

Fall 2005

Lost Cause? A Post-Gay Examination of the Politics of Homosexuality, Islam and Difference in the Netherlands

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lost cause?

a post-gay examination of the politics of homosexuality, islam and
difference in the netherlands

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Presented on December 7, 2005
School for International Training
Sexuality, Gender & Identity Program
Amsterdam, Netherlands
Fall 2005

Key words: Ethnicity, gay, history, identity, sexuality, religion

Abstract:

The gay movement in Holland has been lauded for its efficacy in establishing homosexuality as integral to and equal within Dutch society. Recent political and social tensions between the gay and Muslim communities, however, have brought the issue of homosexuality back to the forefront of debate in a country that has previously determined it to be a depoliticized issue. Through intense research into the nature of gay emancipation and immigrant integration in Holland, this study seeks to identify how the minority gay and Muslim communities became oppositional, and how gay identity functions within a society after equality has been concluded. Interviews with Dutch academics and activists shed light on the structures of Dutch politics and society, and raise questions about the future of a nation whose own identity is the in process of being reformulated.

Acknowledgments:

I would like to thank the following people for their help through this process.

Andre Krouwel, for inciting my interest in this topic through lecture and for supporting me throughout my research. Your guidance has been invaluable, and it has been a pleasure to work with you.

Olaf, for your kindness and sense of humor. It is you who gave me a home with warmth and affection, for which I am forever indebted.

My family, for your interest my pursuits, and an unwavering support in my intellectual and personal development. Even miles away, your presence remained strong.

Kaila, for loving me.

Cassie, for calls in the morning to wake-up and at night to fall asleep. I won't be able to think about ISP without thinking about you.

The ISP Buddy Happy Hour group, which always reminded me of the brighter side of SIT.

And, lastly, to the Dutch people. I have never encountered a culture more fascinating, nor a group of individuals more welcoming and accommodating. For all my criticisms, Amsterdam will remain a (gay) paradise in my eyes.

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Introduction

At present, the gay community in Holland is facing the new challenge of addressing homophobia from the world of Islam. Attacks, both verbal and physical, on behalf of immigrants, both Muslim and non-Muslim, has created a culture of fear and frustration in a country widely known for their peaceful tradition of consociational politics of tolerance. The influx of immigrants has brought a foreign threat at a time when a former nation of minorities (as embodied by the Dutch pillar system) has transformed into a strong progressive moral majority. The development of this political and social core follows a 100-year struggle for integration and legal equality that resulted in equal protection, anti-discrimination and equal marriage legislation that set gay people, theoretically, on even par with heterosexuals.

In a speech given this past fall, Bas Heijne, a right-wing political leader, spoke to a small gathering of citizens, both gay and straight, regarding the current agenda for emancipation. He argued that gay equality in Holland has been achieved and that emancipation is the conclusion. However, the need to politicize “gay” still existed, but only to fight the new threat to gay liberties: Islam.

In this study, I seek to ask the following questions. Just how emancipated are Dutch homosexuals, and is equality really a foregone conclusion? To what extent is Islam the source of remaining homophobia in Holland? How has a society with history of oppressing homosexuals and embracing religious diversity become homophobic and Islamophobic? And, lastly, what is the approach to reconcile these two worlds, that of homosexuality and Islam, which the Dutch media and politicians portray as diametrically

opposed? Underlying all of these questions is one of gay identity and gay movements. What defines the gay political identity in Holland, and in turn, in the world?

My study begins by examining the nature of the gay movement in the Netherlands and the resulting identity formulated as a result of this process. This investigation is framed by the major shifts in political and social structures within the nation. Similar study into the history of the “new Dutch” leads into an analysis of the recent attacks and ensuing debates over homosexuality, immigration and Islam. Interviews with intellectuals and activists bring perspective to the study and draw conclusions as to the future direction of Dutch politics, as well as develop an understanding of gay identity in the specific context of post-gay Holland.

Assumptions/Limitations

I approach this study with the understanding of my own exteriority to both the Dutch context and the issue at hand. I do place value judgment on this statement. My perspective allows me both the opportunity to be critical and to question the source of my views. Certainly, my understanding of the world is a product of my national, sexual, social, educational, racial, religious and ethnic identities. The world that I know and understand is only a small sliver of what remains to be examined. Objectivity, however, cannot be a goal. Instead, maintaining an open mind, while at the same time trusting my own instincts and perceptions, has been my objective in this undertaking.

The limitations in pursuing this study are numerous. Foremost, I speak about political and social realms that are ever changing. Therefore, the temporality of this study is integral; I seek to identify the state of a nation at this exact time. Similarly, the people I speak of are a diverse group, and any sort of general discussion will ignore the potential for diversity amidst the landscape. My aim has been to address this multiplicity as often as possible, while still mapping out general trends that I have witnessed. These are the limitations of any academic pursuit, and should be made clear from the commencement. Lastly, the materials I have had to work with are limited to those of the English language and have been definitive of my knowledge on the subject.

My approach to this project is very much interdisciplinary, and my variety of approaches may seem hodgepodge. This is part of the appeal of gay and lesbian studies. The disciplines that it spans are so great that one would never do it justice. Therefore, I write at once as an anthropologist, sociologist, urban theorist and political scientist,

among other roles, without apology. That said, I felt limited in terms of the depth to which I could explore these avenues while maintaining brevity and distinct view.

Lastly, my interview subjects are a small group whose views certainly do not reflect all the minds in the Dutch intellectual community. I welcome further debate on this topic and the opening up of these issues to all concerned. That, I believe, will allow for a balanced consensus on this issue to be determined.

A History of The Gay Movement

The gay emancipation movement has a particularly long history in the Netherlands, beginning in 1911, with the creation of Article 248 into the Dutch penal code that made homosexual contact between adults and minors illegal. This legislation inspired Jacob Schorer to found the Dutch Scientific Humanitarian Committee (NWHK). His goal was to develop complete equality for homosexual men and women by responding to the negative perceptions of gay people in Holland. Their strategy consisted of working quietly to influence key political figures, rather than develop and bring to light a complete gay subculture.

The German occupation in World War II forced the NWHK to disintegrate, but its goals and efforts were undertaken by the development of the Cultural and Recreation Center (the COC) in 1946. The creation of a gay organization allowed for the Dutch government to keep an eye on this minor community, and increasingly the gay community was perceived as a mini-pillar in itself. Relationships between gay leaders and those of the other pillars existed behind doors, allowing for top-down change in the popular perceptions of gay people; the leaders passed along their new understandings of sexual differences to those they represented (Tielman 1987, 12). This approach of the gay community, to ally with the political elite, is an essential characteristic not only of Dutch emancipation but politics as well.

