosniaks, the three main ethnic groups in the region,

each fought for control of the former Yugoslavia. Bosnia proclaimed its independence in 1992. The Serbs wished to remain part of Yugoslavia and create a nation only for Serbians. Two days after the European Community and the United States recognized Bosnia's independence, the Serbian Democratic party — whose members wanted to be part of the “Greater Serbia” — launched an offensive with the bombardment of Bosnia's capital, Sarajevo beginning the four-year conflict (United Nations, 1996).

The humanitarian operation, under the direction of UNHCR took place in a complex political context, although it was clear at the time what made it necessary. Ruthless leaders went to war in the name of one ethnic group in order to extend or consolidate their power and control over areas with a significant and often majority pre-war population that was not of their group. The principal means to this end was forced population displacement—ethnic cleansing. Conflict began in late June 1991, when the Federal Yugoslav Army (JNA) moved into Croatia and Slovenia immediately after they had declared independence. The war in Croatia lasted until January 1992 and left JNA-backed Croatian Serbs in control of three areas with a significant pre-war population of ethnic Serbs, later designated UN Protected Areas. The European Community (EC) recognized the independence of Croatia and Slovenia on 15 January 1992. A referendum on independence was held in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnia) at the end of February 1992, against a background of rising violence from those opposed to independence: most ethnic Serbs boycotted the vote. Of a turnout of 63 per cent, 93 per cent voted for independence. The European Community recognized Bosnia on 6 April 1992. Violence intensified, spreading to Sarajevo. (European Union, Geneva, November 1993). Many of the non-Serb inhabitants were driven from eastern Bosnia by local Serbs with support from Serbian

paramilitaries and the JNA. Ethnic cleansing and conflict extended throughout Bosnia, and the JNA-equipped Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) besieged Sarajevo. In the spring of 1993, fighting began in central and western Bosnia between the Bosnian Croats, supported by the new Croatian army, and Bosnian government forces. This was formally ended by an agreement signed in Washington on 18 March 1994 (Minear et al., 2007, p.347).

The crisis in Bosnia in the early 90's is a worthwhile illustration of how humanitarian diplomacy could have been used to a greater effect for several reasons. First, the UNHCR was the sole agency responsible for humanitarian assistance in the former Yugoslavia. Second, in hindsight the conflict, and the resulting humanitarian crisis, has been examined extensively not only by different UN agencies, academics, NGO's but also by the ICRC and speaks directly to where a modernized call for humanitarian diplomacy originated.

Mali: 2013-2023

The second case we have looked at was the role of UN Peace-Keepers in the Sahel region of central Africa from 2013-2023 and Mali in particular. Mali's recent turmoil began with a 2012 coup, carried out by soldiers opposed to what they saw as a weak response to a growing separatist insurgency by Tuareg rebels in the country's north, which they called Azawad. This disruption in the north created a power vacuum that ISIS and other Jihadist groups took full advantage of further destabilizing the region.

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was created in 2013 after the collapse of Malian government and its institutions.

This collapse was manifested in two ways: the takeover of northern Mali by a jihadist coalition following the outbreak of a Tuareg separatist rebellion, and the simultaneous meltdown of central authorities. These events demonstrated the fragility of security governance arrangements in the north and state institutions in Mali's capital, Bamako. MINUSMA's mandate was to stabilize Mali's political situation, restore state authority, and support the peace process between the government and the separatists. An inherent ambiguity of the mandate was to support state authority while supposedly being a neutral mediator in the peace process (Security Council Resolution #2100, 2013).

Research Design and Methodology

Research Methods:

This project has been a comparative case study, through looking at the Balkans in the mid-90's to the Sahel until as recently as last year. A comparative case study is defined as 'the systematic comparison of two or more data points "cases" obtained through use of the case study method' (Kaarbo and Beasley 1999, p. 372). For example, in the two case studies discussed here the research looked to isolate trends and patterns of disruption in the confines of developing humanitarian spaces. What solutions repeatedly failed, and why – also what processes were successful; how could the United Nations improve on these successes and learn from its failures.

These two case studies were selected for this research paper because they illustrate the uses, the short comings and evolution of the term humanitarian diplomacy. Moreover, the

different cultural, political, geopolitical, and conflict dynamics that animate each case give the research a broader understanding of the variables that impact humanitarian diplomacy work. This comparative study method has underscored in the first case an early modern rise in the need for humanitarian diplomacy in geopolitics and in the second case how this call was not heeded and the resulting collapse of not only the UN's mandate but also democracy itself in the Sahel. A comparative case study has led to more insightful methods for future implementation of humanitarian diplomacy and the realization of the consequences in the lack of implementation. The research will show that history is witnessing the militarization of large-scale peacekeeping operations lead by the UN. The nature of conflicts in the next century will demand that the UN's role shifts from peacekeeping to a peace enforcement one. A byproduct of this evolution will be that the role of humanitarian actors will necessarily become more political in nature and the process of negotiations more diplomatic if they are going to be successful.

