Youth Perceptions and Engagement with the Moroccan State’s Promotion of Sufism

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Youth Perceptions and Engagement with the Moroccan State’s Promotion of Sufism

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to analyze if the Moroccan state’s efforts to promote Sufism have affected the youth perceptions of and engagement with Sufism. The study first contextualizes Sufism in Morocco and then addresses why and how the state has reformed the religious sphere since the 2003 Casablanca bombings. The King in a 2004 speech announced Sufism as one of the cornerstones of Moroccan Islam and has since heavily promoted it through media, financial support of zawias, and the appointment of Ahmed Toufiq to Minister of Islamic Affairs. The state views Sufism as a tolerant, peaceful, and depoliticized way of practicing Islam that can counter the growing influence of extremist Salafi and Islamist ideologies. By conducting surveys and interviews with a variety of Moroccan youth on Sufism, through the analysis of the academic discourse on Sufism in Morocco, and by using the results of a 2010 national survey on youth engagement with Sufism, the paper provides a picture of how Moroccan youth are engaging with Sufism and its influence at the local level. While the state has actively promoted Sufism in the public sphere, this paper shows Sufism, while viewed positively, is not a critical aspect of Islam in the lives of young local Moroccans.

Introduction

Sufism has existed in Morocco for centuries and has played a role in shaping the country’s Muslim identity. But globally, Sufism faced great criticism with the rise of European colonialism and its presence in Morocco decreased. It was not until after the 2003 Casablanca bombings and the state’s measures to reform the religious sphere that Sufism would again take on a central role in Morocco’s spirituality. Sufism was adopted as an official cornerstone of Moroccan Islam in 2004 and the state proceeded to promote Sufi values and tariqahs in aim of countering extreme religious ideologies. Youth, or those under 30, make up 60% of Morocco’s population and the state viewed them as the most vulnerable population to radicalization. Youth, therefore, were the primary audience for the state’s program. While there are numerous newspaper articles and even a few scholarly journals purporting how Moroccan youth are going Sufi and the effectiveness of Moroccan state at countering extremism, there is a clear lack of literature on how Moroccan youth actually view Sufism and the state’s promotion of it. My research question, and the basis of this paper, consequently is how do Moroccan youth perceive and engage with the Moroccan state’s promotion of Sufism?
In this paper I will first outline my own positionality as a researcher and then outline my research methods. The next section gives an overview of Sufism, its history, organization as a mass movement, and its manifestations in Morocco. I then explain the official view of Islam in Morocco, and how its definition changed after the 2003 Casablanca bombings. The steps taken by the state to restructure the religious field are clarified. The paper then describes the specifics of how and why Sufism is promoted by the state. The next major section addresses my own research findings and data from a 2010 national survey on youth and Sufism. These two sources are compared and analyzed. Finally I offer a conclusion both about the research itself and why this research is significant.

Positionality

My identity as an American, female, white, non-Muslim researcher influenced my interactions and research capabilities in Morocco. First, as an American and as an outsider I had to be aware of people talking about Morocco or Sufism in a way they thought would be most pleasing to me. I often also found that I had to ask more detailed questions because people would often only give me very general descriptions of Sufism or Islam, on the assumption that as a non-Muslim and non-Moroccan I did not know anything. Being a female also influenced my research in so far as I was not comfortable walking up to young men on my own and asking them to complete my survey. I was able to find male perspectives on the topic but only through my female contacts introducing me. Finally, my position as an American researching religion meant I had to be very aware that Islam is a very sensitive topic in Morocco and being critical of it or the state can lead to legal repercussions. To ensure that answering the questions I was asking would not threaten the security of any participants, I worked with my advisor Khalid Saqi and my Arabic professor Assia to frame the questions in a sensitive manner.
Research Methods and Limits

My primary research was completed through surveys. The anonymous survey was written in Arabic, included five questions, and was given to 11 participants. All the research was done in Rabat, Morocco. Seven of the participants were from Dar al-Hadith al-Hassania, a university for Islamic studies in Hay Riad. Two masters students at Mohammed V University completed surveys. One individual completed a survey at a café in the Ville Nouvelle and finally another individual working at a surf shop participated. The ages of participants ranged from 22 to 30. Six were female and five male. All those interviewed had at minimum a high school education and nine of the eleven were pursuing a master’s degree. I attempted to survey people at both Bab al-Had and several cafés in the ville nouvelle, however, individuals at these locations would read the survey and then return it to me blank explaining they knew nothing about Sufism. These non-answers were still significant to my research. A copy of the English versions of the survey can be found in the appendix.

I also completed three interviews, two English and one in Arabic. The first was with Sadik Rddad, a professor in the Department of English at Dhar El Mehraz University in Fez. He is an expert on Sufism and is also a founding member of the Moroccan Cultural Studies Center. I interviewed him both on the history of Sufism in Morocco for background and about Sufism specific to the restructuring of the religious sphere. I then interviewed Professor Emilio Spedola from Colgate University. He is currently in Morocco researching spiritual security and I spoke with him about the concept of spiritual security and how this is related to the restructuring of the religious sphere. Finally, I interviewed a female student from Dar al-Hadith, Hanane Mansour, about the state’s promotion of Sufism and youth participation in it. A copy of my interview guide can be found in the appendix.
Because of the limited scope of my surveys and interviews, it was important to engage with literature on the topic as well. Academic literature on my topic was limited but I did have access to numerous news articles, which were primarily publicity pieces of the Moroccan regime about how the promotion of Sufism effectively counters religious extremism. These were nonetheless good background for my research. I also engaged with academic literature about the reforms of the religious sphere. The most important resource though the 2010 “Survey on Moroccan Youth: Perception and Participation in Sufi Orders” by Khalid Bekkaoui, Ricardo René Larémont and Sadik Rddad. This was a national survey that reached a much wider audience than my own survey, including both rural and urban areas outside of Rabat. By analyzing their data in addition to my own findings, the paper provides findings that are applicable to youth in Morocco in general, versus simply the subset of educated, university-aged Rabat youth.

Certainly terminology begs definition to clarify the arguments of this paper. The state of Morocco is referenced as promoting Sufism not the government of Morocco because these are two separate entities in Morocco. The state traditionally in international relations theory is sovereign territory with an organized political community that is governed by a single system of government. Sociologist and political theorist, Max Weber, defines a state as the entity holding a monopoly on the legal use of force within a specific territory. According to these definitions the state is Morocco is equal to the King. The King in Morocco is both the commander in chief of political and military affairs but he is also the head of all religious affairs. In Morocco, the King embodies the state. A government, on the other hand, is administrative body that has decision-making power within the territory, but it is not immutable. In terms of Morocco, the government is the representatives and ministers that make up parliament and the national ministries. Their power is not fixed but is dependent on the state, in this case the King allowing the government to exist and hold power. Hanane Mansour explained this difference to me and clarified that it is the
state, represented by the King, who is promoting Sufism and reforming the religious sphere, not the elected government. For the purposes of this paper when addressing Sufism and its promotion, I am referring to the actions authorized by the King, first and foremost.