The 1960s saw an influx of radical politics, particularly among students, which marked a shift in the approach of the gay community in achieving equality. Smaller activist groups began advocating for a politics of difference rather than sameness, aiming to change society rather than gay people themselves. The COC moved towards adopting

this view and gained higher visibility as a homosexual organization. In 1964, COC chairman Benno Premesela appeared on television, openly discussing his homosexuality and giving a face to the Dutch “homophile” (Krouwel, Schuyf 2000, 175)

The 1970s proved especially important for gay emancipation, due in part to the push for higher visibility and increased discussion. In 1971, the Dutch penal code abolished Article 248. Two years later, the COC was given legal status by the government, thereby permitting funds to be distributed towards the gay cause. Pressure from within the gay community pushed the COC in a left-wing direction, thereby allowing for an even greater presence, especially in light of the recent government support. These changes were largely due to an increase in secularization and permissive attitudes as a result of the decline of pillarization and an increase in the education of the Dutch public across all classes (Krouwel, Schuyf 2000, 170).

The various left-wing organizations external to the COC collaborated to form the Pink Front in 1979. Their joined efforts developed the Roze Zaterdag (Pink Saturday) celebration, the first gay pride party in Holland. Andre Krouwel and Judith Schuyf divide Pink Saturday’s influence in gay emancipation into three phases. From 1977 to 1983, gay activism aimed at political influence and spanned many different gay organizations. These efforts saw through the creation of equal treatment legislation that was introduced to parliament. In the time between 1984 and 1989, the gay movement became increasingly scattered and divided by ideology. Regardless, the Dutch community became increasingly tolerant as a result of these pride events, allowing for the extreme visibility of difference and the continued support of political efforts (Krouwel, Schuyf 2000).

During the 1980s, the AIDS epidemic hit Holland, though the response of the Dutch government and society did little to increase gay mobilization. In direct contradiction to other nations with strong gay rights movements (most notably the U.S. and France), AIDS did not provide an issue to unite around. The Dutch government was particularly responsive to the issue, assigning elite members of the gay community to address the disease, thereby leaving any choice in their hands. This approach was so radical in and of itself (and counter to any other nation's approach) such that the gay community was thought to be in good hands: it's own (Duyvendak 1996, 430). In spite of this strategy, AIDS was not treated as a solely homosexual disease, and therefore safe sex was emphasized for all persons. As Krouwel and Schuyf write, "This led to a certain de-gaying of AIDS, which was, in fact, not consistent with the actual situation (85 percent of people with AIDs in the Netherlands are gay men) (Krouwel 2000, 170-171)."

The 1990s have seen an increase in participation in the movement by members of both the heterosexual and homosexual communities, and the mainstreaming of gay through commerce. As gay became increasingly integrated into Dutch culture, equality rather than difference became the main goal. This abandonment of the isolated and political gay identity came for numerous reasons. Foremost, a decrease in discrimination against Dutch middle-class homosexuals allowed for increased social mobility. In addition the 1992 penal protection of homosexuals from hate crimes and violence was granted, as was protection from discrimination of homosexuals in the workplace. This was followed by a general Equal Treatment law that protects all citizens from discrimination on the basis of race, nationality, ethnicity, sex, political belief or sexual orientation. These advancements have stagnated further gay mobilization, as seemingly

all efforts toward complete equality had been made. In 1998, registered partnership became available to homosexual couples, followed by the 2001 “Opening Up Of Marriage,” which amended previous marriage laws to define them as between two persons of the same or different sex.

Gay Identity In Holland

At present, the commonly held belief is that gay emancipation has reached its end, with the opening up of marriage having been the final goal. However, equality is far from a foregone conclusion. Visible homosexuality has been on the decrease in the last ten years, for numerous reasons. Foremost, Holland is no longer the gay capital of Europe in light of recent social and political developments in Germany and Spain. Similarly, the lack of political aims to organize around makes public expressions of sexuality seem out of place. Lastly, the nation is still dominated by heterosexuals, especially outside of major cities. Perhaps most surprising is that this decrease in visibility remains uncontested by members of the heterosexual or homosexual communities. As Gert Hekma writes of gay emancipation, “the legal struggle for gay and lesbian rights may have ended, but the much more difficult social battle for queer visibility has yet to begin (Hekma 2002, 240).”

Why has the fight for homosexual visibility re-commenced after years of struggle and subsequent success? Unlike almost any other nation, the gay movement in Holland has been characterized by an assimilationist tactic based upon homosexual identity. The problematizing of gay and lesbian identities by queer studies, particularly in the United States, has not occurred. Instead, the alignment of the gay movement with the elite, in spite of instances in the 1960s and 1970s when radicalism was fostered, has led to a depoliticization of homosexual identity. As Jan Willem Duyvendak writes of Holland in 1996, “Having achieved a relatively favorable position, homosexuals no longer feel the need to maintain a *political* gay identity and have largely given up the struggle for change

(Duyvendak 1996, 421).” This approach is as much a function of the political climate during the movement as it is with the movement itself.

In the 1960s, the lines between pillars of the Dutch political system began to blur into one cohesive majority, or the “new moral majority,” as it is presently named. The decrease in emphasis upon religion and class as definitive of identity stemmed from two influences: a decline in Christian ideology and a general prosperity that created a firm middle-class. Without the confines of religious affiliation or strong political groups, finding consensus about the development of a homosexual pillar was significantly less difficult. This political shift, however, changed the conceptualization of identity and its usefulness in Holland. Whereas identity diversity once defined the nation and its politics, the shift made political, social and religious identities obsolete. In fact, such labels have become increasingly viewed as divisive and dangerous, especially as the new values uniting the pillars have become well defined.

As a result of the “new majority” rhetoric of sameness, differences and dissent were strongly opposed or ignored, even within a minority such as homosexual community. As J. K. Van Wijngaarden writes of the policy debates regarding the AIDS epidemic,

“Public debate about the appropriate course of policy has tended to be narrowly focused, and those with dissenting views have found it difficult to receive a careful hearing. When dissenting views could not be brought into the consensus, they have been virtually ignored (Van Wijngaarden 1992, 275).”

This state of politics has left gay political mobilization stagnant, while at the same time the gay pillar was integrated into this “new majority.”

Distinct benefits have been derived via the assimilationist method. The opening up of marriage act is a prime example of how the Dutch were eager to emphasize a

sameness that is assumedly inherent, regardless of sexual orientation. However, such an approach has endangered the gay community of being heterosexualized and reduced. The voices of a diverse gay population have been silenced amongst all of the positive developments, a critique of the Dutch method that might have been developed via the influence of queer theory or a politics of difference. “‘Homosexual interests’ do not exist *a priori*,” Jan Willem Duyvendak writes, “nor would one be able to formulate them solely on the basis of his or her homosexual identity (Duyvendak 1996, 434).” Therefore, it is troubling that the approach of the Dutch gay community has been to leave their collective status in the hands of few. How can a small cadre of elites speak for an entire movement? Where has all the debate gone?

