A Domestic Pas de Deux: 
The Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist-Regime Relations in Jordan

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Abstract
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During the first three decades of the Jordanian kingdom’s existence, the Muslim Brotherhood was a relatively apolitical charity organization that held a handful of seats in Parliament. From the mid-1970s onward, however, the Brotherhood grew substantially in size and influence, so much so that it is now the largest and most broad-based political party in Jordan. Looking at domestic, regional, economic, social, political and theological factors, this study seeks to explain the Brotherhood’s dramatic political ascendance and, also, how the regime has coped with its rise.

A holistic explanation of this phenomenon is the study’s modus operandi. In order to gather as many different perspectives as possible, my data drew on interviews of (1) members of the Brotherhood and its political offshoot, the Islamic Action Front; (2) officials in the Jordanian regime; and (3) independent academics and journalists who have previously studied the topic.

The theory of is this paper is that the political ascendance of the Brotherhood stems from three factors: (1) its presence in civil society, (2) the resonance of its Islamic message and (3) the movement’s positioning on the Palestinian issue. I further argue that since the government’s response has concentrated only on the first variable – and ignores the other two – it can expect partial, but not complete, success in diminishing the Brotherhood’s popular support.

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Introduction

The results of the 1989 parliamentary elections – Jordan’s first in over two decades – confirmed a dramatic shift in the kingdom’s political landscape. As the traditional antagonists of the regime – leftists, pan-Arab parties and, later, Palestinian nationalists – saw their support collapse, Islamist candidates in 1989 won big. Capturing over a quarter of the eighty seats in Jordan’s lower house of Parliament, the Muslim Brotherhood emerged as the kingdom’s strongest opposition party.

What accounts for this rise? Why did Islamists, who fared poorly during elections in the 1950s and 60s and historically struggled to make gains against secular opposition parties, do so well in the 1989 election? What factors in Jordan – political, economic or social – had changed? By looking at (1) the Brotherhood’s dominance in civil society, specifically the attendant political benefits, (2) the social factors which made the Brotherhood’s religious rhetoric effective, and (3) the unique capacity of the Brotherhood to empower Palestinians, my research will offer comprehensive answers to these questions. I will argue that these three dependent variables are the causal link to the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, my independent variable.

Of course, given the nature of Jordan’s political system, one cannot ask about a successful opposition party without also looking at the response of the regime. Despite the trappings of democratic reform, Jordan’s government remains authoritarian. As such, it keeps a watchful eye on all political trends that could threaten its survival. For the first three decades of its existence, in fact, the Hashemite monarchy chose a policy of outright repression to deal with threats from leftists (supported by Syria and Iraq), pan-Arab parties (backed by Nasserite Egypt) and Palestinian nationalists (a front for the Palestinian Liberation Organization). By directly
banning the party itself (as in the case of the communists) or even resorting to military action (as in the case of Palestinian nationalists), the regime contained these movements and, since the opposition programs called for the dissolution of the monarchy itself, was able to maintain its rule over Jordan.

When the Islamists were voted into Parliament in 1989, however, the regime adopted a less confrontational tone, opting to allow them to participate, if only symbolically, in the day-to-day governance of the nation.\(^1\) The monarchy’s strategy against the Brotherhood – conceived and implemented during a democratic era – departs from the heavy-handedness of past policies, replacing overt oppression with a more subtle approach. This paper reviews the regime’s response to the Muslim Brotherhood and its political wing, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), asking whether that response has been “successful.” My research indicates that by (1) preventing the Brotherhood from exercising any real control over public policy and (2) isolating the group from its base of support within civil society, the regime has succeeded in marginalizing the Brotherhood from formal political authority but has only slightly diminished its popular support. I argue that this mixed success stems from the regime’s strategy, which focuses on only one out of three variables that determine the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood. In this paper, I will show that by attacking only one leg of the movement’s support, the regime can expect a marginal – but not significant – decline in public support for the Brotherhood, as recent history has shown. Using the same dependent and independent variables throughout the paper, I will offer a model that explains both the political ascendance of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan as well as the effectiveness of the regime’s efforts to blunt its popularity.

The rise of political Islam in Jordan and the subsequent reaction of the regime are important to examine not only because they represent a dramatic recent development in
Jordanian politics, but also because they touch on existential issues of the Hashemite kingdom itself. If Jordan is a “modern” state, why is the survival of the regime dependent on heavy-handed intervention in the public and private spheres? Yet, at the same time, what other Arab nation can boast as much stability and political expression as Jordan can? One objective for my research is to attempt to answer this quandary, and I hope that this paper clarifies the limited extent of the regime’s substantive commitment to democratization. Another important reason to study this topic is that analyzing political Islam in Jordan may offer insights into political Islam in general – an ideology that, in the years ahead, will likely occupy a central role in the development and implementation of American foreign policy. Drawing on interviews with members of the Muslim Brotherhood and the IAF, decision-makers within the regime, as well as academics and journalists, this study offers an analysis of Jordan’s fundamental political challenge today, one that intersects issues of ethnic division, civil society, democratization and repression.

**Rationale**

It is impossible to discuss the rise of political Islam (as well as the regime’s response to this phenomenon) without knowing where the Muslim Brotherhood began and what political obstacles it has overcome. What follows, then, is a brief history, divided into three broad periods, of the Brotherhood’s movement in Jordan. Each period marks a different stage in its organizational development as well as its relationship vis-à-vis the state and other opposition parties within the kingdom.²

**The First Period, 1948-1967: Small but Growing**

Spanning the early days of the Hashemite kingdom – from 1946, when the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood was founded, and into the next two decades – the first historical period
represents the nadir of the Islamic movement’s influence. During this era, the Brotherhood made its first foray into electoral politics, which was, by all accounts, rather unsuccessful. Throughout the 1950s and 60s, only a handful of Islamists were elected to Jordan’s Parliament. Judged against the stronger leftist opposition parties, the Brotherhood posted an anemic showing.

Why did Islamists fare so poorly during this period? In a time when secular forces were consuming all of Jordan’s political oxygen, the Muslim Brotherhood found itself without space to breathe. The pan-Arab message championed by Egyptian president Gamal Abdul Nasser during the 1950s resonated with the Arab masses, and those living in Jordan were no exception. Historian Kamal Salibi writes that “practically everybody in Jordan, as in other Arab countries, stayed tuned to the Voice of the Arabs [Nasser’s radio station] broadcasting from Cairo, to hear the man they considered the new Saladin address them in person on the issues of the day.”

Although outlawed, the communist party also made popular inroads, especially among Palestinians, with a similar anti-imperialist message exhorting Arabs to throw off Western oppression and restore lost dignity. By leading public marches and (sometimes violent) demonstrations against the government, these secular forces tapped into deep-seated popular frustrations. The Muslim Brotherhood, on the other hand, floundered with its message of social conservatism – which fell flat during a time of secularized politics and rejection of tradition – and opposition to Israel, an issue articulated with equal intensity by Nasserists and communists alike. Mohammed Abu Rumman offers a succinct formulation of the political forces at work: the Brotherhood at this time “did not have the support of the people, whose mass support went instead to the nationalist and leftist movement.”

Amid an atmosphere dominated by anti-monarchical, radical political forces, the Hashemites found a friend in the Muslim Brotherhood. Leftists and nationalists used their
influence to stage protests against the government that on several occasions grew unruly. The government, surprised by the size and violence of the rallies, called on the army to disperse the rioters. The regime obviously felt threatened by these forces and – prefiguring future policy – searched for rival political groups who, with official backing, could sap support from the larger opposition parties. The Muslim Brotherhood fit such a profile. The mistreatment of fellow Islamists in Nasser’s Egypt not only angered the Brothers but also gave them cause to worry: if secular parties repressed Islamists in their home countries, why would they choose a different policy should they come to power in Jordan? Either out of sympathy for their oppressed Brothers abroad or fear for their party’s survival at home, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan had ample reason to oppose the pan-Arab movement.

Sharing a “common threat and fear for their existence,” the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood saw the benefits of cooperation. Brought together by trying political circumstances, the government and the Brothers developed a “guarded, but not overtly hostile” relationship in which the regime encouraged the Brotherhood to establish ties to the society by founding charity organizations, schools and hospitals, as well as commissioning mosques and funding friendly imams to disseminate a pro-Brotherhood message. The Brotherhood-operated forums also provided space for non-affiliated social gatherings, such as sporting events and scout meetings, to raise the group’s public profile. While some observers characterize this period as an “alliance” between the regime and the Brotherhood, Nathan Brown points out that, despite encouragement in the arena of civil society, the regime maintained a watchful eye over the Islamists, even jailing one of its leaders in 1958 for voicing opposition to the Hashemite-backed Baghdad Pact. It is also important to note that, during the 1950s and the beginning of the 60s, the regime supported the Brotherhood’s move into civil society largely in negative terms – i.e. by
not enforcing anti-associational ordinances against the Brotherhood – only actively encouraging such trends after the most serious threat to the Hashemite throne: the events of Black September, 1970.