Finally, I want to make clear that the scope of my research, even with the academic background literature and the 2010 data, is very limited. This paper attempts to draw a few specific conclusions about the importance of the promotion of Sufism in the lives of Moroccan youth, but in no ways can my research fully represent national trends. There is a great deal left to study about how and why the state is promoting Sufism and also what the results have been. Due to time constraints, language barriers, and my own positionality, my research is only a starting point to delve into the subject. Data analysis is not perfect science and so the conclusions I draw are likely not the only ones that can be drawn from my research. The analysis and conclusions are influenced by my own worldview, and while I have attempted to offer a holistic picture, this research is very much limited.

**Overview of Sufism**

**History**

Sufism is mysticism within the Islamic framework. Sufism developed as a reform movement to what was seen as the materialistic ways of imperial Islam during the Umayyad rule. The people who became known as Sufis wanted to return to the purity and simplicity of the Prophet’s time and were driven by a “deep devotional love of God that culminated in a quest for a direct, personal experience of the presence of God in this life” (Esposito, 2005: 101). The term Sufi originally meant ‘one who wears wool’ and it was applied to Muslims whose ascetic inclinations led them to wear coarse woolen garments. By the 9th century some representatives of these groups of Muslims striving for personal engagement with the Devine adopted *tasawwuf* as the name for their movement (Chittick, 2009). A single definition of Sufism has never been
reached but what is agreed upon is that Sufis aim for personal engagement with the Divine and focuses on “inwardness over outwardness, contemplation over action, spiritual development over legalism and cultivation of the soul over social interaction” (Chittick, 2009).

Sufi orders did not come into being until the 12th century CE. Each order, or tariqah in Arabic, is based on the relationship between master (sheikh) and disciple and most Sufi orders can be linked through pious predecessors all the way back to the Prophet Muhammad (Esposito, 2005: 105). The sheikh is the spiritual guide who leads disciples through set rituals to achieve inner purity and reach a personal experience with God. Sufi congregations include recitation of prayers, poems and selections of the Qur’an that are focused on “remembering God” or dhikr. Each tariqah has its own special practices as well, which may include meditation, asceticism, shire pilgrimages, or chanting.

While Sufism is not directly addressed in Islamic scripture, the Qur’anic phenomenon of ihsan or “doing what is beautiful” is deeply related to Sufi practices. Ihsan is described as a deepened understanding that allows you to “worship God as if you see him” that is gained only after islam (submission or correct activity) and iman (faith or correct understanding) (Chittick, 2009). Islam and iman are codified through shari’ah and kalam (theology) while ihsan is represented by Sufism. Sufism is therefore not apart from other forms of Islamic teaching but is simply another branch.

Each tariqah has its own religious rites, saintly lineage and leadership structure but four general types of tariqahs can be identified. First there are large inclusive traditions which were established and organized by a single revered leader but became widespread geographically with local or regional sheikhs spreading the practices. An important example of this is the Qadiriyyah,
which was established by Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani (d.1166) in Baghdad but spread across the Arab world and North Africa (Voll, 2009). Today a Qadiriyyah branch is one of the most popular Sufi orders in Morocco. The second type is orders based on “Ancient Ways” that have less defined traditions and structures but are based on affirming the inspiration and instruction by the chain of teachers that is traced back to the early Sufis (Voll, 2009). There are also individual-based orders that develop due to the innovations of a later teacher. These individuals proclaim a unique validity of their practices separate from their ties to earlier tariqahs (Voll, 2009). Finally there are shrine tariqahs. These are local orders centered on a particular shrine in which a particular sheikh, revered for their piety and often the ability to preform miracles, is buried. The practices of the order may spread but the shrine remains an essential center of pilgrimage and prayer (Voll, 2009).

As Sufism became a mass movement spreading its influence all the way from West Africa across to the Indian subcontinent, local traditions not based in Islam became incorporated into Sufi practices. As Sufism spread its “healthy concern about legalism and ritual formation gave way to the rejection by many of official religious observances and laws…[and it lead to the] growth of superstition and fatalism” (Esposito, 2005: 109). Modern Islamic reformers starting in the 19th century became incredibly critical of Sufism believing it had led to the decline of the Islamic community at the hands of Western imperialism. The Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia, who came to power in the late 18th century, see Sufism as a deviance from the straight path of Islam. They are especially critical of the idea of sheikhs or saints as being intermediaries between man and God, because power is attached to God alone and not human beings (Ahmed, 2001: 225). Shine and saint worship along with stories of men with miraculous powers discredited Sufism in the eyes of the conservative religious establishment and left it open to criticism for being unfaithful to the tenets of Islam. But as Akbar S. Ahmed, an Islamic historian and Sufi adept
himself, points out the existence of some un-Islamic practices at the local level “does not mean that Sufism is to be rejected in its entirety. It is one of the most endearing faces of Islam. Its philosophy of universal love, of universal peace, sulh-i-kul is one of the most powerful and attractive messages it has for our age” (Ahmed, 2001: 225).

**Sufi Values**

Ibn Arabi (d. 1240), a famous Andalusian scholar, Sufi, and poet, wrote:

> O Marvel,  
> a garden among the flames!

> My heart can take on  
> any form:  
> a meadow for gazelles,  
> a cloister for monks,

> For the idols, sacred ground,  
> Ka'ba for the circling pilgrim,  
> the tables of the Torah,  
> the scrolls of the Qur’an.

> I profess the religion of love;  
> wherever its caravan turns along the way,  
> that is the belief,  
> the faith I keep.

This poem embodies the spirit of Sufism. It professes to be a tolerant and moderate approach to Islam that embraces other religions. Sufi teachings put great emphasis on the need to love God, which is not done simply through prayer but through loving all those around you. “For the Sufis we are all created out of the same soul. By loving others, you love yourself. God created the world out of love” (Rddad, 2015). Ibn Arabi wrote “So show compassion and mercy to the servants of God, just as God provides for them in spite of their disbelief and associate of another Him in their knowledge of them” (Arabi, 2002: 56). Sufism requires being compassionate even to individuals who are not “good Muslims” or who do not believe in God. At the foundation of Sufism is the belief that God created all and is embodied in all, to love and gain nearness to Him requires loving all creatures that He has created.
Sufism in Morocco

There are three major Sufi orders in Morocco: Tariqah Qadiriyyah, Tariqah Shadhiliyyah, and Tariqah Tijaniyyah. The Qadiriyyah has several branches but the major branch in Morocco is the Qadiri Boutchichi founded in the late 18th century in Morocco and now led by Sheikh Hamza Qadiri al Boutchichi (Rddad). The Shadhiliyyah was first founded in Tunisia in 1228 and holds great influence throughout North Africa. It has around 72 different branches globally, which is the largest number of offshoots for any tariqah (Rddad). The Dargawiyyah branch is most active in Morocco and was founded in the late 18th century (Wikipedia).