Data Collection and Analysis

The literature I have reviewed can be categorized into six main topic areas: newspaper articles, academic peer-reviewed articles, interviews, think-tank reports, op-eds or blog posts, and UN or UN-related sources. A number of resources have been particularly helpful in not only defining and locating humanitarian diplomacy and its implementation, but also in illustrating the political and military evolution of UN operations. These included *Humanitarian Diplomacy, Practitioners and Their Craft* (Minear and Smith, 2007), *Realizing Human Rights*, (Power and Allison, 2011), *The United Nations Reality and Ideal*, (Baehr and Gordenker, 2005), *The New UN*

Peacekeeping, Building Peace in Lands of Conflict after the Cold-War, (Ratner, 1997) and *The Militarization of Peacekeeping in the Twenty-First Century*, (Sloan, 2011). On the practical side in researching the two specific case studies in Bosnia and in the Sahel, the United Nation's archives and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies archives of past engagements have been invaluable. The ICRC historically has had more experience peacebuilding on the ground negotiating with belligerents while maintain impartiality during a conflict. Up until the early 90's the UN was strictly a peacekeeping organization and had much to learn from the ICRC in active conflict negotiations. The archives of past engagements of both organizations provide a number of critical and comparative insights into the evolution of both the ICRC and the UN from peacekeeping to peacebuilding.

As an emerging term, humanitarian diplomacy is yet to be defined in absolute terms. The goal in the data collection phase, therefore, was to synthesize the data from multiple sources to produce a hybrid definition of the term and then to implement this form of humanitarian diplomacy consistently throughout the research. This method required a deep reading of a multiple source materials to find all the ways, as many as possible, in which this term has been presented and analyzed over the past thirty years. Additionally, humanitarian diplomacy stands in stark contrast to traditional forms of diplomacy. In order to analyze the data produced cohesively some space had to be given to parsing out the main differences in the identity's diplomacy can take.

However, limitations to these sources become evident early in the research. Scholars, analysts, and the media tend to focus on what is problematic, rather than what looks normal or

routine. The consequence is that problems and short comings are often over-represented in the literature. We might know for example when a massacre of civilians has taken place—where UN Peace-Keepers have failed to protect civilians—but we do not necessarily know when a massacre has been avoided due to some specific action having been taken.

On analysis end the research has adopted an inductive and exploratory approach of the cases used. Following the inductive method, the original source material was divided into four categories and how each effected the ability to create humanitarian spaces. The four categories which proved most effect: First, the intensity of a given regional conflict. Second, how politicized the specific region was. Third, the degree of media attention being paid to a region, and forth the scale of impact a given humanitarian mission had or did not have. Ultimately, categorizing the cases in an attempt distinguish between general principles and specific observation of experiences on the ground creating humanitarian spaces in conflict zones. This method of approach was most useful in sense that it allowed the research to tell its own story on both a micro and macro levels. This research paper has been as impartial as possible. In making all effort to maintain this impartiality the method for analyzing the material collected has been to use the four coding categories to look deeper into possible explanations of success, failures, eases, and hardships. After initial focus on data collection and coding, the research has then looked to analyze, compare, and synthesize the data collected. Finally, defining what forms humanitarian diplomacy can take to be most effective and further illustrating how it can, and needs to be, successfully implemented in our collective future as a new means of conflict resolution.

Positionality

My experiences earning an earlier master's degree in philosophy had a fundamental impact on choosing to research humanitarian diplomacy generally and these two case studies specifically. Philosophy has much to teach on topics such as law, ethics, and morality. And it's not always pretty. Through a philosophical lens such notions are deconstructed, in different ways, to a point where they can be seen not as positive duties to the state but as constructs maintaining social cohesion. Geopolitics, multilateralism, and democracy itself are in crisis as never before. From Indonesia to Argentina voters this year are going to the polls and in many cases democracy itself is on the ballot. The research in this paper has argued throughout that the constructs of social cohesion are shifting, that the old means of military power and coercive negotiation tactics between states have never worked and are now taking their last breaths. Unvarnished forms of authoritarianism are on the rise. Humanitarian diplomacy, if better understood and practiced, is a means to disrupt these future trends. The positionality of the author, having spent much time traveling and living outside the United States, is such that compassion and empathy can in fact exist in all people and in all states. However, it is the outdated forms of negative duties to the state which limits their ability to be implemented and utilized. Further implementation of humanitarian diplomacy will illustrate the truism that when you treat a people, a culture, or a state with respect they will make far more reliable and stable partners over time.