The Brotherhood’s relationship with the regime, however, was not only a marriage of convenience; their association contained an ideological component as well. The Hashemite monarchy had historically staked its legitimacy on two grounds: (1) its pan-Arab credentials earned through leadership of the 1916 Arab Revolt and (2) its deep connection to the Islamic faith. Hashemites trace their lineage back to the Prophet Mohammed and emphasize their family’s historical role as guardian (sharif) of the holy sites in Mecca.13 During a period in which the regime faced serious challenges from left-wing forces, a close relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood allowed the regime to more credibly claim such Islamic legitimacy.14 Even at the ebb of Islam’s political currency in Jordan, the Brotherhood’s endorsement of the regime created a shared ideological front in the face of leftist agitation.

The Second Period, 1967-1985: Alliance with the Regime and Expansion into Civil Society

During the second half of the 1960s, however, the political winds had changed – external events had reshuffled the political landscape in the kingdom, marginalizing the influence of leftist radicals. It was around this time that Jordanians began to perceive that the promises made by Nasser and his allies – to lift up the masses, restore lost Arab dignity and, above all, expel invaders from the region – failed to materialize. Instead of leading to broad-based economic empowerment, Nasser’s socialist reforms in Egypt – which were repudiated by his successor, Anwar Sadat – sparked an economic slowdown that lasted well into the proceeding decades. At the same time, the economy of Ba’athist Syria also experienced a downturn. But the most tangible symbol of the decline of Nasserism was the stunning defeat of the Arab armies in 1967
against Israel, which expanded its territory into the West Bank of Jordan, Gaza in Palestine, the Golan Heights in Syria and the Sinai in Egypt. This loss underscored the vast distance between Nasser’s hard-line rhetoric on the Palestinian issue and his ability to produce substantive gains.

Around the same time, a non-state actor, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), became a vehicle through which Palestinians living in Jordanian refugee camps could express a more militant posture in the wake of the 1967 defeat. This support translated into the creation of armed militias interested in waging a guerilla war against Israel. Organized by the PLO operating from Jordan, these *fedayeen* began strikes into Israel that prompted harsh reprisals, a situation that King Hussein found unacceptable and sought to stop. Bucking the king’s orders to cease the attacks, the PLO continued to operate as they pleased. This crisis of sovereignty erupted into the events of “Black September” 1970, in which the PLO *fedayeen* and King Hussein’s armed forces clashed in open war for control of Jordan. The civil war waged on until March 1971, when the final battle between the PLO and the Hashemite monarchy resulted in the total expulsion of the PLO from Jordan.

The second phase of the Brotherhood’s history thus spans from 1967, after the Arab loss and escalation of *fedayeen* attacks coming from Jordan, until 1985 – an era that witnessed the blossoming of the Muslim Brotherhood’s involvement in Jordanian society and its subsequent rise in popularity. With the military defeat of the PLO and its expulsion from the Hashemite kingdom, a power vacuum developed within the country’s Palestinian refugee camps, which were no longer staffed by PLO activists. Looking to forestall a future confrontation with a radical political ideology, the regime calculated that the Muslim Brotherhood – a group that rejected violence and, after the turbulent decade of the 1950s, enjoyed a working relationship with the monarchy – could credibly represent Palestinians without adopting an extremist political
platform. As a result, the government allowed the Brotherhood to organize within the camps. Mohammed Abu Rumman writes that the “Brotherhood would successfully exploit this opportunity… which allowed them to make considerable and significant gains in solidifying and expanding their social base.”

Through both regime policy and effective political timing, the Muslim Brotherhood steadily grew in size and influence, eventually displacing pan-Arabist, communist and Palestinian nationalist forces as the dominant political organization in Jordan. By giving the Brotherhood – and only the Brotherhood – the space to develop charity organizations, schools, hospitals and orphanages, the regime oversaw the movement’s expansion into civil society. Given the breadth of its “reform activities,” the Brotherhood developed deep roots in society. Since the government lacked the resources for a comprehensive social safety net, many Jordanians, especially poor Palestinians, fell through the cracks. It was the Muslim Brotherhood – not the state – that had an expansive charity network to provide the poor with crucial social services. Quintan Wiktorowicz explains the political significance of such work:

“Often termed ‘social Islam’, these organizations reflect a growing functional synthesis between socioeconomic need and religious values. Islamic medical clinics, schools, hospitals, training centers, charitable societies and cultural associations address pressing development issues while at the same time propagating a religious message. Islamic NGOs thus serve as institutions for the production, articulation and dissemination of values, connecting the movement to the community of the faithful through daily interactions.”

The Brotherhood also reached the richer segments of society through its affiliated schools, mosques and community centers. By developing a close relationship with Jordan’s populace at all levels, the Brotherhood accomplished two important things: (1) they were able to spread their own Islamic views into society and (2) facilitate a dialogue between the people and the party. The Brotherhood, through its “daily interactions” with the public, listened to the people’s concerns and, like any other group with ambitions in a democratic polity, incorporated their views into political priorities – actions that Wiktorowicz calls the “production, articulation
Islamists during this period also gained control of professional organizations – syndicates representing educated professionals such as doctors, engineers and lawyers – as well as labor unions and university student governments. Like the other organizations within civil society, these, too, provided the movement with media to register the frustrations of the Jordanian populace and served as protected forums from which its surrogates could publicly discuss the Islamist message.

Importantly, all of the Brotherhood’s outreach efforts during this period benefited from the coinciding jump in global oil prices. The price hike enriched Jordan’s neighboring Gulf States, whose wealthy patrons directed funding towards the Brotherhood’s charities, providing the movement with ample resources to spread its social conservative message, summarized by the group’s characteristic slogan: “Islam is the Solution!”

The newfound oil wealth of the Gulf States benefited the political prospects of the Brotherhood in Jordan in a more indirect way as well, since new money in those countries translated into more economic development, which in turn translated into new employment opportunities. From the mid-1970s onward, expatriate Palestinians flocked to fill these new jobs. With Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1991, however, these same immigrants fled (or returned, in the case of many Palestinians with family already in the country) to Jordan, bringing with them the more conservative form of wāhābi Islam practiced in the Gulf. The Brotherhood’s socially conservative rhetoric resonated with these more religious émigrés, providing the movement with a loyal political constituency.

What made this immigration more significant, however, was that Muslims in Jordan were not immune to a regional religious revival that combined greater individual piety with an acceptance of Islam in the political sphere. The Brotherhood’s consistent Islamic message
exploited this heightened religiosity and gained credibility with a newly spiritual populace. The most concrete manifestation of this development was the 1979 revolution in Iran, which showed that the Islamist program commanded broad-based popular support in a powerful member of the Muslim world. Despite the obvious demographic differences between the revolutionaries there and in the Arab world – sectarian differences that ruling Arab regimes were anxious to emphasize – the Iranian Islamists’ successful revolt gave hope to their comrades around the region. By taking a group of American hostages, giving the Israeli embassy in Tehran to the PLO and adopting a more confrontational tone in foreign affairs, the revolutionaries blazed the trail for Islamist anti-Western agitation. For Islamists abroad, this development was momentous: Khomenei’s guerillas had overthrown a secular authoritarian government trying to modernize the country, replacing the Shah with an Islamic state, one whose values more closely resembled the identity of the people. The Islamic popular revolution announced the regional ascendance of a new ideology: political Islam.

Thus the years between 1967 and 1985 represented the Muslim Brotherhood’s “golden age” in Jordan: with regional events in its favor, the regime actively encouraging expansion into civil society and the political savvy to seize the opportunities presented to it, the Muslim Brotherhood earned “social credit” from the people – credit that the movement would collect on during subsequent national elections.

The Third Period, 1985 to Present: Becoming a True Jordanian Opposition Party

The Islamists’ stunning electoral success in 1989 presented a new challenge to the regime, which would have to alter old policies to conform to a new democratic era. While communism, pan-Arab radicalism and Palestinian nationalism could in the past be dismissed as military threats and contained using brute force and martial law, the Brotherhood’s ascension
through the ballot box meant that the regime would have to develop more subtle methods of repression. With these limitations in mind, the government devised a two-prong strategy of (1) limiting the substantive control of the Brotherhood over public policy and (2) isolating it from its base of support within civil society. The deterioration of the historic alliance of the regime and Brotherhood therefore marks the third period of the Islamist movement’s history in the kingdom, lasting from 1985 – when, for the first time, Jordanian security forces clashed with Islamist agitators – until the present day.²⁷

The first prong, as I have termed it, of the regime’s Islamist strategy became necessary because of King Hussein’s decision to seek peace with his longstanding hostile neighbor, Israel. Facing chilly relations with the West and the Gulf States after refusing to join the military alliance against Iraq in 1991, Jordan saw much of its aid and foreign remittances dry up.²⁸ Fearing the long term consequences of such isolation, Jordan wanted to reengage diplomatically with regional and global powers and thus forestall another fiscal crisis. The path to do so, it reasoned, lay in peace with Israel, a domestically unpopular but politically necessary solution to end Jordan’s international marginalization.