The third prominent Moroccan Sufi order is the Tijaniyyah. This order has no offshoots and is unique in its nature. The founded Sidi Ahmed Tijani does not have a spiritual guide like in other Sufi orders. Instead he claims the Prophet came to him in a vision and told him he was the seal of the saints and must form a new Sufi order. No disciples can become sheikhs in the Tijani tradition. Sidi Ahmed is buried in Fez and his shrine is a very important pilgrimage site for members of the Tijani order many of whom are from West Africa (Rddad). Renouncing affiliation with all other Sufi orders and promising to never join or create another order are requisites to becoming a member of the Tijaniyyah, making it impossible for this order to have any offshoots.

Reforming the Religious Sphere

3 Cornerstones of Moroccan Islam

Islam in Morocco as defined by the state and existing in public discourse is composed of three central tenants: the Maliki School of jurisprudence, the Ash’ari doctrine, and the concept of the amir al mu’minin (Commander of the Faithful). The Maliki School is one of the four schools of law in Sunni Islam. It was founded by Malik ibn Anas al-Asbahi in the 8th century in the Arabian Peninsula. The use of hadiths from companions of the Prophet as a source of law and allowing for ray (personal opinion) and qiyas (analogy) in making legal decisions distinguishes it
from the other schools of law (Ziadeh). All Moroccan laws are based on rulings based in Maliki School.

The Ash’ari doctrine is a school of Sunni kalam (theology). It was developed by Abu al-Hasan ali al-Ash’ari in the 10th century. He was originally a member of the Mu’tazilis (rationalist) movement but broke away in 912 CE condemning them as inauthentic. The Ash’ari doctrine stresses the use of reason, like the Mu’tazilis, but is more dependent on hadiths. The doctrine emphasizes human dependence on God because “God is omnipotent and creates even our acts. We appropriate them and thereby become responsible for them” (Leaman). The Ash’ari doctrine and Maliki School of thought are important because they allow for human reasoning and do not strictly rely on scripture for developing legal and theological understanding (Wainscott). Islam in Morocco can therefore be considered more flexible and moderate than some other Arab countries.

The third original cornerstone of Moroccan Islam is the position of amir al mu’minin always held by the king. The term historically is a claim of legitimacy by the leader of a caliphate or sovereign Muslim territory to govern the Muslim community. In Morocco, the position combines political and religious power. The Alaouite dynasty, to which the current king belongs, began 400 hundred years ago with Moulay Ali Cherif and can trace its lineage back to the Prophet (“Morocco’s New King” 1). Each year on Throne Day the position of the King as amir is renewed trough the members of the High Council of Islamic Scholars stating their allegiance (Toufiq, 2014: 3). The position of amir al mu'minin, by locating the king within a tradition tracing back to the Prophet, confers an aura of piety and great legitimacy.

**Effects of 2003 Casablanca Bombings**

On May 16th, 2003 terrorists attacked several Western and Jewish gathering places in Casablanca. The death toll was 45 including the 12 suicide bombers. All of the suicide bombers were young men from the shantytown of Sidi Moumen on the outskirts of the city. The attacks
were perpetrated by the Salafia Jihadia organization that has links to Al-Qaeda (START). Not long after the Casablanca attacks, the 2004 Madrid train bombings occurred and the Morocco Islamic Combatant Group was blamed.

These terrorist attacks fundamentally challenged Morocco’s image as the home of moderate and peaceful Islam. King Mohammad VI took swift action in terms of security and legal reforms. The parliament passed an anti-terror law directly after the Casablanca attacks that gave the government new powers to curb peaceful political activity, censor press, allow a person to be detained incommunicado for 12 days, and reduced the requirements for the death penalty (A. Maghraoui, 2008). Both the terrorist attacks but also the government’s response challenged the progress of democratization in Morocco. The response to the bombings, however, was not just focused on increasing security and rounding up those responsible. The background of the bombers as poor, undereducated and marginalized young men from shantytowns necessitated reforms directed economic development and poverty relief. The National Initiative for Human Development was funded in tandem with the World Bank to alleviate rural poverty, social exclusion, and alleviate vulnerability to extremist ideologies (World Bank).

The most significant reforms though came in the restructuring of the religious field. Because religion and politics are directly intertwined through the King’s position as the amir al-mu’minin, the monarchy holds the role of “the ‘guardian’ and ‘protector’ of a particular form of Islam that it deems necessary for the ‘balance’ and ‘spiritual security’ of the country and its citizens” (D. Maghraoui, 2009: 199). The terrorist attacks proved that ideologies other than the state’s “Islam” had become influential within the religious field, and so the state undertook reforms to reestablish its own power and make Morocco more secure.

The restructuring of the religious field was first announced in a speech on April 30th, 2004 (Bekkaoui and Larémont, 2011: 33). In the speech the King stated, Moroccans must contribute
“in a rational and focused way to correct the image of Islam that has been deliberately perverted and tarnished by unbalanced villains and the hideous acts of senseless aggressors involved in terrorism.” The first steps were to clampdown on illegal mosques and the sale of books or tapes associated with Salafi or Wahhabi leaders. The Ministry of Islamic Affairs was given a monopoly over the discourse preached in Mosques, the education of imams, the religious broadcasting on TV and radio stations, and the issuing of fatwas (D. Maghraoui, 2009: 200). The High Council of Religious Scholars – a national High Council, 27 regional councils, and 68 local sections – was established in 2004 to “oversee all religious matters in the country and to keep an eye on all forms of religious expressions and teachings that detract from the orientation of official Islam” (D. Maghraoui, 2009: 202).

Changes within the media sphere occurred also. The government created the Assadissa television and radio stations, which would focus on religious issues and is under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs. The station airs sermons and religious training aimed at promoting tolerant and peaceful Islamic messages (D. Maghraoui, 2009: 204). Previously television broadcasters had worn traditional Moroccan clothing but now all preachers appear on TV in European style dress (D. Maghraoui, 2009: 204).