Research Findings

Humanitarian Diplomacy vs Traditional Diplomacy

As an emerging term, the literature defining humanitarian diplomacy is narrow and varied. One common theme the term does have across the literature is that its development and rise is fundamentally linked to the evolving nature of twenty-first century conflicts. In the first generation of UN peacekeepers, humanitarian actors on the ground were not called on to be political negotiators. However, in the post-Cold War era the role of peacekeeping has shifted to one of peacebuilding within still active conflict areas. This shift demanded that humanitarian missions take on a much more politicized role as they were forced to directly negotiate with belligerents on the ground to get supplies and aid convoys to those desperately needing it. Therefore, the findings covered in this research have looked to define the term humanitarian diplomat within the larger political context of emerging multilateralism, geopolitics, and the increasingly multi-polar nature of conflicts in the twenty-first century.

Humanitarian diplomacy and traditional forms of diplomacy differ in nearly every regard. Indeed, the only similarity to isolate would be the art of negotiation itself. Negotiation is not limited to the world of diplomacy or geo-politics. Negotiation is something one does daily, be that at work, with one's spouse or one's children. According to the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, "Most humanitarian workers negotiate in some way every day, but few have thought to recognize this core activity as a conscious skill and so do not seek to refine and develop it across their organization (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2013)".

The research has shown, and the case studies will illustrate, that humanitarian diplomacy, which is often overlooked when political events are studied, deserves to be

examined further. Undoubtedly, we need to study more closely the role played by humanitarian workers when they negotiate access and related humanitarian issues with belligerents and other actors in conflict zones.

Following Larry Minear and Hazel Smith in their outstanding work, *Humanitarian Diplomacy: Practitioners and their Craft*, we will offer this concept of humanitarian diplomacy: “This we understand to encompass the activities carried out by humanitarian organizations to obtain the space from political and military authorities within which to function with integrity. These activities comprise such efforts as arranging for the presence of international humanitarian organizations and personnel in a given country, negotiating access to civilian populations in need of assistance and protection, monitoring assistance programs, promoting respect for international law and norms, supporting indigenous individuals and institutions, and engaging in advocacy at a variety of levels in support of humanitarian objectives. Humanitarian diplomacy involves activities carried out by humanitarian institutions and personnel, as distinct from diplomacy exercised by traditional diplomats, even in support of humanitarian activities (Minear, 2007, p.13).”

Traditional diplomacy on the other hand functions in a very different realm. Diplomatic corps reflect the sovereign interest of state actors and *realpolitik* understood as a set of “social institutions composed of agreed-upon principles, norms, rules, decision making procedures that govern interactions of actors in specific issue areas (Minear, 2007, p.8).” They undertake joint initiatives on issues, formerly political and military matters but now with an increasingly focus economic and sometimes even humanitarian, of interest to their respective governments. Diplomats have multiple issues within their portfolios, only some could be said to be

humanitarian in nature. Humanitarians, by contrast, have a more focused agenda in which humanitarian interests and the creation of humanitarian spaces are put first and foremost.

Several other fundamental differences between humanitarian diplomacy and traditional diplomacy stand out, the environment the work is done, the timeframe available, and the authority to implement negotiated agreements. In addition to functioning in a still evolving landscape without clear ground rules and sanction, humanitarian diplomacy is marked by an urgency that does not regard sovereignty with the deference of traditional diplomats. From this standpoint humanitarian diplomacy represents an attempt to shift the focus from national security to human security. In foreign service handbooks, the treatment of a nation's civilians has traditionally been the sole discretion of the relevant sovereign state authorities. Only recently with the implementation of Chapter VII to the UN Charter has the failure to exercise the positive obligations of sovereignty come to be viewed as a matter with implications for international peace and security, thereby opening up to international review such practices as the massive violation of human rights and the widespread denial of access to people in grave need. (Sloan, 2011, p.38)

Again, following Larry Minear and Hazel Smith's work defining humanitarian space, they write, "In contrast to its better-established counterpart, humanitarian diplomacy is more improvisational and *ad hoc*, more opportunistic and *ad hominem*. The vaunted humanitarian imperative does not open all doors. When push comes to shove, humanitarian institutions have limited muscle. They lack the authority and the capacity to impose economic or military sanctions, although they on occasion recommend their imposition (Minear, 2007, p. 10)."