“Equality” became the goal of the united gay community through the movement. This approach, and the resulting achievement of said equality, characterizes attempts at organization around differences in lifestyle, gender or other characters as affronts to the movement. When sameness defines a social movement, the potential for difference post-equality is made far more difficult. The depoliticized nature of Dutch homosexuality brings to light the recent debates over stable gay identity as being both repressive and productive. David Halperin writes,

“Gay identity is absolutely necessary, essential and crucial, because it is perennially threatened by denial, refusal, suppression, and ‘invisibilization.’ And so it is always and everywhere important to insist on gay identity at all costs, to claim and it affirm it, over and over again, precisely because it is continually treated as something shameful, deviant, pathological, and out of place. But gay identity is also dangerous, even treacherous. It is an identity which must be ceaselessly resisted and rejected, precisely because it normalizes and polices sexuality, because it functions to contain sexual and social difference, both in heteronormative culture at large and in lesbian and gay culture in particular. It is a politically catastrophic identity insofar as it enables society serenely to manage sexual diversity and in fact to stabilize and consolidate heterosexual identity itself (which would be a much more fluid, unstable and insecure entity without gay identity to shore it up (Halperin 2002, 18).”

The current state of Holland is pristinely expressed in this contradiction. Gay people are essentially likened to the heterosexual establishment, which allows for a normalization of homosexuality which is certainly positive. However, this normalization remains so long as homosexuals do not express extreme differences, political, social or otherwise. The faith of the Dutch heterosexual public has been placed in the fact that gay people are essentially no different. Ignoring the differences present in the gay community as a political group (which, of course, crosses all borders of race, class and ethnic background) ignores any sort of sexual diversity across all orientations.

Similarly, it ignores the historical development of the gay community as exterior to heterosexuality. As Carl F. Stychin writes, “Many have argued that it has been in the conditions of oppression and exclusion from the institutions of heteronormative society that lesbians and gays have had the opportunity for experimentation, and to develop ways of living independent of wider impulses towards social normalization,” citing Bell and Binnie’s work *The Sexual Citizen* (Stychin 2005, 98). Ignoring such differences and maintaining the present consensus of sexual propriety is potentially oppressive and extremely ignorant to difference. This includes but is not limited to differences in sexual and gender expression, as well as views that place them outside the mainstream. The recent controversy over darkrooms in Dutch gay establishments embodies this tension: a heterosexual core legislating and imposing views upon a homosexual, but equal, minority.

A History of the “New Dutch”

It is through this approach of assimilation through the presumption or development of sameness that the Dutch government has addressed recent issues of immigration. The history of the new Dutch begins around the time that the gay movement and depillarization were underway. Immigrant populations from the Middle East and Eastern Europe first came to the Netherlands in the 1960s under the name of “gastarbeiders” (or guest workers). Mainly men from Morocco and Turkey (the Surinamese immigrated during the 1970s, after their national independence), these workers were considered visitors who would benefit from Dutch prosperity in order to support their families, only to return home. Instead, most guest workers remained in Holland, and later brought their families to join them. Recently, smaller groups of refugees from Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran and Somalia have entered the country as well, further diversifying the Dutch ethnic landscape.

The Dutch government has, until recently, refrained from implementing policies integrating or welcoming immigrants, instead assuming that multiculturalism would occur organically. In the 1990s, high levels of unemployment, crime, as well as low education and Dutch proficiency levels, alerted the government to increasing isolation and deterioration of the immigrant communities. At present, the non-Western minority population stands at 1.7 million, or 10% of the Dutch population, one in five of whom were born in the Netherlands (Research 2005, 2).

The “Annual Report on Integration” for 2005 paints a very bleak and honest picture of the current state of Holland with regards to the immigrant population. The most devout Muslim communities are found amongst the Turks, Moroccans, Afghans and

Somalis (Research 2005, 4). Non-Western immigrants make-up the majority of the lower-classes, though a small middle-class is developing, particularly among the Iranian population, though they are generally more secular than other minorities. Education-levels of non-Western immigrants are uniformly low in all groups (with the exception of the Iranian population), though generally the educational level is on the increase. However, the youth of the Muslim minority groups are noticeably less likely to attend secondary or pre-university school (Research 2005, 3). Those that do not attend school, however, have difficulty finding work. In 2004, 16% of non-Western immigrants were unemployed, compared to 6% of the indigenous population (ibid). 29% of these immigrants live in poverty, compared to 8% of the indigenous population (ibid). With respect to crime, Moroccans and Antilleans are overrepresented both in suspect records and convictions, though the study attributes this largely to socio-cultural factors and socioeconomic status and not to essentializing ethnic traits.

The interaction between ethnic groups on the whole is limited, particularly among the Turkish, Moroccan and Somali populations. (Former) Yugoslavians, Surinamese and Antilleans have more mixed circles of friends, and mixed marriages were common among these groups as well. With regard to the Muslim population, ethnic mingling provides a greater challenge. “Turks and Morrocans have very strong personal ties with their religion,” the study claims, “and they display great resistance if doubt is cast on their religion by others or if their religion is spoken about in negative terms (Research 2005, 4).” Those with higher educational levels, and those of the second generation, are less devout and outwardly expressive of their religious affiliation. Regardless, the divide between the indigenous population and the Muslim population with regards to religious

ideology is clear. “Half the indigenous population, and a similar proportion of the Turkish and Moroccan population group, feel that the Western lifestyle cannot be reconciled with that of Islam,” the study claims (Research 2005, 5). In addition, the indigenous population avoids the ethnic minority, “especially as the contact becomes more personal (ibid).”

The issue that defines the indigenous/immigrant tension is that of ideology, especially around the concept of identity. A portion of those that immigrated to the Netherlands did not live in modern cities in their home countries. As a result, their approach to Islam is a more literal and traditional interpretation of the Koran, one which is not shared by all Muslims. A strong identification with religion has led to a culture shock within Dutch culture. As evidenced by the Integration Study 2005, religious identity, and its resulting influence upon political and social identity, is strong among many immigrant communities. This religious identity is in direct conflict with the current state of modern Dutch politics and society, which denies any strong character, especially one based upon religious affiliation. The concept of wearing your religion as a badge (or in extreme circumstances, dying for it) is seen as backwards by the Dutch “new majority.” This marks a distinct shift from the very pillared past of Holland pre-1960.