The Council for Moroccans Abroad was also established as an advisory council to the expatriate community. It address immigration issues and has its own members on the High Council of Religious Scholars (D. Maghraoui, 2009: 205). Morocco had a tarnished international reputation after terrorist attacks and plots in Europe and the US were linked to cells originating in Morocco. In an attempt to again be considered a peaceful and moderate Islamic country Morocco created clear standards for the education of Imams, both male and female, and then opened its religious training programs to foreign nationals. The plan was to “send religious preachers that are accredited by the Moroccan Ministry of Islamic Affairs to different European countries…In
September 2008, 167 imams and 9 mouchidat (female imams) were sent to Europe and Canada” (D. Maghraoui, 2009: 206). Restructuring the religious field was essential to Morocco’s legitimacy as a peaceful and moderate Muslim country that was an ally to the West in the “War on Terror.”

**Sufism as 4th Cornerstone**

In the King Mohammad VI’s 2004 speech Sunni Sufism was announced as the fourth cornerstone of Moroccan Islam. The adoption of Sufism as an official part of Moroccan Islam and the state’s subsequent promotion of Sufi values was part of the policy of restructuring the religious field to counter the growth of political Islam and to dissociate itself from Salafism (Bekkaoui and Larémont, 2011: 34). Sufism was seen as an alternative to the rigidity of radical forms of religious interpretations and instead in line with the tolerant message of Islam (D. Maghraoui, 2009: 206). The Sufi focus on love is what makes it a valuable tool for the government in fighting extremism. Love in Sufism is “not just of your Muslim brotherhood, but love of every single creature in the world” (Rddad, 2015). Sufis believe that Jihad should be launched against oneself, not others. The purpose of jihad is to strike your evil soul not discipline outside enemies (Rddad, 2015). Sufism promotes interfaith dialogue and transnationalism. The idea behind promoting Sufism is to spread the message of showing tolerance towards those of other religions.

The Moroccan state also promotes Sufism because it sees it as de-politicized. Islamist parties, especially the Party of Justice and Development, which now leads parliament, pose a challenge to both the King’s power and his religious legitimacy (Muedini, 2012: 219). Promoting Sufism therefore is used by the Moroccan state to influence “individuals to practice a religion that does not emphasize becoming involved in the political system” (Muedini, 2012: 219). Dr. Abbas Boughanem said, “Because Sufis are generally not interested in politics and are totally involved
in their rituals, they can teach people who follow them some kind of political passivity” (Al-Ashraf, 2010). Just as the state supported Islamists in the 1970’s to counter leftist trends and Salafi movements to fight opposition from the Justice and Charity Party, the state is now using Sufism to combat Jihadi movements but also stall the growth of support for Islamist parties like the Party of Justice and Development and the Movement for Unity and Reform (Al-Ashraf, 2010). Sufis also show there is no contradiction between being religious and pledging allegiance to the state by practicing religious rituals while engaging in no political opposition (Al-Ashraf). Not all Sufi groups, however, are divorced from political involvement. The Justice and Charity Party, an Islamist party founded by a Sufi adept, is actively suppressed by the Moroccan state because it rejects the legitimacy of the King to be both the head of state and the *amir al-mu’minin* (A. Maghraoui, 2008). The state must be careful making the assumption that Sufism is inherently depoliticized.

In restructuring the religious sphere the King took a new approach to diplomacy by connecting with other countries, especially West African nations, through shared religious histories. The adoption of Sufism as a cornerstone of Moroccan Islam was important to these new efforts because large populations in West Africa participate Sufi *tariqahs* that originally developed in Morocco. The *Tijaniyyah tariqah* is especially important because each year thousands of people visit Sidi Ahmed Tijani’s tomb in Fez after making pilgrimage to Mecca (Rddad, 2015). Sufism is especially important to Moroccan-Senegalese relations since to run for president in Senegal one must be endorsed by both major Sufi orders – the *Tijaniyyah* and *Muridiyya* (Rddad, 2015). Outside of Morocco Sufi *tariqahs* hold both spiritual and political significance. By emphasizing Morocco’s Sufi history, the state has created new diplomatic relations.
The state has several methods of promoting Sufism but perhaps the most important step after adopting Sufism as a cornerstone of Islam was appointing Ahmed Toufiq to Minister of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs. Ahmed Toufiq is a Sufi adept of the Qadiriyyah Boutchichia. He was a professor of history at Mohammad V University, director of the National Library, and a writer before becoming a Minister in 2002 (Bekkaoui and Larémont, 2011: 37). Toufiq said in a speech to the UN that promoting Sufism is a “method to raise awareness of the sanctity of the Other; it curbs unhealthy enthusiasm for racial and tribal belonging and sets up institutions that provide assistance, protection, education, and development” (Toufiq, 2012: 5). His appointment as Minister solidified the state’s relation to Sufism but more specifically to the Qadiriyyah Boutchichia tariqah.

In addition to Toufiq’s role as Minister, the state has been investing money in to zawias across Morocco. One organization heavily involved in both refurbishing zawias and holding public gatherings to introduce Moroccans to Sufism is the Munya Association for the Preservation and Revitalization of Moroccan Heritage located in Marrakech (Feuer, 2015). With the help of state funding, it hosts music festivals, art classes, and seminars infused with the Sufi values of love, spirituality, and tolerance. The organization, like the state, believes “the revitalization of Sufism’s inward-looking religious consciousness [is] an antidote to the coercive religious ideology embodied in Wahabism and other extremist strains of Islamic thought” (Feuer, 2015). The state is also investing money in promoting Sufism through media such as television programs (Rddad, 2015). State investment in civil society organizations and media has increased the visibility of Sufism.

Sufism is also promoted in educational institutions. Scholars are now giving much more attention to Sufism and especially its history in Morocco (Rddad, 2015). Further, tariqahs, especially the Qadiriyyah Boutchichia, have developed strong presences on university campuses.
(Rddad, 2015). The leader of the *Boutchichia*, Sidi Hamza, has shifted the order’s focus from *tabarruk* (seeking spiritual blessings from the *sheikh*) to *tarbiyya* (spiritual education) (Bekkaoui and Larémont, 2011: 35). To participate in the *tariqah* it is no longer necessary to go the *zawia* or meet with the *sheikh* each week for *dhikr* (ceremonial chant remembering God) but disciples can hold *dhikr* with their friends and peers at a private residence.

Another means of promotion has been the hosting of Sufi festivals. Moroccan authorities organize festivals to “attract youth to a modernizing Sufi culture. In these events a cocktail of musicians, singers, and dancers are invited, from flamenco to Andalusian, rap and gnawa music” (Bekkaoui and Larémont, 2011: 37). Some of the most important festivals are Samaa Festival for Spiritual Music in Marrakech, the annual Fez Festival of Sufi Culture, and the *Mawlid* ceremony that commemorates the birth of the Prophet. In 2002, about 15,000 *Boutchichia* disciples attended the *Mawlid* ceremony but by 2009 it was estimated that 100,000 disciples attended (Bekkaoui and Larémont, 2011: 35). Sufi festivals are becoming more popular and engagement with Sufism increases along with them.