The firsthand experience of practitioners also underscores distinctions between traditional and humanitarian diplomacy with regard to those with whom such officials normally engage. Whereas diplomats typically deal with states, humanitarians must find ways of engaging non-state actors such as the Bosnian Serbs, or insurgents in the Sahel. Samantha Power in her book, *Chasing the Flame*, a biography on the late Sergio Vieira de Mello, writes of just this issue of humanitarian inertia. At the Council on Foreign Relations in New York in the late 90's, Sergio Vieira de Mello, acting then as Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs the ranking UN aid official, commented on his unenviable task as the point person for negotiating international access to civilians living within the jurisdiction of the limb-amputating Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone. "Who are these shadowy people with whom I am forced to negotiate for access to the nation's civilians?" He asked with evident frustration. "How do I know whom to deal with and how can I hold them accountable for what they promise me? (Power, S. 2008. p.163)"

As we will see in the case of the former Yugoslavia, offering incentives to belligerents in exchange for access to humanitarian space represents a slippery slope and can compromise the integrity of a humanitarian offensive. The UNHCR's capitulation to the demands made by the Bosnian Serbs and the agency's rapid loss of credibility was a case in point. This led to a form of "humanitarian pragmatism" in Bosnia, whereby humanitarian agencies quickly learned that to get something was better than pulling out and getting nothing. As Barak Obama was often known to say, "Better is not worse." Not to take a proactive and pragmatic role in creating humanitarian space, say its proponents, "is to make the perfect the enemy of the good, an unthinkable irony in a world in which the good needs all the help in can get (Power, S.2008. p.

371).” In other words, from the standpoint of an individual who stands to receive emergency aid, a humanitarian bird in the hand is worth a whole flock in the bush.

Bosnia

In early October 1991, the Federal Yugoslav authorities requested UNHCR’s assistance in responding to population displacement in Croatia. Separate requests were made by Croatia and Slovenia. The High Commissioner, Sadako Ogata, consulted UN Secretary-General Pe´rez de Cuelar, requesting her to lend support and offices to bring relief to internally displaced people and to coordinate humanitarian action in the region. The High Commissioner then consulted the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the EC Presidency. Following their assurances of support, an assessment mission was filed with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).

The mission’s preliminary conclusion was that UNHCR should not become involved in a massive relief program but rather should provide modest assistance to displaced families outside the war zones, to complement the ICRC’s activities within them. *(UN operating outside conflict while ICRC operated within the conflict). The realities of the conflict and the international community’s response dictated otherwise, but UNHCR’s subsequent engagement was not simply reactive. Many of the rising number of displaced persons would become refugees when the Yugoslav republics became independent states, and the High Commissioner felt that early engagement was important if UNHCR was to help meet what were clearly going to be rapidly escalating humanitarian needs and have any influence in such a highly political charged situation (Ogata, 2006. p.51).

The UN's role, and the fundamental definition of peacekeeping itself, changed after the end of the Cold War and was magnified in the break-up of the former Yugoslavia from 1991-95. Previously the UN's mandate reflected a peacekeeping model, wherein they had been invited by a host country to maintain the peace *after* a conflict had been resolved. With the break-up of Yugoslavia that role became one of peace-making. The presence of UN peacekeepers on the ground was once a welcome sight that there was peace in the land after a period of conflict. Respected by both civilians and militants alike, peacekeeping forces were present at the request of the host state and charged with managing and facilitating an existing peace in a neutral, non-violent way. What peacekeeping was not expected to do was take sides in a post-conflict (or, *a fortiori*, in a conflict) or to take forceful measures to enforce the will of the Security Council (Rose, M. 1998. p.137).

However, the circumstantial demands on the ground forced the UN's peacekeeping mandate to become a militarized operation. James Sloan in his book *The Militarization of Peacekeeping in the Twenty-First Century*, writes succinctly of this evolution: "The term 'militarized peacekeeping' is used to refer to a peacekeeping operation that possesses enforcement characteristics – that is to say, is authorized, explicitly or implicitly, under Chapter VII and authorized to use force beyond self-defense. Depending on the circumstances, the consent of the host state may not be a legal prerequisite to the establishment of a militarized peacekeeping operation or to the assignment of certain tasks to it; similarly, impartiality may not be a legal requirement for some or all of its tasks (Sloan, J. 2011. p.3)."

There is some scope of disagreement in the literature regarding when the mission was militarized. In the view of Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, 'mission creep' began with

Resolution 752 of 15 May 1992. The Secretary General concluded that: “The danger that a UN peacekeeping operation will fail because of a lack of cooperation from parties is less grievous than the danger that delay in its dispatch will lead to a breakdown of cease-fire and to a new conflagration in Yugoslavia (Secretary Council Resolution 752, 1992).” See timeline below. As the operation shifted to more militarized mission so too necessary humanitarian negotiations became more diplomatic in nature.