Here a very distinct line is drawn between the enlightened and the traditional, such that the old Dutch look down upon immigrants as ignorant and seemingly ancient in their ideology. Therefore, the approach of Holland has been to show the wayward immigrants the modern way to understanding the world. The two strongest points of contention between the Dutch majority and the Muslim minority are homosexuality and women’s rights. These two issues, both of which have been addressed and

accommodated for during depillarization, have attracted attention by the media, and in turn, the Dutch public.

In response to the threat of a minority that is so firmly situated, the Dutch majority has taken to defining itself strongly in opposition to this backward foreign influx. Immigration policies have required that an identity for the Netherlands be formulated, and it is being developed in opposition to that of the Muslim minority. In other words, it's not who the Dutch are, it is who they are not. The new Dutch identity is libertarian, secular, pro-homosexual, pro-euthanasia and in favor of the decriminalization of soft drugs. Even those whose politics were formerly counter to the liberal policy of late, such as the right-wing Christian Democrats, have shifted their views, seemingly to appear less aligned with the immigrant other. This "new majority" seeks to develop consensus by integrating those on the periphery, or emphasizing that those opposed should leave and return to their home country. In other words, a space is available in Holland for all those who will shed their religion, and all the social and political elements associated with it. This dismissal of difference in ideology has only increased the tension among the Dutch, old and new.

As a result of the vulnerability of the immigrant population (and the tradition of the Dutch politics of accommodation), a pillar has slowly developed in an attempt to integrate and assimilate the Muslim community in the Dutch establishment. Efforts have been substantiated through the creation of Muslim schools, mosques and shops. The Integration study emphasizes that schools consisting of only ethnic minorities have "reduced the disadvantage in language skills compared with indigenous schools by half within 15 years, and in arithmetic by no less than three-quarters (Research 2005, 4)." It

can be expected, though, that this pillar will only be embraced and integrated into the Dutch establishment so long as they are secular, the shift that has been present historically in the other pillars. However, the Integration study makes clear that, for some, modernization of Islam has already taken place. “Among young Turkish and Moroccan women, for example, there is a group with modern ideas, who progress a long way in education and have ambitions on the labor market,” the study concludes (Research 2005, 5). This directly contradicts the stereotype that the new Dutch are uniformly extremists, uneducated and that none of them have developed Dutch identities (Hekma 2002).

The Explosion of Dissent

These two parallel minority struggles finally became intertwined on March 1, 2001, when an incident of homophobic violence was reported in *de Volkskrant* between a white Dutch man and his Turkish neighbors. The emphasis of the report was the locality of anti-homosexual sentiments within the immigrant population. The response of Dutch police and political and academic leaders was to advocate a decrease of visibility of homosexuality in public spaces (Hekma 2002, 240). The issue was immediately taken up by Dutch citizens, with members of the Muslim and old Dutch communities taking sides. On the 3rd of May, the Rotterdam based imam Khalil El Moumni appeared on television claiming that homosexuality was sinful, a disease, and a degenerate influence in the Dutch society in its threat to reproduction. It is notable that El Moumni emphasized his opposition to homophobic violence, but this element of the discussion was left out of the broadcast. Regardless, two members of parliament requested that the Imam be deported. Those requests were denied.

The reports of the media ignored the fact that religion-based homophobia has existed in recent history from within the old Dutch pillars. In the last five years, the Cardinal of Utrecht declared homosexuality as unnatural and degenerate, as did one Calvinist member of parliament. Instances of gay bashing, as well as the rampant use of gay slurs, have been consistent among old Dutch communities in post-emancipation Holland, especially in non-urban areas. Violence has not been tolerated since the Article 137 was passed in 1992, thereby criminalizing hate crimes. However, open distaste for

homosexuality cannot be silenced due to the Equal Treatment act, which allows for freedom of expression around religious beliefs (Hekma 2002).

The question still remains as to why homophobia has most recently been associated solely with Islam. The assassination of openly gay politician Pim Fortuyn on May 6, 2002 was completed on behalf of the Muslim people by a Dutch extremist. Fortuyn had been particularly out-spoken about his distaste for the immigrant population, criticizing their lack of integration into Dutch society, and arguing in favor of withholding welfare benefits from those that did not speak Dutch. Though the nature of the attack was not homophobic, it is still popularly viewed as a repercussion of the immigrant presence within Holland, one that resulted in the death of a key gay figure. The November 2, 2004 assassination of Theo van Gogh, the co-creator of the *Submission* documentary addressing domestic violence within the Muslim community, re-emphasizes the lack of legitimacy to an argument of homophobia as the sole reason for dissent.

The homophobic attack upon Washington D.C. reporter Chris Crain on Queen's Day earlier this year, reportedly by the new Dutch, has recently brought the issue of homophobia and Islam back into headlines. In an article published in the *Washington Blade*, Crain addressed sentiments of regret on behalf of the Dutch community. He wrote, "I am not sure much can be accomplished by non-Muslims blaming a faith about which we are mostly ignorant for the culture we think it has produced (Crain 2005 3)." What should be the goal, he argued, is a space in which openness is valued such that people can speak about their differences without fear of persecution.

Fortuyn's brand of politics supported this new criticism of Islam in light of El Moumni and his comments, and his assassination embodies the danger in such

universalistic attitudes towards cultural and religious differences. Wim Lunsing argues that “during his short but turbulent political career, Fortuyn was hailed for making politics in the Netherlands popular again (Lunsing 2003, 21).” His politics, however, did not necessarily involve giving voice to both sides of the debate. Instead, “he made effective use of popular anti-Islamic feeling to gain votes for an extreme right-wing populist agenda (ibid).” Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a Somali-born member of the Christian Democrats, has also served the cause of developing anti-Islamic sentiments. Her perspective has been especially convincing given that she was raised Muslim. Hirsi Ali, a woman saved from Islam, has been particularly critical of the perceived anti-feminism and homophobia inherent within Muslim communities.

Underlying this issue of Muslim homophobia is a racism that has never been named as such and is rarely spoken of. The distinctly different reactions of Holland’s government to the white Dutch religious elite and those of the new Dutch embody the imbalance in treatment (Hekma 2002, 246). Sudden concern over homophobia in response to attacks on behalf of the immigrant other, rather than that of the extreme Christian pockets that exist outside the urban centers, also raises questions. It is tolerable to denounce homosexuals from within the Dutch Christian establishment, but not as an immigrant. Lunsing concurs, “It appears that Muslims are granted less right to freedom of expression than others (Lunsing 2003, 21).” The Muslim community loses credibility because of their unenlightened and pre-modern views, which have been the general source of racial unrest. By de-legitimizing their perspective, a hierarchy of ideology is revealed by which the immigrant community remains exterior to society, regardless of equal citizenship.