The Muslim Brotherhood, however, viewed the situation differently. For them, such pressure from Western governments was exactly the cause of Jordanian – and, generally, Arab – decline. No Muslim should shirk his religious duty in fighting to restore all of historic Palestine, they insisted, and no government has the right to give any part of Palestine to any non-Arab people.²⁹ The Brotherhood argued that this goal – the appropriation of Arab land to foreign powers – was the true purpose of a peace treaty with Israel and urged Jordanians to protest the government’s participation in the 1991 Madrid peace negotiations and oppose any talk of recognizing the Jewish State.³⁰ This was in one sense an easy argument for the Brotherhood to
make, since its view conformed to that of the Jordanian populace. But it was also a hard decision for it to make as well, as this development marked the first ideological disagreement between the Islamists and the regime. Never before had the Brotherhood, buoyed by popular support, aligned against official priorities.

**Reversing Democratic Trends, the Government Gets Serious**

Since the government considered peace with Israel a top political priority and the solution to its diplomatic woes, it would not tolerate dissent from domestic political forces on this issue – it therefore implemented measures that would limit the power of opposition groups to affect this critical policy.\(^{31}\) Shortly after signaling democratic sympathies by legalizing political parties and liberalizing the nation’s press and association laws, the government would reverse gears by passing the elections law of 1993. According to the regime, this law would enshrine the principle of “one man, one vote” and thus equalize voting rights across the nation. This piece of sophistry, however, fails to grasp that Jordanian voters elect candidates to Parliament through multi-member districts. Accordingly, more populous districts have more representation in Parliament – a district in Amman might have, say, eight members while one in Mafraq may only have two. Applying the “one man, one vote” rule, then, dilutes the value of votes in more populous districts and strengthens votes in more rural areas. Since an Ammani has eight members in Parliament, his one vote signals his preference for only *one-eighth* of his total representation in Parliament. A vote cast by a resident of Mafraq, on the other hand, signals his preference for *one-half* of the same.

What is the point of such “electoral engineering”?\(^{32}\) It is no secret that the regime enjoys greater support – both historically and, to a lesser extent, currently – in rural areas, those mostly populated by Bedouin and native Trans-Jordanian citizens. It is also no secret that the
Brotherhood, consistent with the main opposition parties that came before it, is strongest in urban, populous districts, especially among Palestinians. Given these realities, almost all observers of Jordanian politics, including members of the government, see only one purpose of the 1993 elections law: a legislative weapon the regime could use against the Islamist movement. The regime knew that, in the Jordanian polity, forcing voters to pick only one candidate meant that many would pick a candidate with whom he had a personal connection – a friend, someone from the same tribe or family – above a candidate with whom he agreed on policy. As Glenn Robinson puts it, “making voters choose between [an ideological or tribal candidate] was rightly seen by the government to favor tribal gatherings at the expense of political parties.” This choice hurt the IAF’s candidates in the cities (whose voters, due to gerrymandering, already had a disproportionately small say in the Parliament) as well as in rural areas, resulting in a loss of five seats, down from 22 to 17. Clearly a sign of the regime’s success in engineering a more docile legislature, the Parliament elected in 1993 would ratify the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty the following year.

In addition to marginalizing the Brotherhood in formal forums of power, the regime would also attempt to weaken the movement by displacing it from civil society. By dusting off legislation from the martial law period or crafting new laws that amplified its power, the regime sought to distance the Brotherhood from, in their view, the sources of its popularity. To remove the Brotherhood’s presence in Jordan’s mosques, the government turned to the Preaching and Counseling Law, which holds imams accountable for giving a sermon or “any form of religious preaching” without prior official approval. In 2006, the government seized the Brotherhood-controlled Islamic Center – an umbrella organization in service since 1963 that includes a hospital, orphanage and charity center for the poor – for alleged financial irregularities, a move
"widely seen as heavy-handed political pressure." The regime replaced the Islamists on the Center’s board with officials more friendly to the government’s goals, thereby robbing the Brotherhood of control over an organization central to the dissemination of its Islamic message and that served as a window into popular frustrations.

The regime justified these intrusions into the civil sphere using the Law of Societies and Social Organizations of 1966, a remnant from the martial law era. Its most sweeping provision mandates that a voluntary organization must provide “social services without any intention of financial gains or any other personal gains, including political gains,” a vague phrase exploited by the security services to break up organizations believed to support opposition groups. The predominant targets in the last decade have been associations connected to the Muslim Brotherhood.

Another policy throwback from the martial law period is the regime’s revival of triangulation as a way to contain opposition forces. In other words, the government has recently provided support to groups within the greater Islamist movement as a means of undercutting support for the Muslim Brotherhood. Followers of the salafi movement – a theologically radical but political quietest ideology that closely resembles wahabism – receive today the same perks enjoyed by the Muslim Brotherhood during the 50s, 60s and 70s: exclusive permission to establish a foothold in civil society. The regime hopes – now, just as it did in earlier decades – that by strengthening a different opposition group, its primary competition will suffer. Just as the Muslim Brotherhood drew support from leftists in the 50s and 60s and from the PLO in the 70s, so salafis, the regime calculates, will sap political energy from the Muslim Brotherhood today. Salafis are fellow Islamists and so, the thinking goes, the transition between the groups will be natural, since Islamists of any stripe will likely share the same political outlook and
policy priorities. Less clear, however, is whether the regime has considered the long term consequences of such a strategy. It was, after all, exactly this type of policy that led to the ascendance of the Muslim Brotherhood in the first place. By strengthening one opposition group over another, the regime achieved short term political success through an alliance of convenience. But if the government-supported opposition group does not share a strong ideological attachment to the regime – and it appears the salafis today do not – this policy may backfire in the long term. For now, though, it appears that the state has not progressed beyond the “enemy of my enemy is my friend” political logic.

The government’s efforts against the Islamists did not stop with charity work or the salafis, however. The Ministry of Education also transformed public university student unions from completely elected bodies to ones half elected, half appointed – and even with control over appointees, the regime would still provide overt support to government-approved student candidates and work to prevent the promotion of pro-Brotherhood faculty. These moves – in addition to the firing of all faculty members sympathetic to the Islamists at al-Zarqa private university – created a chilling effect on anti-regime political expression on university campuses, a traditional hotbed of opposition activity.

Most overtly, however, the 2007 national elections witnessed what independent monitoring agencies (as well as the Muslim Brotherhood) have labeled widespread electoral fraud. “An experienced politician, who asked to remain anonymous,” writes Mohammed Abu Rumman, a journalist for Al-Ghad, “points out that the 2007 elections, in part, in process and in result were closer to ‘appointments’ than elections.” Two polling districts in Amman registered an “astronomical” amount of votes cast for businessmen with few ties, either tribal or ideological, to the region. At the same time, some IAF candidates – such as Hayat al-Museimi,
an Islamist representative from Zarqa – received vote totals dramatically lower than previous turnout trends would predict. Adding to suspicions was that the government bussed in truckloads of soldiers to vote in districts where they did not live – presumably for the government-backed candidate – while providing them with false identification cards as a cover up. These moves raised questions over the legitimacy of the 2007 results, in which the IAF dwindled to single digit representation in Parliament.

The brief history above is by no means exhaustive; rather, it highlights issues and events critical for the analysis of the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and the subsequent response from the regime. This timeline contains themes important for the theory I present in this paper, as well as for other interpretations found in the secondary literature. In an attempt to contextualize the former within the latter, the next section will review the scholarly debate over the rise of political Islam in Jordan and analyze in what ways my theory departs from, accepts or amalgamates the main arguments pertaining to this topic.

Literature Review

Broadly speaking, there are two schools of thought regarding the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. The first emphasizes the Brotherhood’s dominance in civil society, specifically the political benefits that attend such dominance. The second school disagrees, holding that the content of the Brotherhood’s message – not its ability to disseminate it – is the more important factor. Within this second school are two variations: arguments that emphasize the value of the Islamic message in the Brotherhood’s popularity and those that emphasize the Palestinian issue. My theory attempts to split the difference, arguing that the rise is due to the combination of these trends.
Benefits from Civil Society

One iteration of the argument of the first school is found in Glenn Robinson’s excellent article, “Defensive Democratization in Jordan,” where he argues that the Brotherhood’s success in the 1989 Parliamentary elections stems from the movement’s involvement in civil society. Robinson contends that “the suddenness of the decision to hold elections [in 1989] after such a long interregnum, the brief duration of the permitted campaign period, and the prohibition of political parties greatly benefited previously organized groups. As a result, candidates associated with the long-standing Muslim Brotherhood… were particularly successful.”48 While political parties had been banned during the martial law period, the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliated organizations were allowed to continue operating. Since it had spent decades providing social services by the time of the 1989 election, the Brotherhood had in place a sophisticated network of supporters that showed up on election day. Leftist and Ba’athist political parties, by contrast, had atrophied after years of inaction. In this way, the Brotherhood’s widespread charity work set the groundwork for its success in the 1989 elections.