The break-up of the former Yugoslavia and the resulting wars of ethnic cleansing was a vast and complex process on both the local and intergovernmental levels. The table below gives a general overview of the major events between June 1991 and December 1995:

Timeline of Key Events:

27 June 1991: JNA forces move into Croatia and Slovenia.

7 July 1991: War in Slovenia ends; conflict in Croatia continues to spread and intensify.

14 November 1991: UN Secretary-General requests UNHCR to take the lead in coordinating humanitarian assistance.

3 December 1991: UNHCR issues first appeal for funds, also covering UNICEF and WHO.

11 December 1991: UN Secretary-General announces UNHCR’s lead role (S/23280).

2 January 1992: Cease-fire in Croatia agreed.

21 February 1992: Security Council Resolution 743 authorizes deployment of UNPROFOR in Croatia.

20 March 1992: First large-scale forced displacement in northern Bosnia.

11 April 1992: First distribution of UN relief food in Bosnia; conflict and ethnic cleansing becoming widespread.

15 May 1992: Security Council Resolution 752

30 April 1992 UNHCR: appeals to foreign ministers of 27 countries for funds to meet humanitarian needs.

29 June 1992: Security Council Resolution 761 authorizes additional UNPROFOR elements to ensure security and functioning of Sarajevo airport; humanitarian airlift begins.

29 July 1992: UNHCR convenes ministerial-level meeting in Geneva.

26–27 August 1992: International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia in London

14 September 1992: Security Council Resolution 776 authorizes enlargement of UNPROFOR’s mandate and strength in order to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Bosnia.

February 1993: Conflict breaks out between Bosnian Croat and government forces.

16 April 1993: Security Council Resolution 819 designates Srebrenica as a safe area.

6 May 1993: Security Council Resolution 824 declares that Sarajevo, Tuzla, Žepa, Gorazde and Bihać should also be treated as safe areas.

4 June 1993: Security Council Resolution 836 further expands mandate of UNPROFOR to include protection of the safe areas.

18 November 1993: Political leaders of Bosnia meet with UNHCR in Geneva and sign commitment to facilitate delivery of humanitarian assistance.

March 1994: Washington agreements end conflict between Bosnian Croat and government forces.

April 1994: BSA offensive on Gorazde; first NATO air action against BSA positions; retaliation against UNPROFOR; humanitarian convoys and airlift temporarily suspended.

23 November 1994: NATO air strikes against BSA anti-aircraft sites.

24 November 1994: BSA takes several hundred UNPROFOR troops temporarily hostage; humanitarian operation also disrupted.

1–2 May 1995: Croatian forces reclaim Western Slavonia.

11 July 1995: BSA forces take Srebrenica enclave.

4–7 August 1995: Croatian forces reclaim remainder of territory except strip along border in Eastern Slavonia.

30 August 1995: NATO begins large-scale air strikes on BSA positions.

12–19 September 1995: Bosnian government and Croatian forces make major advances against BSA in northwest Bosnia.

12 October 1995: Military action ceases in Bosnia.

1 November 1995: Negotiations begin in Dayton, USA.

21 November 1995: Agreement reached.

14 December 1995: General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia signed in Paris. (Britannica)

UNHCR's negotiations had different immediate objectives but almost all could be linked to one central aim. The operation sought to meet the vital needs of all civilians affected by the conflict and, where possible, to help prevent further violations of human rights. However, the parties saw this aim in light of their own interests, its motivation was rarely challenged. It remained the foundation on which negotiations were based and to which short-term goals could be linked. The clarity of the aim and the belief of staff at all levels that this was a just cause, though at they might differ over tactics, were all important positive factors in the mission.

An immediate objective of negotiations was access for relief convoys; early convoys from Zagreb to Sarajevo had to negotiate 90 checkpoints. As the new authorities became more organized, clearances had to be obtained for convoy plans and crossings of active frontlines. Access often hinged on the nature of the relief consignment and whether it was seen as contributing to the other side's war effort. In many cases this was a pretext for obstruction; sometimes the concern was genuine. At the highest level, formal assurances were on occasions sought from the leaders of the warring parties and texts negotiated (Minear et al., 2007, p.354).

Such critical humanitarian negotiations from check points at the local level to higher level formal negotiations with different leaders the breakup of the former Yugoslavia demanded that humanitarian actors become humanitarian diplomats. The research has shown that the scale of the UNHCR, the ICRC, and the vast range of NGO's operating in Bosnia necessitated that non-governmental organizations evolve to be more diplomatic in their negotiations on the ground to reach even a margin of success. This shift in the role of humanitarian missions toward diplomatic mission may have gone largely unnoticed at the time as it was simply a necessity on the ground.