Problematizing the situation even more is the methodology of the “accepting” Dutch establishment in response to hate crimes. Instead of pushing for increased gay visibility to open minds and remove stigmas, they have emphasized the need for gay people to conceal their sexuality. One is reminded of the “denial, refusal, suppression, and ‘invisibilization’” that Halperin speaks of when gay identity is ignored (Halperin 2002, 18). However, this response comes in unison with an embracing of gay as a concept within the new Dutch agenda. Regardless of such political support, Hekma emphasizes, “straight still equals public and gay private” (Hekma 2002, 240). Such a binary does not reflect the perceived equality that has led the gay community to recoil from pressing for further activism.

Instead, the sudden shift of the homosexual from embedded in the middle-class to a token of Dutchness emphasizes even more clearly just how unwelcome and incompatible the old and new Dutch are. In addition, the equality created through gay marriage and equal treatment has attempted to heterosexualize homosexuals to an impossible extent. Equality should allow for sexual expression of all people, but same-sex affection or the expression of homosexuality certainly stands out, as it remains minority and not heterosexual. A married gay couple should have every right to walk down the street holding hands, as any straight couple does, but they may feel unable to do so for fear of persecution, and the government is only reinforcing that fear.

The result of legislative equality in Holland makes clear that social and cultural equality lags behind and must not remain unaddressed. The assimilationist approach has also allowed for the gay community to be conveniently made invisible (after attacks occur) and highly visible (when the new Dutch identity is defined by their tolerance).

The assumption of organic integration as a success has been proven false by the hateful nature of the aforementioned incidents, and remains an issue for both the gay and Muslim communities. For all their inherent differences, their commonalities remain the most striking elements within the debate. As Hekma continues, “gay expressions are considered private affairs while heterosexuality remains a public matter, very much like the relationship between the white majority and the ethnic minority” (Hekma 2002, 240).

Methodology

Through research, discussion and thought regarding the issues between the gay and immigrant populations, I developed the previous summation of the state of affairs in Holland. The next step was to seek out members of the educational world who work in the various fields with regard to sexuality. Due to the very political nature of my study, I interviewed individuals that have written about gay emancipation and the inter-minority politics of the past five years. My goal is to determine how those in positions of intellectual authority perceive the current climate.

The methodology used to study these individuals will follow a specific format as outlined in the article “Elite Interviewing.” In relation to these participants I am less accomplished and knowledgeable. My position as a student interviewer allows me to benefit from the privileged knowledge my subjects have as Dutch citizens and intellectuals. That said, the individuals themselves and their disciplines embody a sort of diversity.

Gert Hekma is a professor of Gay and Lesbian studies in the Department of Sociology at the University of Amsterdam. He published an article in 2002 entitled “Imams and Homosexuality,” addressing the proliferation of dissent between the gay and immigrant worlds. Jan Willem Duyvendak, a professor of Sociology at the University of Amsterdam, has written extensively about the development of gay politics in Holland. Wim Lunsing is a professor of anthropology, whose studies focus mainly on Japan. He published an article about recent racial tensions, entitled “Islam versus homosexuality?,” and a follow-up article drawing links to Japan is set to be published early next year. Lastly, Omar Nahas is the founder of the Yoesuf Foundation, which aims to reconcile

issues homosexuality and Islam through education. He is the author of “Yoesuf: An Islamic Idea with Dutch Quality,” published in 2004, as well as numerous educational guides available through his organization.

Through these interviews, I sought another perspective regarding the present state of affairs. Their responses were invaluable, as they have witnessed the turn of events of the last five years take place, allowing for a first-hand understanding that I, as a foreigner, cannot replicate. I began by asking general questions about the gay movement, ethnic tensions and the present state of affairs. From there, I proposed theories regarding the nature of recent events, and sought their responses. Please note that after each interview citation is made once, and all credit thereafter is made clear through the narrative of the text.

Analysis

Reflections on Gay Emancipation & Equality

The preliminary question that I asked all of those interviewed was to describe the current state of gay emancipation and what remained to be done. I wanted to re-examine the popular belief that equality had been achieved. Lunsing validated that the Dutch gay public had largely given up the fight. He stated, “The tendency in the Netherlands has always been integration oriented, and I think that somehow changed, that most gay people felt sufficiently integrated at some point, and they stopped bothering, especially in Amsterdam (interview, Lunsing).” In other words, a shift in status from outsiders to insiders is clear.

Though active participation in the gay movement had ended, all of those interviewed felt strongly that the movement had yet to conclude, and that far more needed to be accomplished before equality could be declared. “I do think that the very idea that homosexuality is on legal par here with homosexuality is really nonsense,” Jan Willem Duyvendak emphasizes. “It is great what we have achieved, but if you really think about is there anything like equality and respect for difference, it is nowhere (interview, Duyvendak).” Gert Hekma expressed the need for the gay movement to approach the second step of gay emancipation, in other words a shift from the juridical to the social. Such a shift in focus, he argues, is assuredly complex. “The social integration, it is long term and it’s more difficult and it’s not as enticing as the legal stuff. The aims are more vague. It is more problematic to do this,” he states (interview, Hekma). The overall emphasis was placed upon the limitations of the pre-existing movement, which relied heavily upon legislation to affect changes within society.

Within the social realm of homosexual integration, Omar Nahas is particularly critical of the lack of connection between gay and other identities. “The gay movement in the Netherlands is developed only for the gay group people, without any connection, any consideration to the rest of society,” he expressed (interview, Nahas). “The gay movement gets secularized and they [the Dutch] reject their own religion in order to be happy with being gay. I think what the gay movement is missing is reconciling all sorts of identities at the same time of a person.” Such a response is indicative of a uniform and narrow approach to issues of homosexuality and identity that assumes a stable definition of “gay.”

Nahas’ speaks from the exterior of the “gay” that has become mainstream and embedded in white Dutch society. Duyvendak was keen to emphasize that “there is a new moral majority in the Netherlands, and it is a kind of progressive moral majority...Even center and right-wing political parties are now embracing gay topics.” He continues, “We are extremely popular now, and feminists as well.” The gay community finds itself allied with strange bedfellows. “It is a very warm bath to be part of the mainstream,” says Duyvendak. “Even the people you had to fight before, you know, they tell you you’re wonderful and that they [the Muslims] are the bad ones and not you.”

While all of those interviewed agreed that the gay identity had become depoliticized, Nahas and Duyvendak felt strongly that a re-politicization was in progress and new agendas were being formulated. However, instead of establishing homosexuals within society, it was calling into question the meaning of their presumed identity and social location due to the threat of Islam. Nahas feels the result is an overwhelming

sentiment that “we cannot unify Islam with Western lifestyles. So, there is a process called ‘verharding¹.’” Duyvendak spoke of a new agenda, one that he views as complicated. In one sense, the gay community is enjoying a newly privileged position within society. “I like to be embraced by the right,” says Duyvendak. But, he continues, “I am horrified by it... It [gay] is not depoliticized anymore, but it is part of the moral majority now. So therefore it goes rather easily.”