In response, a critic could argue here that success at the polls is only an indicator of prior political popularity: penetration into civil society may have helped the Muslim Brotherhood win elections, but that fact alone does not fully explain the movement’s underlying popularity. In other words, Robinson’s argument may answer how the Brotherhood won elections (party organization) but has ignored the reasons why. To successfully make their case, advocates of this view must offer more evidence that it is the Brotherhood’s involvement in civil society – and this factor alone – that accounts for its political growth over the last four decades.

In response, the civil society advocate would point to different political benefits, besides voter mobilization, that stem from civil society penetration. First, the Brotherhood’s
involvement in civil society won the movement a reservoir of popular affection from Jordan’s poor and middle classes. This development becomes clear after contrasting the Muslim Brotherhood’s capable and extensive provision of social services with the spotty and meager work of rival political groups, including the government. Since neither political parties (since they were banned) nor the state apparatus (which was under-funded) set up benefits for Jordan’s poor, urban, mostly Palestinian population during the martial law period, the Brotherhood’s monopoly over charity work earned the movement “social credit” with this demographic at the expense of rival groups. At the same time, the Brotherhood’s work with hospitals and orphanages built up political capital with richer segments of society as well. In the zero-sum world of Jordanian politics, a loss by one group is a gain by another: as the Brotherhood’s opponents dithered and failed to address popular concerns, the Islamists’ competent social work and political grounding stood in stark contrast. While the government and leftists came off as aloof from popular woes, the Brotherhood’s extensive outreach through mosques, community centers, schools and charity organizations showed voters which group genuinely cared about their interests.

Second, in addition to earning the movement goodwill, these social organizations acted as forums where the Brotherhood could communicate with the people and the people could communicate with the Brotherhood – a necessary development for any functioning political party. According to Quintan Wiktorowicz, such communication facilitated the Brotherhood’s “production, articulation and dissemination of values” – values born from “daily interaction” with the people and that thus fell in line with popular concerns. This link with the people simultaneously allowed the movement to spread its Islamist message and to hear the people’s frustrations. Without this connection – and also without the accompanying social services – rival
groups to the Brotherhood, i.e. leftist parties and the government, became discredited. For Jordanian voters, only one party listened to their concerns and delivered on their promises. In this way, the Brotherhood earned the people’s trust and crafted an uncorrupted, “we’re on your side” public perception. According to adherents of the first school of thought, then, these are the reasons the Brotherhood’s involvement in civil society propelled the movement to political ascendancy.

The arguments advanced by the first school also pertain to the effectiveness of the regime’s response to the Brotherhood. Judging by the government’s strategy, in fact, it appears the regime itself subscribes to the first school’s position. The regime’s methods of combating the Muslim Brotherhood – e.g. seizing the Islamic Center charity, regulating sermons, restricting the registration of new organizations through the enforcement of martial law ordinances – seek to remove the group from participation in Jordanian associational life. Since these tactics reflect a strategy of distancing the Brotherhood from civil society, the government must then implicitly believe that participation in civil society is the cause of the Brotherhood’s popularity in the first place, or at least the only cause it can effectively combat. Whether, in fact, such a policy has succeeded in containing the movement’s popularity is an ideal, empirical experiment in political science: if after displacing the Brotherhood from civil society the movement’s support dries up, then its presence in civil society is, in fact, the sufficient condition for its political ascendance; if, however, displacing the Brotherhood from civil society has little or no effect on the Brotherhood’s popularity, some other variable must also be responsible for its popularity.

The Islamic Ideology

As it turns out, proponents of the second school of thought believe exactly that. These scholars agree with some of the premises of their colleagues in the first school but arrive at
different conclusions. They concede that Jordanian politics are zero-sum, that a gain for one
group is a loss for another, and also that the Brotherhood’s public perception was critical to their
success. They disagree, however, that the most important variable explaining the rise of the
Muslim Brotherhood is its presence in civil society. In their view, the movement’s ideology and
rhetoric are more important. Philip Robins argues this position in a 1990 article published in
Middle East Report.51 There, he rejects Robinson’s contention that party organization was a
major contributor to the Brotherhood’s electoral success in 1989:

“Some candidates and many supporters of groups like the communists... were in prison or in
hiding until barely two months before the election. Nevertheless, such groups did better than most
observers expected. By contrast, liberal groupings... which [had] operated openly for 10 years,
made little electoral impact and took no seats.”52

Rather than stemming from party organization, the Brotherhood’s strong showing was due to its
public perception as uncorrupted, clean and competent – something that Robins, departing from
the first school of thought, claims is derived from the popular consensus that Islamists best
shared the people’s values. In the minds of Jordanian voters, members of the Brotherhood “were
identified as not being part of the ‘ancien regime’” because of their past criticism of government
policy. By sharing “the same simple, often frugal, lifestyle of their constituents,” Islamist
candidates impressed the public and won their trust.53 For Robins, it is thus the content of the
Brotherhood’s message – not the ability to disseminate it – that explains the movement’s rise.

For Jordanian academics, however, Robins’s argument presents only a superficial
explanation for the rise of political Islam: for them, all the argument shows is that Islamists did
well because Islam itself was popular.54 Unsatisfied with such an answer, local scholars take the
argument one step further. Looking at recent history, they analyze why Islam had political
currency in the first place.
Their answer lies in the resiliency of conservative Arab values – values that went unchallenged in the modern political discourse of the Middle East and that, as a result, still represent potent political symbols. As discussed earlier, the late 1970s and 80s witnessed a regional revival of religion that combined personal observance of Islam with a greater acceptance of Islamic discourse in the public sphere, a trend best expressed by the 1979 Iranian revolution. Both before and after that event, however, avowedly “secular” Arab regimes turned to Islamic symbols during times of crisis to shore up their own domestic support: during the Iran-Iraq war, for example, Saddam Hussein added “allah akbar” to the Iraqi flag, while during his own crisis Syrian Ba’athist President Hafez al-Assad made a point of praying publicly. Thus, while the Islamic movement was opposed, challenged and marginalized in Assad’s Syria and Saddam’s Iraq, Islamic values and culture were not – on the contrary, they represented a reservoir of support for these regimes during politically difficult times. Thus, even within ostensibly “secular” polities, Islamic values and symbols remained potent political commodities. Because the Muslim Brotherhood was the most credible advocate of the Islamist position, it benefited from the uncontested strength of conservative, religious values. As Glen Robinson explains:

“Allah akbar” not only helped the Brotherhood win elections: long before any votes were cast, the Brotherhood was on the right side of the most enduring political symbol in the region – a position that allowed the movement to make gains against what the people considered “secular”, “non-Islamic” alternatives.
The Palestinian Issue

In another wrinkle to the first school-second school debate, many observers find the division in Jordan between citizens of Trans-Jordanian (i.e. East Bank) origin and citizens of Palestinian (i.e. West Bank) origin inescapable. This persistent question of identity will arise in any discussion of Jordanian politics, they say, and the question of the ascendance of political Islam is no exception. This position, as we will see, holds that a certain type of content in the Brotherhood’s rhetoric accounts for its rise, which, applying my earlier distinction, places it into the second school’s camp.

Two authors, Glenn Robinson and Philip Robins, attribute the popularity of political Islam – and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular – to its ability to neutralize the salience of the Palestinian-Jordanian divide. Robinson’s crystal-clear formulation of this position deserves quotation at length:

“The Muslim Brotherhood has been the only organization in Jordan that Palestinian activists can join and work for a political agenda while at the same time avoiding the label ‘Palestinian.’ Unlike any other Jordanian organization, the Muslim Brotherhood and the IAF have had numerous Palestinians in the upper echelons of leadership, yet these individuals generally have not been known politically in Jordan as Palestinians.”

In the Jordanian polity, the “Palestinian label” carries debilitating connotations for any group, party or policy attached to it. The Muslim Brotherhood, however, has largely avoided this fate, despite its unabashedly pro-Palestinian political inclination:

“The Muslim Brotherhood is the only party in Jordan that effectively integrates Palestinian interests without the political baggage of Palestinian ethnicity. No other organization that overtly espouses a Palestinian nationalist agenda and that is seen to be a legitimate political player in Jordanian affairs by East Bankers exists (or has existed) in Jordan. The Muslim Brotherhood, then, has carried with it legitimacy in the eyes of East Bankers – even those who oppose its agenda – that an overtly Palestinian party never could.”

As such, the Muslim Brotherhood enjoys a resilience that no other party can claim. Since the early 1990s, when the regime began seriously discussing rapprochement with Israel, the
Palestinian issue has carried renewed salience in the Jordanian political discourse – specifically as a popular wedge issue against the government. Robinson and others cite this development as the main explanation for the Brotherhood’s continuing popularity in the recent past. Because the Brotherhood provides Palestinians with a legitimate public forum in which they can discuss Palestinian issues, the movement over the last decade has enjoyed consistent support.