Initially, it was foreseen that only displaced persons would need outside assistance. As the conflict progressed it soon became clear that the needs were much wider, and the operation then sought to assist all civilians affected by the conflict. As the United Nations' led agency, UNHCR saw its responsibilities as analogous to those in a refugee emergency: to try to ensure that needs were met, either directly or through others. In most cases, UNHCR initiated negotiations, but UNHCR also undertook negotiations with the authorities on behalf of others,

for example for clearance for relief consignments or when other NGO staff were detained (Rose, M. 1998. P.48).

In the same way that the humanitarian negotiations had a clear aim, so the obstacles had a clear cause. In varying degrees, all sides saw the operation as neither neutral nor impartial but as directly helping their enemy. Until early 1994, Bosnian Croat and Serb forces surrounded Bosnian government forces in central Bosnia, as Bosnian Serb forces continued to do in Sarajevo and elsewhere throughout the war. For them, the humanitarian operation was undermining their military efforts by breaking the sieges and thereby delaying their victory. Similarly, efforts to prevent ethnic cleansing ran directly counter to the objectives of those seeking ethnically based control of territory. The Bosnian government had its own fundamental objection, seeing the operation as an evasion by the international community of its responsibilities. Given a choice between humanitarian aid and progress towards ending aggression, it would choose the latter, even at the price of more suffering in the short term. On occasions, it obstructed the delivery of aid to its own side to pressure the international community to change its stance and not treat aggressors and victims as equal (Rose, M. 1998. p.53).

While the UNHCR and UNPROFOR had many successes mostly on the ground operations, in the end these humanitarian offensives tactics lacked the military and political muscle to achieve either a lasting cease fire or, at the least, keep the aid corridors open. The Bosnian Serbs would time and again agree to an aid corridor being opened only to find new excuses to obstruct the deal refusing to let the aid trucks through. This non-compliance was

evident throughout the conflict hamstringing the effect of any lasting peacebuilding or aid convoys.

A major concern for UNHCR in all negotiations was to avoid the linking of assistance to one side with assistance to or conditions set by another. Non-food supplies, especially those necessary for the winter, were the most at risk. As the winter of 1993 approached, access to the eastern enclaves in Bosnia for such supplies was in effect blocked by Bosnian Serb demands for reciprocity. UNHCR's position was set out in a 25 September 1993 letter to the Bosnian Serb leader, Dr Karadzic':

"Linking meeting the humanitarian needs of one group of beneficiaries to meeting those of another clearly cannot be justified, no more than can an arbitrary "fee" for the passage of humanitarian assistance on which lives depend ... if the displaced and refugees within your communities have need of similar assistance in advance of the winter, UNHCR and our partners are ready to assess these needs and meet them on their merits within the limits of our resources." Three days later, clearance for six trucks carrying shelter and water supply equipment was again refused with the explanation: "We have warned you several times that you cannot request delivery [of such materials] to the Muslim enclave without same request submitted, at the same time, for the needs of the Serb areas (UNHCR "Information Notes on former Yugoslavia", 1993, p. iii.)"

In the end, it was not the vaulted humanitarian ideals that led to the end of the conflict, it was military might, political pressure, and dominant media coverage by Western news outlets. The Bosnian war was the first conflict of the twenty first century in which the warring parties used CNN to argue their cases (Power, S. 2019, p.273). By the winter of 1994, exhaustive

media coverage had put the war front and center in living rooms across the globe. Political pressure had grown to a boiling point, US president Bill Clinton and politicians across the EU when asked what they were doing to end the conflict in the Balkans could no longer simply make the statement that “We are supporting the humanitarian efforts.” It was time for decisive NATO involvement.

After nearly four years of genocide and ethnic cleansing, one incident may have triggered NATO’s final response. On Saturday, February 5, 1994, at 12:10 pm a shell landed in a crowded downtown Sarajevo market on the busiest shopping day of the week, blowing sixty-eight Bosnian shoppers to bits. On February 9, four days after the market attack, NATO’s sixteen foreign ministers haggled for more than twelve hours to produce an unprecedented ultimatum: The Serbs had until midnight GMT on February 20 to withdraw their heavy weapons from a twelve mile “exclusion zone” around Sarajevo. Any weapons that remained after that time would be placed in the custody of UN peacekeepers or bombed by NATO. The alliance had never before made such an explicit threat. The people of Sarajevo had never been so close to being rescued. “Nobody should doubt NATO’s resolve,” President Bill Clinton warned from Washington. “NATO is now ready to act.” (Cohan, R. 1994).