¹ “Verharding” translates as a hardening or toughening of the debate. The intent of discussion becomes to hurt rather than progress.

Homosexuality and Islam In The Dutch Context

“The straight Dutch people have decided that everything’s okay now, as if it’s their decision to make,” Luning narrates. Thus, what you have at present is a politicization that exists as a by-product of homosexuals and heterosexuals being in alliance, rather opposed to one another. Instead, the opposition is towards the perception of a homophobic Islam. “I think that the acceptance of the gay movement goes sometimes against other acceptances,” Nahas acknowledges, “but this is temporary.” He went on to say, “Nowadays...inside the gay community, there is an anti-Islamic vision developing. But after awhile, they will get less. And then they will understand that the Islamic movement comes like this.”

Those interviewed are critical of the way the relationship between gay and migrant has been portrayed popularly. In particular, almost all expressed in one way or another the sentiment that the gay community was being used as a weapon against all immigrants. Those in power are “beating the Muslims and using the gays,” said Hekma. “It’s the system, because they are not very much in favor of gay rights either...To say the Muslims are bad people because they don’t respect gay rights and women’s rights and they didn’t themselves in the past, well...” Duyvendak feels that “not many gays are aware of the fact, or how they are used or instrumentalized.” Instead, Hekma argues, “the gay community is utterly Islamophobic.”

However, it is essential to recognize that Islam is forced with the burden of being the source of new Dutch homophobia, and that such blame is partly misplaced.

Generalizations and stereotypes are being put upon an already disadvantaged immigrant population. Gert Hekma summarizes:

I would say the first generation, these people are indifferent to Islam. There are a lot of secular Muslims. The new generation, part of them has gone back to their roots, and they become very Muslim. They create a kind of being Muslim from the internet, and they become Orthodox and Jihad people sometimes. There is also a group with the attitude that they like it in Holland, who wouldn't go back to their home country, they are secular. You have a lot of different situations going on in this culture.

In Nahas' article, "Yoseuf: An Islamic Idea with Dutch Quality," an emphasis is placed on diversity, and upon the weak relationship between Islam and homophobia among migrant communities. He identifies the three bases for homophobia among Moroccan Muslims: the perception of homosexuality as sodomy, the idea that homosexuality is an illness or learned, and the religious prohibition of sex amongst members of the same sex. The first two pillars are culturally based, while the third is not. Placing the blame upon devout Muslims for their homophobia ignores the issue. "The troublemakers, they are more indifferent to religion," Hekma argues. "So you have orthodox people that are opposed to homosexuality for religious reasons who will not beat you up." Though one cannot refute that Islam may support homophobia, the link between Islam and gay-bashing cannot be easily upheld as direct.

Omar Nahas links the increase in extremist Muslims not to Islam but to polarization. When asked if immigrant youth was radicalizing, he responded:

I think that is true. The young generations choose for being religious, they have a kind of awareness about their religion. Meanwhile, their fathers and their mothers, it was only a culturally religious thing. So now there are differentiations between those who choose for that and for other Muslim people who say that I am culturally Muslim and nothing more. The group that is getting religious, a part of them is getting radicalized. This is not because of Islam. It is because of the conflict, because of the polarization. When people choose for being religious, they are not welcome anymore in the public. That is why they feel neglected and they feel polarized. So they get radicalized, yes.

When asked if radical youth were an obstacle to furthering his cause, Nahas felt that need not be the case. “I prefer to work with people who are aware and want to discuss, even if they are against my ideas, it’s okay,” he emphasized.

Those who are most radical have perhaps attracted the most attention, and the result is a negative association with non-Western Dutch immigrants. Lusing sees the shift in attitudes towards the ethnic minorities as occurring in 2001, as a result of Pim Fortuyn’s assassination, El Moumni’s televised remarks, and most importantly and surprisingly, the events September 11th. “It was as if it had happened in Holland,” he stated, adding that after that point, “Then you couldn’t say that something was fascist; all these words were out. Now they can say all sorts of things that used to be called racist, but now you can’t say racist anymore.”

Though Fortuyn and Ayaan Hirsi Ali were credited with opening discussion about Islam, “the way she does it, the kind of reactions and the over-generalizing, the way she disqualifies almost all Muslims,” Duyvendak argues, “that of course is very counter-productive.” He continues, “At the same time I like that Hirsi Ali is always pleading for gay rights and for Muslim women, for whatever. I do believe that the more she is on the world scale the better it is” for homosexuality as an issue. This sort of racism and religious hatred in the name of human rights and modern vision evidently complicates how those involved feel regarding issues of immigration. The consequences of universalizing within the context of ethnicity and religion are apparent to Lusing. “The government is trying to politicize Muslim issue, or the politicians who are close to the government,” he states. “They use the Muslim issue to throw people out of the country, the asylum-seekers, and they are not all really Muslims.”

Monoculturalism versus Pluralism

The re-politicization of homosexuality seeks to establish it once again as respectable, equal and normal. Complicating matters is the fact that you have a majority of the population in support of homosexuality, frustrated with a minority for not feeling the same way. Duyvendak argues, “It is not like in other European states in that there is much disagreement on these topics within the political elite or the population.” He feels, however, that the Dutch must think practically and temporally. “It is not a discussion on goals,” Duyvendak argues, “it is a discussion on means. Either you go to seduce them or you go to lock them in.”

Duyvendak feels that the issue of monoculturalism versus pluralism remains at the center of the debate. “They say, ‘integration failed with Muslims due to multiculturalism,’ whereas I indicate that it has to do with monoculturalism,” he emphasizes, citing a recent article he published. “That is not to say that the monoculturalism, or a moral majority, has to change, but it is a specific situation, and you have to deal with that.” In other words, the Dutch expect the Muslim community to shift their views dramatically, with almost no concessions made on behalf of the moral majority. Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s views embody this unwillingness to back down. “She thinks that a tough stance liberates people,” Duyvendak opines, “and I am not only not convinced, I am absolutely convinced that she has come to re-affect” the problem.

The issue that Duyvendak sees is that intolerance is being fought with further intolerance, not a recipe for success. Therefore, the issue is not merely about combating homophobia. “There is indeed a need to discuss with Muslims what has been done and how we are going to solve this,” he agrees. But, “it is not just a discussion about the

position of homosexuality in relationship to Muslims, but is also a discussion of what it is to be Muslim in a society that is so negative about you.” The first step, he feels, is challenging the perceptions of the immigrant minority through an emphasis upon diversity:

What we have to do of course is de-homogenizing, and so indicating that we don't talk about the 'Muslims' and that there are many different groups of people, generations and shifts and changes, that is of course the way to get a bridge and bridge the gap; and not to deny that there are problems, not to deny that gay and lesbians might have a very difficult time in some Muslim families, but at the same time things are changing and they are also changing if you have not this tough stance.