The 2003 Casablanca bombings served as a wake up call to the Moroccan state about how the influence of Salafism and extremist Islamic ideologies could lead to violence. In an effort to dissociate from Salafism and control the rise of political Islam, the state went about restructuring the religious field. The efforts were aimed at better managing mosques, the discourse and education of imams, religious media broadcasts, and the issuing of fatwas. To emphasize the moderate and tolerant nature of Moroccan Islam, Sufism was adopted as one of its cornerstones. Sufism is an effective tool of the state to both counter violent extremism and Islamist opposition parties because it promotes “religiosity that encourage interfaith dialogue, universalism, tolerance, love, peace, and harmony through a language that is effectively depoliticized” (D. Maghraoui, 2009: 206).
Youth Perceptions of Sufism

My Survey and Interview Results
Through conducting three in depth interviews and receiving 11 responses to my surveys, along with analysis of previous data on this topic, I have been able to form a picture of how Sufism is viewed by Moroccan youth. The analysis has led me to conclude that while the Moroccan state has heavily promoted Sufism in the public sphere, a majority of youth remain minimally engaged with Sufism and are not influenced by it on a daily basis. Instead Sufism exists primarily in political and religious discourse at the national level but is not a critical aspect of life or religion on the local level.

The first question I asked was “do you know any Sufi tariqahs?” Ten of eleven individuals surveyed answered “yes” and nine knew the name of at least one tariqah. The most identified tariqah was the Tijaniyyah. All those participants who knew the name of a tariqah identified the Tijaniyyah. The next most often cited tariqah, with seven participants naming it, was the Qadiriyyah Boutchichia. Three participants named the Dargawa tariqah, which is an offshoot of the Shadhiliyyah. Finally, two participants named the Basri tariqah. While the vast majority of participants in my survey could name Sufi tariqahs active in Morocco, it is important to recognize that all but one those surveyed were obtaining a masters degree. On the other hand, all the individuals I approached in public places around Rabat such as cafes or Bab al-Had read the survey and then gave it back to me saying they did not know anything about Sufism. Within the skewed sample of highly educated Moroccans who did complete my survey there is a general knowledge of Sufism, but this cannot be generalized to the Moroccan public.

The second question asked of participants was “In your opinion, is Sufism important to Islam in Morocco?” Six of eleven participants answered “yes” while five answered “no”. The reasons for its significance were generally focused on how Sufism is a part of the history of
Morocco. One individual answered, “[Sufism] is a part of the Islamic identity like the golden age of history in Morocco” (Participant A). Participant B responded that Sufism is “important for its role in reviving spirituality.” Hanane Mansour, a student at Dar al-Hadith who I interviewed, also believes Sufism is significant historically because it represents the “spirit of ethics in the spiritual lives of Muslims” but today in Morocco it is important because the state has adopted it as “a pillar and element of Islam in addition to fiq (law) and aqida (doctrine).” Two individuals also referred to Sufism as important because it is a moderate form of Islam (Participant C and Participant H).

Participants who answered “no” believed that Sufism was out-dated. Participant F responded, “Sufism served Islam at certain historical stages but in modern times it became a set of practices and rituals inconsistent with the values of Islam.” When my host aunt read the survey and she laughed at this question and told me bluntly, “Sufism is not important to Muslims in Morocco.” From my own data is clear that the significance of Sufism to Islam in Morocco is up for debate and there is no definitive answer to if youth perceive Sufism as important in Morocco. But both those who do believe Sufism is currently important to Islam and those who don’t agree that in the past Sufism was of greater significance.

Participants were also asked, “do you participate in a Sufi tariqah?” Ten of eleven participants answered “no.” Reasons for not joining were often based on negative perceptions such as participant K who answered, “Tariqahs practice outdated rituals.” Participant E said, “I am not convinced of the validity of tariqahs so I cannot commit.” An important answer to make note of was Participant D who said, “I have not received an invitation from any tariqah.” This answer implies that had a tariqah reached out to this individual he might have joined. Tariqahs traditionally rely on people seeking them out to become disciples and do not attempt outreach to gain members, but the Qadiriyyah Boutchichia has begun to seek out new members especially on
college campuses (Rddad, 2015). The participant’s sentiments demonstrate openness to Sufism and suggest that engagement with Sufism could increase if tariqahs are more active in recruiting disciples. The one participant who does participate in a tariqah explained, “Yes because it is the spiritual education I have been looking for since I was younger” (Participant C). From my own data it is clear that only a minority of youth join tariqahs.

To gauge the participants’ awareness of how the state promotes Sufism, I asked, “Who encourages Sufism in Moroccan Society?” Eight participants gave answers related to the state. Three of these individuals simply wrote that the Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs promoted Sufism. But the other five gave answers directly stating “the state” or “the government” encouraged the presence of Sufism in Moroccan society. Participant F said, “The state encourages Sufism and Sufi tariqahs in service of its political goals and to control religiosity.”Participant D responded, “The state encourages and advertises Sufism.” Participant A stated, “the government and the state promote it as a response to the tendencies of a large part of youth.” It is unclear what tendencies he was referencing but it can be surmised that he was talking about the engagement of youth with Salafi and jihadi movements. Hanane Mansour recognized that the state specifically promotes Sufism to counter religious extremism. Three other responses stated that zawias were encouraging Sufism. While it is true that zawias do promote Sufism, much of the funding for these organizations is coming from the state. In general, there is awareness amongst the participants that Sufism is being actively encouraged within Moroccan society. But the education level of the participants is again very significant to how they responded. The awareness of the promotion of Sufism cannot be generalized to all youth because of the distinct lack of knowledge about Sufism demonstrated by those surveyed at Bab al-Had and a café. Individuals asked at those locations refused to participate acknowledging that they did
not know the answers to the survey questions. While the educated subsection of individuals I researched did recognize the promotion of Sufism, not all youths do.