Conflicts involving large-scale abuse of human rights to which the primary response of the international community is humanitarian action are not unique. What was different in the Balkans between 1991 and 1995 was the level of attention demanded of Western governments by public opinion and the media. The deep involvement of humanitarian actors in actions that went well beyond traditional humanitarian concerns and were conducted in an intensely political context yielded lessons of wider significance. Large scale humanitarian operations

simply cannot function long term without some degree of political *and* military support from the international community, thus the birth of the term humanitarian diplomat. In the thirty years since the end of conflicts in Bosnia the world has only become more violent, human caused climate change has grown to be much more than an existential threat. People are being displaced at unprecedented rates across the planet, migration and refugee are toxic political terms used to lite the old flame of nationalism in the West.

Can diplomats become more humanitarian, could humanitarians become more diplomatic? The research done in this project suggests the later. Military might and political pressure alone will not address our current nor future global issues, a third way can be found by allowing humanitarian actors a greater role at high level political discussions. In conclusion, for an example of how humanitarians have taken a larger role in the political conversation over the last thirty years, the career of Samantha Power would be a case in point. Currently the Administer to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), she was a string reporter in Croatia in 91' when the conflict began to escalate, and she would later go on to be President Barak Obama's Ambassador to the United Nations from 2013-2017.

The Sahel

In June 2023, to the surprise of most UN Security Council members, Mali's government called on the Security Council to pull UN peacekeepers out of the country "without delay". Although the precise timing of Bamako's demand was unexpected, the Malian government had recently been open and public about its loss of trust in the UN agency. But the move also

reflected the fact that many members of the Council sense that an era of large, complex UN blue helmet missions in Africa is drawing to an end (Criss Group, 2021).

The United Nations Multidimensions Integrated Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) ceased its peace operations on December 31, 2023, following termination by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on June 30, 2023. The departure was initiated by the Malian military's transitional administration under Col. Assimi Goita, who came to power in 2021 following a coup. Goita holds the UN responsible for failing to bring peace to Mali since its deployment a decade ago. MINUSMA replaced the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) in 2013, a year after its deployment in 2012. Its major objective was to assist Mali in bolstering its security and defense capabilities, support it in protecting communities, implement stabilization projects, and facilitate humanitarian access to northern Mali (Wilson Center, 2022).

Through political discourse and involvement with armed actors and communities, the mission was able to develop local conflict prevention systems, advance protection, and reduce violence within communities. Additionally, the country's promotion and defense of human rights aided the human rights monitoring, reporting, and capacity-building mandate of MINUSMA. However, in light of the UN's departure, risks to civilians have increased as the mission winds down, not just from other armed actors but also from the mission's own actions, resulting from inadequate coordination with local actors and reprisals against civilians who collaborated with the UN.

MINUSMA has also endured grueling security conditions since it first deployed in 2013. Jihadist groups including al-Qaeda and the Islamic Maghreb have waged a long campaign of hit-

and-run attacks on the mission's bases and convoys, as well as on civilians. In the past decade over 300 blue helmets have died serving in Mali, handing MINUSMA the unwelcome ranking of UN peacekeeping's deadliest mission (Crisis Group, 2021).

Relations between the mission and governments in Bamako have long been troubled. Malian authorities have repeatedly argued that the UN should use greater force in fighting anti-government armed groups. Ties between the mission and Mali's government frayed further after the second military coup in May 2021. Since then, Mali's political leaders have moved closer to Russia, while distancing themselves from Western and regional partners, notably France, which until then had been a key ally in the battle with jihadist forces. It expelled French and European troops leading counter-terrorism efforts in the country and invited the Russian private military company Wagner to replace them. Early in 2023, Mali also denounced France's role as steward of MINUSMA's affairs at the Security Council (Al Jazeera, 2023).

While many of the causes of the falling-out are peculiar to Mali, the issues plaguing MINUSMA surface time and again in the rest of the "big four" missions in Africa. The most obvious of these is peacekeepers' failure to project sufficient force to deter or halt violence against civilians. Although protecting civilians is a standard element of peacekeeping mandates, UN contingents often lack the situational awareness, military resources, and willingness to take risks required to prevent attacks on the people they are supposed to shield. In 2022, disillusioned citizens in the eastern DRC launched a series of protests accusing the UN stabilization mission there, MONUSCO, of failure to fight rebel groups. Some of these demonstrations turned violent, with both civilian and UN fatalities (Crisis Group, 2023).

Similar charges are laid against the UN force in South Sudan, known as UNMISS, where militia groups tell Crisis Group that they generally disregard the mission when attacking their rivals, as peacekeepers rarely intervene. UNMISS units also faced accusations in June of last year for failing to put down an outbreak of fighting inside the UN-led compound sheltering over 37,000 displaced persons. The UN stabilization mission in the Central African Republic, MINUSCA, has long struggled to protect civilians outside the capital Bangui from large-scale attacks, due simply to poor performance. Although its presence in the country is a deterrent to some armed groups that might otherwise attack civilians, the mission no longer mounts major offensives against insurgents (Crisis Group, 2023).