**My Theory: Bridging the Gap**

I have included this discussion and analysis of the literature on the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan in order to contextualize my own research. Through my interviews with members of the Brotherhood, decision-makers in the regime as well as journalists and academics, I have developed my own theory that attempts to reconcile the first and second schools mentioned above. My paper seeks to incorporate the ideas of both camps, holding that positive values on three dependent variables – (1) presence in civil society, (2) a credible Islamic message and (3) the ability to empower Palestinians – account for positive value on my independent variable, the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. It is important to note that, in including all three of these dependent variables, I am rebuking the notion that the two schools of thought are somehow mutually exclusive. Only by incorporating both of their perspectives, I maintain, do we gain a comprehensive view of the political factors that brought the Brotherhood to prominence in Jordan. Excluding a few hard-liners on either side of the issue, my interviewees established a consensus that the rise of Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan stems *both* from its extensive civil society network – and all of the attendant political benefits – as well as from the content of its political rhetoric.
Findings

As mentioned earlier, I included the debate within the literature and the history of the Brotherhood in Jordan to set neutral points of reference for the arguments advanced by my interviewees. Coming from diverse backgrounds, and sometimes from opposite ends of the political spectrum, the participants differed on which political events deserved more or less credit in explaining the Brotherhood’s rise. What follows, then, is an attempt to analyze their views, which, together, roughly agree that the movement’s ascendance stems from two factors: (1) the Brotherhood’s presence in civil society and (2) its resonant Islamic message. More controversial among my sample is my third dependent variable – the Brotherhood’s connection to the Palestinian issue – which members of the government see as an important factor in the movement’s rise but that members of the Brotherhood and the IAF vigorously deny. Their reasons for doing so will be discussed later. For now, however, I will review my interviewees’ perspectives towards the major issues found in the literature.

Civil Society: A Potent Force or Non-Issue?

During our meetings, members of the Islamic Action Front (or IAF, the political party offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood) tended to dismiss the civil society explanation for the rise of their movement. For them, such an explanation is “what the government thinks,” a cynical, materialist argument that implies a low view of their Jordanian supporters and that denies the inherent truth and power of the Islamic message. Hamza Mansour – a senior member of the Islamist party and sitting member of Parliament – best represents this view, taking the opportunity during our interview to “clarify a big lie said by the government: that charity and working in the field is the main reason why the IAF has gotten to be part of the Parliament.” The “real reasons” for their rise, he argued, are that the IAF “expresses the conscience of the
people,” that their “outlook is comprehensive since it covers every aspect of Jordanian life,” and, third, that they “are close with the people and share with them their daily life.”

But looking at his last reason, why do the people consider the IAF “close” with them in the first place? Adopting a less ideological position than their colleague, two other members of the IAF – Rehail Gharibeh and Hayat al-Museimi – concede that the answer lies in the movement’s activities in civil society. “The government thought that by controlling the most popular social services center, the Islamic Center, they were getting control of the IAF,” Gharibeh told me. “This is because the IAF gets its popularity from its social work, and that’s why [the government] controls it in an illegal way.” Hayat al-Museimi agrees on the motivation behind the government’s seizure: the security services “lied and said financial and administrative problems” were why they took control, she said, “but the real reason was because we were helping the people who stood with us in the election.” Both of these comments are instructive because they reveal, despite Mansour’s protestation to the contrary, that members of the IAF see political significance in their work in civil society. The way that the Brotherhood and the IAF demonstrate that they “stand with the people” and share their values is by communicating with and helping them through the movement’s affiliated organizations. To illustrate this point, Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat told me an “Egyptian joke”: “A Nasserist Egyptian official approached a member of the Brotherhood there and told him that the government had no way of competing with the Islamists for the public’s affection. ‘That is because you see them five times a day,’ he said ‘while we see them at most only once a week!’” The pun here is that, through their presence in the mosque, the Brotherhood can indeed communicate with the people “five times a day.” Meetings of the Nasserite socialist party, on the other hand, only take place “once a week.” Local academic Mohammed al-Momany agrees with this view, arguing that the
Brotherhood’s extensive (and hitherto protected) sphere of activity in civil society allowed the movement to forge a close bond with the people.⁶⁴

The arguments from my interviewees here corroborate the first school’s account. Following Wiktorowicz, they point to the importance of “daily interaction” with the people, which the Brotherhood achieves though its presence in the mosques and other public forums, as the “Egyptian joke” demonstrates. Even Mansour himself seems willing to admit this much: after the regime’s move to displace the Brotherhood from civil society, he was pessimistic that the IAF could in the short term “restore its link with the people” that had been severed by the government.⁶⁵ By facilitating dialogue with the people – and thus creating an uncorrupted, “we share your values” public perception, as scholars from the first school maintain – the Brotherhood’s work in civil society, according to al-Momany and members of the IAF, explains the enduring support for the party in Jordan.

It is unsurprising, then, that IAF members are troubled by the regime’s recent moves to uproot the Brotherhood from its historical presence in civil society. Musa Hantash, a failed IAF candidate in 2007, as well as his colleagues Gharibeh and al-Museimi echo Mansour’s fears that this tactic has, if only temporarily, succeeded in distancing the party from the people and thus undercut its base of support. Gharibeh concedes that the move has had a “negative effect,” preventing the movement from “talking with the people.” Hantash laments that “no longer can we organize and present the public’s complaints.”⁶⁶ This development, they said, has hampered their ability to communicate with the people, removing one pillar from their winning formula.

**Islam as Ideology**

Despite this setback in the civil society sphere, members of the IAF remain confident in the strength of Islamic values, something that, as an Islamist party, they can credibly espouse.
Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat, former Secretary General of the IAF and Speaker of the Parliament, maintains that, unlike communism or Ba’athism, Islam is an ideology that comes from “within” Jordan. “You have to think about who we are,” Dr. Arabiyyat told me. “We are not foreigners; we are from the heart of the people. Socialism and communism are from abroad. We represent the origin, the faith, the philosophy of the people.”67 His colleague, Rehail Gharibeh, agrees, pointing to the enduring strength of the Islamic “idea”: “the IAF believes in an idea,” he said, “and the idea always persists and is sustained forever. The regime, however, works with certain people, and certain people will one day change.”68 These arguments imply that the Islamic message promoted by the IAF contains some sort of added political resiliency above and beyond the concrete work the movement does in civil society.

Looking at history, however, these same members concede that the Islamic “idea” was not always this potent. As mentioned earlier, the Brotherhood posted anemic showings in the elections of the 1950s and 60s, losing badly to the more popular leftist and pan-Arab Nasserist parties. Members of the IAF concede that Nasser’s overwhelming popularity left little space for the Brotherhood in Jordan to gain political traction. But they also consider other factors important as well. In al-Musemi’s view, the Brotherhood’s weakness stemmed from a popular misunderstanding of Islam’s place in society. At that time, “Islam was taught to the people as a tough religion, [as something only consisting] of religious and moral obligations,” she said. “They didn’t teach the real Islam.” For al-Museimi the “real Islam” means a more comprehensive Islam – a holistic religious perspective that touches on economic, social and, most importantly, political issues.69 In the 50s and 60s, “the people tried to separate Islam and politics, so that I could be a good Muslim but [could still] choose a different orientation” than Islamism, she said. “People now understand that Islam is for public and private life.”70
Later, the dynamics that propelled pan-Arab and leftist parties into prominence – discussed in depth in the earlier history section – would reverse. The failure of the leftist regimes to defend Arab lands (exemplified by the 1967 defeat) and to lift up the Arab masses (exemplified by the recessionary Egyptian and Syrian economies) eroded their public support and discredited their political ideology. Before these setbacks, “the people tried to see whether the [leftist] solutions would work,” al-Museimi argued. “They gave them space to try their solutions.” 71 These failures, however, exhausted the people’s patience, both in leftist countries and abroad. With “Arab Socialism” discredited and Palestinian nationalism in decline after a few brief years in ascendance, political Islam took center stage in Jordanian politics. “Nasserism was deflated by losses in 1967 and 1973, as were other Palestinian groups,” contends Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat. The leftists “claimed something and didn’t achieve anything, and at the same time of the declining of these socialist parties, there was the rise of the Islamist party.” 72 As this account makes clear, the eroding credibility of leftists abroad offered a political opening fully embraced by the Brotherhood. 73

More was at work politically, however, than the mere decline of Arab Socialism: in order for the Brotherhood to gain from the leftists’ fall, the movement had to offer a legitimate alternative to Nasserist failures. As mentioned earlier, Jordanian academics hold that the Brotherhood gained political prominence because of the resiliency of conservative religious values. 74 Even leftist regimes, such as those of Saddam Hussein and Hafez al-Assad, exploited these values during times of crisis in order to shore up their own domestic support. And even if they did oppose the Islamist movement and repress its members, no serious Arab political figure or ideology challenged Islamist values. 75 Left intact by these “secular” Arab regimes, Islamic symbols remained potent in Arab political discourse throughout modern Middle Eastern history.
Not only, then, did Islamists offer a chance for Arabs to turn the page on the disastrous failures of the leftists; it also provided a compelling rationale of its own, one that drew on symbols dear to the people and whose political value had not diminished over the last fifty years.\textsuperscript{76}