“Moroccan Islam” is a common idiom in the state’s political discourse and the media. In media and political discourse “Moroccan Islam” means a form of tolerant, peaceful Islam. It refers to the four cornerstones of the Maliki legal tradition, the Ash’ari doctrine, the King as *amir al-mu’minin*, and Sunni Sufism (Raddad). While the term is readily used in speeches by the King and his Ministers and can be found in numerous news articles about Morocco’s strategy to counter-terrorism, I was interested in understanding if youth also believed in a specific Moroccan Islam. I asked participants, “Do you think there is such thing as Morocco Islam?” While not all participants answered this question, the majority agreed that there is no such thing as “Moroccan Islam.” Most participants agreed that there exists a universal Islam but in individual practices that there are differences. Participant A answered, “No because there is one Islam but Morocco, like all countries, has its own religiosity.” Participant E wrote, “There is one Islam with negligible differences. The differences are in the customs of people but we are all the same religion.” In her interview, Hanane Mansour explained, “Islam is the same in Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia but you find the name “Moroccan Islam” in politics to mean a moderate Islam that is open to other religions.” Dr. Raddad agreed that in Morocco “Islam is not monolithic. In Morocco we want to keep our secular beliefs private. Religion is not a private thing it is communal and public. But, there exists a discrepancy between reality and discourses about that reality.” The one participant who answered “yes” wrote, “Yes, Islam in Morocco is a mixture of Maliki jurisprudence, the Ash’ari doctrine, and Sufism. This mixture cannot be found anywhere besides Morocco.” Indeed the four cornerstones of “Moroccan Islam” make it a unique entity. But “Moroccan Islam” only exists in discourse. It is the official Islam but my data points to a discrepancy between this
discourse and reality. In reality, Moroccan youth don’t see themselves practicing “Moroccan Islam” they are simply practicing Islam as a Moroccan.

**Analysis of 2010 Survey on Youth and Sufism**

In 2010 three researchers, Khalid Bekkaoui, Ricardo René Larémort, and Sadik Rddad, conducted a public opinion survey of Moroccan youths’ perceptions and participation in Sufi orders. The questions were focused on identity and religious affiliation. The survey involved 1,054 respondents aged 16-30 (Bekkaoui et al. 2011: 2). As of 2010 around 60% of the Moroccan population was under the age of 30. The survey and the authors’ analysis conclude that a positive statistical shift has occurred in Moroccan youth associating positive values with Sufism (Bekkaoui et al. 2011: 1). Through analyzing the 2010 study in addition to my findings, I can offer a broader picture of Moroccan youth perceptions and draw more informed conclusions.

The 2010 questionnaire was in Arabic and was distributed randomly to young Moroccans in both rural and urban areas. The sample was 57.40% male and 42.59% female; 73.18% were urban respondents while 26.81% were rural (Bekkaoui et al. 2011: 2). In terms of education, a majority of 69.33% had a university level education. The survey asked participants to define themselves in relation to religion, nationality, and ethnicity. 92.69% of those surveyed identified as Muslim and 90.03% identified as Moroccan (Bekkaoui et al. 2011: 4). The survey shows that national and religious identities are very important to Moroccan youth. For comparison, a survey done in 1983 found that 70.3% of Moroccan youth identified as Muslim and only 14% identified as Moroccan (Bekkaoui et al. 2011: 5). The significant increase in self-identification as Muslim and as Moroccan points to growing religiosity and nationalism within Moroccan youth.

The survey then asked questions regarding participation in political parties, religious organizations, and Sufi *tariqahs*. Only 7.68% of participants were affiliated with political parties, 9.6% with religious organizations, and 8.1% with Sufi *tariqahs*. Participation in any organized
form of religion or politics is low within Moroccan youth. But the study also asked the likelihood of respondents to join these groups. In terms of Sufi tariqahs 18.69% responded they were very likely to join a tariqah, 18.50% were neither likely nor unlikely to join a tariqah, and 44.68% were unlikely to join a tariqah (Bekkaoui et al. 2011: 11). The 18.69% who responded very likely are important because some respondents may not have been willing to directly express being affiliated with a Sufi organization if they were for instance Sufi and a member of the Justice and Charity Party, which is suppressed by the state (Bekkaoui et al. 2011: 11). The actual percentage of youth participating in tariqahs lies, mostly likely, somewhere between the 8.1% who did confirm membership in a Sufi tariqah and the 18.69% who were likely to join an order. But this is still a small percentage of youth participating in Sufism. 18.69% likely to join a tariqah is significantly smaller than the 44.68% who are unlikely to join and echoes my own finding that youth engagement with Sufism is very limited.

The finding of limited engagement with Sufism is demonstrated again the 2010 findings on the number of respondents who visit zawias. The majority, 53.79% of participants, never attends a zawia. While only 9% frequently go to a zawia (Bekkaoui et al. 2011: 12). Only a small minority is actively participating in Sufism. However, comparing data from 2005-2006 to the 2010 data there appears to be an increase in engagement with Sufism. The 2005-2006 survey found 0.6% of youth were Sufi disciples and 0.9% were members of zawias (Bekkaoui et al. 2011: 12). That is a 135% increase in participation in Sufi tariqahs between 2006 and 2010. These numbers do mean that while youth engagement in Sufism is limited, it is growing.

While actual participation in Sufi orders may be low, perceptions of Sufism are more positive within youth. Participants were asked if they agree with the state’s adoption of Sufism as a cornerstone of Moroccan Islam. In total 40.32% agreed, 32.06% disagreed, and 27.60% had no opinion on the decision (Bekkaoui et al. 2011: 14). Significantly more women than men agreed
with the decision, 50.11% of females versus 33.05% of males. This discrepancy is related to how
the political and social scene is dominated by men, but Sufism is an alternative where women
face less discrimination (Bekkaoui et al. 2011: 14). Significantly more youths positively
perceived the adoption of Sufism by the state than the percentage of youth who said they were
likely to join a tariqah. This tendency means that while participation is low, Sufism is not
necessarily viewed negatively. But when looking at these numbers the majority of participants
either disagreed or did not have an opinion on the state’s decision. The nearly 60% of respondents
who did not view the decision positively indicate that despite the state promotion of Sufism
support for it is still not mainstream.

The main value associated with Sufism by respondents was spirituality (77.60%) and then
renunciation of the material world (52.37%) (Bekkaoui et al. 2011: 14). 18.12% of respondents
associated Sufism with progress but 21.82% associated it backwardness. Again 13.28%
associated Sufism with modernity but 17.83% associated it with obscurantism (Bekkaoui et al.
2011: 15). Youths thought the elderly were the most likely to join Sufi tariqahs (56.45% of
respondents) (Bekkaoui et al. 2011: 16). These numbers indicate that despite the state’s efforts to
link Sufism to modernity, this opinion has not become popular. Most importantly though from
that data is that at least 30% of respondents had no opinion on how Sufism was related to the
concepts of modernity, progress, backwardness, or obscurantism (Bekkaoui et al. 2011: 15).
There is a significant lack youth opinions on Sufism shown by the 2010 survey. Just as many of
the people I attempted to survey responded they had no knowledge about Sufism, it appears at
many of the participants in the 2010 survey also did not know much about Sufism. The lack of
opinion on the topic of Sufism implies that it is insignificant in the lives of Moroccan youth.