Humanitarian intervention has been acknowledged as a measure of enforcement accepted under Chapter VII, in terms of an exceptional event. The case of Yugoslavia is an example of the UN acting in response to ethnic cleansing. United Nations human rights agents' response confirmed grave violations of human rights that included concentration camps, torture, rape of women and children and large-scale murders in Yugoslavia.

Baehr and Gordenker, in their book *The United Nations Reality and Ideal*, write: "After news reports gave a shocking vision of fighting, atrocities, 'ethnic cleansing' and fleeing inhabitants within and outside the territories that had made up Yugoslavia, the Security Council begin in 1991 to approve a series of resolutions that eventually numbered far more than 100 to deal with an extraordinary complex, mercurial situation. Part of these envisaged peace keeping force with enlarged functions, while others fell under enforcement action of Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Baehr and Gordenker 2005, p.85).

Along with millions of viewers at home around the globe, the United Nations Protection force (UNPROFOR) soldiers also watched in frustration as they saw the horrors unfolding but could not stop them. They were not given orders to engage, nor did they have the strength to interfere and provide 'safe havens' for those being abused. The declaration of human rights may have been signed just after the foundation of the United Nations was created with the common principles based by the UN Charter to protect individuals, but it did not prevent such horrors that closely resembled the Holocaust.

Conclusion

As the nature of conflicts has evolved in the post-Cold War environment from unipolar conflicts to multipolar, so too has the role of the United Nations changed from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. Peacekeeping was originally envisioned to be a stop-gap measure to preserve a cease-fire between two hostile armies, however as S.R. Ratner writes in his work, *The New UN Peacekeeping Building Peace in Lands of Conflict after the Cold War*; "Peacekeeping has, since the end of the Cold War, come to include something vastly different- the employment of the United Nations operations to implement an agreed political solution to the underlying conflict between antagonists" (Ratner 1997, p.1).

This shift of operations based around non-military tactics of observing borders to enforcement operations dealing with internal disputes to protect individuals, created many gray areas for the UN. The research here has shown that the UN for the last 30 years has not fully recognized this shifting world order, nor has it adapted its own role in that evolving geopolitical world. When it becomes necessary for a military presents to enable the creation of

humanitarian spaces then humanitarian workers will necessarily become humanitarian diplomats as well. Chapter VII of the UN Charter clearly reflects these necessities for engaging an increasingly localized inner-state conflict. Since peacekeeping has evolved into operations in which peacekeepers are deployed into internal disputes, humanitarian interventions have been categorized under enforcement measures under Chapter VII. Peace enforcement is when military action is mandated by the United Nations in the context of breaches made to the international peace caused by aggression, when a state aggressively attacks another state, as well as the violations of human rights, such as the acts of genocide and ethnic cleansing (Ratner, S. 1997. p.14).

While peace operations in the former Yugoslavia in the early 90's, and operations in the Sahel and Mali were different in many ways they both saw that large-scale operations on the ground demanded some element of military presents, and a political will, to create humanitarian spaces within which to operate with some degree of marginal success. Humanitarian diplomacy will be a necessary by-product of that evolution. In both case studies addressed here the same drivers and trends contributed to mission failure. Those include, but are not limited to, failure to project sufficient force to deter or halt violence against civilians, situational awareness, communication and coordination failures, military resources, and a willingness to take risks. One distinction between the two cases should be noted in closing, the media coverage of the atrocities in the Bosnian war created a global outcry which demanded that Western governments and NATO respond with force. The 10 plus years of war, famine, rape, genocide, and forced displacement of millions of civilians throughout the Sahel has not garnered the same media sympathies.

The United Nations must take a more proactive role in defining its own evolution, recognizing that the world has long ago not only moved past the first generation of peacekeeping, but well past the second generation also. One recent evolution in this direction, which may well be an indication of future peacebuilding operations, is the emerging collaboration between the United Nations and the African Union (AU). As a result, a new global peace and security architecture is evolving in an era of increasingly multilateralism. The AU military forces have the capacity to deploy and influence the security situation on the ground, allowing the UN to then focus solely on humanitarian assistance, relief, and recovery. Additionally, having AU forces on the ground providing security along with UN lends an additional political element to the operation. Such a cooperation formula of outsourcing security to allow for the development of humanitarian spaces, may well be in the future for large-scale humanitarian operations to be successful, provided that the UN has learnt by now that security gains are short lived if they are not undertaken in the context of a larger political and peacebuilding process.

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