Members of the IAF largely corroborate this account, adding that \textit{only} they – the \textit{true} advocates of the Islamic position, not leftists engaging in political posturing – benefited from this trend. Voters, they said, can tell the difference between candidates that hold substantive Islamic values and those that merely parrot such rhetoric and use religion as a tool for their own gain. Rehail Gharibeh argued that the “Muslim public is able to differentiate between those who are committed to Islam and those who are raising the motto just for their own sake.”\textsuperscript{77} Hayat al-Museimi put it more bluntly: “the people can distinguish between real and false Muslims.”\textsuperscript{78} Hamza Mansour agreed, offering an additional explanation. The IAF is “not using Islam; we are living Islam! We are more credible [in this regard] because we don’t use religion for certain purposes but rather implement it into everything [we do].”\textsuperscript{79} Despite this caveat, these IAF figures have no quarrel with the main thrust of the argument: with conservative, religious values dominant, the Muslim Brotherhood, as an Islamist party with a credible Islamist message, was best positioned to ride this wave into political ascendancy.

Either through articulating a message that fit neatly into regional trends, then, or benefiting from a credibility gap vis-à-vis leftist and Palestinian nationalist parties, the political potency of the Islamist brand propelled the Muslim Brotherhood to prominence. My interviewees acknowledge both of these trends as important causal factors in Brotherhood’s rise. Returning to an earlier distinction, then, these arguments fit into the second school, as they posit that the message of the Brotherhood had a greater impact than did its work in civil society.
Adnan Abu Odeh advances an argument along the same lines. He maintains that the Brotherhood’s associational presence cannot alone be the cause of its political ascendance. While providing charity work and other services to the public did, in fact, earn the Brotherhood goodwill, it cannot explain the movement’s rising popularity because, as Abu Odeh points out, leftists provided their own type of social services, which earned *them* goodwill as well. With support from their patrons abroad, socialists in Jordan gave scholarships to study in Russia and Eastern Europe to men who would not otherwise be able to attend university, “something more serious than the Brotherhood’s ‘charity.’”

For Abu Odeh, the leftists’ social work shows that civil society alone is not a sufficient condition for the rise of the Brotherhood in Jordan. Instead, Abu Odeh subscribes to second school-type arguments, albeit ones that use linguistic evidence that no Western analyst has ever before considered. While the decline of the leftists was important in the Brotherhood’s rise, it was not all important. Their weakness, in a manner of speaking, opened a door for the movement but could not make them walk through. That, Abu Odeh maintains, was achieved by the Brotherhood’s credibility with the people, which, for him, stemmed from their Islamic rhetoric. The word for reform in Arabic, *yasaleh*, is close to another word – *saleh* – that has linguistic connotations that reinforce the Brotherhood’s religious credentials. Abu Odeh points out that *saleh* can also mean straightforward or pious – attributes that the Brotherhood seeks to emphasize in crafting their public perception. He insists that “to the mind of the ordinary voter, the Muslim Brotherhood is closer to reform than anyone else because of this psychological connection.”

Through subtle political imagery, the Brotherhood reinforced its reform *bona fides* and earned the confidence of the people, a development that helped cement its status as the dominant political organization in Jordan.
Palestinian Politics

As mentioned earlier, Glenn Robinson argues that the IAF has enjoyed enduring popularity over the past decade for its ability to advocate a hard-line position on Palestinian issues without carrying the attendant Palestinian “political baggage.” The IAF refuses to compromise on issues such as normalization with Israel and recognition of Hamas, but, unlike other pro-Palestinian outfits, still manages to enjoy legitimacy in the eyes of East Bank Jordanians. This development did not come about by accident. The IAF, for example, selects candidates in rural districts by two criteria: allegiance to the Islamist position and also, for the sake of electability, a local tribal affiliation. Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat also admitted that, in the same vein, Palestinians within the Brotherhood leadership always push for an East Banker to lead the IAF, presumably a way to further distance the party from the Palestinian political label. Robinson sees this strategy as decisive in sustaining the IAF’s support.

My research found that, despite the force of these arguments, members of the IAF deny Robinson’s view. Without exception, every Islamist I talked to stressed that ethnicity plays no part whatsoever in their position on the Palestinian issue. Rehail Gharibeh even went so far as to say that “Islam calls for union of different peoples and an end to discrimination. Our party’s goal is to fight discrimination based on race.” At the same time, however, they stress that Islam demands solidarity against oppression and that a good Muslim must stand with other Muslims in fighting occupation. While many members of the party have “Palestinian origins or relatives living in Palestine,” Hayat al-Museimi said, embracing the “Palestinian issue is for us something that comes from our religion.”

On the other hand, members of the government that I interviewed seem to subscribe to Robinson’s argument. Adnan Abu Odeh thinks it is “true,” only adding that since Islam, as a
religion, “transcends nationalism, sectarianism and ethnicity,” Islamists can clothe their arguments with universal concepts and still convey a very particular platform – i.e., an uncompromising hostility toward the peace process.\textsuperscript{86} It thus makes sense for the IAF to deny Robinson’s argument: if they did not and chose to descend into ethnic politics, they would lose the advantage of high-minded universality that their Islamic discourse confers. Also, as the PLO moderated on the Palestinian issue – as illustrated by its acceptance of the Oslo accords – the Brotherhood, which has never wavered from its hard-line stance, brought more radical Palestinians into its fold.\textsuperscript{87} Abu Odah’s arguments here completely accept Robinson’s overall storyline, adding only a few more details to flush out the position and show why the IAF has political incentives in denying it.

**Regime Response: Successful?**

All my interviewees – whether from the IAF, the government or the halls of academia – agreed that the regime has succeeded in marginalizing the power of the IAF in formal political forums. The 1993 electoral law and the principle of “one man, one vote” have succeeded in electing fewer Islamists to Parliament, as seen by their decreasing presence in 2003 as compared to 1993 – they boycotted in 1997 – and again in 2007 as compared to 2003. As Abu Odeh put it, “the Brotherhood’s number in the Parliament is [enough] evidence of the effectiveness” of these measures.\textsuperscript{88} While labeling the election law “illegal” and “unjust,” members of the IAF nonetheless come to same conclusion: “it has decreased the number of our friends in Parliament.”\textsuperscript{89}

Equally unanimous is the view that the regime has succeeded in displacing the Brotherhood from civil society, which has in turn hurt the movement politically. According to Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat, it was social reform and charity work that brought the Brotherhood into
politics, and so by removing it from these arenas, the government has caught the movement off
guard. This development also concerns current members of the IAF, who lament the lack of
communication with the people and its subsequent implications for the party’s popularity.
Despite recognizing this tactic’s effectiveness, however, Jordanian Islamists remain optimistic.
Hayat al-Museimi insists that the movement is

“like flowers everywhere in the soil. The government should believe that we are in the hearts and
minds of the people... We have members of the party who view talking to people and helping the
party as religious duties, like fasting or praying. We are talking with our family, friends and
colleagues, so if [the government is] trying to prevent us from talking, we will find another way to
do so.”

Despite a sanguine attitude, al-Museimi’s comments here imply that the government prevented
the IAF from talking with the people in the first place, which is the direct result of the regime’s
emphasis on removing the movement from civil society.

While my IAF interviewees have come to expect political gamesmanship from the regime
and subtle forms of repression, they were taken aback by the overt government interference
displayed in the 2007 national election. By bussing in friendly voters, issuing them false
identification cards and tampering with final vote totals, the government went to unprecedented
lengths in marginalizing the Brotherhood. Speaking of these measures, Hayat al-Museimi
remarked that those in the IAF “didn’t think things would become as bad as they were.” Given
the recent fractious history between the IAF and the regime, however, one would think the
movement would anticipate any and all attacks against it. Yet until 2007, the IAF-regime
relationship had not descended into a state of all-out war. There was, in fact, a widespread belief
inside the IAF that the government respected the movement’s contribution to Jordanian society.
King Hussein “said that [the Brotherhood] is an essential part of society, and so we can’t exclude
it from the country,” reported Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat, one of the Islamist movement’s more
senior leaders. “The King recognized our party, showed us respect and recognized our work
when we met him." One unfortunate result of the 2007 elections, however, is that Arabiyyat’s faith in the government seems to be disappearing among younger members of the IAF. Neither Gharibeh, al-Museimi nor Mansour was willing to attribute to the government the same good intentions as Arabiyyat was. Perhaps this stems from another development the IAF has become aware of: the government’s sponsorship of rival groups within the Islamist movement to undercut their base of support.