The 2010 survey did show that Sufism is positively associated with the value of tolerance
and is linked to protecting youth from religious extremism. 40.79% of respondents agreed that
Sufism helps youth avoid joining extremist organizations and another 15.08% believed “more or less” that Sufism protected youth from extremism (Bekkaoui et al. 17). A majority of respondents (56.54%) associate Sufism with the value of tolerance (Bekkaoui et al. 17). These results signify that while only a small minority of youth participates in Sufism, it is viewed positively, especially in terms of its message countering religious extremism, by a majority of youth. These are favorable results for the state’s promotion of Sufism showing that indeed youth, like the state, view Sufism as an alternative to religious fanaticism.

**Analysis**

An exploration of both my data and the results from the 2010 survey show that youth participation in Sufi *tariqahs* remains low but state has been successful in promoting Sufism as an alternative to religious extremism. In my survey, one of eleven respondents (0.09%) was a member of a Sufi *tariqah*. In the 2010 survey 8.1% of participants were members of *tariqahs*. In both cases only a small minority was actively engaging with Sufism. But growth in participation has occurred as shown by the results from the 2006 national survey according to which .06% of youth were members of *tariqahs* to 8.1% of youth in 2010. Further, the 18.69% of youth who said they were likely to join a *tariqah* demonstrates the interest in Sufism is growing. The high percentage of 2010 respondents who had “no opinion” on many questions and my own experience with youths expressing that they knew nothing about Sufism, however, prove that Sufism remains outside of mainstream life.

The state has put on numerous concerts and festivals aimed combatting the stereotypes of Sufism being archaic and anachronistic (Bekkaoui and Larémont, 2011: 37). Further they have supported outreach by *tariqahs* on university campuses. Yet, youth engagement with *tariqahs* remains minimal, why? The research points to youth associating Sufism with outdated practices and traditions. A higher percentage of 2010 participants associated Sufism with backwardness
and obscurantism than with progress and modernity (Bekkaoui et al. 2011: 15). From my own observations when I discussed my research topic in relaxed conversations with youth I often received responses that Sufism is not important or that they didn’t know anything about Sufism. But in casual conversations with older generations I observed that nearly every individual had a story about a zawia, they may not have personally attended the zawia but it was a place of significance in their community.

Another important reason youth may not being joining tariqahs is because how Moroccans acquire religious knowledge has changed. In the past Islam was “transmitted by [to youth] by their parents, textbooks, or mosques” (Bekkaoui et al. 2011: 8). Going to the zawia was an important way of gaining religious knowledge and joining a tariqah was a means of both spiritual education and social membership. According to the 2006 national survey, religious knowledge is now primarily acquired though television. 68.60% of respondents thought that Middle Eastern television channels such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiyya were the most important sources of religious knowledge (Bekkaoui et al. 2011: 9). Religious institutions are no longer primary for spiritual education. Youth now “adhere to an individualized sense of Islam and derive their knowledge about faith more from media sources than from mosques” (Bekkaoui et al. 2011: 8). If youth are less inclined to join organized religion or practice Islam in a group setting, then it follows that engagement with tariqahs is low.

Despite low youth participation in tariqahs, Sufism is associated with the values of peace and tolerance. A majority of youth agrees Sufism can prevent youth from joining extremist organizations (Bekkaoui et al. 2011: 17). The state has promoted Sufism to counter violent extremism and youth agree that Sufism is an alternative to Salafism or other extreme ideologies. In my research participants expressed that Sufism was important to Islam in Morocco because it is a moderate force. One youth agreed that “Sufism with its philosophy of inner peace, social
harmony and oneness with God, is seen by many in Morocco as the ideal counterweight to such strict interpretations of Islam as Salafism, which have gained ground in the past few decades, as well as answering the country’s spiritual needs” (Bekkaoui and Larémont, 2011: 38). The 2010 survey result of 92.69% of youth identifying as Muslim shows that religion is a very important aspect of the lives of Moroccan youths. The worry for the state is that the growing religiosity of youth and concurrent interest in finding spiritual guidance will lead youth to join more extreme and politically involved religious ideologies. Promoting Sufism, even if youth remain minimally engaged, is important because it shows there is an alternative for spiritual involvement based on a tolerant and peaceful message.

**Conclusion**

The 2003 Casablanca bombings led the Moroccan state to adopt Sufism as an official cornerstone of Moroccan Islam. Sufism was promoted by appointing Ahmed Toufiq to Minister of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs, hosting festivals of Sufi culture, financially supporting zawias, and encouraging outreach by tariqahs on university campuses. Promoting Sufism was important for the state beyond just countering religious extremism, but as a means of counteracting the growing influence of Islamist parties and to generate stronger diplomatic connections with Western African nations that share Sufi history and traditions with Morocco.

The state’s promotion of Sufism has not led to significant growth of youth participating in tariqahs. Only a small minority of youth actively engages with tariqahs and the importance of Sufism to Islam in Morocco is contested. But in general, youth do view Sufism positively associating it with the values of spirituality and tolerance. Engagement with Sufism has grown slightly in the years since 2003 and more youth are expressing interest in joining tariqahs. With continued outreach on university campuses and through the media, the numbers of Sufi youths will probably continue to grow slowly. But Sufism is certainly not a critical aspect of the
religious lives of Moroccan youth currently and it is doubtful, especially because of the trend of youth being less inclined to join organized religion, that it will become significantly more influential in the future.