Omar Nahas agrees, but feels that a re-characterization of Islam in the Dutch context is necessary for a change in perception. “There are a quite a lot of people who are growing up in the Netherlands, all born in the Netherlands, they do not identify themselves culturally as Moroccan or Turkish or Pakistani, they define themselves as Dutch,” Nahas argues. “But religiously they define themselves as Islamic. This means that I am bringing something new, that Islam is nothing exotic, it is something from here. And it has to participate in the whole thing.” Instead of removing religion from the Dutch sphere and secularizing, Nahas feels it is necessary to understand the role of religion in present day.

I think that secularization is sometimes avoiding the problem instead of solving the problem. I see the difference between 9/11 and after 9/11, because before 9/11 it was not accepted to speak about religion. ‘Religion is not important, it does not influence the life of people.’ Now people think, no, religion is very important, and they rediscover the influence of their religion in their own life back again. So this means that being religious, or accepting that there is something called religion, is something modern. So modernity, nowadays, is to understand and accept that there is diversity, and that your priorities in your identity is different from the priorities of someone else.

In attempting to exact change, Nahas has encountered resistance to his work in bringing together Islam and homosexuality. “Until now, the Dutch ministry which gives money to gay organizations is a different program from the one that gives money to multicultural organizations, so this means that the separation is in the structure itself,” he

recalls. “Until now, they are using the multicultural model and trying to apply that to sexual identity and religion. Meanwhile, I think that religion and sexual identity they are not the same as cultural identity.” His efforts to change such conceptions has yielded concrete results. “I am very happy to tell that after seven years of working on this issue, the government is accepting the idea that we can bring these two together.”

The opening of the Stichting Habibi Ana shelter on Spuistraat 47/A1 signals another development in the fight for bringing homosexuality and Islam together. Most importantly, the center caters to everyone, regardless of ethnicity or religion. Even if its main goal is a safe space for gay Muslims, it will be also a safe space for all gay people. “The Yoesuf Foudation is now working towards an education center, and Stichting Habibi Ana is an open-door for everybody, come tell your story, speak to others,” Nahas says. In other words, the Muslim community is taking control of social and educational issues via self-empowerment, often without funding from the government.

Public versus Private

Duyvendak sees limitations in terms of alliance between the gay community and Muslims. Regardless of their status as minorities, he says, “this old rainbow idea, of all minorities together against whatever, that is not working here.” He cites the integration of gay into the mainstream that has made their conceptualization of gay oppression near impossible. “If you ask them to think about what it is to be a minority,” he said in reference to the gay community, “it’s even a question of whether they recognize themselves as being part of a minority.”

Regardless of their vastly different social locations within the Netherlands, both groups find themselves plagued by issues of public and private. Gert Hekma argues that, in this context, the matrices of power shift in favor of Islam.

The Muslims, they fit into the Dutch system of pillarization, so they have a kind of advantage, because I would say that the Dutch privilege religious citizenship over sexual citizenship. They have sexual rights, but the sexual rights can only be private rights, no public rights as a gay man. They have much more public rights for the religious community, so I guess they are privileged above the gays, but because they are poor people they are also less privileged than the gays in terms of housing, education, and sexuality also.

The right of the Muslim community to public expressions of religion, however, is debatable. In light of recent decisions to ban the *niqaab* (the head scarf that covers the entire face except for the eyes) in schools and the defacing of numerous mosques after Theo Van Gogh’s death, public religion, or at least a public Islam, appears out of the question (21 Lunsing). It seems both visible homosexuality and visible Islam are outside the rights of the public.

“And for sure, this society is deeply heterosexual,” agrees Duyvendak, “and almost all images are heterosexual, and gay people, in a sense, don’t dare to walk hand in hand in the streets; it’s very rare.” Gert Hekma views the lack of visibility as generational. “Nowadays, most gay men, the first people they talk with about

homosexuality are their parents and their peers, heterosexual people,” he argues. “They learn about homosexuality through heterosexual eyes...this progress, it also brings regress, in a sense.” The result is, perhaps, a conceptualization of visible homosexuality that validates the heterosexual majority with which it is aligned.

The Dutch moral majority fights for homosexuality to be public to a limited degree, while religion becomes private or de-legitimated. This is a distinct shift from the old days of pillarization and religious identification. “Everybody who is religious nowadays is saying, hmmm, can I still be religious?” Duyvendak argues. “It is not exclusively Muslim bashing, but it also against right-wing Christians.” Meanwhile, the devout Muslim community desires for the exact opposite: a public Islam and a private or non-existent homosexuality. The tensions here arise due to near opposite approaches to issues of sexuality and religion.

Omar Nahas describes one of the first meetings between the gay and Muslim communities as making these tensions tangible. “They came together in one room, but unfortunately, the gay movement was too open for the Muslim community,” Nahas stated, in reference to the explicit approach of the Dutch gay community. However, the religious practices of the Muslims present drew criticisms from the gay community. Nahas continued, “If you are a Muslim, and you say, ‘Sorry, stop the whole meeting because I am going to pray,’ people would not accept that anymore, because they are saying that you are in public, in an open meeting...”

In the same way that the Dutch conceptualization of religion has shifted due to depillarization, the conceptualization of sexuality (and, therefore, visibility) of the migrant population is being raised as an issue. Those frustrated with a lack of tolerance

for homosexuality within Muslim circles assume that Western conceptualizations of sexuality are relevant to those who come from the non-Western world. “This whole idea of sexual identities, we know it is different” in the non-Western world, Duyvendak states. Therefore, “the visibility won’t be the same, and at the same time there will be more Muslim young people who won’t want to identify with some sexuality. Whether they are going to identify as being gay or totally gay, that remains a question.” Indeed, the Koran may acknowledge that sodomy between two men is sin, but it mentions nothing about same-sex acts between women. Already, you see that the Dutch understanding of sexuality has a historicity that is far different from that of Islam.

Amidst all of these differences, what the two poles have in common is a desire to express elements of their identity publicly, and that they believe it is part of their right as citizens. Paul Scheffer, the author of the influential essay “The Multicultural Tragedy,” felt that both expressions were affronts to society. He told Duyvendak that “this demonstrative homosexuality was something that was as wrong as those Muslim people.” The sort of visibility that is desired by both groups appears diametrically opposed in the context of daily reality, “but it is a way of thinking about it,” Duyvendak continues. “It is one republican model in which we, all those who are not really part of the mainstream, are marginalized.”