Academics and interviewees associated with the government, however, point to a different development as representative of the deteriorating relationship between the regime and the IAF. The party’s support for Hamas in the wake of its 2006 victory in Palestinian elections “scared the regime,” according to Mohammed al-Momany. “That’s why the government shifted from tolerating to cracking down on the Islamists.” Adnan Abu Odeh agrees. A fear that “the Hamas model” would spread into Jordan, he says, prompted the regime to take harsher steps against the Brotherhood. One of these steps included taking their own fears public: in its official rhetoric, the government began accusing the Jordanian Brotherhood of being in league with foreign Islamist forces such as Hamas and Hezbollah. The Brotherhood’s own hard-line foreign policy played into the hands of this critique, proof for journalist Mohammed Abu Rumman of the validity of the government’s account: “one finds that the Brotherhood’s interests are aligned with those of the Hamas movement. Their interests lie also in an alliance with Iran, Syria and Hezbollah in confronting what the Brotherhood considers ‘the American Plan for the Middle East.’” Additionally, after watching the civil war rage between Hamas and Fateh for control of the Palestinian Authority and grimacing at the authoritarian character of Hamas’s rule over Gaza, Jordanians began to view the Palestinian Islamists in a negative light. By connecting the Brotherhood to Hamas (and, more distantly, to Hezbollah), the regime succeeded
in undercutting the movement’s popularity, sowing fears that the Brotherhood would bring about the same type of instability seen in Palestine and Lebanon.

Adnan Abu Odeh identifies another way the regime has successfully morphed the perception of Brotherhood – one that, like the Hamas charge, cuts into the base of the movement’s support. Abu Odeh argues that the 2006 seizure of the Islamic Center serves the government’s goals in two important ways. First, as discussed earlier, it removes the Brotherhood from its presence in civil society, which in turn robs it of a public forum from which the movement can disseminate its popular-based political platform. Second, and more important, charging the Brotherhood’s organization with financial impropriety directly undercuts the Islamist movement’s perception as uncorrupted and clean. “The fact that [the government] arrested the Islamic Center board members was an attempt to discredit their “yasalleh” [i.e. reform-minded] reputation,” argues Abu Odeh. The charges of fraud show that Islamists “can cheat the government too.”100 By directly attacking the Brotherhood’s strength – its public perception as uncorrupted, pious, straightforward, saleh – the government neutralized an important aspect of its successful mass appeal.

Conclusion

What do all these developments mean? Into what larger context do they fall? Drawing on the secondary source literature and my interviews in the field, I argue that three dependent variables – (1) presence in civil society, (2) a resonant Islamic message and (3) a strong Palestinian component – explain the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, my independent variable. Because the regime has responded to the Brotherhood by addressing only one of these variables – the Brotherhood’s presence in civil society – it has achieved partial, but not complete, success in diminishing the movement’s popular support. The Brotherhood suffered tremendous
losses in the 2007 national election, when its membership in Parliament shrunk to single digits, a
debutation not much bigger than that of the Brotherhood during the nadir of its power in the
1950s and 60s. Because of widespread electoral fraud and gerrymandered districts, however,
representation in Parliament does not accurately reflect popular support. Yet according to
opinion polls, Jordanian support for the Brotherhood, while still higher than that for any other
opposition party, has dropped slightly over the past few years.101

This is consistent with the theory I have presented in the preceding pages: by attacking
only one source of its support, namely its presence in civil society, the regime has achieved only
partial success in diminishing the Brotherhood’s popularity. Although official propaganda
stresses the Hashemite’s religious credentials – emphasizing, for example, its role in fomenting
the 1916 Arab Revolt and reminding the people of their the monarchy’s historic role as the
Guardian (sharif) of the holy sites in the Hejaz – the government cannot compete effectively with
the IAF on the issue of who is more Islamic.102 The regime’s efforts, for example, to sponsor
Koranic memorization contests fell flat.103 This particular failure, however, represents a more
general trend: the IAF has consistently outmaneuvered the regime on its religious credentials.
As a result, the IAF remains today the most credible Islamist political organization in Jordan.

At the same time, the Islamists’ strength on the Palestinian question has gone
unchallenged. The continued marginalization of Palestinians from political power – through
gerrymandered Parliamentary districts that give added weight to rural areas and unwritten
discrimination in public sector employment and university admissions, to name just two areas –
has kept the issue alive.104 As mentioned earlier, moderation on the Palestinian question by both
the Jordanian monarchy (which signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1994) and the PLO (which
accepted the 1996 Oslo Accords) pushed more radical Palestinians into the IAF fold. And
although this advantage was mitigated slightly by the declining popularity of Hamas, the
Brotherhood as an Islamist party still enjoys the ability to discuss Palestinian issues without the
accompanying Palestinian political baggage. These developments, joined in tandem, have
handed the Islamists in Jordan a major asset: reliable support from the nation’s large Palestinian
populace.

The government’s strategy against the Brotherhood – which only involves decreasing its
presence in civil society – ignores these two sources of its popular support. Through its failure to
compete with the Brotherhood on the issue of its Islamic credentials as well as its refusal to
engage Islamists on the Palestinian issue, the regime has left intact two pillars of the movement’s
popularity. As such, we have seen only a marginal reduction in the movement’s support, a
development that has not changed the overall power dynamics in Jordan.105 While weaker today
than it was five years ago, the Brotherhood still remains the kingdom’s only functional
opposition party.106

Suggestions for Further Research

In the course of writing this paper, I have come across some issues that, to my
knowledge, have not yet been thoroughly discussed in the Western literature. The first involves
the appropriation of religious symbols by supposedly “secular” Arab dictators, such as Saddam
Hussein and Hafez al-Assad. I maintain that the use of these symbols by this type of leader calls
into question the scholarly consensus that radical leftists (e.g. pan-Arabists and Ba’athists) were
actually “secular” parties, as they are now classified. Insofar as their political programs lacked
an overt Islamic rationale, this characterization is of course accurate: Arab socialism, like its
European equivalent, eliminates religion’s role in the state, since the guiding political philosophy
is by definition atheistic. If, on the other hand, we attempt to label Saddam and al-Assad’s
political discourse – i.e. the symbols they emphasized, the rhetoric they employed – as “secular,” then perhaps we must coin a new term, since these “secular” regimes plainly invoke Islamic terms and ideas. The literature, then, must take into account the persistence of Islam as a potent political symbol – itself a factor in the Brotherhood’s rise in Jordan – even within polities with non-religious discursive frameworks.

A second interesting but unexplored issue is the ironic path of the Brotherhood’s political ascendance. The movement’s penetration into Jordan’s associational life – a development that Wiktorowicz and others consider to have propelled the Brotherhood to prominence – was a direct result of earlier regime policy. By encouraging Islamists to establish a base in civil society after the expulsion of the PLO in 1971, the regime unknowingly planted the seeds that would grow into its future opposition.

Finally, my research clarifies the substantive commitment of the Jordanian regime to political liberalization, a point on which some in the Western literature have waffled. Despite the formal advances in the nation’s democratization – the country holds regular elections, has a functioning Parliament as well as a plethora of political parties – Jordan’s system remains fundamentally authoritarian. Power resides in an unelected, unaccountable monarchy and in particular one that has recently leaned more heavily on its security services than in earlier periods. As for its commitment to electoral integrity, a central tenet of democracy, the accusations against the government during the 2007 national election (which are likely true given the independent groups leveling the charges) demonstrate the limited extent of Jordan’s liberalization project. Unfortunately, it appears that the regime today has not moved very far from the days of its unabashed exercise of authoritarian power to quash its political foes.
Relatively speaking, however, Jordanians still enjoy a high level of political expression within their remarkably stable kingdom.

In the years ahead, this tension between increasing political liberalization – a development the King himself views as inevitable – and the regime’s authoritarian instincts will likely continue. Such ambiguity will unfortunately shed no light on Jordan’s existential quandary, as modernization in Jordan is still incomplete. What role the IAF will play in a “modern” Jordan depends, of course, on the regime. Continuing its present policy would suggest that the regime considers the Islamist platform and a liberal state mutually exclusive. If the regime decides on a more substantive commitment to democracy, however, then the Islamists, too, should take their place as an integral partner in Jordan’s future.

Methodology

In analyzing the ascendance of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and the regime’s subsequent response, my research drew from two main sources: materials from the secondary literature, mostly books and articles from academic journals, and interviews with journalists, academics and members of the IAF and government. Since the first source requires no further methodological explanation and comprised a minority of the information that I used in my paper, this section will focus on the second.