Despite these trends the state will likely continue to promote Sufism because it is serves its political interests. Sufism may function as an alternate to religious extremism; however, its promotion may also be dangerous, especially given how minimal the engagement with it is in reality. Promoting Sufism on the basis that it is a moderate, tolerant form of Islam plays in to the dichotomy between “good” and “bad” Muslims. These categorizations “rely not on sound judgments but, rather, on simple labels based on the way in which people practice their faith. Groups that are seen as more political and willing to challenge government policies are criticized…However, peaceful Muslims who are Westernized and minimize the role of their own faith, and take an impartial view of political affairs, are therefore viewed as good” (Muedini 2015). Sufism is promoted by the Moroccan state largely because it believed to not challenge the status quo, but to assume all Sufis are good and all political Islamist threatening is to make a dangerously large and ill-informed assumption. In promoting Sufism, the Moroccan state must be careful not to alienate other Islamic groups, which could leave these members more susceptible to radicalization.
## Appendix A – Butler-Dines Survey Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Education level</th>
<th>Do you know any tariqahs?</th>
<th>Is Sufism important in Morocco?</th>
<th>Do you participate?</th>
<th>Who promotes Sufism?</th>
<th>Is there such thing as “Moroccan Islam”?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Masters</td>
<td>Yes, tijania; Qadiriyyah Boutchichia</td>
<td>Yes, it is part of the Islamic identity like the golden age in the history of Morocco</td>
<td>No, I don’t have time</td>
<td>The government and state promote it as a response to the tendencies of a large part of youth</td>
<td>No: Islam is one but in Morocco there is Moroccan religiosity. Each country designates its religiosity but there is one Islam in reality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Masters</td>
<td>Yes, Tijania</td>
<td>Yes, it is important for its role in reviving spirituality in Morocco</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The zawias and civil organizations promote it</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Masters</td>
<td>Yes, Tijania; Qadiriyyah Boutchichia</td>
<td>Yes, because it is moderate Islam between extremes</td>
<td>Yes, it is the spiritual education I was looking for since I was younger</td>
<td>Ministry of endowments and Islamic affairs and the high scientific council</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>23 Masters</td>
<td>Yes: Qadiriyyah Boutchichia, Basri, Darqawa, Tijania</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No, I have not received an invitation from any tariqah.</td>
<td>The state encourages Sufism and advertises it</td>
<td>Yes, Islam in morocco is a mixture of Maliki madhab, Ash’ari doctrine, and Sufism. This is a mixture you can’t find except in Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>25 Masters</td>
<td>Yes:</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No, I am not</td>
<td>The ministry of</td>
<td>No, there is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Qadiriya Boutchichia, Darqawa, Tijania</strong></td>
<td>convinced on the validity of any of the tariqahs so I can’t commit to one endowments and Islamic affairs; ministry of commandment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>one islam with negligible differences. Differences are in the customs of people but all the same religion.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>F 30 High</strong></td>
<td>Yes: tijania, Boutchichia, No: I think Sufism served Islam at certain historical stages but in modern times it became a set of practices and rituals inconsistent with Islam and its values</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The state encourages Sufism and Sufi tariqahs in service of its political goals and to control religion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>G 25 Masters</strong></td>
<td>Yes: Qadiriyyah Boutchichia, Basri, Darqawa, Shadhiliyya, Tijania</td>
<td>Yes, it is one of the pillars and elements of Islam in addition to fiq (law) and aqida (doctrine). It represents the spirit of ethics and Islam in the spiritual life of Muslims.</td>
<td>No because I believe Sufism is a personal experience on how to understand the Qur’an and God and evoke meaning and values in ones like from knowing god</td>
<td>It is promoted by the government as an element of Islam like Maliki and aqida - No Islam is the same in Morocco, Egypt, Tunis, but you find the name “Moroccan Islam” in politics to mean a moderate Islam that is open to other religions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H 25 Masters</strong></td>
<td>Yes, Tijania</td>
<td>Yes, it is a moderate form of Islam</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The zawias No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I 22</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The ministry of Islamic affairs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>J Masters</strong></td>
<td>Yes, Qadiriya Boutchichia;</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>The state encourages Sufism No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B – Survey Questions in English

1) Do you know any Sufi orders? If yes what are their names?
2) Do you think Sufism is important to Islam in Morocco?
3) Have you ever joined a Sufi order? Why or Why not?
4) Who promotes Sufism in Moroccan society?
5) Do you think there is such thing as Moroccan Islam? Why or Why not?

Appendix C – Interview Guide

1) What do you know about Sufism?
2) Do you know any Sufi orders? –
   a. Where and when do you see practices of Sufism in Morocco?
   b. In your opinion are they popular?
   c. Are they viewed positively?
3) Do you think Sufism is important to Islam in Morocco?
4) What do you see as the values that Sufism promotes?
5) Have you ever joined a Sufi order? Why or Why not?
6) Do you think joining an order is a good/bad thing? Why or why not?
7) Do you think Morocco would be a better community with more or less Sufism? Why or Why not?
8) Who wants Sufism to be present in Moroccan society?
9) Do you have any examples of Sufism being promoted in Morocco?
10) What is the relevance of Sufism in a Muslim life?
11) Do you think there is such thing as Moroccan Islam?

Appendix D – Data from 2010 Bekkaoui, Larémont, and Rddad Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population 2010 in Morocco (pg.2)</th>
<th>33,483,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>50.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>49.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-14 years</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-24 years</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-30 years</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Backgrounds of respondents (pg.3)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>73.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>26.81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No education</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary School</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior High School</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>69.33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Moroccan Youth Self-Identification (pg. 4)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>92.69%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moroccan</td>
<td>90.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>62.71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amazigh</td>
<td>25.71%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Youth Sources for Acquiring Religious knowledge (pg. 8)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Television Channels</th>
<th>47.9%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Channels</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Eastern Religious Channels</td>
<td>68.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audio Cassettes</td>
<td>15.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet</td>
<td>3.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DVD/VCD</td>
<td>8.90%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Youth Membership (pg. 10)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political party</th>
<th>7.68%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious Organization</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sufi tariqah</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Number of youth Likely to join political, religious, Sufi organizations (pg. 11)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Likely or Very likely</th>
<th>Not likely or unlikely</th>
<th>Unlikely or very unlikely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political parties</td>
<td>23.90%</td>
<td>25.42%</td>
<td>34.53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious organizations</td>
<td>45.92%</td>
<td>23.90%</td>
<td>24.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sufi tariqah</td>
<td>18.69%</td>
<td>18.50%</td>
<td>44.68%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Respondents who visited zawias (pg. 12)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Rarely</th>
<th>Occasionally</th>
<th>Frequently</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>53.79%</td>
<td>23.52%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Youth Reaction to Moroccan State Adoption of Sufism (pg. 14)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Don’t Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>33.05%</td>
<td>37.35%</td>
<td>29.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>50.11%</td>
<td>33.85%</td>
<td>16.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40.32%</td>
<td>32.06%</td>
<td>27.60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Concepts Associated with Sufism (pg. 15, 17)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Associated (Yes)</th>
<th>More or Less</th>
<th>Unassociated (No)</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spirituality</td>
<td>77.60%</td>
<td>10.53%</td>
<td>10.43%</td>
<td>8.44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Backwardness</td>
<td>21.82%</td>
<td>11.95%</td>
<td>27.30%</td>
<td>38.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obscurantism</td>
<td>17.83%</td>
<td>11.19%</td>
<td>34.62%</td>
<td>36.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progress</td>
<td>18.12%</td>
<td>16.88%</td>
<td>35.19%</td>
<td>29.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modernity</td>
<td>13.28%</td>
<td>13.85%</td>
<td>39.27%</td>
<td>33.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helps youth avoid joining extremist groups</td>
<td>40.79%</td>
<td>15.08%</td>
<td>17.45%</td>
<td>26.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance</td>
<td>56.54%</td>
<td>13.28%</td>
<td>16.12%</td>
<td>9.48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>33.77%</td>
<td>14.80%</td>
<td>16.12%</td>
<td>35.29%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Works Cited


Butler-Dines 36

http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.georgetown.edu/docview/459009376?pq-origsite=summon