Duyvendak remembers a statement made by peer Stefan Dudink, a professor of gay and lesbian studies at the University of Nijmegen. ““Be careful,” he recalls Dudink saying. “It seems to be as if gay people are better treated part of the mainstream now, but the very moment they attack the kind of public identities like headscarves, they are going to attack any manifestation that is not normal,’ and I think he is right. I tried to deny it at

first. ‘No,’ I said, ‘gay people are really embraced,’ and at the same time...I thought, okay, this is the [new] agenda, we have to become French.”²

² To “become French” to Duyvendak means when “you really have to hide all of your differences for private” and maintain a national identity that trumps all others.

Conclusions

The Dutch political system has a history as a divided nation, as embodied by the pillar system. Religious and political minorities co-existed within a depoliticized state that functioned to derive consensus. The multicultural model thrived. The present state of Dutch politics marks a distinct shift from this diverse multiculturalism to the reigning monoculturalism. A new moral majority has formed that is largely in agreement on issues of religion and politics. This change is evident in structural changes in the Dutch conceptualization of politics; consensus is not longer the goal but a foregone conclusion.

The homosexuals of the Netherlands, too, have been brought into this majority as the result of a movement that sought integration and equality. The gay pillar that existed separate from the establishment until the 1980s has given way to its community being brought into the mainstream. The common culture has opened to accommodate for this sexual diversity. In fact, acceptance of homosexuals has come to partially define what is the majority. As a result, the cause of equal homosexuality has been taken up by the Dutch heterosexual public.

The rising tensions between the old Dutch and the Muslim new Dutch has led to a repoliticization of identity. Events like September 11th, 2001, politicians like Pim Fortuyn and Ayaan Hirsi Ali and homophobic incidents like El Moumni's televised statements – they have only reinforced the present belief that all views outside of the Dutch libertarian standard are violent, backwards and counter-productive. This shift to public discussions and emphasis on identity is very new, and represents a break in the Dutch political tradition. In the past, issues of religious difference were buried in the pillar system which supported such minority groups. Now, the question of religious

identity is at the forefront of the debate. The dissent expressed by the Muslim minority makes clear that Dutch majoritarian views are not universal, even within the national boundaries of Holland.

The multicultural versus monocultural debate brings both the gay and Muslim communities into the fold. Sexual difference has been adopted through an understanding of sameness beyond sexual orientation, such that homosexuals fit cleanly into the monoculture of Holland without bringing a sort of multi-dimensionality. The mainstreaming of gay has had both positive and negative repercussions. Gays are being championed as equal citizens and human beings, while this fact is being utilized to prove that others are not. The lack of gay mobilization refuses homosexuals the power to determine how their cause is positioned, but this is evidently by choice. The progressive gay movement has largely lost support, and the idea of a unified gay community has become myth. Many of those gays who previously focused on moving forward have achieved their goals and are supportive of the new Dutch model. After all, it is highly inclusive of their lifestyle and their participation in politics.

The Islamic community within the Netherlands refuses to integrate by succumbing to the norms of the majority, as the government seeks to strip them of their religious identity. The Dutch system itself was founded on standards of religious characterization, and yet that history has been ignored. Instead, the progression towards a unified state has made such an approach seem obsolete to Dutch leaders. Instead of being allowed an equal alternative to or space in the moral majority, they have been characterized as the enemy. The ignorance of inherent diversity within the Dutch Muslim world, and the immigrant population as a whole, has been a large source of the

discrimination they have faced. Certainly, the concept of sameness does not appear to be the answer to their problems. For some, integration into Holland has come hand in hand with their religious development, and their identity cannot be reduced to one or the other.

The tensions between homosexuality and Islam, too, cannot be reduced, not even to a debate on multiculturalism versus monoculturalism. If the gay integration into the majority is one divider, the development of prejudice from both communities further complicates the matter. The gay community is becoming increasingly Islamophobic, while the Muslim community is anti-homosexual. The compounding of structural inconsistencies and diametrically opposed interests makes a traditional rainbow coalition an impossibility. Intolerance is being fought with further intolerance, an approach that has and will continue to manifest in violence and unrest. The multicultural model is dead. What is necessary is an effort towards productive discussion, rather than a majoritarian consensus, as it's goal. As Wim Lunsing writes, "Freedom of speech is very important, but I don't know what use it is if nobody listens to each other (interview, Lunsing)."

The formation of a new nationalistic character has been undertaken as necessary to understand where Holland stands in the debate over identity. The right-wing has taken advantage of the structural shift to a moral majority by developing a firm concept of Dutchness. However, this artificial identity has been formulated in reaction to the tensions of identity politicization. The new Dutch identity defines not what Holland is but what it is not. At the same time, the Islamic community is actively enforcing its definition of Muslim Dutchness, and by equal measures refuses to back down. This

tension via structural shifts and agency signals that the gap is widening exponentially. It seems that two nations are forming within the bounds of a single country.

The French model of republican monoculturalism is enticing for Holland, as it allows for the maintenance a powerful majority. However, the recent riots in France over the dismissal of immigrant interests prove the ineffectiveness of a tough right-wing stance. Such an approach in the Netherlands will only lead to similar unrest. However, in the Dutch case, the repercussions could be far more grave. The new Dutch immigrant population is the fastest growing group in Holland. Unlike in France, the new Dutch do not live in ghetto banlieues³ but on the interior of major cities, in the very same spaces that gay people have made their homes. Now comes word of a second *Submission* video penned by Ayaan Hirsi Ali, this time addressing Islamic homophobia. In light of the resulting death of Theo Van Gogh after their first installment, I am not optimistic about the future acceptance of a Dutch Islam. I beg the question: how many more must die before difference is acknowledged?

³ French for “suburbs.”

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Appendix: Interview Guide

The following questions form the outline from which interviews were conducted. The questions asked of subjects varied slightly and were tailored to particular issues raised in each subject's published works.

What do you feel is the state of the gay emancipation movement in Holland? What, if anything, remains to be done?

If changes need to be made: How do structures need to change for further development to take place?

Is "gay" de-politicized?

How do you feel about recent tension between the gay and immigrant populations?

Do you see any similarities between the struggles of the gay community and that of the immigrant population?

How do you reconcile the fact that responses to homophobia from the old Dutch establishment have been different from that of the new Dutch?

Do you see a queer movement as a possible future for the gay community in Holland?

What steps do you feel can be taken to amend the relationship between the gay and new Dutch communities?

Do you feel that the present stance of the Dutch moral majority positions the gay and Muslim communities against one another?

How do you feel about the development of a new Dutch identity?