My first methodological decision was to choose a qualitative study over a quantitative one. This choice meant that I would primarily use the informed opinions and impressions of my participant sample, instead of hard numbers or graphs, to develop my conclusions. This choice stemmed mostly from the character of my topic, which, as a complex political phenomenon, hinges on variables that are difficult to exactly quantify. To get richer, more useful data, I opted to use qualitative methods of analysis.
I also designed my study to paint a holistic portrait of the political forces at work in the political ascendance of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. To do this, I would need to draw upon many different perspectives, a goal that I hope my final theory – which incorporates the views of academics, members of the government and the IAF – has achieved. In order to preserve analytical continuity – and avoid messy *ad hoc* explanations of the phenomenon – I demanded that my hypothesis use the same variables to explain both the Brotherhood’s rise *and* the effectiveness of the regime’s response. Again, I hope that my final theory – which uses the same one independent variable and three dependent variables throughout the entire paper – has succeeded in this regard. With the exception of Glenn Robinson’s excellent article, most theories from the Western literature present one of my dependent variables (say, penetration of civil society) as the *only* variable that explains the phenomenon.\(^{108}\) In my opinion, this approach impoverishes our understanding of political Islam in Jordan, as it fails to grasp the whole political picture.

With a holistic explanation as my *modus operandi*, I designed survey instruments that, while limiting the interview to a few specific sub-topics, did not force the participants to answer in one of a set number of ways. In other words, my interviews used open-ended but pre-figured questions. Because of the complexity of the topic and the diversity of the opinions regarding it, open ended questions gave the interviewees enough space to articulate their own perspective. After hearing their general ideas about the topic, however, I moved on to more specific questions: I asked them to evaluate theories I had encountered in the literature on the rise of and response to the political ascendance of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. Even when discussing these more specific subjects, my questions remained open-ended. My strategy was to lay out a theory and then ask them whether they “agreed or disagreed.” Given that about the
same number of interviewees agreed with a certain theory as disagreed, I think this strategy succeeded in avoiding bias for one answer. While the interview questions differed slightly depending on the interviewee – members of the government were asked more questions about the regime’s thinking, while members of the IAF were asked to comment on the inner deliberations of the party, for example – the questions remained generally the same from participant to participant. My goal was to solicit deep, rich answers on a specific set of topics.

As is the case with any qualitative researcher, the safety and comfort of my participants was my top priority. I worked hard to avoid offending a culture that has so graciously hosted me over the last three months. With that said, however, I decided to forego an Informed Consent Form because I thought the paperwork might inadvertently confer a sterile, distant feel to my interviews when the goal was informal, frank conversation. Since I am dealing with politicians – whose political statements are a matter of public record, according to IRB guidelines – I also felt more comfortable dispensing with the Form. Of course, I verbally confirmed with my participants that their statements would be kept confidential, and that, should the interview make them uncomfortable, they could end it at any time. Despite this statement, all of interviewees insisted there was no problem attributing comments to them by name. During our meetings, we discussed factors that, in the interviewees’ opinion, were important in explaining the rise of and the response to the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. Most interviews lasted sixty to ninety minutes.

For this project, I interviewed eight people. I talked to five members of the Islamic Action Front: in English, Hayat al-Museimi, Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat and Musa Hantast; in Arabic with a translator, Rehail Gharibeh and Hamza Mansour. These two interviews felt more distant and awkward, mostly because all our communication had to go through an intermediary. From
the government, I talked with Adnan Abu Odeh. (Repeated calls to Abdel Salam al-Majali, Jawad Anani and Sameer Habashneh were not returned.) Here, one can see another problem I encountered: the sample size from the government is clearly smaller than that from the IAF. This did not occur by design. Nonetheless, my research still benefited from the contributions of Adnan Abu Odeh. Given his extensive experience working in the government as well as the breadth of his knowledge of Jordanian politics, Abu Odeh represented the regime’s perspective well. I also talked with Mohammed al-Momany and Mohammed al-Masri, two local Jordanian academics who specialize in democratization and political Islam.
Appendix A: Informed Consent

All interviewees in this study were voluntary participants. Before discussing anything, I informed the interviewees that they had the right both to the anonymity of their comments and to end the interview at any time should the questions make them uncomfortable in any way. All participants confirmed they understood these rights before the interviews began.
Bibliography


Notes

1. At the outset, it is important to note that not all political Islamists are members of the Muslim Brotherhood, but all members of the Muslim Brotherhood are political Islamists. "Islamism" qua political ideology is a bigger category than members of the Muslim Brotherhood, containing less institutionalized and organized movements such as the Salafi and wahabi. I have preserved this distinction throughout the paper.

2. This division follows the work of Mohammed Abu Rumman in his Muslim Brotherhood volume.

3. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood had been founded earlier in 1928. Interview with Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat.


6. Ibid., 182-195.

7. Abu Rumman, Muslim Brotherhood, 19.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.


11. Abu Rumman, Muslim Brotherhood, 19.


13. Brand, “Palestinians and Jordanians,” 51. During the Gulf War of 1991, for example, King Hussein asked members of Parliament to address him as al-sharif to remind them of his family’s special place in the Islamic tradition.

14. Joffe, Jordan in Transition, 70-71

15. Ibid., 239-241.


17. This is Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat’s phrase.


19. Ibid.


22. Ibid.


24. Interview, Mohammed al-Masri.

25. Interview, Mohammed al-Masri.


27. Abu Rumman, Muslim Brotherhood, 21.


29. Interview with Hamza Mansour.

30. Abu Rumman, Muslim Brotherhood, 23

31. Nor on its policy of trading domestic subsidy cuts for loans from the IMF.

32. See Marsha Pripstein Posusney, “Electoral Engineering.”
G. Robinson, “Defensive Democratization in Jordan,” 397. This argument came from Robinson’s interview with Izz al-Din, an official within the prime ministry at the time the 1993 elections law was passed.

Ibid., 397.


Abu Rumman, Muslim Brotherhood, 76.


Ibid., emphasis added.

Abu Rumman, Muslim Brotherhood, 69.

While it is true that the Brotherhood and the regime shared some ideological commitments, this link was broken by the regime’s decision to seek peace with Israel. It could thus fairly be said that the two groups lacked a strong ideological attachment.

Abu Rumman, Muslim Brotherhood, 76.

See communist, leftist agitation on college campuses during bread riots in 1996; Islamist agitation at Yarmouk University in 1985.

See, for example, reports by the Amman Center for Human Rights Studies, the National Center for Human Rights – groups not allowed by the government to monitor the 2007 election. <http://www.nchr.org.jo/pages.php?menu_id=-1&local_type=1&local_id=4&local_details=1&local_details1=0&localsite_branchname=NCHR>

Abu Rumman, Muslim Brotherhood, 66.

Ibid.

National Center for Human Rights Report, above.


Ibid., 399. “Social credit” is Mohammed Abu Rumman’s term.

Wiktorowicz, “Islamic NGOs and Muslim Politics,” 686.


Ibid., 56.

Interview Mohammed al-Masri; Interview Mohammed al-Momany.

Interview Mohammed al-Masri; Interview Mohammed al-Momany.


Ibid., 400.

Ibid.

Interview with Rehail Gharibeh.

Interview with Hamza Mansour.

Interview with Rehail Gharibeh.

Interview with Hayat al-Museimi

Interview with Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat.

Interview with Mohammed al-Momany.

Interview with Hamza Mansour.

Interview with Rehail Gharibeh, Musa Hantash.

Interview with Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat.

Interview with Rehail Gharibeh.
Interview with Hayat al-Museimi.
Interview with Hayat al-Museimi, emphasis original.
Ibid.
Interview with Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat.
See this paper pp. 3-16, above.
See this paper pp. 21-23, above.
Interview with Mohammed al-Momany.
Interview with Mohammed al-Momany.
Interview with Rehail Gharibeh.
Interview with Hayat al-Museimi.
Interview with Hamza Mansour
Interview with Adnan Abu Odeh.
Ibid.
Interview with Rehail Gharibeh
Interview with Hamza Mansour.
Interview with Hayat al-Museimi.
Interview with Adnan Abu Odeh.
Interview with Adnan Abu Odeh.
Ibid.
Interview with Hamza Mansour.
Interview with Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat.
Interview with Rehail Gharibeh, Musa Hantash, Hamza Mansour; cf. this paper p. 28, above.
Interview with Hayat al-Museimi.
Ibid.
Interview with Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat.
Interviews with Gharibeh, Mansour, Hantash, al-Museimi.
Interview with Mohammed al-Momany.
Interview with Adnan Abu Odeh.
Abu Rumman, Muslim Brotherhood, 54.
Abu Rumman, Muslim Brotherhood, 69.
Interview with Adnan Abu Odeh.
Interview with Mohammed al-Momany and Mohammed al-Masri.
Brand, “Palestinians and Jordanians,” 51.
Interview with Adnan Abu Odeh.
See Reiter, “Higher Education and Sociopolitical Transformation in Jordan” and Posusney, “Behind the Ballot Box: Electoral Engineering in the Arab World”.
Interview with Mohammed al-Masri.
The “five years” figure comes from an interview with my interview Mohammed al-Momany.
See Andoni, “King Abdallah: In His Father’s Footsteps?”
See Quintan Wiktorowicz’s “Islamic NGOs” for an example of the civil society explanation and Philip Robins’s “Jordan’s Elections” for an example of the rhetorical explanation.